From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=185.125.25.11 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1795013001; b=sK0NUpXx3M7Qb9Am5cxtg/DhSERmO5nUYbZIRbbZu5LtDEenk2n1Qlv5RS9Q3yjharhz qPXjvG8zs3CGnhGNOQuHJ3h5guZeAGukOeNosGdyz9nt5pWVZbVZI9I+RN8SSzr9OVahw ILe8k9xpNGTCCJ9S9XlQGFCaBhDe/+fFsVbLqL45GNvH82PJLePMOsC7ue2TruPCvF04c qN7fzU0XtGpVmI/lkFb1y9wHmDiL0/0IWo+7UyQCUYLp8w6BBNx0KXpSEMawFpNLE5xzH g0X64W7qZqL1AOFJWQQHfh8WQ+QITIdqiZ8yTme/9XZh67kfJ8rH0ZGkjD5N7IA8IZw== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1795013001; h=DMARC-Filter:Received:DKIM-Signature:Received:Date:From:To:Cc: Subject:Message-ID:References:MIME-Version:Content-Type: Content-Disposition:Content-Transfer-Encoding:In-Reply-To: X-Infomaniak-Routing; bh=M6QIKb9uK+rYlKgFv0M8IDY5COdkGlTIaO9ytGUAZX0=; b=Z0cqbTJEl+foSh5MMaoJMwsIxruRuNcp1FNOQ2PCjjplKGop5feSvgY+hxsLmthJeB0X 2WcHNnnfwyScvgzB/ZqiOqfrbMneqXtnDSqAh3Xk7x+7HZ2zGJIDQUp3RgIolAUcCwOCH lYvlQCVLjc5OUrCKTeIN0558ze6oMMgx4KA84hV2S8rtf62g1HplW1qAnYo9I/4/LN18v ETcY51jXGy832/79Mhcc8pq6tjVfJ9YgCSHSYuK1yv+umltVKYrnYSMwYi4c7J123WqIV VBnKUsX26Uc3JGK3qkgnSgaDiIIMu3i2TsQuQuVkaiE2XiFyIenicV7ReC8TWbeF6aQ== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=none header.from=digikod.net; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=digikod.net; dkim=pass header.d=digikod.net header.i=@digikod.net header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=20191114 header.b=FgUMxLDk; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=185.125.25.11 Received: from smtp-190b.mail.infomaniak.ch (smtp-190b.mail.infomaniak.ch [185.125.25.11]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BF25A606A32C for ; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 14:43:18 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.4.2 smtp.subspace.kernel.org BF25A606A32C Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=digikod.net Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=digikod.net Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=digikod.net header.i=@digikod.net header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=20191114 header.b=FgUMxLDk Received: from smtp-3-0001.mail.infomaniak.ch (smtp-3-0001.mail.infomaniak.ch [10.4.36.108]) by smtp-4-3000.mail.infomaniak.ch (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4jV48b1XfvzmKT; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 15:43:11 +0100 (CET) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=digikod.net; s=20191114; t=1795012990; bh=M6QIKb9uK+rYlKgFv0M8IDY5COdkGlTIaO9ytGUAZX0=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=FgUMxLDkPqSmwZ6EcBTblOHEUd3cgQPaQjH7r9+HN4HyCZJeS3aKGBU7y63C5PQm4 oahgWtSJtuYQnKjYsDzintXkET56emKP/Mku2uupkeQGot2oHw2ebluUA1miq883PB QdiuiYDN13+67tWQ3e8v1w4PYHRkbyYyag7nc3PM= Received: from unknown by smtp-3-0001.mail.infomaniak.ch (Postfix) with ESMTPA id 4jV48V68V3zPlr; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 15:43:06 +0100 (CET) Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 15:43:03 +0100 From: =?utf-8?Q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= To: "Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson" Cc: Christian Brauner , Alexander Viro , Paul Moore , Serge Hallyn , Kees Cook , "David S . Miller" , Eric Dumazet , Jakub Kicinski , Paolo Abeni , Jan Kara , James Morris , Simon Horman , Jonathan Corbet , Shuah Khan , Randy Dunlap , Jann Horn , =?utf-8?Q?G=C3=BCnther?= Noack , KP Singh , Jonathan Calmels , Casey Schaufler , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, containers@lists.linux.dev, netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/8] userns: per-namespace capability bounding set and opt-in netns loopback Message-ID: <20261118.faiBee9Taigh@digikod.net> References: <20261028221705.3915340-1-halg@google.com> <20261107.aighieG4Ami1@digikod.net> X-Mailing-List: linux-api@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: <20261107.aighieG4Ami1@digikod.net> X-Infomaniak-Routing: alpha Hallgrimur, could you please explain why your use case would not work with Landlock? The capability split or new clone flags would be complementary of course. On Sat, Nov 07, 2026 at 01:43:53PM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote: > Hi, > > I think this is mostly solved with Landlock (kernel v7.4), see > https://docs.kernel.org/userspace-api/landlock.html#capability-and-namespace-restrictions > and > https://lore.kernel.org/all/20261014082718.1435842-1-mic@digikod.net/ > > This approach is agnostic to UID, cgroups, or other ways to identify > processes, so it should fit any use case. > > What is missing is a split of capabilities (e.g. CAP_NET_ADMIN) that > makes sense from a security and (user) namespace point of view. > > Regards, > Mickaël > > On Wed, Oct 28, 2026 at 10:16:57PM +0000, Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson wrote: > > When an unprivileged process creates a new user namespace, it is granted > > a full set of capabilities (CAP_FULL_SET) scoped to that namespace. > > While these capabilities are isolated to the namespace, they allow > > unprivileged local users to reach deep kernel subsystems (most notably > > networking configuration and raw sockets via CAP_NET_ADMIN and > > CAP_NET_RAW) that historically assumed a trusted caller and have > > accounted for a large share of local privilege escalation > > vulnerabilities. > > > > Many workloads and sandboxes use unprivileged user namespaces strictly > > for basic UID/GID, mount, PID, or network isolation and never need > > high-risk capabilities like CAP_NET_ADMIN or CAP_NET_RAW. Likewise, > > system administrators often want a host-wide policy ceiling restricting > > which capabilities unprivileged user namespaces may acquire, without > > disabling unprivileged user namespaces altogether. > > > > Prior work by Jonathan Calmels [1] proposed addressing this via a sixth > > per-thread capability set (cap_userns) alongside a global sysctl mask. > > During that discussion [1, 2], feedback (e.g. from Casey Schaufler) > > suggested that rather than adding another per-thread capability set and > > prctl() interface, capability restrictions could be integrated directly > > into struct user_namespace and configured via clone3(). At the same > > time, as noted in [1], a clone3() flag alone is not sufficient for > > administrators who need to enforce a host-wide ceiling on unprivileged > > user namespaces without modifying every userspace callsite. > > > > This series combines both pieces of feedback: it embeds a capability > > bounding set (cap_bset) directly into struct user_namespace, reusing > > the existing task cap_bset, cap_permitted, and cap_effective sets on > > namespace entry, and provides both a system-wide sysctl ceiling for > > unprivileged user namespaces and a CLONE_NEWUSER_BSET flag for > > voluntary per-namespace restriction via clone3(). > > > > In addition, because restricting CAP_NET_ADMIN at user namespace > > creation time prevents userspace from bringing up the loopback > > interface in new network namespaces, the series first introduces > > an opt-in flag to automatically enable loopback on network namespace > > creation: > > > > 1. Opt-in loopback activation on netns creation (Patch 1) > > > > New network namespaces start with the loopback interface (lo) DOWN by > > default, requiring CAP_NET_ADMIN over the owning user namespace to > > bring it up. To block external network access while preserving > > localhost networking, sandboxes commonly create an isolated network > > namespace with only the loopback interface enabled. > > > > However, requiring a sandbox to hold CAP_NET_ADMIN in a new user > > namespace solely to bring loopback up conflicts with reducing the > > CAP_NET_ADMIN attack surface. Today, an unprivileged sandbox must > > start with CAP_NET_ADMIN to bring loopback up, drop it, and then > > block CAP_NET_ADMIN from being regained in nested user namespaces > > (e.g. via seccomp or max_user_namespaces limits). Conversely, when > > CAP_NET_ADMIN is restricted at user namespace creation time (via the > > sysctl ceiling or CLONE_NEWUSER_BSET introduced in Patches 2-3, or > > via LSMs such as Landlock), tasks inside the new namespace never > > acquire CAP_NET_ADMIN and cannot bring loopback up from userspace, > > breaking localhost networking for unprivileged sandboxes. > > > > Introduce the CLONE_NEWNET_LOOPBACK flag for clone3() and the > > corresponding UNSHARE_NEWNET_LOOPBACK flag for unshare(), which imply > > CLONE_NEWNET and automatically bring the loopback device up in > > copy_net_ns() before returning the new network namespace. Making this > > an explicit opt-in preserves default network namespace semantics > > while allowing unprivileged sandboxes to create an isolated network > > namespace with functional localhost networking without ever holding > > CAP_NET_ADMIN. > > > > 2. Per-user-namespace capability bounding set & sysctl ceiling (Patch 2) > > > > Add cap_bset to struct user_namespace (initialized to CAP_FULL_SET in > > init_user_ns) and introduce a system-wide sysctl ceiling for > > unprivileged users at: > > /proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_userns_caps_allowed > > (defaulting to CAP_FULL_SET). > > > > When a new user namespace is created: > > - Privileged creators (holding CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the parent user > > namespace) inherit cap_bset from the parent user namespace. > > - Unprivileged creators (lacking CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the parent user > > namespace) have the child namespace's bounding set constrained by > > the sysctl ceiling combined with any effective capabilities the > > creator already holds in the parent namespace: > > child_bset = parent_bset & (sysctl_ceiling | creator_effective) > > Allowing the creator to retain capabilities it already holds in the > > parent namespace ensures that a process granted a specific > > capability (e.g. CAP_NET_ADMIN) does not lose it when creating a > > nested user namespace. > > > > When a task enters a user namespace via clone()/unshare() or > > setns(), its cap_bset, cap_permitted, and cap_effective sets are > > clamped to user_ns->cap_bset. In addition, cap_capable_helper() is > > updated so that implicit capabilities granted to the parent-namespace > > owner of a user namespace are likewise bounded by the owned > > namespace's cap_bset. > > > > 3. Per-namespace restriction via clone3() (Patch 3) > > > > Introduce CLONE_NEWUSER_BSET and add cap_bset to struct clone_args. > > When specified alongside CLONE_NEWUSER, the new user namespace's > > bounding set is further intersected with the requested cap_bset mask, > > allowing container runtimes and sandboxes to drop unneeded capabilities > > from a user namespace at creation time even when permitted by the > > global sysctl. > > > > 4. Introspection via NS_USER_GET_INFO (Patch 4) > > > > While tasks inside a user namespace see their initial ceiling in > > /proc//status (CapBnd), threads may subsequently drop > > individual capabilities from their per-thread bounding set. Add > > an extensible NS_USER_GET_INFO ioctl on userns file descriptors > > to allow userspace to directly query a user namespace's cap_bset. > > > > 5. Selftests (Patches 5-8) > > > > Add kselftest suites covering CLONE_NEWNET_LOOPBACK, the sysctl > > ceiling, creator capability retention, nested monotonicity, > > parent-owner bounding, CLONE_NEWUSER_BSET and NS_USER_GET_INFO. > > > > [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240609104355.442002-1-jcalmels@3xx0.net/ > > [2] https://lwn.net/Articles/978846/ > > > > Note on tree routing: > > > > While Patch 1 (CLONE_NEWNET_LOOPBACK) touches net/core/net_namespace.c, > > most of its changes add clone3()/unshare() flag plumbing in > > include/uapi/linux/sched.h, kernel/fork.c, and kernel/nsproxy.c, which > > Patch 3 (CLONE_NEWUSER_BSET) builds directly on top of. To avoid > > merge conflicts in kernel/fork.c and include/uapi/linux/sched.h, it > > may be simplest to route the entire series through a single tree, e.g. > > a namespace branch in vfs.git with Acked-by from the netdev and > > capabilities/credentials maintainers, or whichever tree the maintainers > > prefer. > > > > Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson (8): > > net: introduce CLONE_NEWNET_LOOPBACK to auto-enable loopback > > userns: introduce capability bounding set for user namespaces > > userns: allow restricting capability bounding set via clone3() > > nsfs: add NS_USER_GET_INFO ioctl to inspect user namespace > > capabilities > > selftests/net: add test suite for CLONE_NEWNET_LOOPBACK > > selftests/capabilities: tests for user namespace capability bounding > > set > > selftests/capabilities: add clone3() tests for CLONE_NEWUSER_BSET > > selftests/nsfs: add tests for NS_USER_GET_INFO ioctl > > > > Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst | 37 ++ > > fs/nsfs.c | 29 + > > include/linux/cred.h | 3 +- > > include/linux/sched/task.h | 1 + > > include/linux/user_namespace.h | 20 +- > > include/uapi/linux/nsfs.h | 17 + > > include/uapi/linux/sched.h | 9 + > > kernel/cred.c | 10 +- > > kernel/fork.c | 38 +- > > kernel/nsproxy.c | 9 + > > kernel/user.c | 1 + > > kernel/user_namespace.c | 100 +++- > > net/core/net_namespace.c | 11 + > > security/commoncap.c | 8 +- > > .../testing/selftests/capabilities/.gitignore | 1 + > > tools/testing/selftests/capabilities/Makefile | 2 +- > > .../capabilities/userns_bounding_set_test.c | 566 ++++++++++++++++++ > > .../selftests/clone3/clone3_selftests.h | 1 + > > .../selftests/filesystems/nsfs/.gitignore | 1 + > > .../selftests/filesystems/nsfs/Makefile | 4 +- > > .../selftests/filesystems/nsfs/userns.c | 120 ++++ > > tools/testing/selftests/net/.gitignore | 1 + > > tools/testing/selftests/net/Makefile | 1 + > > tools/testing/selftests/net/loopback_netns.c | 103 ++++ > > 24 files changed, 1069 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) > > create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/capabilities/userns_bounding_set_test.c > > create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/filesystems/nsfs/userns.c > > create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/net/loopback_netns.c > > > > > > base-commit: cee9395acd8043be0644b25c34bfa86623f2b935 > > -- > > 2.56.0.313.g2479322e68-goog > > > >