From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
bpf@vger.kernel.org, containers@lists.linux.dev,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Aleksa Sarai <aleksa@amutable.com>,
Alexander Mikhalitsyn <alex@amutable.com>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
Giuseppe Scrivano <giuseppe@scrivano.org>,
Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>, Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>,
Neal Gompa <neal@gompa.dev>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>,
Serge Hallyn <sergeh@kernel.org>,
Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
Zygmunt Krynicki <zygmunt.krynicki@canonical.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v7 07/26] mount: Support MOVE_MOUNT_CLONE with MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS
Date: Sun, 22 Nov 2026 21:35:20 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261122193539.3334213-8-jarkko@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261122193539.3334213-1-jarkko@kernel.org>
Unprivileged container managers cannot use open_tree(OPEN_TREE_CLONE) in
the host mount namespace because it requires may_mount() against the
caller's current mount namespace rather than the destination namespace.
Add MOVE_MOUNT_CLONE for use with MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS so move_mount() can
recursively loopback-clone a path from the caller's mount namespace
directly into the target mount namespace file descriptor. Authorize the
operation against CAP_SYS_ADMIN in target_mnt_ns->user_ns, apply
CL_SLAVE | CL_COPY_UNBINDABLE when crossing user namespace boundaries,
and lock cross-user-namespace cloned subtrees with MNT_LOCKED inside
attach_recursive_mnt().
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
---
fs/namespace.c | 91 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
include/uapi/linux/mount.h | 3 +-
2 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index 93dd11da7e73..b2c89ad2393e 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -2573,6 +2573,7 @@ enum mnt_tree_flags_t {
MNT_TREE_PROPAGATION = BIT(1),
MNT_TREE_MNTNS = BIT(2),
MNT_TREE_MNTNS_INIT = BIT(3),
+ MNT_TREE_CLONE = BIT(4),
};
/**
@@ -3805,31 +3806,28 @@ static int do_move_mount(const struct path *old_path,
{
struct mount *old = real_mount(old_path->mnt);
struct user_namespace *src_user_ns = NULL;
+ struct mount *cloned = NULL;
struct mnt_namespace *dest_mnt_ns;
int err;
bool beneath = flags & MNT_TREE_BENEATH;
- if (!path_mounted(old_path))
+ if (!(flags & MNT_TREE_CLONE) && !path_mounted(old_path))
return -EINVAL;
if (d_is_dir(new_path->dentry) != d_is_dir(old_path->dentry))
return -EINVAL;
+ if ((flags & MNT_TREE_CLONE) &&
+ mnt_ns_loop_target(old_path->dentry, target_mnt_ns))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
LOCK_MOUNT_MAYBE_BENEATH(mp, new_path, beneath);
if (IS_ERR(mp.parent))
return PTR_ERR(mp.parent);
if (flags & MNT_TREE_MNTNS) {
- u64 seq;
-
- if (!anon_ns_root(old) || old->mnt_ns == mp.parent->mnt_ns ||
- mp.parent->mnt_ns != target_mnt_ns)
- return -EINVAL;
- seq = old->mnt_ns->seq_origin;
- if (seq && seq != target_mnt_ns->ns.ns_id &&
- seq != current->nsproxy->mnt_ns->ns.ns_id)
+ if (mp.parent->mnt_ns != target_mnt_ns)
return -EINVAL;
- src_user_ns = old->mnt_ns->user_ns;
if (flags & MNT_TREE_MNTNS_INIT) {
if (mp.parent != target_mnt_ns->root)
return -EBUSY;
@@ -3842,6 +3840,36 @@ static int do_move_mount(const struct path *old_path,
if (m == target_mnt_ns->root)
return beneath ? -EINVAL : -EBUSY;
}
+ if (flags & MNT_TREE_CLONE) {
+ unsigned int copy_flags;
+
+ if (!check_mnt(old) || old->mnt_ns == target_mnt_ns ||
+ (old->mnt.mnt_sb->s_flags & SB_NOUSER))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ src_user_ns = old->mnt_ns->user_ns;
+ copy_flags = (target_mnt_ns->user_ns != src_user_ns) ?
+ (CL_SLAVE | CL_COPY_UNBINDABLE) :
+ CL_COPY_MNT_NS_FILE;
+ cloned = __do_loopback(old_path, true, copy_flags);
+ if (IS_ERR(cloned))
+ return PTR_ERR(cloned);
+ old = cloned;
+ if (d_is_symlink(old->mnt.mnt_root)) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_cloned;
+ }
+ } else {
+ u64 seq;
+
+ if (!anon_ns_root(old) ||
+ old->mnt_ns == mp.parent->mnt_ns)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ seq = old->mnt_ns->seq_origin;
+ if (seq && seq != target_mnt_ns->ns.ns_id &&
+ seq != current->nsproxy->mnt_ns->ns.ns_id)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ src_user_ns = old->mnt_ns->user_ns;
+ }
} else if (check_mnt(old)) {
/* if the source is in our namespace... */
/* ... it should be detachable from parent */
@@ -3881,23 +3909,36 @@ static int do_move_mount(const struct path *old_path,
over = mp.parent->overmount;
err = can_move_mount_beneath(old, over, &mp);
if (err)
- return err;
+ goto out_cloned;
}
/*
* Don't move a mount tree containing unbindable mounts to a destination
* mount which is shared.
*/
- if (IS_MNT_SHARED(mp.parent) && tree_contains_unbindable(old))
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (IS_MNT_SHARED(mp.parent) && tree_contains_unbindable(old)) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_cloned;
+ }
dest_mnt_ns = is_anon_ns(mp.parent->mnt_ns) ?
current->nsproxy->mnt_ns : mp.parent->mnt_ns;
- if (!check_for_nsfs_mounts(old, dest_mnt_ns))
- return -ELOOP;
- if (mount_is_ancestor(old, mp.parent))
- return -ELOOP;
+ if (!check_for_nsfs_mounts(old, dest_mnt_ns)) {
+ err = -ELOOP;
+ goto out_cloned;
+ }
+ if (mount_is_ancestor(old, mp.parent)) {
+ err = -ELOOP;
+ goto out_cloned;
+ }
- return attach_recursive_mnt(old, &mp, src_user_ns);
+ err = attach_recursive_mnt(old, &mp, src_user_ns);
+out_cloned:
+ if (err && cloned) {
+ lock_mount_hash();
+ umount_tree(cloned, UMOUNT_SYNC);
+ unlock_mount_hash();
+ }
+ return err;
}
static int do_move_mount_old(const struct path *path, const char *old_name)
@@ -4823,8 +4864,8 @@ static int lookup_move_mount_from(int from_dfd,
/**
* DOC: MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS
*
- * ``MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS`` installs detached anonymous mount trees into a target
- * mount namespace ``nsfs`` file descriptor supplied as ``to_dfd``:
+ * ``MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS`` installs mount trees into a target mount namespace
+ * ``nsfs`` file descriptor supplied as ``to_dfd``:
*
* 1. ``to_pathname`` of ``"/"`` attaches the initial root mount onto the
* ``nullfs`` root of an empty mount namespace at most once.
@@ -4832,6 +4873,11 @@ static int lookup_move_mount_from(int from_dfd,
* 2. Relative ``to_pathname`` values resolve beneath the live root of the
* target mount namespace.
*
+ * 3. Combining ``MOVE_MOUNT_CLONE`` with ``MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS`` recursively
+ * loopback-clones ``from_pathname`` from the caller's mount namespace into
+ * ``to_dfd`` without requiring ``OPEN_TREE_CLONE`` or ``may_mount()`` in
+ * the caller's own mount namespace.
+ *
* Capability is checked against ``CAP_SYS_ADMIN`` in the target mount
* namespace's owning user namespace, and source trees crossing user namespace
* boundaries are locked with ``MNT_LOCKED`` and locked mount flags.
@@ -4933,12 +4979,17 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(move_mount,
if (flags & ~MOVE_MOUNT__MASK)
return -EINVAL;
+ if ((flags & MOVE_MOUNT_CLONE) && !(flags & MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
if ((flags & (MOVE_MOUNT_BENEATH | MOVE_MOUNT_SET_GROUP)) ==
(MOVE_MOUNT_BENEATH | MOVE_MOUNT_SET_GROUP))
return -EINVAL;
if (flags & MOVE_MOUNT_SET_GROUP) mflags |= MNT_TREE_PROPAGATION;
if (flags & MOVE_MOUNT_BENEATH) mflags |= MNT_TREE_BENEATH;
+ if (flags & MOVE_MOUNT_CLONE)
+ mflags |= MNT_TREE_CLONE;
if (unlikely(flags & MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS)) {
if (flags & (MOVE_MOUNT_T_EMPTY_PATH | MOVE_MOUNT_SET_GROUP))
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/mount.h b/include/uapi/linux/mount.h
index 7d413418426a..cb4f7175db02 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/mount.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/mount.h
@@ -78,7 +78,8 @@
#define MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS 0x00000080 /* Resolve to_dfd as mntns fd */
#define MOVE_MOUNT_SET_GROUP 0x00000100 /* Set sharing group instead */
#define MOVE_MOUNT_BENEATH 0x00000200 /* Mount beneath top mount */
-#define MOVE_MOUNT__MASK 0x000003f7
+#define MOVE_MOUNT_CLONE 0x00000400 /* Recursively clone from path */
+#define MOVE_MOUNT__MASK 0x000007f7
/*
* fsopen() flags.
--
2.47.3
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-22 19:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-22 19:35 [RFC PATCH v7 00/26] userland: Userland containers Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 01/26] userns: Factor out idmap validation and commit helpers Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 02/26] userns: Add userns_set_idmap() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 03/26] arch: Wire up " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 04/26] mount: Add mnt_ns_get_root() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 05/26] mount: Enforce mount_too_revealing() for foreign mntns Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 06/26] mount: Support MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS in move_mount() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 08/26] userns: Factor out install_user_ns_cred() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 09/26] nsproxy: Expose create_new_namespaces() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 10/26] userland: Add core infrastructure Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 11/26] userland: Track init lifecycle via copy_process() and pid_namespace Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 20:09 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 12/26] userland: Add userland_open() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 13/26] userland: Add USERLAND_GET_NSFD ioctl Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 14/26] userland: Add USERLAND_SHARE_NSFD ioctl Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 15/26] exit: Support P_USERLAND in waitid() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 16/26] signal: Support userland fds in pidfd_send_signal() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 17/26] fork: Support CLONE_INTO_USERLAND in clone3() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 18/26] fs: Support FSCONFIG_SET_USERLAND in fsconfig() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 19/26] proc: Implement ->set_userland() fs_context operation Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 20/26] ipc/mqueue: " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 21/26] security: Add userland LSM hooks Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 22/26] bpf: Register " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 23/26] arch: Wire up userland_open() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 24/26] docs: Document userland uAPI Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 20:09 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 25/26] selftests/userland: Add userland test suite Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 26/26] MAINTAINERS: Add entry for USERLAND Jarkko Sakkinen
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