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From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
To: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromiun.org>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	Peter Zijlstra <pet>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 13/27] mm: Handle shadow stack page fault
Date: Tue, 10 Jul 2018 16:06:25 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2f3ff321-c629-3e00-59f6-8bca510650d4@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180710222639.8241-14-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>

On 07/10/2018 03:26 PM, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> +	if (is_shstk_mapping(vma->vm_flags))
> +		entry = pte_mkdirty_shstk(entry);
> +	else
> +		entry = pte_mkdirty(entry);
> +
> +	entry = maybe_mkwrite(entry, vma);
>  	if (ptep_set_access_flags(vma, vmf->address, vmf->pte, entry, 1))
>  		update_mmu_cache(vma, vmf->address, vmf->pte);
>  	pte_unmap_unlock(vmf->pte, vmf->ptl);
> @@ -2526,7 +2532,11 @@ static int wp_page_copy(struct vm_fault *vmf)
>  		}
>  		flush_cache_page(vma, vmf->address, pte_pfn(vmf->orig_pte));
>  		entry = mk_pte(new_page, vma->vm_page_prot);
> -		entry = maybe_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(entry), vma);
> +		if (is_shstk_mapping(vma->vm_flags))
> +			entry = pte_mkdirty_shstk(entry);
> +		else
> +			entry = pte_mkdirty(entry);
> +		entry = maybe_mkwrite(entry, vma);

Do we want to lift this hunk of code and put it elsewhere?  Maybe:

	entry = pte_set_vma_features(entry, vma);

and then:

pte_t pte_set_vma_features(pte_t entry, struct vm_area_struct)
{
		/*
		 * Shadow stack PTEs are always dirty and always
		 * writable.  They have a different encoding for
		 * this than normal PTEs, though.
		 */
		if (is_shstk_mapping(vma->vm_flags))
			entry = pte_mkdirty_shstk(entry);
		else
			entry = pte_mkdirty(entry);

		entry = maybe_mkwrite(entry, vma);

	return entry;
}

>  		/*
>  		 * Clear the pte entry and flush it first, before updating the
>  		 * pte with the new entry. This will avoid a race condition
> @@ -3201,6 +3211,14 @@ static int do_anonymous_page(struct vm_fault *vmf)
>  	mem_cgroup_commit_charge(page, memcg, false, false);
>  	lru_cache_add_active_or_unevictable(page, vma);
>  setpte:
> +	/*
> +	 * If this is within a shadow stack mapping, mark
> +	 * the PTE dirty.  We don't use pte_mkdirty(),
> +	 * because the PTE must have _PAGE_DIRTY_HW set.
> +	 */
> +	if (is_shstk_mapping(vma->vm_flags))
> +		entry = pte_mkdirty_shstk(entry);
> +
>  	set_pte_at(vma->vm_mm, vmf->address, vmf->pte, entry);

I'm not sure this is the right spot to do this.

The other code does pte_mkdirty_shstk() near where we do the
pte_mkwrite().  Why not here?  I think you might have picked this
because it's a common path used by both allocated pages and zero pages.
But, we can't have the zero pages in shadow stack areas since they can't
be read-only.  I think you need to move this up.  Can you even
consolidate it with the other two pte_mkdirt_shstk() call sites?

>  	/* No need to invalidate - it was non-present before */
> @@ -3983,6 +4001,14 @@ static int handle_pte_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
>  	entry = vmf->orig_pte;
>  	if (unlikely(!pte_same(*vmf->pte, entry)))
>  		goto unlock;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Shadow stack PTEs are copy-on-access, so do_wp_page()
> +	 * handling on them no matter if we have write fault or not.
> +	 */

I'd say this differently:

	Shadow stack PTEs can not be read-only and because of that can
	not have traditional copy-on-write semantics.  This essentially
	performs a copy-on-write operation, but on *any* access, not
	just actual writes.

  reply	other threads:[~2018-07-10 23:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 123+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-07-10 22:26 [RFC PATCH v2 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/27] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUIDs for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Change some names to separate XSAVES system and user states Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Enable XSAVES system states Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/27] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11  8:27   ` Pavel Machek
2018-07-11 15:25     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11  9:57   ` Florian Weimer
2018-07-11 13:47     ` H.J. Lu
2018-07-11 14:53       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/27] x86/cet: Control protection exception handler Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/27] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11  8:34   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 16:15     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/27] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/27] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11  8:45   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11  9:21   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/27] x86/mm: Modify ptep_set_wrprotect and pmdp_set_wrprotect for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:44   ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-10 23:23     ` Nadav Amit
2018-07-10 23:52       ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11  8:48     ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/27] x86/mm: Shadow stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:52   ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 17:28     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 23:24   ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 13/27] mm: Handle shadow stack page fault Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 23:06   ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2018-07-11  9:06     ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-08-14 21:28       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 14/27] mm: Handle THP/HugeTLB " Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 23:08   ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11  9:10   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 16:11     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-20 14:20   ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-20 14:58     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 15/27] mm/mprotect: Prevent mprotect from changing shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 23:10   ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11  9:12     ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 16:07       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 16:22         ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 16/27] mm: Modify can_follow_write_pte/pmd for " Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 23:37   ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 17:05     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-13 18:26       ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-17 23:03         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-17 23:11           ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-17 23:15           ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-18 20:14             ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-18 21:45               ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-18 23:10                 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-19  0:06                   ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-19 17:06                     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-19 19:31                       ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11  9:29   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-17 23:00     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 17/27] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 23:40   ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11  9:34   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 15:45     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11  9:36   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 21:10   ` Jann Horn
2018-07-11 21:34     ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-07-11 21:51       ` Jann Horn
2018-07-11 22:21         ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-07-13 18:03           ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 18/27] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 23:48   ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-12 22:59     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-12 23:49       ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13  1:50         ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13  2:21           ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-07-13  4:16             ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13  4:18               ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13 17:39                 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-13  5:55               ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-07-11  9:44   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 15:06     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 15:30       ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11  9:45   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 14:58     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 15:27       ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 15:41         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-13 12:12   ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13 17:37     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 19/27] x86/cet/shstk: Signal handling for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 20/27] x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing of CET Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 11:12   ` Florian Weimer
2018-07-11 19:37   ` Jann Horn
2018-07-11 20:53     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 21/27] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 22/27] x86/cet/ibt: User-mode indirect branch tracking support Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11  0:11   ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 22:10     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 22:40       ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 23:00         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 23:16           ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13 17:56             ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-13 18:05               ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 21:07   ` Jann Horn
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 23/27] mm/mmap: Add IBT bitmap size to address space limit check Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 23:57   ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 16:56     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 24/27] x86: Insert endbr32/endbr64 to vDSO Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 25/27] x86/cet: Add PTRACE interface for CET Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 10:20   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-07-11 15:40     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-12 14:03       ` Ingo Molnar
2018-07-12 22:37         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-12 23:08           ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-07-13 16:07             ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-13  6:28         ` Pavel Machek
2018-07-13 13:33           ` Ingo Molnar
2018-07-14  6:27             ` Pavel Machek
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 26/27] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 27/27] x86/cet: Add arch_prctl functions for CET Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 12:19   ` Florian Weimer
2018-07-11 21:02     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 19:45   ` Jann Horn
2018-07-11 20:55     ` Yu-cheng Yu

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