From mboxrd@z Thu Jan  1 00:00:00 1970
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V40 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode
Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2019 17:32:58 +0100
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References: <20190820001805.241928-24-matthewgarrett@google.com> <20190820001805.241928-1-matthewgarrett@google.com>
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To: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, jmorris@namei.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, netdev@vger.kernel.org, Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@suse.com>, Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
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Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com> wrote:

> From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> 
> bpf_read() and bpf_read_str() could potentially be abused to (eg) allow
> private keys in kernel memory to be leaked. Disable them if the kernel
> has been locked down in confidentiality mode.
> 
> Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
> cc: Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@suse.com>
> cc: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>