From: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
To: "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
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Cc: "Yu, Yu-cheng" <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 18/39] mm: Handle faultless write upgrades for shstk
Date: Wed, 25 Jan 2023 10:27:04 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4d224020-f26f-60a4-c7ab-721a024c7a6d@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <8c3820ae1448de4baffe7c476b4b5d9ba0a309ff.camel@intel.com>
On 24.01.23 19:14, Edgecombe, Rick P wrote:
> On Tue, 2023-01-24 at 17:24 +0100, David Hildenbrand wrote:
>> On 23.01.23 21:47, Edgecombe, Rick P wrote:
>>> On Mon, 2023-01-23 at 10:50 +0100, David Hildenbrand wrote:
>>>> On 19.01.23 22:22, Rick Edgecombe wrote:
>>>>> The x86 Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) feature
>>>>> includes
>>>>> a new
>>>>> type of memory called shadow stack. This shadow stack memory
>>>>> has
>>>>> some
>>>>> unusual properties, which requires some core mm changes to
>>>>> function
>>>>> properly.
>>>>>
>>>>> Since shadow stack memory can be changed from userspace, is
>>>>> both
>>>>> VM_SHADOW_STACK and VM_WRITE. But it should not be made
>>>>> conventionally
>>>>> writable (i.e. pte_mkwrite()). So some code that calls
>>>>> pte_mkwrite() needs
>>>>> to be adjusted.
>>>>>
>>>>> One such case is when memory is made writable without an actual
>>>>> write
>>>>> fault. This happens in some mprotect operations, and also
>>>>> prot_numa
>>>>> faults.
>>>>> In both cases code checks whether it should be made
>>>>> (conventionally)
>>>>> writable by calling vma_wants_manual_pte_write_upgrade().
>>>>>
>>>>> One way to fix this would be have code actually check if memory
>>>>> is
>>>>> also
>>>>> VM_SHADOW_STACK and in that case call pte_mkwrite_shstk(). But
>>>>> since
>>>>> most memory won't be shadow stack, just have simpler logic and
>>>>> skip
>>>>> this
>>>>> optimization by changing vma_wants_manual_pte_write_upgrade()
>>>>> to
>>>>> not
>>>>> return true for VM_SHADOW_STACK_MEMORY. This will simply handle
>>>>> all
>>>>> cases of this type.
>>>>>
>>>>> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
>>>>> Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
>>>>> Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
>>>>> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
>>>>> Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <
>>>>> kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
>>>>> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
>>>>> ---
>>>>
>>>> Instead of having these x86-shadow stack details all over the MM
>>>> space,
>>>> was the option explored to handle this more in arch specific
>>>> code?
>>>>
>>>> IIUC, one way to get it working would be
>>>>
>>>> 1) Have a SW "shadowstack" PTE flag.
>>>> 2) Have an "SW-dirty" PTE flag, to store "dirty=1" when
>>>> "write=0".
>>>
>>> I don't think that idea came up. So vma->vm_page_prot would have
>>> the SW
>>> shadow stack flag for VM_SHADOW_STACK, and pte_mkwrite() could do
>>> Write=0,Dirty=1 part. It seems like it should work.
>>>
>>
>> Right, if we include it in vma->vm_page_prot, we'd immediately let
>> mk_pte() just handle that.
>>
>> Otherwise, we'd have to refactor e.g., mk_pte() to consume a vma
>> instead
>> of the vma->vm_page_prot. Let's see if we can avoid that for now.
>>
>>>>
>>>> pte_mkwrite(), pte_write(), pte_dirty ... can then make decisions
>>>> based
>>>> on the "shadowstack" PTE flag and hide all these details from
>>>> core-
>>>> mm.
>>>>
>>>> When mapping a shadowstack page (new page, migration, swapin,
>>>> ...),
>>>> which can be obtained by looking at the VMA flags, the first
>>>> thing
>>>> you'd
>>>> do is set the "shadowstack" PTE flag.
>>>
>>> I guess the downside is that it uses an extra software bit. But the
>>> other positive is that it's less error prone, so that someone
>>> writing
>>> core-mm code won't introduce a change that makes shadow stack VMAs
>>> Write=1 if they don't know to also check for VM_SHADOW_STACK.
>>
>> Right. And I think this mimics the what I would have expected HW to
>> provide: a dedicated HW bit, not somehow mangling this into semantics
>> of
>> existing bits.
>
> Yea.
>
>>
>> Roughly speaking: if we abstract it that way and get all of the "how
>> to
>> set it writable now?" out of core-MM, it not only is cleaner and
>> less
>> error prone, it might even allow other architectures that implement
>> something comparable (e.g., using a dedicated HW bit) to actually
>> reuse
>> some of that work. Otherwise most of that "shstk" is really just x86
>> specific ...
>>
>> I guess the only cases we have to special case would be page pinning
>> code where pte_write() would indicate that the PTE is writable (well,
>> it
>> is, just not by "ordinary CPU instruction" context directly): but you
>> do
>> that already, so ... :)
>>
>> Sorry for stumbling over that this late, I only started looking into
>> this when you CCed me on that one patch.
>
> Sorry for not calling more attention to it earlier. Appreciate your
> comments.
>
> Previously versions of this series had changed some of these
> pte_mkwrite() calls to maybe_mkwrite(), which of course takes a vma.
> This way an x86 implementation could use the VM_SHADOW_STACK vma flag
> to decide between pte_mkwrite() and pte_mkwrite_shstk(). The feedback
> was that in some of these code paths "maybe" isn't really an option, it
> *needs* to make it writable. Even though the logic was the same, the
> name of the function made it look wrong.
>
> But another option could be to change pte_mkwrite() to take a vma. This
> would save using another software bit on x86, but instead requires a
> small change to each arch's pte_mkwrite().
I played with that idea shortly as well, but discarded it. I was not
able to convince myself that it wouldn't be required to pass in the VMA
as well for things like pte_dirty(), pte_mkdirty(), pte_write(), ...
which would end up fairly ugly (or even impossible in thing slike GUP-fast).
For example, I wonder how we'd be handling stuff like do_numa_page()
cleanly correctly, where we use pte_modify() + pte_mkwrite(), and either
call might set the PTE writable and maintain dirty bit ...
Having that said, maybe it could work with only a single saved-dirty bit
and passing in the VMA for pte_mkwrite() only.
pte_wrprotect() would detect "writable=0,dirty=1" and move the dirty bit
to the soft-dirty bit instead, resulting in
"writable=0,dirty=0,saved-dirty=1",
pte_dirty() would return dirty==1||saved-dirty==1.
pte_mkdirty() would set either set dirty=1 or saved-dirty=1, depending
on the writable bit.
pte_mkclean() would clean both bits.
pte_write() would detect "writable == 1 || (writable==0 && dirty==1)"
pte_mkwrite() would act according to the VMA, and in addition, merge the
saved-dirty bit into the dirty bit.
pte_modify() and mk_pte() .... would require more thought ...
Further, ptep_modify_prot_commit() might have to be adjusted to properly
flush in all relevant cases IIRC.
>
> x86's pte_mkwrite() would then be pretty close to maybe_mkwrite(), but
> maybe it could additionally warn if the vma is not writable. It also
> seems more aligned with your changes to stop taking hints from PTE bits
> and just look at the VMA? (I'm thinking about the dropping of the dirty
> check in GUP and dropping pte_saved_write())
The soft-shstk bit wouldn't be a hint, it would be logically changing
the "type" of the PTE such that any other PTE functions can do the right
thing without having to consume the VMA.
--
Thanks,
David / dhildenb
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-01-25 9:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 120+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-01-19 21:22 [PATCH v5 00/39] Shadow stacks for userspace Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 01/39] Documentation/x86: Add CET shadow stack description Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20 0:38 ` Kees Cook
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 02/39] x86/shstk: Add Kconfig option for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20 0:40 ` Kees Cook
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 03/39] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPU feature flags for shadow stacks Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20 0:44 ` Kees Cook
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 04/39] x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20 0:46 ` Kees Cook
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 05/39] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20 0:46 ` Kees Cook
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 06/39] x86/fpu: Add helper for modifying xstate Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20 0:47 ` Kees Cook
2023-02-01 11:01 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-01 17:31 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-01 18:18 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 07/39] x86: Add user control-protection fault handler Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20 0:50 ` Kees Cook
2023-02-03 19:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-03 19:24 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-03 19:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-03 23:01 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-04 10:37 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 08/39] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20 0:52 ` Kees Cook
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 09/39] x86/mm: Move pmd_write(), pud_write() up in the file Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 10/39] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20 0:55 ` Kees Cook
2023-01-23 9:16 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-01-23 9:28 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-01-23 20:56 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-24 16:28 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 11/39] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20 0:57 ` Kees Cook
2023-02-09 14:08 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-09 17:09 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-10 13:57 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-10 17:00 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-17 16:11 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-17 16:53 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 12/39] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20 0:58 ` Kees Cook
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 13/39] x86/mm: Start actually marking _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 14/39] mm: Move VM_UFFD_MINOR_BIT from 37 to 38 Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 15/39] mm: Introduce VM_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack memory Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 16/39] x86/mm: Check shadow stack page fault errors Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20 0:59 ` Kees Cook
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 17/39] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 18/39] mm: Handle faultless write upgrades for shstk Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-23 9:50 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-01-23 20:47 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-24 16:24 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-01-24 18:14 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-25 9:27 ` David Hildenbrand [this message]
2023-01-25 18:43 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-26 0:59 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-26 8:46 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-01-26 20:19 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-27 16:12 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-01-28 0:51 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-31 8:46 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-01-31 23:33 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-01 9:03 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-02-01 17:32 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-01 18:03 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-01-26 8:57 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-01-26 20:16 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-27 16:19 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 19/39] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20 1:01 ` Kees Cook
2023-02-14 0:09 ` Deepak Gupta
2023-02-14 1:07 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-14 6:10 ` Deepak Gupta
2023-02-14 18:24 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-15 6:37 ` Deepak Gupta
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 20/39] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 21/39] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 22/39] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap() Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 23/39] mm: Don't allow write GUPs to shadow stack memory Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-23 9:10 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-01-23 10:45 ` Florian Weimer
2023-01-23 20:46 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-24 16:26 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-01-24 18:42 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-24 23:08 ` Kees Cook
2023-01-24 23:41 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-25 9:29 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-01-25 15:23 ` Kees Cook
2023-01-25 15:36 ` Schimpe, Christina
2023-01-25 16:43 ` Schimpe, Christina
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 24/39] x86/mm: Introduce MAP_ABOVE4G Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 25/39] mm: Warn on shadow stack memory in wrong vma Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20 1:01 ` Kees Cook
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 26/39] x86: Introduce userspace API for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20 1:04 ` Kees Cook
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 27/39] x86/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20 1:05 ` Kees Cook
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 28/39] x86/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 29/39] x86/shstk: Introduce routines modifying shstk Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20 1:05 ` Kees Cook
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 30/39] x86/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 31/39] x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20 1:07 ` Kees Cook
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 32/39] x86/shstk: Support WRSS for userspace Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20 1:06 ` Kees Cook
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 33/39] x86: Expose thread features in /proc/$PID/status Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 34/39] x86/shstk: Wire in shadow stack interface Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 35/39] selftests/x86: Add shadow stack test Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 36/39] x86/fpu: Add helper for initing features Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 37/39] x86: Add PTRACE interface for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20 1:08 ` Kees Cook
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 38/39] x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_UNLOCK Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 39/39] x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_STATUS Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20 1:08 ` Kees Cook
2023-01-19 22:26 ` [PATCH v5 00/39] Shadow stacks for userspace Andrew Morton
2023-01-20 17:27 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-20 19:19 ` Kees Cook
2023-01-25 19:46 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-20 17:48 ` John Allen
2023-01-22 8:20 ` Mike Rapoport
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