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To: jarkko@kernel.org,linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
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Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v6 11/26] userland: Track init lifecycle via copy_process() and pid_namespace
Date: Sun, 22 Nov 2026 02:13:27 +0000 (UTC) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5bdbcf00cb4e4471bbae9999b2dd8ee652650653ac4182840c5c0d416229d7ef@mail.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261122011809.2667684-12-jarkko@kernel.org>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 4032 bytes --]
> userland: Track init lifecycle via copy_process() and pid_namespace
TL;DR: userland_copy() may take c->lock inside siglock and tasklist_lock,
while c->lock is taken with IRQs enabled elsewhere; this could trigger a
lockdep report and a possible deadlock once CLONE_INTO_USERLAND goes live.
> diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
> --- a/kernel/fork.c
> +++ b/kernel/fork.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -2573,12 +2574,14 @@ __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(
> attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PID);
> + if (thread_group_leader(p))
> + userland_copy(p, pid, NULL);
> nr_threads++;
> }
> total_forks++;
> hlist_del_init(&delayed.node);
> spin_unlock(¤t->sighand->siglock);
[ ... ]
> diff --git a/kernel/userland.c b/kernel/userland.c
> --- a/kernel/userland.c
> +++ b/kernel/userland.c
> @@ -82,6 +82,49 @@ static const struct file_operations userland_fops = {
[ ... ]
> +void userland_copy(struct task_struct *tsk, struct pid *pid, struct userland *c)
> +{
> + if (likely(!c || !is_child_reaper(pid)))
> + return;
> +
> + scoped_guard(spinlock, &c->lock) {
> + if (c->state != USERLAND_FORKING)
> + return;
> + refcount_inc(&c->usage);
Can this nest c->lock inside siglock and tasklist_lock in an unsafe way?
userland_copy() is called from copy_process() while tasklist_lock is held
for write with interrupts disabled, and while current->sighand->siglock is
held:
attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PID);
if (thread_group_leader(p))
userland_copy(p, pid, NULL);
nr_threads++;
...
spin_unlock(¤t->sighand->siglock);
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
siglock is taken from hard interrupt context. For example, the ITIMER_REAL
timer uses a non-soft hrtimer, and it_real_fn() -> kill_pid_info() ->
do_send_sig_info() -> lock_task_sighand() takes siglock in hardirq. So
holding siglock while acquiring c->lock records a siglock -> c->lock
dependency.
Every other acquisition of c->lock in the series uses plain
scoped_guard(spinlock, ...) with interrupts enabled: userland_release(),
userland_exit(), and, from later commits, userland_prepare_fork(),
userland_finish_fork(), userland_waitid(), userland_get_nsfd() and
userland_share_nsfd(). That makes c->lock hardirq-unsafe while it is
nested under a hardirq-safe lock, and lockdep should report "HARDIRQ-safe ->
HARDIRQ-unsafe lock order detected" the first time a userland is
bootstrapped on a CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING kernel.
It also looks like a real deadlock:
CPU0: a second clone3(CLONE_INTO_USERLAND) caller in
userland_prepare_fork() (or waitid(P_USERLAND), or USERLAND_SHARE_NSFD on
the same userland) holds c->lock with IRQs enabled.
CPU1: the bootstrapping parent is in copy_process() holding tasklist_lock
(write) and its siglock, and spins in userland_copy() on c->lock.
CPU0: takes the parent's ITIMER_REAL (or a posix-timer) hrtimer interrupt,
and it_real_fn() spins on the parent's siglock, which CPU1 holds.
Neither CPU can make progress. This looks reachable without privilege,
since userland_open() creates its own user namespace and the caller holds
CAP_SYS_ADMIN/CAP_SYS_CHROOT there.
In this commit the call passes NULL, so userland_copy() returns early. The
path becomes live with 498ccb2ffbc4 ("fork: Support CLONE_INTO_USERLAND in
clone3()"), which changes the call to userland_copy(p, pid, args->userland).
I don't see a later commit in the series that addresses this; at 942764a55437
every c->lock user still uses scoped_guard(spinlock, ...).
Should c->lock be taken IRQ-safe everywhere (spinlock_irq/spinlock_irqsave),
or should the FORKING->RUNNING commit happen outside the tasklist_lock and
siglock section?
> + ns_of_pid(pid)->userland = c;
> + WRITE_ONCE(c->init_pid, get_pid(pid));
> + WRITE_ONCE(c->state, USERLAND_RUNNING);
> + }
> +}
---
AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug.
See: https://github.com/kernel-patches/vmtest/blob/master/ci/claude/README.md
CI run summary: https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/44972669664
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-22 2:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 41+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-22 1:17 [RFC PATCH v6 00/26] userland: Userland containers Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 1:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 01/26] userns: Factor out idmap validation and commit helpers Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 1:57 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-22 1:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 02/26] userns: Add userns_set_idmap() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 2:13 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-22 1:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 03/26] arch: Wire up " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 1:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 04/26] mount: Add mnt_ns_get_root() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 1:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 05/26] mount: Enforce mount_too_revealing() for foreign mntns Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 2:13 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-22 1:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 06/26] mount: Support MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS in move_mount() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 2:14 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-22 1:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 07/26] mount: Support MOVE_MOUNT_CLONE with MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 1:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 08/26] userns: Factor out install_user_ns_cred() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 1:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 09/26] nsproxy: Expose create_new_namespaces() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 1:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 10/26] userland: Add core infrastructure Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 1:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 11/26] userland: Track init lifecycle via copy_process() and pid_namespace Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 2:13 ` bot+bpf-ci [this message]
2026-11-22 1:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 12/26] userland: Add userland_open() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 2:13 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-22 1:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 13/26] userland: Add USERLAND_GET_NSFD ioctl Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 2:13 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-22 1:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 14/26] userland: Add USERLAND_SHARE_NSFD ioctl Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 1:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 15/26] exit: Support P_USERLAND in waitid() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 2:13 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-22 1:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 16/26] signal: Support userland fds in pidfd_send_signal() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 2:13 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-22 1:18 ` [RFC PATCH v6 17/26] fork: Support CLONE_INTO_USERLAND in clone3() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 2:14 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-22 1:18 ` [RFC PATCH v6 18/26] fs: Support FSCONFIG_SET_USERLAND in fsconfig() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 2:13 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-22 1:18 ` [RFC PATCH v6 19/26] proc: Implement ->set_userland() fs_context operation Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 1:18 ` [RFC PATCH v6 20/26] ipc/mqueue: " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 1:18 ` [RFC PATCH v6 21/26] security: Add userland LSM hooks Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 1:18 ` [RFC PATCH v6 22/26] bpf: Register " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 1:18 ` [RFC PATCH v6 23/26] arch: Wire up userland_open() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 1:18 ` [RFC PATCH v6 24/26] docs: Document userland uAPI Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 1:56 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-22 1:18 ` [RFC PATCH v6 25/26] selftests/userland: Add userland test suite Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 2:14 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-22 1:18 ` [RFC PATCH v6 26/26] MAINTAINERS: Add entry for USERLAND Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 1:58 ` [RFC PATCH v6 00/26] userland: Userland containers Jarkko Sakkinen
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