From: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
To: "Maxime Bélair" <maxime.belair@canonical.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: john.johansen@canonical.com, paul@paul-moore.com,
jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, mic@digikod.net,
kees@kernel.org, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com,
casey@schaufler-ca.com, takedakn@nttdata.co.jp,
penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp, song@kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] lsm: introduce security_lsm_config_*_policy hooks
Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2025 20:03:23 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <848423f2-65d8-4ae2-a873-2e8cd474ab86@infradead.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250619181600.478038-3-maxime.belair@canonical.com>
On 6/19/25 11:15 AM, Maxime Bélair wrote:
> Define two new LSM hooks: security_lsm_config_self_policy and
> security_lsm_config_system_policy and wire them into the corresponding
> lsm_config_*_policy() syscalls so that LSMs can register a unified
> interface for policy management. This initial, minimal implementation
> only supports the LSM_POLICY_LOAD operation to limit changes.
>
> Signed-off-by: Maxime Bélair <maxime.belair@canonical.com>
> ---
> include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 4 ++
> include/linux/security.h | 16 ++++++++
> include/uapi/linux/lsm.h | 8 ++++
> security/Kconfig | 22 +++++++++++
> security/lsm_syscalls.c | 17 ++++++++-
> security/security.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 6 files changed, 134 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
> index 4816fc74f81e..958be7b49a9e 100644
> --- a/security/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/Kconfig
> @@ -220,6 +220,28 @@ config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH
> If you wish for all usermode helper programs to be disabled,
> specify an empty string here (i.e. "").
>
> +config LSM_CONFIG_SELF_POLICY_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE
> + int "Maximum buffer size for lsm_manage_policy"
Update function name.
> + range 16384 1073741824
> + depends on SECURITY
> + default 4194304
> + help
> + The maximum size of the buffer argument of lsm_config_self_policy.
> +
> + The default value of 4194304 (4MiB) is reasonable and should be large
> + enough to fit policies in for most cases.
> +
> +config LSM_CONFIG_SYSTEM_POLICY_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE
> + int "Maximum buffer size for lsm_manage_policy"
same here.
> + range 16384 1073741824
> + depends on SECURITY
> + default 4194304
> + help
> + The maximum size of the buffer argument of lsm_config_system_policy.
> +
> + The default value of 4194304 (4MiB) is reasonable and should be large
> + enough to fit policies in for most cases
> +
> source "security/selinux/Kconfig"
> source "security/smack/Kconfig"
> source "security/tomoyo/Kconfig"
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index fb57e8fddd91..8efea2b6e967 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -5883,6 +5883,75 @@ int security_bdev_setintegrity(struct block_device *bdev,
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_bdev_setintegrity);
>
> +/**
> + * security_lsm_config_self_policy() - Manage caller's LSM policies
> + * @lsm_id: id of the LSM to target
> + * @op: Operation to perform (one of the LSM_POLICY_XXX values)
> + * @buf: userspace pointer to policy data
> + * @size: size of @buf
> + * @flags: lsm policy management flags
> + *
> + * Manage the policies of a LSM for the current domain/user. This notably allows
> + * to update them even when the lsmfs is unavailable is restricted. Currently,
or
?
> + * only LSM_POLICY_LOAD is supported.
> + *
> + * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
> + */
> +int security_lsm_config_self_policy(u32 lsm_id, u32 op, void __user *buf,
> + size_t size, u32 flags)
> +{
> + int rc = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(lsm_config_self_policy);
> + struct lsm_static_call *scall;
> +
> + if (size > (CONFIG_LSM_CONFIG_SELF_POLICY_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE))
> + return -E2BIG;
> +
> + lsm_for_each_hook(scall, lsm_config_self_policy) {
> + if ((scall->hl->lsmid->id) == lsm_id) {
> + rc = scall->hl->hook.lsm_config_self_policy(lsm_id, op, buf, size, flags);
> + break;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + return rc;
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_lsm_config_self_policy);
> +
> +/**
> + * security_lsm_config_system_policy() - Manage system LSM policies
> + * @lsm_id: id of the lsm to target
> + * @op: Operation to perform (one of the LSM_POLICY_XXX values)
> + * @buf: userspace pointer to policy data
> + * @size: size of @buf
> + * @flags: lsm policy management flags
> + *
> + * Manage the policies of a LSM for the whole system. This notably allows
> + * to update them even when the lsmfs is unavailable is restricted. Currently,
or
?
> + * only LSM_POLICY_LOAD is supported.
> + *
> + * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
> + */
> +int security_lsm_config_system_policy(u32 lsm_id, u32 op, void __user *buf,
> + size_t size, u32 flags)
> +{
[snip]
--
~Randy
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-06-20 3:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-06-19 18:15 [PATCH v2 0/3] lsm: introduce lsm_config_self_policy() and lsm_config_system_policy() syscalls Maxime Bélair
2025-06-19 18:15 ` [PATCH v2 1/3] Wire up lsm_config_self_policy and lsm_config_system_policy syscalls Maxime Bélair
2025-06-19 18:15 ` [PATCH v2 2/3] lsm: introduce security_lsm_config_*_policy hooks Maxime Bélair
2025-06-20 3:03 ` Randy Dunlap [this message]
2025-06-20 6:28 ` kernel test robot
2025-06-20 10:54 ` kernel test robot
2025-06-19 18:15 ` [PATCH v2 3/3] AppArmor: add support for lsm_config_self_policy and lsm_config_system_policy Maxime Bélair
2025-06-20 3:09 ` Randy Dunlap
2025-06-20 6:28 ` kernel test robot
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