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From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	 Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
	 Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	 Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
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	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2)
Date: Sat, 06 Jul 2024 17:32:12 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <871q46bkoz.fsf@oldenburg.str.redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240706.poo9ahd3La9b@digikod.net> ("Mickaël Salaün"'s message of "Sat, 6 Jul 2024 16:55:51 +0200")

* Mickaël Salaün:

> On Fri, Jul 05, 2024 at 08:03:14PM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote:
>> * Mickaël Salaün:
>> 
>> > Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2) to check if a file would be
>> > allowed for execution.  The main use case is for script interpreters and
>> > dynamic linkers to check execution permission according to the kernel's
>> > security policy. Another use case is to add context to access logs e.g.,
>> > which script (instead of interpreter) accessed a file.  As any
>> > executable code, scripts could also use this check [1].
>> 
>> Some distributions no longer set executable bits on most shared objects,
>> which I assume would interfere with AT_CHECK probing for shared objects.
>
> A file without the execute permission is not considered as executable by
> the kernel.  The AT_CHECK flag doesn't change this semantic.  Please
> note that this is just a check, not a restriction.  See the next patch
> for the optional policy enforcement.
>
> Anyway, we need to define the policy, and for Linux this is done with
> the file permission bits.  So for systems willing to have a consistent
> execution policy, we need to rely on the same bits.

Yes, that makes complete sense.  I just wanted to point out the odd
interaction with the old binutils bug and the (sadly still current)
kernel bug.

>> Removing the executable bit is attractive because of a combination of
>> two bugs: a binutils wart which until recently always set the entry
>> point address in the ELF header to zero, and the kernel not checking for
>> a zero entry point (maybe in combination with an absent program
>> interpreter) and failing the execve with ELIBEXEC, instead of doing the
>> execve and then faulting at virtual address zero.  Removing the
>> executable bit is currently the only way to avoid these confusing
>> crashes, so I understand the temptation.
>
> Interesting.  Can you please point to the bug report and the fix?  I
> don't see any ELIBEXEC in the kernel.

The kernel hasn't been fixed yet.  I do think this should be fixed, so
that distributions can bring back the executable bit.

Thanks,
Florian


  reply	other threads:[~2024-07-06 15:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 102+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-07-04 19:01 [RFC PATCH v19 0/5] Script execution control (was O_MAYEXEC) Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-04 19:01 ` [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2) Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-05  0:04   ` Kees Cook
2024-07-05 17:53     ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-08 19:38       ` Kees Cook
2024-07-05 18:03   ` Florian Weimer
2024-07-06 14:55     ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-06 15:32       ` Florian Weimer [this message]
2024-07-08  8:56         ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-08 16:37           ` [PATCH] binfmt_elf: Fail execution of shared objects with ELIBEXEC (was: Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2)) Florian Weimer
2024-07-08 17:34             ` [PATCH] binfmt_elf: Fail execution of shared objects with ELIBEXEC Eric W. Biederman
2024-07-08 17:59               ` Florian Weimer
2024-07-10 10:05             ` [PATCH] binfmt_elf: Fail execution of shared objects with ELIBEXEC (was: Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2)) Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-08 16:08     ` [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2) Jeff Xu
2024-07-08 16:25       ` Florian Weimer
2024-07-08 16:40         ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-08 17:05           ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-08 17:33           ` Florian Weimer
2024-07-08 17:52             ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-09  9:18               ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-09 10:05                 ` Florian Weimer
2024-07-09 20:42                   ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-09 18:57                 ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-09 20:41                   ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-06  8:52   ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-07-07  9:01     ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-17  6:33   ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-17  8:26     ` Steve Dower
2024-07-17 10:00       ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-18  1:02         ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-07-18 12:22           ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-20  1:59             ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-07-20 11:43               ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-07-23 13:16                 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-23 13:16               ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-18  1:51         ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-18 12:23           ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-18 22:54             ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-17 10:01     ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-18  2:08       ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-18 12:24         ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-18 13:03           ` James Bottomley
2024-07-18 15:35             ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-19  1:29           ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-19  8:44             ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-19 14:16               ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-19 15:04                 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-19 15:27                   ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-23 13:15                     ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-08-05 18:35                       ` Jeff Xu
2024-08-09  8:45                         ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-08-09 16:15                           ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-19 15:12           ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-19 15:31             ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-19 17:36               ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-23 13:15                 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-18 14:46         ` enh
2024-07-18 15:35           ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-04 19:01 ` [RFC PATCH v19 2/5] security: Add new SHOULD_EXEC_CHECK and SHOULD_EXEC_RESTRICT securebits Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-05  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2024-07-05 17:54     ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-05 21:44       ` Kees Cook
2024-07-05 22:22         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-07-06 14:56           ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-06 17:28             ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-07-06 14:56         ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-18 14:16           ` Roberto Sassu
2024-07-18 16:20             ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-08 16:17   ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-08 17:53     ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-08 18:48       ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-08 21:15         ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-08 21:25           ` Steve Dower
2024-07-08 22:07             ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-09 20:42               ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-09 21:57                 ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-10  9:58                   ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-10 16:26                     ` Kees Cook
2024-07-11  8:57                       ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-16 15:02                         ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-16 15:10                           ` Steve Dower
2024-07-16 15:15                           ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-16 15:18                             ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-10 16:32                     ` Steve Dower
2024-07-20  2:06   ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-07-23 13:15     ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-04 19:01 ` [RFC PATCH v19 3/5] selftests/exec: Add tests for AT_CHECK and related securebits Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-04 19:01 ` [RFC PATCH v19 4/5] selftests/landlock: Add tests for execveat + AT_CHECK Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-04 19:01 ` [RFC PATCH v19 5/5] samples/should-exec: Add set-should-exec Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-08 19:40   ` Mimi Zohar
2024-07-09 20:42     ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-08 20:35 ` [RFC PATCH v19 0/5] Script execution control (was O_MAYEXEC) Mimi Zohar
2024-07-09 20:43   ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-16 15:57     ` Roberto Sassu
2024-07-16 16:12       ` James Bottomley
2024-07-16 17:31         ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-18 16:21           ` Mickaël Salaün
     [not found]         ` <E608EDB8-72E8-4791-AC9B-8FF9AC753FBE@sempervictus.com>
2024-07-16 17:47           ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-17 17:59             ` Boris Lukashev
2024-07-18 13:00               ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-15 20:16 ` Jonathan Corbet
2024-07-16  7:13   ` Mickaël Salaün

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