From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>, Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>,
Alejandro Colomar <alx.manpages@gmail.com>,
Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
Christian Heimes <christian@python.org>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
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Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>,
Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>,
James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>,
Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Jordan R Abrahams <ajordanr@google.com>,
Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>,
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"Madhavan T . Venkataraman" <madvenka@linux.microsoft.com>,
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Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>,
Steve Dower <steve.dower@python.org>,
Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>,
Thibaut Sautereau <thibaut.sautereau@ssi.gouv.fr>,
Vincent Strubel <vincent.strubel@ssi.gouv.fr>,
Xiaoming Ni <nixiaoming@huawei.com>,
Yin Fengwei <fengwei.yin@intel.com>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2)
Date: Fri, 05 Jul 2024 20:03:14 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87bk3bvhr1.fsf@oldenburg.str.redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240704190137.696169-2-mic@digikod.net> ("Mickaël Salaün"'s message of "Thu, 4 Jul 2024 21:01:33 +0200")
* Mickaël Salaün:
> Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2) to check if a file would be
> allowed for execution. The main use case is for script interpreters and
> dynamic linkers to check execution permission according to the kernel's
> security policy. Another use case is to add context to access logs e.g.,
> which script (instead of interpreter) accessed a file. As any
> executable code, scripts could also use this check [1].
Some distributions no longer set executable bits on most shared objects,
which I assume would interfere with AT_CHECK probing for shared objects.
Removing the executable bit is attractive because of a combination of
two bugs: a binutils wart which until recently always set the entry
point address in the ELF header to zero, and the kernel not checking for
a zero entry point (maybe in combination with an absent program
interpreter) and failing the execve with ELIBEXEC, instead of doing the
execve and then faulting at virtual address zero. Removing the
executable bit is currently the only way to avoid these confusing
crashes, so I understand the temptation.
Thanks,
Florian
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-07-05 18:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 102+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-07-04 19:01 [RFC PATCH v19 0/5] Script execution control (was O_MAYEXEC) Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-04 19:01 ` [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2) Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-05 0:04 ` Kees Cook
2024-07-05 17:53 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-08 19:38 ` Kees Cook
2024-07-05 18:03 ` Florian Weimer [this message]
2024-07-06 14:55 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-06 15:32 ` Florian Weimer
2024-07-08 8:56 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-08 16:37 ` [PATCH] binfmt_elf: Fail execution of shared objects with ELIBEXEC (was: Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2)) Florian Weimer
2024-07-08 17:34 ` [PATCH] binfmt_elf: Fail execution of shared objects with ELIBEXEC Eric W. Biederman
2024-07-08 17:59 ` Florian Weimer
2024-07-10 10:05 ` [PATCH] binfmt_elf: Fail execution of shared objects with ELIBEXEC (was: Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2)) Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-08 16:08 ` [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2) Jeff Xu
2024-07-08 16:25 ` Florian Weimer
2024-07-08 16:40 ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-08 17:05 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-08 17:33 ` Florian Weimer
2024-07-08 17:52 ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-09 9:18 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-09 10:05 ` Florian Weimer
2024-07-09 20:42 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-09 18:57 ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-09 20:41 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-06 8:52 ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-07-07 9:01 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-17 6:33 ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-17 8:26 ` Steve Dower
2024-07-17 10:00 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-18 1:02 ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-07-18 12:22 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-20 1:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-07-20 11:43 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-07-23 13:16 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-23 13:16 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-18 1:51 ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-18 12:23 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-18 22:54 ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-17 10:01 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-18 2:08 ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-18 12:24 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-18 13:03 ` James Bottomley
2024-07-18 15:35 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-19 1:29 ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-19 8:44 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-19 14:16 ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-19 15:04 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-19 15:27 ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-23 13:15 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-08-05 18:35 ` Jeff Xu
2024-08-09 8:45 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-08-09 16:15 ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-19 15:12 ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-19 15:31 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-19 17:36 ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-23 13:15 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-18 14:46 ` enh
2024-07-18 15:35 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-04 19:01 ` [RFC PATCH v19 2/5] security: Add new SHOULD_EXEC_CHECK and SHOULD_EXEC_RESTRICT securebits Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-05 0:18 ` Kees Cook
2024-07-05 17:54 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-05 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2024-07-05 22:22 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-07-06 14:56 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-06 17:28 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-07-06 14:56 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-18 14:16 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-07-18 16:20 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-08 16:17 ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-08 17:53 ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-08 18:48 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-08 21:15 ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-08 21:25 ` Steve Dower
2024-07-08 22:07 ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-09 20:42 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-09 21:57 ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-10 9:58 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-10 16:26 ` Kees Cook
2024-07-11 8:57 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-16 15:02 ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-16 15:10 ` Steve Dower
2024-07-16 15:15 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-16 15:18 ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-10 16:32 ` Steve Dower
2024-07-20 2:06 ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-07-23 13:15 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-04 19:01 ` [RFC PATCH v19 3/5] selftests/exec: Add tests for AT_CHECK and related securebits Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-04 19:01 ` [RFC PATCH v19 4/5] selftests/landlock: Add tests for execveat + AT_CHECK Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-04 19:01 ` [RFC PATCH v19 5/5] samples/should-exec: Add set-should-exec Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-08 19:40 ` Mimi Zohar
2024-07-09 20:42 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-08 20:35 ` [RFC PATCH v19 0/5] Script execution control (was O_MAYEXEC) Mimi Zohar
2024-07-09 20:43 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-16 15:57 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-07-16 16:12 ` James Bottomley
2024-07-16 17:31 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-18 16:21 ` Mickaël Salaün
[not found] ` <E608EDB8-72E8-4791-AC9B-8FF9AC753FBE@sempervictus.com>
2024-07-16 17:47 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-17 17:59 ` Boris Lukashev
2024-07-18 13:00 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-15 20:16 ` Jonathan Corbet
2024-07-16 7:13 ` Mickaël Salaün
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