From mboxrd@z Thu Jan  1 00:00:00 1970
From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
Subject: Re: [PATCH] [RFC] mnt: add ability to clone mntns starting with the current root
Date: Tue, 07 Oct 2014 15:42:44 -0700
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	(Andy Lutomirski's message of "Tue, 7 Oct 2014 15:19:12 -0700")
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To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
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Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> writes:

> On Tue, Oct 7, 2014 at 2:42 PM, Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> wrote:
>>
>> I am squinting and looking this way and that but while I can imagine
>> someone more clever than I can think up some unique property of rootfs
>> that makes it a little more exploitable than just mounting a ramfs,
>> but since you have to be root to exploit those properties I think the
>> game is pretty much lost.
>
> Yes.  rootfs might not be empty, it might have totally insane
> permissions, and it's globally shared, which makes it into a wonderful
> channel to pass things around that shouldn't be passed around.

But if only root with proc mounted can reach it...  I don't know.
There might be a case for setting MNT_LOCKED when we overmount "/"
as root but I don't yet see it.

> Can non-root do this?  You'd need to be in a userns with a "/" that
> isn't MNT_LOCKED.  Can this happen on any normal setup?
>
> FWIW, I think we should unconditionally MNT_LOCKED the root on userns
> unshare, even if it's the only mount.

To the best of my knowledge MNT_LOCKED is set uncondintially on userns
unshare.

Eric