From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
Ted Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>, "Andrew G. Morgan" <morgan@kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Aaron Jones <aaronmdjones@gmail.com>,
Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Markku Savela <msa@moth.iki.fi>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Subject: [PATCH v4 2/2] capabilities: Add a securebit to disable PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE
Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2015 12:46:16 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <880e650ee1f52742f20c6a7370c0de22876ebf85.1436903028.git.luto@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1436903028.git.luto@kernel.org>
In-Reply-To: <cover.1436903028.git.luto@kernel.org>
Per Andrew Morgan's request, add a securebit to allow admins to
disable PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE. This securebit will prevent processes
from adding capabilities to their ambient set.
For simplicity, this disables PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE entirely rather
than just disabling setting previously cleared bits.
Acked-By: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Aaron Jones <aaronmdjones@gmail.com>
CC: Ted Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: akpm@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com>
Cc: Markku Savela <msa@moth.iki.fi>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
---
include/uapi/linux/securebits.h | 11 ++++++++++-
security/commoncap.c | 3 ++-
2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/securebits.h b/include/uapi/linux/securebits.h
index 985aac9e6bf8..35ac35cef217 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/securebits.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/securebits.h
@@ -43,9 +43,18 @@
#define SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS (issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS))
#define SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED (issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED))
+/* When set, a process cannot add new capabilities to its ambient set. */
+#define SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE 6
+#define SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE_LOCKED 7 /* make bit-6 immutable */
+
+#define SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE (issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE))
+#define SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE_LOCKED \
+ (issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE_LOCKED))
+
#define SECURE_ALL_BITS (issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT) | \
issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP) | \
- issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS))
+ issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS) | \
+ issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE))
#define SECURE_ALL_LOCKS (SECURE_ALL_BITS << 1)
#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H */
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 1f74dde1063e..1832cf701c3d 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -993,7 +993,8 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
if (arg2 == PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE &&
(!cap_raised(current_cred()->cap_permitted, arg3) ||
!cap_raised(current_cred()->cap_inheritable,
- arg3)))
+ arg3) ||
+ issecure(SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE)))
return -EPERM;
new = prepare_creds();
--
2.4.3
prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-07-14 19:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-07-14 19:46 [PATCH v4 0/2] capabilities: Ambient capability patchset Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-14 19:46 ` [PATCH v4 1/2] capabilities: Ambient capabilities Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <9f660ee708e58892bfa7012b6b9c840298e24544.1436903028.git.luto-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>
2015-07-15 11:13 ` James Morris
[not found] ` <alpine.LRH.2.11.1507152033420.8351-gx6/JNMH7DfYtjvyW6yDsg@public.gmane.org>
2015-07-15 17:09 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <CALCETrWMBZ0p7P1FvtrYp5ChJXvvRzy0JpjS8KwUUa5m9gqgQA-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2015-07-17 20:40 ` Christoph Lameter
[not found] ` <alpine.DEB.2.11.1507171539590.13763-wcBtFHqTun5QOdAKl3ChDw@public.gmane.org>
2015-07-17 20:50 ` Andrew Morton
2015-07-17 23:10 ` Kees Cook
[not found] ` <CAGXu5j+V0fMae5OOHwU5DcMrG0TCANYOTfbz5+LDZZqYKcXAaw-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2015-07-17 23:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-14 19:46 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=880e650ee1f52742f20c6a7370c0de22876ebf85.1436903028.git.luto@kernel.org \
--to=luto@kernel.org \
--cc=aaronmdjones@gmail.com \
--cc=ahferroin7@gmail.com \
--cc=akpm@linuxfoundation.org \
--cc=cl@linux.com \
--cc=corbet@lwn.net \
--cc=james.l.morris@oracle.com \
--cc=jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=linux-api@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=luto@amacapital.net \
--cc=morgan@kernel.org \
--cc=msa@moth.iki.fi \
--cc=mtk.manpages@gmail.com \
--cc=serge.hallyn@canonical.com \
--cc=serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com \
--cc=serge@hallyn.com \
--cc=tytso@mit.edu \
--cc=zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).