messages from 2019-08-17 15:36:54 to 2019-08-30 14:26:22 UTC [more...]
[PATCH V40 00/29] Add kernel lockdown functionality
2019-08-30 14:26 UTC (40+ messages)
` [PATCH V40 01/29] security: Support early LSMs
` [PATCH V40 02/29] security: Add a "locked down" LSM hook
` [PATCH V40 03/29] security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM
` [PATCH V40 04/29] lockdown: Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
` [PATCH V40 05/29] lockdown: Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when "
` [PATCH V40 06/29] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if "
` [PATCH V40 07/29] lockdown: Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot
` [PATCH V40 08/29] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE
` [PATCH V40 09/29] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down
` [PATCH V40 10/29] hibernate: Disable when "
` [PATCH V40 11/29] PCI: Lock down BAR access "
` [PATCH V40 12/29] x86: Lock down IO port "
` [PATCH V40 13/29] x86/msr: Restrict MSR "
` [PATCH V40 14/29] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method "
` [PATCH V40 15/29] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been "
` [PATCH V40 16/29] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is "
` [PATCH V40 17/29] lockdown: Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when "
` [PATCH V40 18/29] lockdown: Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
` [PATCH V40 19/29] lockdown: Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)
` [PATCH V40 20/29] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module
` [PATCH V40 21/29] lockdown: Lock down /proc/kcore
` [PATCH V40 22/29] lockdown: Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode
` [PATCH V40 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is "
` [PATCH V40 24/29] lockdown: Lock down perf when "
` [PATCH V40 25/29] kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down
` [PATCH V40 26/29] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is "
` [PATCH V40 27/29] tracefs: Restrict tracefs "
` [PATCH V40 28/29] efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load "
` [PATCH V40 29/29] lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages
[PATCH 00/11] Keyrings, Block and USB notifications [ver #7]
2019-08-30 14:23 UTC (17+ messages)
` [PATCH 01/11] uapi: General notification ring definitions "
` [PATCH 02/11] security: Add hooks to rule on setting a watch "
` [PATCH 03/11] security: Add a hook for the point of notification insertion "
` [PATCH 04/11] General notification queue with user mmap()'able ring buffer "
` [PATCH 05/11] keys: Add a notification facility "
` [PATCH 06/11] Add a general, global device notification watch list "
` [PATCH 07/11] block: Add block layer notifications "
` [PATCH 08/11] usb: Add USB subsystem "
` [PATCH 09/11] Add sample notification program "
` [PATCH 10/11] selinux: Implement the watch_key security hook "
` [PATCH 11/11] smack: Implement the watch_key and post_notification hooks [untested] "
` watch_queue(7) manpage
` watch_devices(2) manpage
` keyctl_watch_key.3 manpage
[PATCH v14 0/6] Add utilization clamping support (CGroups API)
2019-08-30 9:48 UTC (9+ messages)
` [PATCH v14 1/6] sched/core: uclamp: Extend CPU's cgroup controller
` [PATCH v14 2/6] sched/core: uclamp: Propagate parent clamps
` [PATCH v14 3/6] sched/core: uclamp: Propagate system defaults to root group
` [PATCH v14 4/6] sched/core: uclamp: Use TG's clamps to restrict TASK's clamps
` [PATCH v14 5/6] sched/core: uclamp: Update CPU's refcount on TG's clamp changes
` [PATCH v14 6/6] sched/core: uclamp: always use enum uclamp_id for clamp_id values
[PATCH v2 bpf-next 1/3] capability: introduce CAP_BPF and CAP_TRACING
2019-08-30 4:16 UTC (19+ messages)
` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 2/3] bpf: implement CAP_BPF
` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 3/3] perf: implement CAP_TRACING
[PATCH 0/7] Rework random blocking
2019-08-30 2:01 UTC (10+ messages)
` [PATCH 1/7] random: Don't wake crng_init_wait when crng_init == 1
` [PATCH 2/7] random: Add GRND_INSECURE to return best-effort non-cryptographic bytes
` [PATCH 3/7] random: Ignore GRND_RANDOM in getentropy(2)
` [PATCH 4/7] random: Make /dev/random be almost like /dev/urandom
` [PATCH 5/7] random: Remove the blocking pool
` [PATCH 6/7] random: Delete code to pull data into pools
` [PATCH 7/7] random: Remove kernel.random.read_wakeup_threshold
[PATCH 00/11] Keyrings, Block and USB notifications [ver #6]
2019-08-29 19:11 UTC (14+ messages)
` [PATCH 01/11] uapi: General notification ring definitions "
` [PATCH 02/11] security: Add hooks to rule on setting a watch "
` [PATCH 03/11] security: Add a hook for the point of notification insertion "
` [PATCH 04/11] General notification queue with user mmap()'able ring buffer "
` [PATCH 05/11] keys: Add a notification facility "
` [PATCH 06/11] Add a general, global device notification watch list "
` [PATCH 07/11] block: Add block layer notifications "
` [PATCH 08/11] usb: Add USB subsystem "
` [PATCH 09/11] Add sample notification program "
` [PATCH 10/11] selinux: Implement the watch_key security hook "
` [PATCH 11/11] smack: Implement the watch_key and post_notification hooks [untested] "
[PATCH bpf-next] bpf, capabilities: introduce CAP_BPF
2019-08-29 17:49 UTC (33+ messages)
[PATCH RESEND v11 0/8] openat2(2)
2019-08-29 13:19 UTC (16+ messages)
` [PATCH RESEND v11 1/8] namei: obey trailing magic-link DAC permissions
` [PATCH RESEND v11 2/8] procfs: switch magic-link modes to be more sane
` [PATCH RESEND v11 3/8] open: O_EMPTYPATH: procfs-less file descriptor re-opening
` [PATCH RESEND v11 4/8] namei: O_BENEATH-style path resolution flags
` [PATCH RESEND v11 5/8] namei: LOOKUP_IN_ROOT: chroot-like path resolution
` [PATCH RESEND v11 6/8] namei: aggressively check for nd->root escape on ".." resolution
` [PATCH RESEND v11 7/8] open: openat2(2) syscall
` [PATCH RESEND v11 8/8] selftests: add openat2(2) selftests
[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 09/29] selftests: fib_rule_tests: use pre-defined DEV_ADDR
2019-08-29 10:49 UTC
[PATCH v2 1/2] mm/page_idle: Add per-pid idle page tracking using virtual indexing
2019-08-29 4:04 UTC (2+ messages)
` [mm/page_idle] b6cb55961f: kernel_BUG_at_mm/slub.c
[PATCH v8 00/27] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack
2019-08-28 14:57 UTC (16+ messages)
` [PATCH v8 02/27] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET)
` [PATCH v8 03/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Change names to separate XSAVES system and user states
` [PATCH v8 11/27] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_DIRTY_SW
` [PATCH v8 18/27] mm: Introduce do_mmap_locked()
` [PATCH v8 22/27] binfmt_elf: Extract .note.gnu.property from an ELF file
[PATCH v5 0/9] FPGA DFL updates
2019-08-27 21:38 UTC (12+ messages)
` [PATCH v5 1/9] fpga: dfl: make init callback optional
` [PATCH v5 2/9] fpga: dfl: fme: convert platform_driver to use dev_groups
` [PATCH v5 3/9] fpga: dfl: afu: "
[PATCH v2 bpf-next 1/4] bpf: unprivileged BPF access via /dev/bpf
2019-08-27 0:34 UTC (31+ messages)
` RFC: very rough draft of a bpf permission model
[PATCH v4 0/3] Casefolding in F2FS
2019-08-21 13:15 UTC (3+ messages)
` [PATCH v4 3/3] f2fs: Support case-insensitive file name lookups
` [f2fs-dev] "
[PATCH v5 1/6] mm/page_idle: Add per-pid idle page tracking using virtual index
2019-08-19 21:52 UTC (6+ messages)
[PATCH v2 bpf-next 1/4] bpf: unprivileged BPF access via /dev/bpf
2019-08-19 17:38 UTC (15+ messages)
[PATCHv6 00/36] kernel: Introduce Time Namespace
2019-08-19 14:44 UTC (10+ messages)
` [PATCHv6 23/36] x86/vdso: Allocate timens vdso
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