From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Matthew Garrett Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot Date: Wed, 04 Apr 2018 00:10:47 +0000 Message-ID: References: <4136.1522452584@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <186aeb7e-1225-4bb8-3ff5-863a1cde86de@kernel.org> <30459.1522739219@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <9758.1522775763@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <13189.1522784944@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <9349.1522794769@warthog.procyon.org.uk> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Return-path: In-Reply-To: Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org To: Linus Torvalds Cc: luto@kernel.org, David Howells , Ard Biesheuvel , jmorris@namei.org, Alan Cox , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Linux Kernel Mailing List , jforbes@redhat.com, linux-man@vger.kernel.org, jlee@suse.com, LSM List , linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Kees Cook , linux-efi List-Id: linux-api@vger.kernel.org On Tue, Apr 3, 2018 at 5:06 PM Linus Torvalds wrote: > On Tue, Apr 3, 2018 at 4:59 PM, Matthew Garrett wrote: > > > > Ok. So we can build distribution kernels that *always* have this on, and to > > turn it off you have to disable Secure Boot and install a different kernel. > Bingo. > Exactly like EVERY OTHER KERNEL CONFIG OPTION. So your argument is that we should make the user experience worse? Without some sort of verified boot mechanism, lockdown is just security theater. There's no good reason to enable it unless you have some mechanism for verifying that you booted something you trust.