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From: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
To: "Maxime Bélair" <maxime.belair@canonical.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	john.johansen@canonical.com,  paul@paul-moore.com,
	jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, mic@digikod.net,
	 kees@kernel.org, casey@schaufler-ca.com, takedakn@nttdata.co.jp,
	 penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp, song@kernel.org,
	rdunlap@infradead.org,  linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com,  linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	SElinux list <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	 Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 4/5] SELinux: add support for lsm_config_system_policy
Date: Fri, 10 Oct 2025 10:42:12 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAEjxPJ5hbGrDPv3bRb1hhBw3+w=wOR3vxW5n9FnNLL8Uv-f0YQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAEjxPJ6Xcwsic_zyLTPdHHaY9r7-ZTySzyELQ76aVZCFbh8FMQ@mail.gmail.com>

On Fri, Oct 10, 2025 at 9:58 AM Stephen Smalley
<stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Oct 10, 2025 at 9:27 AM Maxime Bélair
> <maxime.belair@canonical.com> wrote:
> >
> > Enable users to manage SELinux policies through the new hook
> > lsm_config_system_policy. This feature is restricted to CAP_MAC_ADMIN.
>
> (added selinux mailing list and Fedora/Red Hat SELinux kernel maintainer to cc)
>
> A couple of observations:
> 1. We do not currently require CAP_MAC_ADMIN for loading SELinux
> policy, since it was only added later for Smack and SELinux implements
> its own permission checks. When loading policy via selinuxfs, one
> requires uid-0 or CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE to write to /sys/fs/selinux/load
> plus the corresponding SELinux permissions, but this is just an
> artifact of the filesystem-based interface. I'm not opposed to using
> CAP_MAC_ADMIN for loading policy via the new system call but wanted to
> note it as a difference.
>
> 2. The SELinux namespaces support [1], [2] is based on instantiating a
> separate selinuxfs instance for each namespace; you load a policy for
> a namespace by mounting a new selinuxfs instance after unsharing your
> SELinux namespace and then write to its /sys/fs/selinux/load
> interface, only affecting policy for the new namespace. Your interface
> doesn't appear to support such an approach and IIUC will currently
> always load the init SELinux namespace's policy rather than the
> current process' SELinux namespace.

Actually, on second thought, checking CAP_MAC_ADMIN via capable() will
require the process to have that capability in the global/init
namespace, which IIUC would prevent systemd running in a non-init user
namespace from loading the SELinux policy at all. That's problematic
for a different reason since it would prevent us from using this
interface for loading the namespace policy using this system call.
>
> [1] https://github.com/stephensmalley/selinuxns
> [2] https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/20250814132637.1659-1-stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com/
>
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Maxime Bélair <maxime.belair@canonical.com>
> > ---
> >  security/selinux/hooks.c            | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >  security/selinux/include/security.h |  7 +++++++
> >  security/selinux/selinuxfs.c        | 16 ++++++++++++----
> >  3 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > index e7a7dcab81db..3d14d4e47937 100644
> > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > @@ -7196,6 +7196,31 @@ static int selinux_uring_allowed(void)
> >  }
> >  #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
> >
> > +/**
> > + * selinux_lsm_config_system_policy - Manage a LSM policy
> > + * @op: operation to perform. Currently, only LSM_POLICY_LOAD is supported
> > + * @buf: User-supplied buffer
> > + * @size: size of @buf
> > + * @flags: reserved for future use; must be zero
> > + *
> > + * Returns: number of written rules on success, negative value on error
> > + */
> > +static int selinux_lsm_config_system_policy(u32 op, void __user *buf,
> > +                                           size_t size, u32 flags)
> > +{
> > +       loff_t pos = 0;
> > +
> > +       if (op != LSM_POLICY_LOAD || flags)
> > +               return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> > +
> > +       if (!selinux_null.dentry || !selinux_null.dentry->d_sb ||
> > +           !selinux_null.dentry->d_sb->s_fs_info)
> > +               return -ENODEV;
> > +
> > +       return __sel_write_load(selinux_null.dentry->d_sb->s_fs_info, buf, size,
> > +                               &pos);
> > +}
> > +
> >  static const struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid = {
> >         .name = "selinux",
> >         .id = LSM_ID_SELINUX,
> > @@ -7499,6 +7524,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
> >  #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
> >         LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_alloc, selinux_perf_event_alloc),
> >  #endif
> > +       LSM_HOOK_INIT(lsm_config_system_policy, selinux_lsm_config_system_policy),
> > +
> >  };
> >
> >  static __init int selinux_init(void)
> > diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
> > index e7827ed7be5f..7b779ea43cc3 100644
> > --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
> > +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
> > @@ -389,7 +389,14 @@ struct selinux_kernel_status {
> >  extern void selinux_status_update_setenforce(bool enforcing);
> >  extern void selinux_status_update_policyload(u32 seqno);
> >  extern void selinux_complete_init(void);
> > +
> > +struct selinux_fs_info;
> > +
> >  extern struct path selinux_null;
> > +extern ssize_t __sel_write_load(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi,
> > +                               const char __user *buf, size_t count,
> > +                               loff_t *ppos);
> > +
> >  extern void selnl_notify_setenforce(int val);
> >  extern void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno);
> >  extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
> > diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
> > index 47480eb2189b..1f7e611d8300 100644
> > --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
> > +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
> > @@ -567,11 +567,11 @@ static int sel_make_policy_nodes(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi,
> >         return ret;
> >  }
> >
> > -static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
> > -                             size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
> > +ssize_t __sel_write_load(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi,
> > +                        const char __user *buf, size_t count,
> > +                        loff_t *ppos)
> >
> >  {
> > -       struct selinux_fs_info *fsi;
> >         struct selinux_load_state load_state;
> >         ssize_t length;
> >         void *data = NULL;
> > @@ -605,7 +605,6 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
> >                 pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: failed to load policy\n");
> >                 goto out;
> >         }
> > -       fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
> >         length = sel_make_policy_nodes(fsi, load_state.policy);
> >         if (length) {
> >                 pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: failed to initialize selinuxfs\n");
> > @@ -626,6 +625,15 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
> >         return length;
> >  }
> >
> > +static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
> > +                             size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
> > +{
> > +       struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
> > +
> > +       return __sel_write_load(fsi, buf, count, ppos);
> > +}
> > +
> > +
> >  static const struct file_operations sel_load_ops = {
> >         .write          = sel_write_load,
> >         .llseek         = generic_file_llseek,
> > --
> > 2.48.1
> >

  reply	other threads:[~2025-10-10 14:42 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-10-10 13:25 [PATCH v6 0/5] lsm: introduce lsm_config_self_policy() and lsm_config_system_policy() syscalls Maxime Bélair
2025-10-10 13:25 ` [PATCH v6 1/5] Wire up lsm_config_self_policy and lsm_config_system_policy syscalls Maxime Bélair
2025-10-10 18:06   ` Song Liu
2025-10-10 21:13     ` Casey Schaufler
2025-10-11 12:07   ` kernel test robot
2025-10-10 13:25 ` [PATCH v6 2/5] lsm: introduce security_lsm_config_*_policy hooks Maxime Bélair
2025-10-10 13:25 ` [PATCH v6 3/5] AppArmor: add support for lsm_config_self_policy and lsm_config_system_policy Maxime Bélair
2025-10-10 13:25 ` [PATCH v6 4/5] SELinux: add support for lsm_config_system_policy Maxime Bélair
2025-10-10 13:58   ` Stephen Smalley
2025-10-10 14:42     ` Stephen Smalley [this message]
2025-10-10 14:57     ` Paul Moore
2025-10-10 13:25 ` [PATCH v6 5/5] Smack: add support for lsm_config_self_policy and lsm_config_system_policy Maxime Bélair
2025-10-10 15:15   ` Casey Schaufler
2025-11-04 14:41   ` Casey Schaufler

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