From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: YiFei Zhu <yifeifz2@illinois.edu>,
Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.pizza>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@redhat.com>,
Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@ibm.com>,
Dimitrios Skarlatos <dskarlat@cs.cmu.edu>,
Valentin Rothberg <vrothber@redhat.com>,
Hubertus Franke <frankeh@us.ibm.com>,
Jack Chen <jianyan2@illinois.edu>,
Josep Torrellas <torrella@illinois.edu>,
Tianyin Xu <tyxu@illinois.edu>, bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/6] seccomp: Emulate basic filters for constant action results
Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2020 01:47:47 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAG48ez251v19U60GYH4aWE6+C-3PYw5mr_Ax_kxnebqDOBn_+Q@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200923232923.3142503-5-keescook@chromium.org>
On Thu, Sep 24, 2020 at 1:29 AM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> This emulates absolutely the most basic seccomp filters to figure out
> if they will always give the same results for a given arch/nr combo.
>
> Nearly all seccomp filters are built from the following ops:
>
> BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS
> BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K
> BPF_JMP | BPF_JGE | BPF_K
> BPF_JMP | BPF_JGT | BPF_K
> BPF_JMP | BPF_JSET | BPF_K
> BPF_JMP | BPF_JA
> BPF_RET | BPF_K
>
> These are now emulated to check for accesses beyond seccomp_data::arch
> or unknown instructions.
>
> Not yet implemented are:
>
> BPF_ALU | BPF_AND (generated by libseccomp and Chrome)
BPF_AND is normally only used on syscall arguments, not on the syscall
number or the architecture, right? And when a syscall argument is
loaded, we abort execution anyway. So I think there is no need to
implement those?
> Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez1p=dR_2ikKq=xVxkoGg0fYpTBpkhJSv1w-6BG=76PAvw@mail.gmail.com/
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> ---
> kernel/seccomp.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
> net/core/filter.c | 3 +-
> 2 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
> index 111a238bc532..9921f6f39d12 100644
> --- a/kernel/seccomp.c
> +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
> @@ -610,7 +610,12 @@ static struct seccomp_filter *seccomp_prepare_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog)
> {
> struct seccomp_filter *sfilter;
> int ret;
> - const bool save_orig = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE);
> + const bool save_orig =
> +#if defined(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) || defined(SECCOMP_ARCH)
> + true;
> +#else
> + false;
> +#endif
You could probably write this as something like:
const bool save_orig = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) ||
__is_defined(SECCOMP_ARCH);
[...]
> diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c
[...]
> -static void bpf_release_orig_filter(struct bpf_prog *fp)
> +void bpf_release_orig_filter(struct bpf_prog *fp)
> {
> struct sock_fprog_kern *fprog = fp->orig_prog;
>
> @@ -1154,6 +1154,7 @@ static void bpf_release_orig_filter(struct bpf_prog *fp)
> kfree(fprog);
> }
> }
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bpf_release_orig_filter);
If this change really belongs into this patch (which I don't think it
does), please describe why in the commit message.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-09-23 23:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-09-23 23:29 [PATCH v1 0/6] seccomp: Implement constant action bitmaps Kees Cook
2020-09-23 23:29 ` [PATCH 1/6] seccomp: Introduce SECCOMP_PIN_ARCHITECTURE Kees Cook
2020-09-24 0:41 ` Jann Horn
2020-09-24 7:11 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-23 23:29 ` [PATCH 2/6] x86: Enable seccomp architecture tracking Kees Cook
2020-09-24 0:45 ` Jann Horn
2020-09-24 7:12 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-23 23:29 ` [PATCH 3/6] seccomp: Implement constant action bitmaps Kees Cook
2020-09-24 0:25 ` Jann Horn
2020-09-24 7:36 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-24 8:07 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-24 8:15 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-24 8:22 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-24 12:28 ` Jann Horn
2020-09-24 12:37 ` David Laight
2020-09-24 12:56 ` Jann Horn
[not found] ` <DM6PR11MB271492D0565E91475D949F5DEF390@DM6PR11MB2714.namprd11.prod.outlook.com>
2020-09-24 0:36 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-24 7:38 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-24 7:51 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-23 23:29 ` [PATCH 4/6] seccomp: Emulate basic filters for constant action results Kees Cook
2020-09-23 23:47 ` Jann Horn [this message]
2020-09-24 7:46 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-24 15:28 ` Paul Moore
2020-09-24 19:52 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-24 20:46 ` Paul Moore
2020-09-24 21:35 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-23 23:29 ` [PATCH 5/6] selftests/seccomp: Compare bitmap vs filter overhead Kees Cook
2020-09-23 23:29 ` [PATCH 6/6] [DEBUG] seccomp: Report bitmap coverage ranges Kees Cook
2020-09-24 13:40 ` [PATCH v1 0/6] seccomp: Implement constant action bitmaps Rasmus Villemoes
2020-09-24 13:58 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-25 5:56 ` Rasmus Villemoes
2020-09-25 7:07 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-26 18:11 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-28 20:04 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-28 20:16 ` YiFei Zhu
2020-09-24 14:05 ` Jann Horn
2020-09-24 18:57 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2020-09-24 19:18 ` Jann Horn
[not found] ` <9dbe8e3bbdad43a1872202ff38c34ca2@DM5PR11MB1692.namprd11.prod.outlook.com>
2020-09-24 19:48 ` Tianyin Xu
2020-09-24 20:00 ` Kees Cook
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