From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
To: yu-cheng.yu@intel.com
Cc: the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
bsingharora@gmail.com, Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
hjl.tools@gmail.com, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
keescook@chromiun.org, Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>Pe
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 27/27] x86/cet: Add arch_prctl functions for CET
Date: Wed, 11 Jul 2018 12:45:16 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAG48ez2cY1CPTTfDnV5yZyHVPXP787=fR1+G_D7tR5VYXdjFmQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180710222639.8241-28-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
On Tue, Jul 10, 2018 at 3:31 PM Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> wrote:
>
> arch_prctl(ARCH_CET_STATUS, unsigned long *addr)
> Return CET feature status.
>
> The parameter 'addr' is a pointer to a user buffer.
> On returning to the caller, the kernel fills the following
> information:
>
> *addr = SHSTK/IBT status
> *(addr + 1) = SHSTK base address
> *(addr + 2) = SHSTK size
>
> arch_prctl(ARCH_CET_DISABLE, unsigned long features)
> Disable SHSTK and/or IBT specified in 'features'. Return -EPERM
> if CET is locked out.
>
> arch_prctl(ARCH_CET_LOCK)
> Lock out CET feature.
>
> arch_prctl(ARCH_CET_ALLOC_SHSTK, unsigned long *addr)
> Allocate a new SHSTK.
>
> The parameter 'addr' is a pointer to a user buffer and indicates
> the desired SHSTK size to allocate. On returning to the caller
> the buffer contains the address of the new SHSTK.
>
> arch_prctl(ARCH_CET_LEGACY_BITMAP, unsigned long *addr)
> Allocate an IBT legacy code bitmap if the current task does not
> have one.
>
> The parameter 'addr' is a pointer to a user buffer.
> On returning to the caller, the kernel fills the following
> information:
>
> *addr = IBT bitmap base address
> *(addr + 1) = IBT bitmap size
>
> Signed-off-by: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
[...]
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..86bb78ae656d
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> +
> +#include <linux/errno.h>
> +#include <linux/uaccess.h>
> +#include <linux/prctl.h>
> +#include <linux/compat.h>
> +#include <asm/processor.h>
> +#include <asm/prctl.h>
> +#include <asm/elf.h>
> +#include <asm/elf_property.h>
> +#include <asm/cet.h>
> +
> +/* See Documentation/x86/intel_cet.txt. */
> +
> +static int handle_get_status(unsigned long arg2)
> +{
> + unsigned int features = 0;
> + unsigned long shstk_base, shstk_size;
> +
> + if (current->thread.cet.shstk_enabled)
> + features |= GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_SHSTK;
> + if (current->thread.cet.ibt_enabled)
> + features |= GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_IBT;
> +
> + shstk_base = current->thread.cet.shstk_base;
> + shstk_size = current->thread.cet.shstk_size;
> +
> + if (in_ia32_syscall()) {
> + unsigned int buf[3];
> +
> + buf[0] = features;
> + buf[1] = (unsigned int)shstk_base;
> + buf[2] = (unsigned int)shstk_size;
> + return copy_to_user((unsigned int __user *)arg2, buf,
> + sizeof(buf));
> + } else {
> + unsigned long buf[3];
> +
> + buf[0] = (unsigned long)features;
> + buf[1] = shstk_base;
> + buf[2] = shstk_size;
> + return copy_to_user((unsigned long __user *)arg2, buf,
> + sizeof(buf));
> + }
Other places in the kernel (e.g. the BPF subsystem) just
unconditionally use u64 instead of unsigned long to avoid having to
switch between different sizes. I wonder whether that would make sense
here?
> +}
> +
> +static int handle_alloc_shstk(unsigned long arg2)
> +{
> + int err = 0;
> + unsigned long shstk_size = 0;
> +
> + if (in_ia32_syscall()) {
> + unsigned int size;
> +
> + err = get_user(size, (unsigned int __user *)arg2);
> + if (!err)
> + shstk_size = size;
> + } else {
> + err = get_user(shstk_size, (unsigned long __user *)arg2);
> + }
As above.
> + if (err)
> + return -EFAULT;
> +
> + err = cet_alloc_shstk(&shstk_size);
> + if (err)
> + return -err;
> +
> + if (in_ia32_syscall()) {
> + if (put_user(shstk_size, (unsigned int __user *)arg2))
> + return -EFAULT;
> + } else {
> + if (put_user(shstk_size, (unsigned long __user *)arg2))
> + return -EFAULT;
> + }
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int handle_bitmap(unsigned long arg2)
> +{
> + unsigned long addr, size;
> +
> + if (current->thread.cet.ibt_enabled) {
> + if (!current->thread.cet.ibt_bitmap_addr)
> + cet_setup_ibt_bitmap();
> + addr = current->thread.cet.ibt_bitmap_addr;
> + size = current->thread.cet.ibt_bitmap_size;
> + } else {
> + addr = 0;
> + size = 0;
> + }
> +
> + if (in_compat_syscall()) {
> + if (put_user(addr, (unsigned int __user *)arg2) ||
> + put_user(size, (unsigned int __user *)arg2 + 1))
> + return -EFAULT;
> + } else {
> + if (put_user(addr, (unsigned long __user *)arg2) ||
> + put_user(size, (unsigned long __user *)arg2 + 1))
> + return -EFAULT;
> + }
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +int prctl_cet(int option, unsigned long arg2)
> +{
> + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) &&
> + !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + switch (option) {
> + case ARCH_CET_STATUS:
> + return handle_get_status(arg2);
> +
> + case ARCH_CET_DISABLE:
> + if (current->thread.cet.locked)
> + return -EPERM;
> + if (arg2 & GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_SHSTK)
> + cet_disable_free_shstk(current);
> + if (arg2 & GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_IBT)
> + cet_disable_ibt();
> +
> + return 0;
> +
> + case ARCH_CET_LOCK:
> + current->thread.cet.locked = 1;
> + return 0;
> +
> + case ARCH_CET_ALLOC_SHSTK:
> + return handle_alloc_shstk(arg2);
> +
> + /*
> + * Allocate legacy bitmap and return address & size to user.
> + */
> + case ARCH_CET_LEGACY_BITMAP:
> + return handle_bitmap(arg2);
> +
> + default:
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> +}
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/elf.c b/arch/x86/kernel/elf.c
> index 42e08d3b573e..3d4934fdac7f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/elf.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/elf.c
> @@ -8,7 +8,10 @@
>
> #include <asm/cet.h>
> #include <asm/elf_property.h>
> +#include <asm/prctl.h>
> +#include <asm/processor.h>
> #include <uapi/linux/elf-em.h>
> +#include <uapi/linux/prctl.h>
> #include <linux/binfmts.h>
> #include <linux/elf.h>
> #include <linux/slab.h>
> @@ -255,6 +258,7 @@ int arch_setup_features(void *ehdr_p, void *phdr_p,
> current->thread.cet.ibt_enabled = 0;
> current->thread.cet.ibt_bitmap_addr = 0;
> current->thread.cet.ibt_bitmap_size = 0;
> + current->thread.cet.locked = 0;
> if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
> if (shstk) {
> err = cet_setup_shstk();
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
> index 43a57d284a22..259b92664981 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
> @@ -795,6 +795,12 @@ long do_arch_prctl_common(struct task_struct *task, int option,
> return get_cpuid_mode();
> case ARCH_SET_CPUID:
> return set_cpuid_mode(task, cpuid_enabled);
> + case ARCH_CET_STATUS:
> + case ARCH_CET_DISABLE:
> + case ARCH_CET_LOCK:
> + case ARCH_CET_ALLOC_SHSTK:
> + case ARCH_CET_LEGACY_BITMAP:
> + return prctl_cet(option, cpuid_enabled);
> }
>
> return -EINVAL;
> --
> 2.17.1
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-07-11 19:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 123+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-07-10 22:26 [RFC PATCH v2 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/27] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUIDs for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Change some names to separate XSAVES system and user states Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Enable XSAVES system states Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/27] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 8:27 ` Pavel Machek
2018-07-11 15:25 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 9:57 ` Florian Weimer
2018-07-11 13:47 ` H.J. Lu
2018-07-11 14:53 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/27] x86/cet: Control protection exception handler Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/27] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 8:34 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 16:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/27] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/27] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 8:45 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 9:21 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/27] x86/mm: Modify ptep_set_wrprotect and pmdp_set_wrprotect for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:44 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-10 23:23 ` Nadav Amit
2018-07-10 23:52 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 8:48 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/27] x86/mm: Shadow stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:52 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 17:28 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 23:24 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 13/27] mm: Handle shadow stack page fault Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 23:06 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 9:06 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-08-14 21:28 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 14/27] mm: Handle THP/HugeTLB " Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 23:08 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 9:10 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 16:11 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-20 14:20 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-20 14:58 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 15/27] mm/mprotect: Prevent mprotect from changing shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 23:10 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 9:12 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 16:07 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 16:22 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 16/27] mm: Modify can_follow_write_pte/pmd for " Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 23:37 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 17:05 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-13 18:26 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-17 23:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-17 23:11 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-17 23:15 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-18 20:14 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-18 21:45 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-18 23:10 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-19 0:06 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-19 17:06 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-19 19:31 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 9:29 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-17 23:00 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 17/27] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 23:40 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 9:34 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 15:45 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 9:36 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 21:10 ` Jann Horn
2018-07-11 21:34 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-07-11 21:51 ` Jann Horn
2018-07-11 22:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-07-13 18:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 18/27] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 23:48 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-12 22:59 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-12 23:49 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13 1:50 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13 2:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-07-13 4:16 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13 4:18 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13 17:39 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-13 5:55 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-07-11 9:44 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 15:06 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 15:30 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 9:45 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 14:58 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 15:27 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 15:41 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-13 12:12 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13 17:37 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 19/27] x86/cet/shstk: Signal handling for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 20/27] x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing of CET Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 11:12 ` Florian Weimer
2018-07-11 19:37 ` Jann Horn
2018-07-11 20:53 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 21/27] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 22/27] x86/cet/ibt: User-mode indirect branch tracking support Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 0:11 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 22:10 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 22:40 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 23:00 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 23:16 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13 17:56 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-13 18:05 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 21:07 ` Jann Horn
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 23/27] mm/mmap: Add IBT bitmap size to address space limit check Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 23:57 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 16:56 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 24/27] x86: Insert endbr32/endbr64 to vDSO Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 25/27] x86/cet: Add PTRACE interface for CET Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 10:20 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-07-11 15:40 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-12 14:03 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-07-12 22:37 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-12 23:08 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-07-13 16:07 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-13 6:28 ` Pavel Machek
2018-07-13 13:33 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-07-14 6:27 ` Pavel Machek
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 26/27] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 27/27] x86/cet: Add arch_prctl functions for CET Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 12:19 ` Florian Weimer
2018-07-11 21:02 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 19:45 ` Jann Horn [this message]
2018-07-11 20:55 ` Yu-cheng Yu
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