From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Andy Lutomirski Subject: Re: [PATCH V31 22/25] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2019 12:21:24 -0700 Message-ID: References: <20190326182742.16950-1-matthewgarrett@google.com> <20190326182742.16950-23-matthewgarrett@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Return-path: In-Reply-To: <20190326182742.16950-23-matthewgarrett@google.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org To: Matthew Garrett Cc: James Morris , LSM List , LKML , David Howells , Linux API , Andrew Lutomirski , Alexei Starovoitov , Matthew Garrett , Network Development , Chun-Yi Lee , Daniel Borkmann List-Id: linux-api@vger.kernel.org On Tue, Mar 26, 2019 at 11:28 AM Matthew Garrett wrote: > > From: David Howells > > There are some bpf functions can be used to read kernel memory: > bpf_probe_read, bpf_probe_write_user and bpf_trace_printk. These allow > private keys in kernel memory (e.g. the hibernation image signing key) to > be read by an eBPF program and kernel memory to be altered without > restriction. Disable them if the kernel has been locked down in > confidentiality mode. > :) This is yet another reason to get the new improved bpf_probe_user_read stuff landed!