From: Andy Lutomirski <luto-kltTT9wpgjJwATOyAt5JVQ@public.gmane.org>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org>,
Julien Tinnes <jln-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
David Drysdale <drysdale-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
Al Viro <viro-RmSDqhL/yNMiFSDQTTA3OLVCufUGDwFn@public.gmane.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
LSM List
<linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
<gregkh-hQyY1W1yCW8ekmWlsbkhG0B+6BGkLq7r@public.gmane.org>,
Paul Moore <paul-r2n+y4ga6xFZroRs9YW3xA@public.gmane.org>,
James Morris
<james.l.morris-QHcLZuEGTsvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
Linux API <linux-api-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>,
Meredydd Luff <meredydd-zPN50pYk8eUaUu29zAJCuw@public.gmane.org>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch-wEGCiKHe2LqWVfeAwA7xHQ@public.gmane.org>,
"linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org"
<linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 11/11] seccomp: Add tgid and tid into seccomp_data
Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 21:05:42 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrWaUsi1Ea3YTXLN6BFqcoHnbFTuMvcNncS5rq0nSgOatA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87vbqhp4hf.fsf-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
On Mon, Jul 28, 2014 at 2:18 PM, Eric W. Biederman
<ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org> wrote:
> Andy Lutomirski <luto-kltTT9wpgjJwATOyAt5JVQ@public.gmane.org> writes:
>
>> [cc: Eric Biederman]
>>
>
>> Can we do one better and add a flag to prevent any non-self pid
>> lookups? This might actually be easy on top of the pid namespace work
>> (e.g. we could change the way that find_task_by_vpid works).
>>
>> It's far from just being signals. There's access_process_vm, ptrace,
>> all the signal functions, clock_gettime (see CPUCLOCK_PID -- yes, this
>> is ridiculous), and probably some others that I've forgotten about or
>> never noticed in the first place.
>
> So here is the practical question.
>
> Are these processes that only can send signals to their thread group
> allowed to call fork()?
>
>
> If fork is allowed and all pid lookups are restricted to their own
> thread group that wait, waitpid, and all of the rest of the wait family
> will never return the pids of their children, and zombies will
> accumulate. Aka the semantics are fundamentally broken.
Good point.
I can imagine at least three ways that fork() could continue working, though:
1. Allow lookups of immediate children, too. (I don't love this one.)
2. Allow non-self pids to be translated in but not out. This way
P_ALL will continue working.
3. Have the kernel treat any PID-restricted process as though it were NOCLDWAIT.
I think I like #3. Thoughts?
>
> If fork is not allowed pid namespaces already solve this problem.
PID namespaces are fairly heavyweight. Julien pointed out that using
PID namespaces requires a bunch of dummy PID 1 processes.
--Andy
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-07-30 4:05 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-07-25 13:46 [RFC PATCHv2 00/11] Adding FreeBSD's Capsicum security framework David Drysdale
2014-07-25 13:46 ` [PATCH 01/11] fs: add O_BENEATH flag to openat(2) David Drysdale
2014-07-25 13:46 ` [PATCH 02/11] selftests: Add test of O_BENEATH & openat(2) David Drysdale
2014-07-25 13:46 ` [PATCH 03/11] capsicum: rights values and structure definitions David Drysdale
[not found] ` <1406296033-32693-1-git-send-email-drysdale-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2014-07-25 13:47 ` [PATCH 04/11] capsicum: implement fgetr() and friends David Drysdale
2014-07-25 13:47 ` [PATCH 05/11] capsicum: convert callers to use fgetr() etc David Drysdale
2014-07-25 13:47 ` [PATCH 09/11] capsicum: add syscalls to limit FD rights David Drysdale
2014-07-25 13:47 ` [PATCH 10/11] capsicum: prctl(2) to force use of O_BENEATH David Drysdale
2014-07-25 14:01 ` Paolo Bonzini
2014-07-25 16:00 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-27 12:08 ` David Drysdale
2014-07-25 13:47 ` [PATCH 6/6] prctl.2: describe PR_SET_OPENAT_BENEATH/PR_GET_OPENAT_BENEATH David Drysdale
2014-07-26 21:04 ` [RFC PATCHv2 00/11] Adding FreeBSD's Capsicum security framework Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <871tt796i0.fsf-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
2014-07-28 12:30 ` Paolo Bonzini
2014-07-28 16:04 ` David Drysdale
[not found] ` <CAHse=S_7Jpb9bTXHgU8q8_UZ=ce2gwdq8C15a+jbfO_pHmV_iA-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2014-07-28 21:13 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87ha21qja0.fsf-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
2014-07-29 8:43 ` Paolo Bonzini
2014-07-29 10:58 ` David Drysdale
[not found] ` <CAHse=S_w4+AMuc=-XbAK_PiaD56_ks13R53RENMHif5KRN_Kiw-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2014-07-30 6:22 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-07-30 14:51 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-25 13:47 ` [PATCH 06/11] capsicum: implement sockfd_lookupr() David Drysdale
2014-07-25 13:47 ` [PATCH 07/11] capsicum: convert callers to use sockfd_lookupr() etc David Drysdale
2014-07-25 13:47 ` [PATCH 08/11] capsicum: invoke Capsicum on FD/file conversion David Drysdale
2014-07-25 13:47 ` [PATCH 11/11] seccomp: Add tgid and tid into seccomp_data David Drysdale
2014-07-25 15:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-25 17:10 ` Kees Cook
2014-07-25 17:18 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-25 17:38 ` Kees Cook
[not found] ` <CAGXu5jLPrKA5LR-9=M6jAfPXYoztGzXPiaSiXgEcUE=+na73GA-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2014-07-25 18:24 ` Julien Tinnes
[not found] ` <CAKyRK=j-f92xHTL3+TNr9WOv_y47dkZR=WZkpY_a5YW3Q8HfaQ@mail.gmail.com>
2014-07-25 18:32 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <CALCETrWrCU1bw+-xP_xxoRfv6L7j+GhZS_YwrWFHd2uhSp8ySw-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2014-07-27 12:10 ` David Drysdale
2014-07-27 12:09 ` David Drysdale
2014-07-28 21:18 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87vbqhp4hf.fsf-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
2014-07-30 4:05 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
[not found] ` <CALCETrWaUsi1Ea3YTXLN6BFqcoHnbFTuMvcNncS5rq0nSgOatA-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2014-07-30 4:08 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-07-30 4:35 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <8761ifie81.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
[not found] ` <8761ifie81.fsf-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
2014-07-30 14:52 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-25 13:47 ` [PATCH 1/6] open.2: describe O_BENEATH flag David Drysdale
2014-07-25 13:47 ` [PATCH 2/6] capsicum.7: describe Capsicum capability framework David Drysdale
2014-07-25 13:47 ` [PATCH 3/6] rights.7: Describe Capsicum primary rights David Drysdale
2014-07-25 13:47 ` [PATCH 4/6] cap_rights_limit.2: limit FD rights for Capsicum David Drysdale
2014-07-25 13:47 ` [PATCH 5/6] cap_rights_get.2: retrieve Capsicum fd rights David Drysdale
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