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From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"H . J . Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>,
	kcc@google.com, eranian@google.com, rppt@kernel.org,
	jamorris@linux.microsoft.com, dethoma@microsoft.com,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com,
	christina.schimpe@intel.com, Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>,
	Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 07/39] x86: Add user control-protection fault handler
Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2022 17:19:32 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <Y6HglBhrccduDTQA@zn.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221203003606.6838-8-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>

On Fri, Dec 02, 2022 at 04:35:34PM -0800, Rick Edgecombe wrote:
> From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
> 
> A control-protection fault is triggered when a control-flow transfer
> attempt violates Shadow Stack or Indirect Branch Tracking constraints.
> For example, the return address for a RET instruction differs from the copy
> on the shadow stack.
> 
> There already exists a control-protection fault handler for handling kernel
> IBT. Refactor this fault handler into sparate user and kernel handlers,

Unknown word [sparate] in commit message.
Suggestions: ['separate', 

You could use a spellchecker with your commit messages so that it
catches all those typos.

...

> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
> index 8b83d8fbce71..e35c70dc1afb 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
> @@ -213,12 +213,7 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY(exc_overflow)
>  	do_error_trap(regs, 0, "overflow", X86_TRAP_OF, SIGSEGV, 0, NULL);
>  }
>  
> -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT
> -
> -static __ro_after_init bool ibt_fatal = true;
> -
> -extern void ibt_selftest_ip(void); /* code label defined in asm below */
> -
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET
>  enum cp_error_code {
>  	CP_EC        = (1 << 15) - 1,
>  
> @@ -231,15 +226,87 @@ enum cp_error_code {
>  	CP_ENCL	     = 1 << 15,
>  };
>  
> -DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(exc_control_protection)
> +static const char control_protection_err[][10] = {

You already use the "cp_" prefix for the other things, might as well use
it here too.

> +	[0] = "unknown",
> +	[1] = "near ret",
> +	[2] = "far/iret",
> +	[3] = "endbranch",
> +	[4] = "rstorssp",
> +	[5] = "setssbsy",
> +};
> +
> +static const char *cp_err_string(unsigned long error_code)
> +{
> +	unsigned int cpec = error_code & CP_EC;
> +
> +	if (cpec >= ARRAY_SIZE(control_protection_err))
> +		cpec = 0;
> +	return control_protection_err[cpec];
> +}
> +
> +static void do_unexpected_cp(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
> +{
> +	WARN_ONCE(1, "Unexpected %s #CP, error_code: %s\n",
> +		     user_mode(regs) ? "user mode" : "kernel mode",
> +		     cp_err_string(error_code));
> +}
> +#endif /* CONFIG_X86_CET */
> +
> +void do_user_cp_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code);

What's that forward declaration for?

In any case, push it into traps.h pls.

I gotta say, I'm not a big fan of that ifdeffery here. Do we really
really need it?

> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK
> +static DEFINE_RATELIMIT_STATE(cpf_rate, DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_INTERVAL,
> +			      DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_BURST);
> +
> +void do_user_cp_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
>  {
> -	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) {
> -		pr_err("Unexpected #CP\n");
> -		BUG();
> +	struct task_struct *tsk;
> +	unsigned long ssp;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * An exception was just taken from userspace. Since interrupts are disabled
> +	 * here, no scheduling should have messed with the registers yet and they
> +	 * will be whatever is live in userspace. So read the SSP before enabling
> +	 * interrupts so locking the fpregs to do it later is not required.
> +	 */
> +	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, ssp);
> +
> +	cond_local_irq_enable(regs);
> +
> +	tsk = current;
> +	tsk->thread.error_code = error_code;
> +	tsk->thread.trap_nr = X86_TRAP_CP;
> +
> +	/* Ratelimit to prevent log spamming. */
> +	if (show_unhandled_signals && unhandled_signal(tsk, SIGSEGV) &&
> +	    __ratelimit(&cpf_rate)) {
> +		pr_emerg("%s[%d] control protection ip:%lx sp:%lx ssp:%lx error:%lx(%s)%s",
> +			 tsk->comm, task_pid_nr(tsk),
> +			 regs->ip, regs->sp, ssp, error_code,
> +			 cp_err_string(error_code),
> +			 error_code & CP_ENCL ? " in enclave" : "");
> +		print_vma_addr(KERN_CONT " in ", regs->ip);
> +		pr_cont("\n");
>  	}
>  
> -	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(user_mode(regs) || (error_code & CP_EC) != CP_ENDBR))
> +	force_sig_fault(SIGSEGV, SEGV_CPERR, (void __user *)0);
> +	cond_local_irq_disable(regs);
> +}
> +#endif
> +
> +void do_kernel_cp_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code);
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT
> +static __ro_after_init bool ibt_fatal = true;
> +
> +extern void ibt_selftest_ip(void); /* code label defined in asm below */

Yeah, pls put that comment above the function. Side comments are nasty.

Thx.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette

  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-12-20 16:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 107+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-12-03  0:35 [PATCH v4 00/39] Shadow stacks for userspace Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 01/39] Documentation/x86: Add CET shadow stack description Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:20   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03  8:58   ` Bagas Sanjaya
2022-12-05 21:20     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 02/39] x86/shstk: Add Kconfig option for Shadow Stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:20   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 03/39] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPU feature flags for shadow stacks Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:22   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-07 11:00   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-07 22:35     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-08 11:10       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 04/39] x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:23   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-07 12:49   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-07 18:35     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 05/39] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:24   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-20 11:32   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-21  0:45     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 06/39] x86/fpu: Add helper for modifying xstate Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:25   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-20 12:04   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-21  0:03     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-21 10:31       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 07/39] x86: Add user control-protection fault handler Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:28   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-20 16:19   ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2022-12-21  0:37     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-21 10:41       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-21 21:42         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-04 12:50           ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-20 21:21   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-21  0:38     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 08/39] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:29   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-20 19:11   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 09/39] x86/mm: Move pmd_write(), pud_write() up in the file Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 10/39] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:31   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-20 21:29   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-21  0:45     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 11/39] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:31   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-27 11:42   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-27 23:31     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-04 13:25       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-01-05  1:06         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 12/39] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:32   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-27 13:26   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-27 22:26     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-04 13:28       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 13/39] x86/mm: Start actually marking _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:33   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 14/39] mm: Move VM_UFFD_MINOR_BIT from 37 to 38 Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 15/39] mm: Introduce VM_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack memory Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:34   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 16/39] x86/mm: Check Shadow Stack page fault errors Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-04 14:32   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-01-05  1:29     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 17/39] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:34   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 18/39] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:37   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 19/39] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 20/39] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:38   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 21/39] mm/mprotect: Exclude shadow stack from preserve_write Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:38   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 22/39] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap() Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 23/39] mm: Don't allow write GUPs to shadow stack memory Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:39   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 24/39] mm: Warn on shadow stack memory in wrong vma Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:40   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 25/39] x86: Introduce userspace API for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:42   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 26/39] x86/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:43   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 27/39] x86/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:44   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 28/39] x86/shstk: Introduce routines modifying shstk Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:45   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 29/39] x86/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:46   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 30/39] x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:51   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-05 22:19     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 31/39] x86/shstk: Support wrss for userspace Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:52   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 32/39] x86: Expose thread features in /proc/$PID/status Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:52   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03  0:36 ` [PATCH v4 33/39] x86: Prevent 32 bit operations for 64 bit shstk tasks Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 22:49   ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-12-04 20:51     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-15  0:25       ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03  0:36 ` [PATCH v4 34/39] x86/shstk: Wire in shadow stack interface Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  0:36 ` [PATCH v4 35/39] selftests/x86: Add shadow stack test Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  0:36 ` [PATCH v4 36/39] x86/fpu: Add helper for initing features Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  0:36 ` [PATCH v4 37/39] x86: Add PTRACE interface for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:55   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-09 17:04   ` Mike Rapoport
2022-12-09 17:08     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03  0:36 ` [PATCH v4 38/39] x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_UNLOCK Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:56   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03  0:36 ` [PATCH v4 39/39] x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_STATUS Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:57   ` Kees Cook

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