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[95.82.160.96]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id ffacd0b85a97d-38f258dd5acsm12253193f8f.35.2025.02.17.04.09.44 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Mon, 17 Feb 2025 04:09:44 -0800 (PST) From: Jiri Olsa X-Google-Original-From: Jiri Olsa Date: Mon, 17 Feb 2025 13:09:43 +0100 To: Andy Lutomirski , Kees Cook Cc: Jiri Olsa , Steven Rostedt , Masami Hiramatsu , Oleg Nesterov , Peter Zijlstra , Andrii Nakryiko , Eyal Birger , stable@vger.kernel.org, Jann Horn , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Deepak Gupta , Stephen Rothwell Subject: Re: [PATCHv3 perf/core] uprobes: Harden uretprobe syscall trampoline check Message-ID: References: <20250212220433.3624297-1-jolsa@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-api@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: On Thu, Feb 13, 2025 at 09:58:29AM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > On Thu, Feb 13, 2025 at 1:16 AM Jiri Olsa wrote: > > > > On Wed, Feb 12, 2025 at 05:37:11PM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > > > On Wed, Feb 12, 2025 at 2:04 PM Jiri Olsa wrote: > > > > > > > > Jann reported [1] possible issue when trampoline_check_ip returns > > > > address near the bottom of the address space that is allowed to > > > > call into the syscall if uretprobes are not set up. > > > > > > > > Though the mmap minimum address restrictions will typically prevent > > > > creating mappings there, let's make sure uretprobe syscall checks > > > > for that. > > > > > > It would be a layering violation, but we could perhaps do better here: > > > > > > > - if (regs->ip != trampoline_check_ip()) > > > > + /* Make sure the ip matches the only allowed sys_uretprobe caller. */ > > > > + if (unlikely(regs->ip != trampoline_check_ip(tramp))) > > > > goto sigill; > > > > > > Instead of SIGILL, perhaps this should do the seccomp action? So the > > > logic in seccomp would be (sketchily, with some real mode1 mess): > > > > > > if (is_a_real_uretprobe()) > > > skip seccomp; > > > > IIUC you want to move the address check earlier to the seccomp path.. > > with the benefit that we would kill not allowed caller sooner? > > The benefit would be that seccomp users that want to do something > other than killing a process (returning an error code, getting > notified, etc) could retain that functionality without the new > automatic hole being poked for uretprobe() in cases where uprobes > aren't in use or where the calling address doesn't match the uprobe > trampoline. IOW it would reduce the scope to which we're making > seccomp behave unexpectedly. Kees, any thoughts about this approach? thanks, jirka > > > > > jirka > > > > > > > > where is_a_real_uretprobe() is only true if the nr and arch match > > > uretprobe *and* the address is right. > > > > > > --Andy > >