From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9E4DDC433FE for ; Thu, 7 Oct 2021 19:00:06 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 89F8F6113E for ; Thu, 7 Oct 2021 19:00:06 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S243842AbhJGTB7 (ORCPT ); Thu, 7 Oct 2021 15:01:59 -0400 Received: from smtp-42af.mail.infomaniak.ch ([84.16.66.175]:55095 "EHLO smtp-42af.mail.infomaniak.ch" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S243799AbhJGTB6 (ORCPT ); Thu, 7 Oct 2021 15:01:58 -0400 X-Greylist: delayed 2182 seconds by postgrey-1.27 at vger.kernel.org; Thu, 07 Oct 2021 15:01:57 EDT Received: from smtp-2-0001.mail.infomaniak.ch (unknown [10.5.36.108]) by smtp-2-3000.mail.infomaniak.ch (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4HQLH64cp8zMrCZw; Thu, 7 Oct 2021 21:00:02 +0200 (CEST) Received: from ns3096276.ip-94-23-54.eu (unknown [23.97.221.149]) by smtp-2-0001.mail.infomaniak.ch (Postfix) with ESMTPA id 4HQLH40zbkzlh8TG; Thu, 7 Oct 2021 21:00:00 +0200 (CEST) Subject: Re: [PATCH v12 0/3] Add trusted_for(2) (was O_MAYEXEC) To: Mimi Zohar , Kees Cook Cc: bauen1 , akpm@linux-foundation.org, arnd@arndb.de, casey@schaufler-ca.com, christian.brauner@ubuntu.com, christian@python.org, corbet@lwn.net, cyphar@cyphar.com, deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com, dvyukov@google.com, ebiggers@kernel.org, ericchiang@google.com, fweimer@redhat.com, geert@linux-m68k.org, jack@suse.cz, jannh@google.com, jmorris@namei.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, luto@kernel.org, madvenka@linux.microsoft.com, mjg59@google.com, mszeredi@redhat.com, mtk.manpages@gmail.com, nramas@linux.microsoft.com, philippe.trebuchet@ssi.gouv.fr, scottsh@microsoft.com, sgrubb@redhat.com, shuah@kernel.org, steve.dower@python.org, thibaut.sautereau@clip-os.org, vincent.strubel@ssi.gouv.fr, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, willy@infradead.org References: <20201203173118.379271-1-mic@digikod.net> <2a4cf50c-7e79-75d1-7907-8218e669f7fa@digikod.net> <202110061500.B8F821C@keescook> <4c4bbd74-0599-fed5-0340-eff197bafeb1@digikod.net> <7ee6ba1200b854fc6012b0cec49849f7c0789f42.camel@linux.ibm.com> From: =?UTF-8?Q?Micka=c3=abl_Sala=c3=bcn?= Message-ID: Date: Thu, 7 Oct 2021 21:00:33 +0200 User-Agent: MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <7ee6ba1200b854fc6012b0cec49849f7c0789f42.camel@linux.ibm.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-15 Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-api@vger.kernel.org On 07/10/2021 20:37, Mimi Zohar wrote: > On Thu, 2021-10-07 at 20:29 +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote: >> On 07/10/2021 00:03, Kees Cook wrote: >>> On Fri, Apr 09, 2021 at 07:15:42PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote: >>>> There was no new reviews, probably because the FS maintainers were busy, >>>> and I was focused on Landlock (which is now in -next), but I plan to >>>> send a new patch series for trusted_for(2) soon. >>> >>> Hi! >>> >>> Did this ever happen? It looks like it's in good shape, and I think it's >>> a nice building block for userspace to have. Are you able to rebase and >>> re-send this? >> >> I just sent it: >> https://lore.kernel.org/all/20211007182321.872075-1-mic@digikod.net/ >> >> Some Signed-off-by would be appreciated. :) >> > >>>From the cover letter, > > It is important to note that this can only enable to extend access > control managed by the kernel. Hence it enables current access control > mechanism to be extended and become a superset of what they can > currently control. Indeed, the security policy could also be delegated > to an LSM, either a MAC system or an integrity system. For instance, > this is required to close a major IMA measurement/appraisal interpreter > integrity gap by bringing the ability to check the use of scripts [1]. > Other uses are expected, such as for magic-links [2], SGX integration > [3], bpffs [4]. > >>>From a quick review of the code, I don't see a new security hook being > defined to cover these use cases. Indeed, there is no new hook because it would require to implement it with a current LSM. This first step is a standalone implementation that is useful as-is but open the way to add a new LSM hook in this new syscall. That would be a second step for any LSM developer to implement if interested. > > thanks, > > Mimi > >>> >>> I've tended to aim these things at akpm if Al gets busy. (And since >>> you've had past review from Al, that should be hopefully sufficient.) >>> >>> Thanks for chasing this! >>> >>> -Kees >>> > >