From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: James Morris Subject: Re: [PATCH V34 09/29] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 04:14:30 +1000 (AEST) Message-ID: References: <20190622000358.19895-1-matthewgarrett@google.com> <20190622000358.19895-10-matthewgarrett@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Return-path: In-Reply-To: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: "kexec" Errors-To: kexec-bounces+glkk-kexec=m.gmane.org-IAPFreCvJWM7uuMidbF8XUB+6BGkLq7r@public.gmane.org To: Matthew Garrett Cc: Jiri Bohac , Linux API , kexec-IAPFreCvJWM7uuMidbF8XUB+6BGkLq7r@public.gmane.org, Linux Kernel Mailing List , David Howells , LSM List List-Id: linux-api@vger.kernel.org On Thu, 27 Jun 2019, Matthew Garrett wrote: > By that metric, on a secure boot system how do we determine that code > running in the firmware environment wasn't compromised before it > launched the initial signed kernel? Remote attestation tied to a hardware root of trust, before allowing access to any further resources. -- James Morris