From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1795119260; b=gGdr8ENWI0q8Z6e4Fq7fdHurMPtR5uz2N4r52+JklqU//ZSchlSQiKTBGbPLUdwgMDNG 0bYs5yWvouIRQorbu9e8EOgcvqcxq7PXhLdg+Uv6cv+gMotu3iweSetTjJDtpls8Ts2zi CTwOIxsWumJrcp72h5goWuoQFMXfraOZgkHd3XjiqSYF4Pg/60+7nbLDGWr0q6DzrCMRn qnOYVe7bDdErcU43r7CCX7brE63IGnjVCiUSZWfkkXrHty/DaTQ264PVY23WfOktFL+gQ sKKCT7OTo41M/UmwB6NJP4JzMIxF6DkBHdNyxICT/s0vsUrGCeCnsfIB8TAzlPcxQdg== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1795119260; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID: References:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; bh=ztZOYDDj4YBSqYLNwQGp2fMnE23YsKtU2LeiU8/UQwE=; b=06irUZf2HB4Ectvcdb7wvcVagxxHKrs5DvB8x7t7J+g0umphTzd8llX3kj2BSe3nYVkh iXSjIl0g0X140S3DehYnfuv/kr91xb2JGp1bu59V9iPBZ/YQ1cE+jSnajnLEpGxuuGJL8 qNwlAJjBIKLP2sICv/kNBNFw+G5ZzCL6qpi8WyiCviU4WqdmvXLHj8z6eLC6vX8HazSfX GD70vJwZUcr/CQM7smvFTFXr47LoUSBY2e/cywfSs/4r6wwMvbAy/fBjwbHt3SdjtXffK YApbK24sE+iOS/nQQ2U3WGDFA1eBgnidm5w9mtv1tJ9Uv4uJMcsNmknIcwhq9T80ouA== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=mNSYDVjJ; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with UTF8SMTPS id 479D0606A320; Thu, 19 Nov 2026 20:14:20 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=mNSYDVjJ Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with UTF8SMTPSA id 9941C1F000C0; Thu, 19 Nov 2026 20:14:19 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1795119260; bh=ztZOYDDj4YBSqYLNwQGp2fMnE23YsKtU2LeiU8/UQwE=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To; b=mNSYDVjJ/BEzpaUbevR2cNTUAwuX81DGs1T+9sVKjtaxqcTSGfvEPldgdpP7Jchji jqpAwSVXHOuhZ5aY45s9O9/0dgEPRPZniI/JiMbsnRUlbivecIuPENcjQqdjVBDKMp ekjPDsS5ooFm3VuggwXme6iPKovVVyVVkrEajuUi3jLY+wMwI1h/m47qU+VP6NkvTy OJdcoCeBw7o0G6JmK1KtFdtqiC+TMVFiC8s6nHvMHqMFbv5kUCCyPJ3qOPEzuA1gPs 3pgHdelX/ywey3HjBAONozyA2zIkL89dLrU7ld9cbhT8mPqGmYi5dUa7nyPLlXjqpk YjQ8Z6Y9pHgwA== Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2026 22:14:16 +0200 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: "Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson" Cc: Christian Brauner , Serge Hallyn , Andy Lutomirski , Paul Moore , James Morris , David Howells , Kees Cook , Jonathan Corbet , Shuah Khan , Randy Dunlap , =?iso-8859-1?Q?Micka=EBl_Sala=FCn?= , Jonathan Calmels , Jann Horn , =?iso-8859-1?Q?G=FCnther?= Noack , KP Singh , Casey Schaufler , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, containers@lists.linux.dev, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/4] userns: introduce capability bounding set for user namespaces Message-ID: References: <20261119104208.782900-1-halg@google.com> <20261119104208.782900-2-halg@google.com> X-Mailing-List: linux-api@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: On Thu, Nov 19, 2026 at 07:19:53PM +0000, Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson wrote: > On Thu, Nov 19, 2026 at 05:05:26PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > On Thu, Nov 19, 2026 at 10:42:05AM +0000, Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson wrote: > > > static void set_cred_user_ns(struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *user_ns) > > > > I read the diff through but this led me to dead end. Cannot find this > > function from anywhere. I look the changes again once this is sorted > > out becaus this is interesting. > > > > I wanted to look at the call site to understand how cap_bset gets set, > > which is not now possible but I do get the gist and agree with it. > > Thanks for taking a look. The series is based on v7.4-rc1 and > set_cred_user_ns() lives in kernel/user_namespace.c, where it is called > from create_user_ns() and userns_install(). ns->cap_bset itself is > initialized in create_user_ns() right before calling set_cred_user_ns(). > > > I'd figure getting this relates to my rootns patches (perhas). One key > > mechanism for me resolving the unprivileged in my use case is > > MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS [1], which is orthogonal but just pointing out > > the problem space. > > From a quick look, they appear complementary. Being able to do more > setup operations from the outside generally aligns with bounding > capabilities inside the user namespace. > > > I read through https://lwn.net/Articles/978846/ to understand the topic > > overall. Just mentionining as a possible addition to the cover letter > > (not a priority/necessity). > > That LWN article is actually linked in the cover letter as [2]. > > > Hope these help and can be kept in the loop :-) > > Will do, I'll keep you CC'd on future revisions. Thank you. Br, Jarkko