From: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
To: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
luto@kernel.org, mgorman@techsingularity.net,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, arnd@arndb.de
Subject: Re: [PATCH 08/10] x86, pkeys: default to a restrictive init PKRU
Date: Mon, 1 Aug 2016 16:42:51 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <cd74ae8b-36e4-a397-e36f-fe3d4281d400@suse.cz> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160729163021.F3C25D4A@viggo.jf.intel.com>
On 07/29/2016 06:30 PM, Dave Hansen wrote:
> From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
>
> PKRU is the register that lets you disallow writes or all access
> to a given protection key.
>
> The XSAVE hardware defines an "init state" of 0 for PKRU: its
> most permissive state, allowing access/writes to everything.
> Since we start off all new processes with the init state, we
> start all processes off with the most permissive possible PKRU.
>
> This is unfortunate. If a thread is clone()'d [1] before a
> program has time to set PKRU to a restrictive value, that thread
> will be able to write to all data, no matter what pkey is set on
> it. This weakens any integrity guarantees that we want pkeys to
> provide.
>
> To fix this, we define a very restrictive PKRU to override the
> XSAVE-provided value when we create a new FPU context. We choose
> a value that only allows access to pkey 0, which is as
> restrictive as we can practically make it.
>
> This does not cause any practical problems with applications
> using protection keys because we require them to specify initial
> permissions for each key when it is allocated, which override the
> restrictive default.
Here you mean the init_access_rights parameter of pkey_alloc()? So will
children of fork() after that pkey_alloc() inherit the new value or go
default?
> In the end, this ensures that threads which do not know how to
> manage their own pkey rights can not do damage to data which is
> pkey-protected.
>
> 1. I would have thought this was a pretty contrived scenario,
> except that I heard a bug report from an MPX user who was
> creating threads in some very early code before main(). It
> may be crazy, but folks evidently _do_ it.
>
> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-08-01 14:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-07-29 16:30 [PATCH 00/10] [v6] System Calls for Memory Protection Keys Dave Hansen
2016-07-29 16:30 ` [PATCH 01/10] x86, pkeys: add fault handling for PF_PK page fault bit Dave Hansen
2016-07-29 16:30 ` [PATCH 02/10] mm: implement new pkey_mprotect() system call Dave Hansen
2016-07-29 16:30 ` [PATCH 03/10] x86, pkeys: make mprotect_key() mask off additional vm_flags Dave Hansen
2016-07-29 16:30 ` [PATCH 04/10] x86, pkeys: allocation/free syscalls Dave Hansen
[not found] ` <20160729163009.5EC1D38C-LXbPSdftPKxrdx17CPfAsdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>
2016-07-29 16:30 ` [PATCH 05/10] x86: wire up protection keys system calls Dave Hansen
2016-07-29 16:30 ` [PATCH 06/10] generic syscalls: wire up memory protection keys syscalls Dave Hansen
2016-07-29 16:30 ` [PATCH 07/10] pkeys: add details of system call use to Documentation/ Dave Hansen
2016-07-29 16:30 ` [PATCH 08/10] x86, pkeys: default to a restrictive init PKRU Dave Hansen
2016-07-29 17:29 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-29 17:50 ` Dave Hansen
2016-07-29 19:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-01 14:42 ` Vlastimil Babka [this message]
2016-08-01 14:58 ` Dave Hansen
2016-08-02 8:20 ` Vlastimil Babka
2016-07-29 16:30 ` [PATCH 09/10] x86, pkeys: allow configuration of init_pkru Dave Hansen
2016-08-02 8:28 ` Vlastimil Babka
2016-08-02 14:37 ` Dave Hansen
2016-07-29 16:30 ` [PATCH 10/10] x86, pkeys: add self-tests Dave Hansen
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2016-08-08 23:18 [PATCH 00/10] [v6] System Calls for Memory Protection Keys Dave Hansen
2016-08-08 23:18 ` [PATCH 08/10] x86, pkeys: default to a restrictive init PKRU Dave Hansen
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