From: Demi Marie Obenour <demiobenour@gmail.com>
To: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>, Alyssa Ross <hi@alyssa.is>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
jlayton@kernel.org, Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org>,
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
shuah@kernel.org, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.pizza>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: Safety of resolving untrusted paths with detached mount dirfd
Date: Wed, 19 Nov 2025 21:39:36 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <cdf9deb2-7a09-48c5-97e2-2ea6d5901882@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2025-11-20-limber-salted-luncheon-scads-7AT044@cyphar.com>
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On 11/19/25 21:18, Aleksa Sarai wrote:
> On 2025-11-19, Alyssa Ross <hi@alyssa.is> wrote:
>> Hello,
>>
>> As we know, it's not safe to use chroot() for resolving untrusted paths
>> within some root, as a subdirectory could be moved outside of the
>> process root while walking the path[1]. On the other hand,
>> LOOKUP_BENEATH is supposed to be robust against this, and going by [2],
>> it sounds like resolving with the mount namespace root as dirfd should
>> also be.
>>
>> My question is: would resolving an untrusted path against a detached
>> mount root dirfd opened with OPEN_TREE_CLONE (not necessarily a
>> filesystem root) also be expected to be robust against traversal issues?
>> i.e. can I rely on an untrusted path never resolving to a path that
>> isn't under the mount root?
>
> No, if you hit an absolute symlink or use an absolute path it will
> resolve to your current->fs->root (mount namespace root or chroot).
> However, OPEN_TREE_CLONE will stop ".." from naively stepping out of the
> detached bind-mount. If you are dealing with procfs then magic-links can
> also jump out.
Is using open_tree_attr() with MOUNT_ATTR_NOSYMFOLLOW enough to prevent
these? Will it still provide protection even if someone concurrently
renames one of the files out from under the root? I know that can
escape a chroot, but I wonder if this provides more guarantees.
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/main/QSBs/qsb-014-2015.txt
was the chroot breakout.
> You can always use RESOLVE_BENEATH or RESOLVE_IN_ROOT in combination
> with OPEN_TREE_CLONE.
Unfortunately not everything supports that. For instance, mkdirat()
doesn't.
--
Sincerely,
Demi Marie Obenour (she/her/hers)
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-11-20 2:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-11-19 13:46 Safety of resolving untrusted paths with detached mount dirfd Alyssa Ross
2025-11-19 18:34 ` David Laight
2025-11-20 2:18 ` Aleksa Sarai
2025-11-20 2:39 ` Demi Marie Obenour [this message]
2025-11-20 9:24 ` Aleksa Sarai
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