From: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>, Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
linux-audit@redhat.com, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
John Crispin <john@phrozen.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 2/4] seccomp: Add sysctl to configure actions that should be logged
Date: Thu, 16 Feb 2017 12:40:23 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <db7949f6-b0a7-f078-ead4-fd48978bc082@canonical.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5j+xttArLAuSFHGMB8BqZ7tNrELmSFascGYPgDmwcorStw@mail.gmail.com>
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On 02/15/2017 07:10 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 13, 2017 at 7:55 PM, Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> wrote:
>> diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
>> index e36dfe9..270a227 100644
>> --- a/kernel/seccomp.c
>> +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
>> @@ -509,6 +509,22 @@ static void seccomp_send_sigsys(int syscall, int reason)
>> }
>> #endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */
>>
>> +static u32 seccomp_log_max_action = SECCOMP_RET_KILL;
>> +
>> +static inline void seccomp_log(unsigned long syscall, long signr, u32 action)
>> +{
>> + /* Force an audit message to be emitted when the action is not greater
>> + * than the configured maximum action.
>> + */
>> + if (action <= seccomp_log_max_action)
>> + return __audit_seccomp(syscall, signr, action);
>> +
>> + /* Let the audit subsystem decide if the action should be audited based
>> + * on whether the current task itself is being audited.
>> + */
>
> Nitpick on comment style, please use:
>
> /*
> * line 1
> * line 2...
> */
No problem.
>
>> + return audit_seccomp(syscall, signr, action);
>> +}
>> +
>> /*
>> * Secure computing mode 1 allows only read/write/exit/sigreturn.
>> * To be fully secure this must be combined with rlimit
>> @@ -534,7 +550,7 @@ static void __secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall)
>> #ifdef SECCOMP_DEBUG
>> dump_stack();
>> #endif
>> - audit_seccomp(this_syscall, SIGKILL, SECCOMP_RET_KILL);
>> + seccomp_log(this_syscall, SIGKILL, SECCOMP_RET_KILL);
>> do_exit(SIGKILL);
>> }
>>
>> @@ -633,18 +649,30 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd,
>> return 0;
>>
>> case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW:
>> + /* Open-coded seccomp_log(), optimized for the RET_ALLOW hot
>> + * path.
>> + *
>> + * We only want to log RET_ALLOW actions when the admin has
>> + * configured them to be logged via the log_max_action sysctl.
>> + * Therefore, call __audit_seccomp() directly so that RET_ALLOW
>> + * actions are not audited simply because the task is being
>> + * audited.
>> + */
>> + if (unlikely(seccomp_log_max_action == SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW))
>> + __audit_seccomp(this_syscall, 0, action);
>> +
>> return 0;
>>
>> case SECCOMP_RET_KILL:
>> default:
>> - audit_seccomp(this_syscall, SIGSYS, action);
>> + seccomp_log(this_syscall, SIGSYS, action);
>> do_exit(SIGSYS);
>> }
>>
>> unreachable();
>>
>> skip:
>> - audit_seccomp(this_syscall, 0, action);
>> + seccomp_log(this_syscall, 0, action);
>> return -1;
>> }
>> #else
>> @@ -917,12 +945,96 @@ long seccomp_get_filter(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long filter_off,
>> #define SECCOMP_RET_TRACE_NAME "trace"
>> #define SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW_NAME "allow"
>>
>> +/* Largest strlen() of all action names */
>> +#define SECCOMP_RET_MAX_NAME_LEN 5
>> +
>> static char seccomp_actions_avail[] = SECCOMP_RET_KILL_NAME " "
>> SECCOMP_RET_TRAP_NAME " "
>> SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO_NAME " "
>> SECCOMP_RET_TRACE_NAME " "
>> SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW_NAME;
>>
>> +struct seccomp_action_name {
>> + u32 action;
>> + const char *name;
>> +};
>> +
>> +static struct seccomp_action_name seccomp_action_names[] = {
>
> As long as I'm nit-picking, this can be const too. :)
I'll have to cast to a non-const pointer when assigning ctl_table.data
but I think that's fine in this case.
Tyler
>
> -Kees
>
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-02-16 18:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-02-14 3:55 [PATCH v4 0/4] Improved seccomp logging Tyler Hicks
2017-02-14 3:55 ` [PATCH v4 1/4] seccomp: Add sysctl to display available actions Tyler Hicks
2017-02-14 3:55 ` [PATCH v4 2/4] seccomp: Add sysctl to configure actions that should be logged Tyler Hicks
[not found] ` <1487044559-6351-3-git-send-email-tyhicks-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>
2017-02-16 1:10 ` Kees Cook
2017-02-16 18:40 ` Tyler Hicks [this message]
2017-02-16 22:21 ` Tyler Hicks
2017-02-14 3:55 ` [PATCH v4 3/4] seccomp: Create an action to log before allowing Tyler Hicks
2017-02-14 3:55 ` [PATCH v4 4/4] seccomp: Add tests for SECCOMP_RET_LOG Tyler Hicks
[not found] ` <1487044559-6351-5-git-send-email-tyhicks-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>
2017-02-16 1:13 ` Kees Cook
2017-02-16 18:42 ` Tyler Hicks
[not found] ` <1487044559-6351-1-git-send-email-tyhicks-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>
2017-02-16 1:17 ` [PATCH v4 0/4] Improved seccomp logging Kees Cook
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