* Re: [PATCH v25 12/12] LRNG - add interface for gathering of raw entropy
From: Stephan Müller @ 2019-11-21 15:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Nicolai Stange
Cc: Arnd Bergmann, Greg Kroah-Hartman, linux-crypto, LKML, linux-api,
Eric W. Biederman, Alexander E. Patrakov, Ahmed S. Darwish,
Theodore Y. Ts'o, Willy Tarreau, Matthew Garrett, Vito Caputo,
Andreas Dilger, Jan Kara, Ray Strode, William Jon McCann, zhangjs,
Andy Lutomirski, Florian Weimer, Lennart Poettering,
"Peter, Matthias" <matthias>
In-Reply-To: <87a78pl8xp.fsf@suse.de>
Am Donnerstag, 21. November 2019, 13:18:10 CET schrieb Nicolai Stange:
Hi Nicolai,
> Hi Stephan,
>
> two general remarks on debugfs usage below
>
> Stephan Müller <smueller@chronox.de> writes:
> > diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_testing.c
> > b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_testing.c new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..5c33d3bd2172
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_testing.c
>
> <snip>
>
> > +/*
> > + * This data structure holds the dentry's of the debugfs files
> > establishing + * the interface to user space.
> > + */
> > +struct lrng_raw_debugfs {
> > + struct dentry *lrng_raw_debugfs_root; /* root dentry */
> > + struct dentry *lrng_raw_debugfs_lrng_raw; /* .../lrng_raw */
> > +};
> > +
> > +static struct lrng_raw_debugfs lrng_raw_debugfs;
> > +
> > +/* DebugFS operations and definition of the debugfs files */
> > +static ssize_t lrng_raw_read(struct file *file, char __user *to,
> > + size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
> > +{
> > + loff_t pos = *ppos;
> > + int ret;
> > +
> > + if (!count)
> > + return 0;
> > + lrng_raw_entropy_init();
> > + ret = lrng_raw_extract_user(to, count);
> > + lrng_raw_entropy_fini();
> > + if (ret < 0)
> > + return ret;
> > + count -= ret;
> > + *ppos = pos + count;
> > + return ret;
> > +}
> > +
> > +/* Module init: allocate memory, register the debugfs files */
> > +static int lrng_raw_debugfs_init(void)
> > +{
> > + lrng_raw_debugfs.lrng_raw_debugfs_root =
> > + debugfs_create_dir(KBUILD_MODNAME, NULL);
> > + if (IS_ERR(lrng_raw_debugfs.lrng_raw_debugfs_root)) {
> > + lrng_raw_debugfs.lrng_raw_debugfs_root = NULL;
> > + return PTR_ERR(lrng_raw_debugfs.lrng_raw_debugfs_root);
> > + }
>
> I think pointers returned by the debugfs API are not supposed to get
> checked for NULL/IS_ERR(), c.f commit ff9fb72bc077 ("debugfs: return
> error values, not NULL") or the the output from
>
> git log --pretty=oneline | grep 'no need to check return value of
> debugfs_create'
>
> (Also the above code is dubious: you're effectively returning
> PTR_ERR(NULL)).
Removed the check compliant to the mentioned patches.
>
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static struct file_operations lrng_raw_name_fops = {
> > + .owner = THIS_MODULE,
> > + .read = lrng_raw_read,
> > +};
> > +
> > +static int lrng_raw_debugfs_init_name(void)
> > +{
> > + lrng_raw_debugfs.lrng_raw_debugfs_lrng_raw =
> > + debugfs_create_file("lrng_raw", 0400,
> > + lrng_raw_debugfs.lrng_raw_debugfs_root,
> > + NULL, &lrng_raw_name_fops);q
>
> CONFIG_LRNG_TESTING is a bool and thus, this debugfs file can't ever get
> removed. Even if it could, this inode hasn't got any data associated
> with it and so file removal would not be a problem for lrng_raw_read().
Correct.
>
> Please consider using debugfs_create_file_unsafe() instead to save
> debugfs from kmalloc()ing a proxy file_operations protecting your fops
> against concurrent file removal.
Yes, you are correct. Changed.
>
> > + if (IS_ERR(lrng_raw_debugfs.lrng_raw_debugfs_lrng_raw)) {
> > + lrng_raw_debugfs.lrng_raw_debugfs_lrng_raw = NULL;
> > + return PTR_ERR(lrng_raw_debugfs.lrng_raw_debugfs_lrng_raw);
> > + }
>
> Same comment regarding return value checking applies here.
Same here: I removed the check.
With that, I also removed the static variable to maintain the two dentries
following the examples seen in other kernel code. Also, the __exit function is
removed as we do not need it as you pointed out.
Thanks a lot.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Nicolai
>
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static int __init lrng_raw_init(void)
> > +{
> > + int ret = lrng_raw_debugfs_init();
> > +
> > + if (ret < 0)
> > + return ret;
> > +
> > + ret = lrng_raw_debugfs_init_name();
> > + if (ret < 0)
> > + debugfs_remove_recursive(
> > + lrng_raw_debugfs.lrng_raw_debugfs_root);
> > +
> > + return ret;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void __exit lrng_raw_exit(void)
> > +{
> > + debugfs_remove_recursive(lrng_raw_debugfs.lrng_raw_debugfs_root);
> > +}
> > +
> > +module_init(lrng_raw_init);
> > +module_exit(lrng_raw_exit);
> > +
> > +MODULE_LICENSE("Dual BSD/GPL");
> > +MODULE_AUTHOR("Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>");
> > +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Kernel module for gathering raw entropy");
Ciao
Stephan
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] block: add iostat counters for flush requests
From: Jens Axboe @ 2019-11-21 15:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Konstantin Khlebnikov, linux-block, linux-kernel, linux-doc
Cc: linux-fsdevel, linux-api, Dmitry Monakhov
In-Reply-To: <157433282607.7928.5202409984272248322.stgit@buzz>
On 11/21/19 3:40 AM, Konstantin Khlebnikov wrote:
> Requests that triggers flushing volatile writeback cache to disk (barriers)
> have significant effect to overall performance.
>
> Block layer has sophisticated engine for combining several flush requests
> into one. But there is no statistics for actual flushes executed by disk.
> Requests which trigger flushes usually are barriers - zero-size writes.
>
> This patch adds two iostat counters into /sys/class/block/$dev/stat and
> /proc/diskstats - count of completed flush requests and their total time.
This makes sense to me, and the "recent" discard addition already proved
that we're fine extending with more fields. Unless folks object, I'd be
happy to queue this up for 5.5.
--
Jens Axboe
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] block: add iostat counters for flush requests
From: Darrick J. Wong @ 2019-11-21 16:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jens Axboe
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov, linux-block, linux-kernel, linux-doc,
linux-fsdevel, linux-api, Dmitry Monakhov
In-Reply-To: <ff971ff6-9a10-c3f1-107d-4f7d378e8755@kernel.dk>
On Thu, Nov 21, 2019 at 08:56:14AM -0700, Jens Axboe wrote:
> On 11/21/19 3:40 AM, Konstantin Khlebnikov wrote:
> > Requests that triggers flushing volatile writeback cache to disk (barriers)
> > have significant effect to overall performance.
> >
> > Block layer has sophisticated engine for combining several flush requests
> > into one. But there is no statistics for actual flushes executed by disk.
> > Requests which trigger flushes usually are barriers - zero-size writes.
> >
> > This patch adds two iostat counters into /sys/class/block/$dev/stat and
> > /proc/diskstats - count of completed flush requests and their total time.
>
> This makes sense to me, and the "recent" discard addition already proved
> that we're fine extending with more fields. Unless folks object, I'd be
> happy to queue this up for 5.5.
Looks like a good addition to /me... :)
--D
> --
> Jens Axboe
>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] block: add iostat counters for flush requests
From: Jens Axboe @ 2019-11-21 16:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Darrick J. Wong
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov, linux-block, linux-kernel, linux-doc,
linux-fsdevel, linux-api, Dmitry Monakhov
In-Reply-To: <20191121160430.GJ6211@magnolia>
On 11/21/19 9:04 AM, Darrick J. Wong wrote:
> On Thu, Nov 21, 2019 at 08:56:14AM -0700, Jens Axboe wrote:
>> On 11/21/19 3:40 AM, Konstantin Khlebnikov wrote:
>>> Requests that triggers flushing volatile writeback cache to disk (barriers)
>>> have significant effect to overall performance.
>>>
>>> Block layer has sophisticated engine for combining several flush requests
>>> into one. But there is no statistics for actual flushes executed by disk.
>>> Requests which trigger flushes usually are barriers - zero-size writes.
>>>
>>> This patch adds two iostat counters into /sys/class/block/$dev/stat and
>>> /proc/diskstats - count of completed flush requests and their total time.
>>
>> This makes sense to me, and the "recent" discard addition already proved
>> that we're fine extending with more fields. Unless folks object, I'd be
>> happy to queue this up for 5.5.
>
> Looks like a good addition to /me... :)
That's all the encouragement I needed, added :-)
--
Jens Axboe
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCHv8 00/34] kernel: Introduce Time Namespace
From: Andrei Vagin @ 2019-11-21 18:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Dmitry Safonov
Cc: linux-kernel, Dmitry Safonov, Adrian Reber, Andrei Vagin,
Andy Lutomirski, Arnd Bergmann, Christian Brauner,
Cyrill Gorcunov, Eric W. Biederman, H. Peter Anvin, Ingo Molnar,
Jann Horn, Jeff Dike, Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Emelyanov, Shuah Khan,
Thomas Gleixner, Vincenzo Frascino, containers, criu, linux-api,
x86
In-Reply-To: <20191112012724.250792-1-dima@arista.com>
Hi Thomas,
What is your plan on this series? We know you are probably busy with
the next merge window. We just want to check that this is still in your
TODO list.
On Tue, Nov 12, 2019 at 01:26:49AM +0000, Dmitry Safonov wrote:
>
> v7..v8 Changes:
> * Fix compile-time errors:
> - on architectures without the support of time namespaces.
> - when CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS isn't set.
> * Added checks in selftests for CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS.
> * Inline do_hres and do_coarse.
> (And added Tested-by Vincenzo - thanks!)
> * Make TIME_NS depends on GENERIC_VDSO_TIME_NS and set it per-arch.
>
> [v1..v7 Changelogs is at the very bottom here]
>
> Our performance measurements show that the price of VDSO's clock_gettime()
> in a child time namespace is about 8% with a hot CPU cache and about 90%
Here is a typo. The price of VDSO's clock_gettime() in a child time
namespace is about 12% with a cold CPU cache. The table with
measurements for a cold CPU cache contains correct data.
> with a cold CPU cache. There is no performance regression for host
> processes outside time namespace on those tests.
>
....
>
> Cold CPU cache (lesser tsc per cycle - the better):
>
> | before | CONFIG_TIME_NS=n | host | inside timens
> --------------------------------------------------------------
> tsc | 476 | 480 | 487 | 531
> stdev(tsc) | 0.6 | 1.3 | 4.3 | 5.7
> diff (%) | 100 | 100.9 | 102 | 112
>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [RESEND RFC PATCH 0/1] CAP_SYS_NICE inside user namespace
From: Enrico Weigelt, metux IT consult @ 2019-11-21 18:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Prakash Sangappa, Jann Horn
Cc: kernel list, Linux API, Eric W. Biederman, Thomas Gleixner,
Peter Zijlstra, Serge E. Hallyn, Christian Brauner
In-Reply-To: <9a63f7ae-562e-67a6-8f40-050c58c08933@oracle.com>
On 18.11.19 21:34, Prakash Sangappa wrote:
> It is more the latter. Admin should be able to explicitly decide that
> container A
> workload is to be given priority over other containers.
I guess, you're talking about the host's admin, correct ?
Shouldn't this already be possibly by tweaking the container's cgroups ?
--mtx
--
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---
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---
Enrico Weigelt, metux IT consult
Free software and Linux embedded engineering
info@metux.net -- +49-151-27565287
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [RESEND RFC PATCH 1/1] Selectively allow CAP_SYS_NICE capability inside user namespaces
From: Eric W. Biederman @ 2019-11-21 21:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Prakash Sangappa; +Cc: linux-kernel, linux-api, tglx, peterz, serge
In-Reply-To: <1574096478-11520-2-git-send-email-prakash.sangappa@oracle.com>
Prakash Sangappa <prakash.sangappa@oracle.com> writes:
> Allow CAP_SYS_NICE to take effect for processes having effective uid of a
> root user from init namespace.
>
> Signed-off-by: Prakash Sangappa <prakash.sangappa@oracle.com>
> ---
> kernel/sched/core.c | 6 +++++-
> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c
> index 7880f4f..628bd46 100644
> --- a/kernel/sched/core.c
> +++ b/kernel/sched/core.c
> @@ -4548,6 +4548,8 @@ int can_nice(const struct task_struct *p, const int nice)
> int nice_rlim = nice_to_rlimit(nice);
>
> return (nice_rlim <= task_rlimit(p, RLIMIT_NICE) ||
> + (ns_capable(__task_cred(p)->user_ns, CAP_SYS_NICE) &&
> + uid_eq(current_euid(), GLOBAL_ROOT_UID)) ||
> capable(CAP_SYS_NICE));
> }
>
> @@ -4784,7 +4786,9 @@ static int __sched_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p,
> /*
> * Allow unprivileged RT tasks to decrease priority:
> */
> - if (user && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
> + if (user && !(ns_capable(__task_cred(p)->user_ns, CAP_SYS_NICE) &&
> + uid_eq(current_euid(), GLOBAL_ROOT_UID)) &&
> + !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
> if (fair_policy(policy)) {
> if (attr->sched_nice < task_nice(p) &&
> !can_nice(p, attr->sched_nice))
I remember looking at this before. I don't remember if I commented.
1) Having GLOBAL_ROOT_UID in a user namespace is A Bad Idea™.
Definitely not something we should make special case for.
That configuration is almost certainly a privilege escalation waiting
to happen.
2) If I read the other thread correctly there was talk about setting the
nice levels of processes in other containers. Ouch!
The only thing I can think that makes any sense at all is to allow
setting the nice levels of the processes in your own container.
I can totally see having a test to see if a processes credentials are
in the caller's user namespace or a child of caller's user namespace
and allowing admin level access if the caller has the appropriate
caps in their user namespace.
But in this case I don't see anything preventing the admin in a
container from using the ordinary nice levels on a task. You are
unlocking the nice levels reserved for the system administrator
for special occassions. I don't see how that makes any sense
to do from inside a container.
The design goal of user namespaces (assuming a non-buggy kernel) is to
ensure user namespaces give a user no more privileges than the user had
before creating a user namespace. In this case you are granting a user
who creates a user namespace the ability to change nice levels on all
process in the system (limited to users whose uid happens to be
GLOBAL_ROOT_UID). But still this is effectively a way to get
CAP_SYS_NICE back if it was dropped.
As a violation of security policy this change simply can not be allowed.
The entire idiom: "ns_capable(__task_cred(p)->user_ns, ...)" is a check
that provides no security.
Eric
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [RESEND RFC PATCH 1/1] Selectively allow CAP_SYS_NICE capability inside user namespaces
From: Prakash Sangappa @ 2019-11-22 1:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Eric W. Biederman; +Cc: linux-kernel, linux-api, tglx, peterz, serge
In-Reply-To: <87wobszzqi.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
On 11/21/19 1:27 PM, ebiederm@xmission.com wrote:
> Prakash Sangappa <prakash.sangappa@oracle.com> writes:
>
>> Allow CAP_SYS_NICE to take effect for processes having effective uid of a
>> root user from init namespace.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Prakash Sangappa <prakash.sangappa@oracle.com>
>> ---
>> kernel/sched/core.c | 6 +++++-
>> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c
>> index 7880f4f..628bd46 100644
>> --- a/kernel/sched/core.c
>> +++ b/kernel/sched/core.c
>> @@ -4548,6 +4548,8 @@ int can_nice(const struct task_struct *p, const int nice)
>> int nice_rlim = nice_to_rlimit(nice);
>>
>> return (nice_rlim <= task_rlimit(p, RLIMIT_NICE) ||
>> + (ns_capable(__task_cred(p)->user_ns, CAP_SYS_NICE) &&
>> + uid_eq(current_euid(), GLOBAL_ROOT_UID)) ||
>> capable(CAP_SYS_NICE));
>> }
>>
>> @@ -4784,7 +4786,9 @@ static int __sched_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p,
>> /*
>> * Allow unprivileged RT tasks to decrease priority:
>> */
>> - if (user && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
>> + if (user && !(ns_capable(__task_cred(p)->user_ns, CAP_SYS_NICE) &&
>> + uid_eq(current_euid(), GLOBAL_ROOT_UID)) &&
>> + !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
>> if (fair_policy(policy)) {
>> if (attr->sched_nice < task_nice(p) &&
>> !can_nice(p, attr->sched_nice))
>
> I remember looking at this before. I don't remember if I commented.
Thanks for looking at this.
>
> 1) Having GLOBAL_ROOT_UID in a user namespace is A Bad Idea™.
> Definitely not something we should make special case for.
> That configuration is almost certainly a privilege escalation waiting
> to happen.
Mapping root uid 0(GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) from init namespace into a user
namespace is allowed right now. so the proposal was to extend this to
allow capabilities like CAP_SYS_NICE to take effect which is lacking.
Understand encouraging use of GLOBAL_ROOT_UID for this purpose may not
be a good idea.
We could look at other means to grant such capabilities to user
namespace thru a per process /proc file like 'cap_map' or something as
suggested in the other thread. What do you think about this approach?
Only privileged user in init namespace gets to add an entry to this
file. We need to define if this gets inherited by any nested user
namespaces that get created.
> 2) If I read the other thread correctly there was talk about setting the
> nice levels of processes in other containers. Ouch!
No not in other containers. Only on processes with in the container
which as this capability. The use case is to use it in a container with
user namespace and pid namespace. So no processes from other containers
should be visible. Necessary checks should be added?.
>
> The only thing I can think that makes any sense at all is to allow
> setting the nice levels of the processes in your own container.
Yes that is the intended use.
>
> I can totally see having a test to see if a processes credentials are
> in the caller's user namespace or a child of caller's user namespace
> and allowing admin level access if the caller has the appropriate
> caps in their user namespace.
Ok
> But in this case I don't see anything preventing the admin in a
> container from using the ordinary nice levels on a task. You are
> unlocking the nice levels reserved for the system administrator
> for special occassions. I don't see how that makes any sense
> to do from inside a container.
But this is what seems to be lacking. A container could have some
critical processes running which need to run at a higher priority.
>
> The design goal of user namespaces (assuming a non-buggy kernel) is to
> ensure user namespaces give a user no more privileges than the user had
> before creating a user namespace. In this case you are granting a user
> who creates a user namespace the ability to change nice levels on all
> process in the system (limited to users whose uid happens to be
> GLOBAL_ROOT_UID). But still this is effectively a way to get
> CAP_SYS_NICE back if it was dropped.
Giving privileges to only to those user with root uid from init
namespace inside the user namespace(GLOBAL_ROOT_UID), or if not using
GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, then privilege granted thru the /proc mechanism as
mentioned above.
>
> As a violation of security policy this change simply can not be allowed.
> The entire idiom: "ns_capable(__task_cred(p)->user_ns, ...)" is a check
> that provides no security.
If the effect of allowing such privileges inside user namespace could be
controlled with use of Cgroups, even then would it be a concern?
-Prakash
> Eric
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [RESEND RFC PATCH 0/1] CAP_SYS_NICE inside user namespace
From: Prakash Sangappa @ 2019-11-22 1:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Enrico Weigelt, metux IT consult, Jann Horn
Cc: kernel list, Linux API, Eric W. Biederman, Thomas Gleixner,
Peter Zijlstra, Serge E. Hallyn, Christian Brauner
In-Reply-To: <c7949242-385f-3256-b290-87640acd0577@metux.net>
On 11/21/19 10:33 AM, Enrico Weigelt, metux IT consult wrote:
> On 18.11.19 21:34, Prakash Sangappa wrote:
>
>> It is more the latter. Admin should be able to explicitly decide that container A
>> workload is to be given priority over other containers.
> I guess, you're talking about the host's admin, correct ?
Yes, Specifically host's admin decides which container gets the
privilege to increase priority of processes inside that container.
>
> Shouldn't this already be possibly by tweaking the container's cgroups ?
Don't think so. The use case is that admin/user inside the container
needs to be able to increase the priority of some the critical processes
running in the container.
>
>
> --mtx
>
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH v26 00/12] /dev/random - a new approach with full SP800-90B
From: Stephan Müller @ 2019-11-23 20:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stephan Müller
Cc: Arnd Bergmann, Greg Kroah-Hartman, linux-crypto, LKML, linux-api,
Eric W. Biederman, Alexander E. Patrakov, Ahmed S. Darwish,
Theodore Y. Ts'o, Willy Tarreau, Matthew Garrett, Vito Caputo,
Andreas Dilger, Jan Kara, Ray Strode, William Jon McCann, zhangjs,
Andy Lutomirski, Florian Weimer, Lennart Poettering,
Nicolai Stange
In-Reply-To: <2787174.DQlWHN5GGo@positron.chronox.de>
Hi,
The following patch set provides a different approach to /dev/random which is
called Linux Random Number Generator (LRNG) to collect entropy within the Linux
kernel. The main improvements compared to the existing /dev/random is to provide
sufficient entropy during boot time as well as in virtual environments and when
using SSDs. A secondary design goal is to limit the impact of the entropy
collection on massive parallel systems and also allow the use accelerated
cryptographic primitives. Also, all steps of the entropic data processing are
testable.
The LRNG patch set allows a user to select use of the existing /dev/random or
the LRNG during compile time. As the LRNG provides API and ABI compatible
interfaces to the existing /dev/random implementation, the user can freely chose
the RNG implementation without affecting kernel or user space operations.
This patch set provides early boot-time entropy which implies that no
additional flags to the getrandom(2) system call discussed recently on
the LKML is considered to be necessary. Yet, if additional flags are
introduced to cover special hardware, the LRNG implementation will also
provide them to be fully ABI and API compliant as already discussed on
LKML.
The LRNG is fully compliant to SP800-90B requirements and is shipped with a
full SP800-90B assessment and all required test tools. The existing /dev/random
implementation on the other hand has architectural limitations which
does not easily allow to bring the implementation in compliance with
SP800-90B. The key statement that causes concern is SP800-90B section
3.1.6. This section denies crediting entropy to multiple similar noise
sources. This section explicitly references different noise sources resting
on the timing of events and their derivatives (i.e. it is a direct complaint
to the existing existing /dev/random implementation). Therefore, SP800-90B
now denies the very issue mentioned in [1] with the existing /dev/random
implementation for a long time: crediting entropy to interrupts as well as
crediting entropy to derivatives of interrupts (HID and disk events). This is
not permissible with SP800-90B.
SP800-90B specifies various requirements for the noise source(s) that seed any
DRNG including SP800-90A DRBGs. In about a year from now, SP800-90B will be
mandated for all noise sources that provide entropy to DRBGs as part of a FIPS
140-[2|3] validation or other evaluation types. That means, if we there are no
solutions to comply with the requirements of SP800-90B found till one year
from now, any random number generation and ciphers based on random numbers
on Linux will be considered and treated as not applicable and delivering
no entropy! As /dev/urandom, getrandom(2) and /dev/random are the most
common and prevalent noise sources for DRNGs, all these DRNGs are affected.
This applies across the board for all validations of cryptography executing on
Linux (kernel and user space modules).
For users that are not interested in SP800-90B, the entire code for the
compliance as well as test interfaces can be deselected at compile time.
The design and implementation is driven by a set of goals described in [1]
that the LRNG completely implements. Furthermore, [1] includes the full
assessment of the SP800-90B compliance as well as a comparison with RNG
design suggestions of SP800-90C, and AIS20/31.
The LRNG provides a complete separation of the noise source maintenance
and the collection of entropy into an entropy pool from the post-processing
using a pseudo-random number generator. Different DRNGs are supported,
including:
* The LRNG can be compile-time enabled to replace the existing /dev/random
implementation. When not selecting the LRNG at compile time (default), the
existing /dev/random implementation is built.
* Built-in ChaCha20 DRNG which has no dependency to other kernel
frameworks.
* SP800-90A DRBG using the kernel crypto API including its accelerated
raw cipher implementations. This implies that the output of /dev/random,
getrandom(2), /dev/urandom or get_random_bytes is fully compliant to
SP800-90A.
* Arbitrary DRNGs registered with the kernel crypto API
* Full compliance with SP800-90B which covers the startup and runtime health
tests mandated by SP800-90B as well as providing the test tools and test
interfaces to obtain raw noise data securely. The test tools are provided at
[1].
Booting the patch with the kernel command line option
"dyndbg=file drivers/char/lrng/* +p" generates logs indicating the operation
of the LRNG. Each log is pre-pended with "lrng".
The LRNG has a flexible design by allowing an easy replacement of the
deterministic random number generator component.
Compared to the existing /dev/random implementation, the compiled binary
is smaller when the LRNG is compiled with all options equal to the
existing /dev/random (i.e. only CONFIG_LRNG and
CONFIG_LRNG_TRNG_SUPPORT are set): random.o is 52.5 kBytes whereas
all LRNG object files are in 49 kBytes in size. The fully
SP800-90A/SP800-90B compliant binary code (CONFIG_LRNG,
CONFIG_LRNG_DRNG_SWITCH, CONFIG_LRNG_DRBG, CONFIG_LRNG_HEALTH_TESTS)
uses some 61 kBytes.
[1] http://www.chronox.de/lrng.html - If the patch is accepted, I would
be volunteering to convert the documentation into RST format and
contribute it to the Linux kernel documentation directory.
Changes (compared to the previous patch set):
* Extract the time initalization code into its own function
lrng_init_time_source and invoke it with core_initcall as reported
by Nicolai Stange
* Add linux/errno.h include to lrng.h as suggested by Nicolai Stange
* Add linux/slab.h to lrng_chacha20.h
* Changed lrng_testing.c reading/writing of ring buffer to use a lock
as suggested by Andy Lutomirski
* Use "depends on DEBUG_FS" for lrng_testing.c Kconfig entry as
suggested by Randy Dunlap
* Remove declaration of random_table from lrng_proc.c as suggested by
Eric W. Biederman
* Move the lrng_type file out of the sysctl table into its own file
/proc/lrng_type since its purpose is not to serve as a sysctl
as suggested by Eric W. Biederman
* Update patch description for /proc patch to refer to sysctls as suggested
by Eric W. Biederman
* /dev/random and getrandom(GRND_RANDOM) now invokes the secondary DRNG
ensuring that the DRNG is fully seeded before requests are served. With
this change, /dev/random is no TRNG any more. This change implements
the suggestion from Andy Lutomirski and is based on the discussions
previously on the LKML and the changes developed by Andy for the existing
random.c implementation.
* Simplification of the debugfs code in lrng_testing.c as return code
checks are not further needed any more as suggested by Nicolai Stange.
* Addition of GRND_TRUERANDOM to the getrandom(2) syscall to make the TRNG
externally accessible as a TRNG. The change also includes the GRND_INSECURE
flag as proposed by Andy Lutomirski. To avoid touching the random.h and
potentially clashing with Andy's patch set, I kept the symbol definitions
in lrng_interfaces.c noting that they should be moved to random.h. The
GRND_TRUERANDOM allows unprivileged user space to access the TRNG as follows:
if CAP_SYS_ADMIN calls, the whole entropy available to the LRNG is used. If
an unprivileged process invokes GRND_TRUERANDOM, at least 1024 bits of entropy
will remain in the pool to serve CAP_SYS_ADMIN and all secondary DRNGs
serving /dev/urandom, /dev/random and getrandom(.., 0) with entropy. With
that unprivileged processes calling GRND_TRUERANDOM have the lowest priority
in getting entropy and must wait accordingly. If the TRNG is not present,
GRND_TRUERANDOM returns -EOPNOTSUPP. A new test tool is provided as part
of the LRNG test archive found at [1] allowing to analyze all four types
of RNGs accessible via getrandom(2).
* Remove duplication of MODULE_LICENSE/AUTHOR/DESCRIPTION from lrng_testing.c
A patch for adding power-up self tests is prepared but I did not want to add it
now to support code review of a code base with minimal changes. It will be
provided once the code review is completed. With this pending code, the
following tests are available:
* power-on self test: LFSR self test
* power-on self test: ChaCha20 DRNG self test
* power-on self test: time stamp array handling in lrng_sw_noise.c
* power-on self test: SP800-90A DRBG self test
* runtime test: raw noise source data collection, if enabled
* separate test: SP800-90B APT and RCT test enforcement validation if enabled
As a side node: With the switchable DRNG support offered in this patch set,
the following areas could be removed. As the existing /dev/random has no support
for switchable DRNGs, however, this is not yet feasible though.
* remove lrng_ready_list and all code around it in lrng_interfaces.c
* remove the kernel crypto API RNG API to avoid having two random number
providing APIs - this would imply that all RNGs developed for this API would
be converted to the LRNG interface
CC: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CC: "Alexander E. Patrakov" <patrakov@gmail.com>
CC: "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com>
CC: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CC: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
CC: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
CC: Vito Caputo <vcaputo@pengaru.com>
CC: Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca>
CC: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CC: Ray Strode <rstrode@redhat.com>
CC: William Jon McCann <mccann@jhu.edu>
CC: zhangjs <zachary@baishancloud.com>
CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
CC: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
CC: Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@0pointer.de>
CC: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Tested-by: Roman Drahtmüller <draht@schaltsekun.de>
Tested-by: Marcelo Henrique Cerri <marcelo.cerri@canonical.com>
Stephan Mueller (12):
Linux Random Number Generator
LRNG - allocate one SDRNG instance per NUMA node
LRNG - sysctls and /proc interface
LRNG - add switchable DRNG support
crypto: DRBG - externalize DRBG functions for LRNG
LRNG - add SP800-90A DRBG extension
LRNG - add kernel crypto API PRNG extension
crypto: provide access to a static Jitter RNG state
LRNG - add Jitter RNG fast noise source
LRNG - add TRNG support
LRNG - add SP800-90B compliant health tests
LRNG - add interface for gathering of raw entropy
MAINTAINERS | 7 +
crypto/drbg.c | 16 +-
crypto/jitterentropy.c | 23 +
drivers/char/Kconfig | 2 +
drivers/char/Makefile | 9 +-
drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig | 188 ++++++++
drivers/char/lrng/Makefile | 19 +
drivers/char/lrng/lrng_archrandom.c | 92 ++++
drivers/char/lrng/lrng_aux.c | 148 ++++++
drivers/char/lrng/lrng_chacha20.c | 329 ++++++++++++++
drivers/char/lrng/lrng_drbg.c | 261 +++++++++++
drivers/char/lrng/lrng_health.c | 409 +++++++++++++++++
drivers/char/lrng/lrng_interfaces.c | 665 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/char/lrng/lrng_internal.h | 320 +++++++++++++
drivers/char/lrng/lrng_jent.c | 88 ++++
drivers/char/lrng/lrng_kcapi.c | 328 ++++++++++++++
drivers/char/lrng/lrng_numa.c | 101 +++++
drivers/char/lrng/lrng_pool.c | 671 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/char/lrng/lrng_proc.c | 179 ++++++++
drivers/char/lrng/lrng_sdrng.c | 420 +++++++++++++++++
drivers/char/lrng/lrng_sw_noise.c | 144 ++++++
drivers/char/lrng/lrng_switch.c | 185 ++++++++
drivers/char/lrng/lrng_testing.c | 269 +++++++++++
drivers/char/lrng/lrng_trng.c | 297 ++++++++++++
include/crypto/drbg.h | 7 +
include/linux/lrng.h | 71 +++
26 files changed, 5241 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig
create mode 100644 drivers/char/lrng/Makefile
create mode 100644 drivers/char/lrng/lrng_archrandom.c
create mode 100644 drivers/char/lrng/lrng_aux.c
create mode 100644 drivers/char/lrng/lrng_chacha20.c
create mode 100644 drivers/char/lrng/lrng_drbg.c
create mode 100644 drivers/char/lrng/lrng_health.c
create mode 100644 drivers/char/lrng/lrng_interfaces.c
create mode 100644 drivers/char/lrng/lrng_internal.h
create mode 100644 drivers/char/lrng/lrng_jent.c
create mode 100644 drivers/char/lrng/lrng_kcapi.c
create mode 100644 drivers/char/lrng/lrng_numa.c
create mode 100644 drivers/char/lrng/lrng_pool.c
create mode 100644 drivers/char/lrng/lrng_proc.c
create mode 100644 drivers/char/lrng/lrng_sdrng.c
create mode 100644 drivers/char/lrng/lrng_sw_noise.c
create mode 100644 drivers/char/lrng/lrng_switch.c
create mode 100644 drivers/char/lrng/lrng_testing.c
create mode 100644 drivers/char/lrng/lrng_trng.c
create mode 100644 include/linux/lrng.h
--
2.23.0
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH v26 01/12] Linux Random Number Generator
From: Stephan Müller @ 2019-11-23 20:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Arnd Bergmann
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, linux-crypto, LKML, linux-api,
Eric W. Biederman, Alexander E. Patrakov, Ahmed S. Darwish,
Theodore Y. Ts'o, Willy Tarreau, Matthew Garrett, Vito Caputo,
Andreas Dilger, Jan Kara, Ray Strode, William Jon McCann, zhangjs,
Andy Lutomirski, Florian Weimer, Lennart Poettering,
Nicolai Stange, "Peter, Matthias" <matth>
In-Reply-To: <2722222.P16TYeLAVu@positron.chronox.de>
In an effort to provide a flexible implementation for a random number
generator that also delivers entropy during early boot time, allows
replacement of the deterministic random number generation mechanism,
implement the various components in separate code for easier
maintenance, and provide compliance to SP800-90[A|B|C], introduce
the Linux Random Number Generator (LRNG) framework.
The general design is as follows. Additional implementation details
are given in [1]. The LRNG consists of the following components:
1. The LRNG may contain a True Random Number Generator (TRNG). The
TRNG is a deterministic random number generator that is operated as
a true random number generator. Using SP800-90A terminology, the
TRNG is a DRBG with prediction resistance. The TRNG has a behavior
similar to SP800-90A's concept of prediction resistance by only
generating output when it is re-seeded with an equal amount of
entropy. Every time a caller requests random numbers, the TRNG
must be re-seeded with at least that amount of entropy from its noise
sources. During boot time, the TRNG is not yet operated with
prediction resistance. As the external interfaces to the TRNG to
obtain random numbers start to be accessible after boot time
completes, random numbers generated via these interfaces always
access the TRNG that is operated with prediction resistance.
2. The LRNG implements a secondary DRNG. The secondary DRNG always
generates the requested amount of output. When using the SP800-90A
terminology it operates without prediction resistance. The secondary
DRNG maintains a counter of how many bytes were generated since last
re-seed and a timer of the elapsed time since last re-seed. If either
the counter or the timer reaches a threshold, the secondary DRNG is
seeded from the TRNG.
In case the Linux kernel detects a NUMA system, one secondary DRNG
instance per NUMA node is maintained.
3. The TRNG is seeded by concatenating the data from the
following sources:
(a) the output of the entropy pool,
(b) the Jitter RNG if available and enabled, and
(c) the CPU-based noise source such as Intel RDRAND if available and
enabled.
The entropy estimate of the data of all noise sources are added to
form the entropy estimate of the data used to seed the TRNG with.
The LRNG ensures, however, that the TRNG after seeding is at
maximum the security strength of the TRNG.
The LRNG is designed such that none of these noise sources can dominate
the other noise sources to provide seed data to the TRNG during
boot time due to the following:
(a) During boot time, the amount of received interrupts are the trigger
points to (re)seed the TRNG.
(b) At runtime, the caller requesting random numbers from the primary
TRNG drives the reseeding where always as much entropy as available is
used to reseed the TRNG.
4. The entropy pool accumulates entropy obtained from certain events,
which will henceforth be collectively called "slow noise sources".
The entropy pool collects noise data from slow noise sources. Any data
received by the LRNG from the slow noise sources is inserted into the
entropy pool using an LFSR with a primitive and irreducible polynomial.
The following sources of entropy are used:
(a) When an interrupt occurs, the high-resolution time stamp is mixed
into the LFSR. This time stamp is credited with heuristically implied
entropy.
(b) HID event data like the key stroke or the mouse coordinates are
mixed into the LFSR. This data is not credited with entropy by the LRNG.
(c) Device drivers may provide data that is mixed into the LFSR. This
data is not credited with entropy by the LRNG.
(d) After the entropy pool is ``read'' by the TRNG, the data
used to seed the TRNG is mixed back into the entropy pool to
stir the pool. This data is not credited with entropy by the LRNG.
Any data provided from user space by either writing to /dev/random,
/dev/urandom or the IOCTL of RNDADDENTROPY on both device files
are always injected into the entropy pool.
In addition, when a hardware random number generator covered by the
Linux kernel HW generator framework wants to deliver random numbers,
it is injected into the entropy pool as well. HW generator noise source
is handled separately from the other noise source due to the fact that
the HW generator framework may decide by itself when to deliver data
whereas the other noise sources always requested for data driven by the
LRNG operation. Similarly any user space provided data is inserted into
the entropy pool.
When the TRNG requires data from the entropy pool, the entire
entropy pool is processed with an SP800-90A section 10.3.1 compliant
hash_df function to generate random numbers.
To speed up the interrupt handling code of the LRNG, the time stamp
collected for an interrupt event is truncated to the 8 least
significant bits. 64 truncated time stamps are concatenated and then
jointly inserted into the LFSR. During boot time, until the fully seeded
stage is reached, each time stamp with its 32 least significant bits is
inserted into the LFSR at the time of arrival.
The LRNG allows the TRNG and secondary DRNG mechanism to be changed
at runtime. Per default, a ChaCha20-based DRNG is used. The ChaCha20-DRNG
implemented for the LRNG is also provided as a stand-alone user space
deterministic random number generator. The LRNG also offers an
SP800-90A DRBG based on the Linux kernel crypto API DRBG implementation.
The DRNG allows two methods of obtaining random data:
* For users requiring random numbers from a seeded and frequently reseeded
secondary DRNG, such as the /dev/urandom, the getrandom system call with
GRND_RANDOM or with a zero flags field, /dev/random, or the in-kernel
get_random_bytes function, the secondary DRNG is accessed directly by
invoking its generate function. This generate function complies with the
generate function discussed in SP800-90A.
* Users requiring random data that contains information theoretical
entropy, such as for seeding other DRNGs also use the TRNG's
generate function via the /dev/random device file and the getrandom
system call when invoked with GRND_TRUERANDOM. The difference to the
/dev/urandom handling is that:
1. each TRNG generate request is limited to the amount of entropy
the of the DRNG was seeded with, and
2. each TRNG generate request is preceded by a reseeding of the
DRNG to implement a TRNG / a DRNG with prediction resistance.
The processing of entropic data from the noise source before injecting
them into the TRNG is performed with the following mathematical
operations:
1. LFSR: The 8 least significant bits of the time stamp data received
from the interrupts are processed with an LFSR. That LFSR is implemented
identically to the LSFR used in the existing /dev/random implementation
except that it is capable of processing an entire word and that a
different polynomial is used. The reason for the different polynomial
is performance in a performance sensitive code section, the interrupt
handler. The chosen polynomials have 4 taps. Also, this LFSR-approach
is used in the OpenBSD /dev/random equivalent.
2. Concatenation: The temporary seed buffer used to seed the TRNG is
a concatenation of parts of the entropy pool data, and the CPU noise
source output.
The TRNG always tries to seed itself with 256 bits of entropy,
except during boot. In any case, if the noise sources cannot deliver
that amount, the available entropy is used and the TRNG keeps
track on how much entropy it was seeded with. The entropy implied by
the LRNG available in the entropy pool may be too conservative.
To ensure that during boot time all available entropy from the entropy
pool is transferred to the TRNG, the hash_df function always
generates 256 data bits during boot to seed the TRNG. Yet, the
TRNG entropy estimate is only increased by the amount of entropy the
LRNG assumes to be present in that data. During boot, the TRNG
is seeded as follows:
1. The DRNG is reseeded from the entropy pool and potentially the fast
noise sources if the entropy pool has collected at least 32 bits of
entropy from the interrupt noise source. The goal of this step is to
ensure that the primary and secondary DRNG receive some initial entropy
as early as possible. In addition it receives the entropy available from
the fast noise sources.
2. The DRNG is reseeded from the entropy pool and potentially the fast
noise sources if all noise sources collectively can provide at least
128 bits of entropy.
3. The DRNG is reseeded from the entropy pool and potentially the fast
noise sources if all noise sources collectivel can provide at least 256
bits.
At the time of the reseeding steps, the DRNG requests as much entropy as
is available in order to skip certain steps and reach the seeding level
of 256 bits. This may imply that one or more of the aforementioned steps
are skipped.
In all listed steps, the secondary DRNG is (re)seeded with a number of
random bytes from the TRNG that is equal to the amount of
entropy the TRNG was seeded with. This means that when the
TRNG is seeded with 128 or 256 bits of entropy, the secondary
DRNG is seeded with that amount of entropy as well. There is only one
exception to that rule: during initialization before the seed level of
128 bits is reached, a random number with 128 bit is generated by the
TRNG to seed the secondary DRNG.
Before the TRNG is seeded with 256 bits of entropy in step 3,
requests of random data from /dev/random are not processed.
At runtime, the TRNG delivers only random bytes equal to the
entropy amount it was seeded with. E.g. if the TRNG was seeded
with 128 bits of entropy, it will return only 128 bits of random data.
Subsequent requests for random data are only fulfilled after a
reseeding operation of the TRNG.
The TRNG will always require that all entropy sources collectively
can deliver at least as many entropy bits as configured with
/proc/sys/kernel/random/read_wakeup_threshold, i.e. per default 129 bits
(128 bits of entropy for seeding plus one bit of entropy that is lost
with the post processing as defined in SP800-90B).
The secondary DRNG operates as deterministic random number generator with
the following properties:
* The maximum number of random bytes that can be generated with one
DRNG generate operation is limited to 4096 bytes. When longer random
numbers are requested, multiple DRNG generate operations are performed.
The ChaCha20 DRNG as well as the SP800-90A DRBGs implement an update of
their state after completing a generate request for backtracking
resistance.
* The secondary DRNG is reseeded with whatever entropy is available –
in the worst case where no additional entropy can be provided by the
noise sources, the DRNG is not re-seeded and continues its operation
to try to reseed again after again the expiry of one of these thresholds:
- If the last reseeding of the secondary DRNG is more than 600 seconds
ago, or
- 2^20 DRNG generate operations are performed, whatever comes first, or
- the secondary DRNG is forced to reseed before the next generation of
random numbers if data has been injected into the LRNG by writing data
into /dev/random or /dev/urandom.
The chosen values prevent high-volume requests from user space to cause
frequent reseeding operations which drag down the performance of the
DRNG.
When the secondary DRNG requests a reseeding from the TRNG and
the TRNG pulls from the entropy pool, an emergency entropy level
of 512 bits of entropy is left in the entropy pool. This emergency
entropy is provided to serve getrandom(GRND_TRUERANDOM) even
when called by a process possessing CAP_SYS_ADMIN while /dev/urandom
is stressed.
To ensure that unprivileged users cannot deplete the entropy pool
completely, getrandom(GRND_TRUERANDOM) will leave an emergency level
of 1024 bits of entropy in the entropy pool when it is called by
an unprivileged application. This allows the secondary DRNGs to be
seeded twice with full entropy.
With the automatic reseeding after 600 seconds, the LRNG is triggered
to reseed itself before the first request after a suspend that put the
hardware to sleep for longer than 600 seconds.
The TRNG may not be compiled. In this case, the aforementioned
statements covering the TRNG are not applicable. The secondary DRNG is
seeded directly from the entropy pool just like the TRNG would have been
seeded.
The LRNG has the following properties:
* internal noise source: interrupts timing with fast boot time seeding
* high performance of interrupt handling code: The LRNG impact on the
interrupt handling has been reduced to a minimum. On one example
system, the LRNG interrupt handling code executes within an average
of 65 cycles whereas the existing /dev/random on the same device
takes about 97 cycles when measuring the execution time of
add_interrupt_randomness().
* lockless LFSR to collect raw entropy
* use of standalone ChaCha20 based RNG with the option to use a
different DRNG selectable at compile time
* "atomic" seeding of secondary DRBG to ensure full entropy transport
* instantiate one DRNG per NUMA node
* support for runtime switchable output DRNGs
* support for TRNG deactivation: The LRNG supports the compile-time
deactivation of the TRNG (i.e. deactivating
getrandom(GRND_TRUERANDOM)).
* use of only well-defined entropy-preserving operations to collect,
compress and forward entropy: concatenation, LFSR, SP800-90A hash_df
function
* compile-time selectable entropy pool size: the choice also
uses the applicable LFSR polynomial to maintain the entropy pool
size
Further details including the rationale for the design choices and
properties of the LRNG together with testing is provided at [1].
In addition, the documentation explains the conducted regression
tests to verify that the LRNG is API and ABI compatible with the
existing /dev/random implementation.
[1] https://www.chronox.de/lrng.html
CC: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CC: "Alexander E. Patrakov" <patrakov@gmail.com>
CC: "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com>
CC: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CC: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
CC: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
CC: Vito Caputo <vcaputo@pengaru.com>
CC: Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca>
CC: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CC: Ray Strode <rstrode@redhat.com>
CC: William Jon McCann <mccann@jhu.edu>
CC: zhangjs <zachary@baishancloud.com>
CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
CC: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
CC: Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@0pointer.de>
CC: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Mathematical aspects Reviewed-by: "Peter, Matthias" <matthias.peter@bsi.bund.de>
Reviewed-by: Marcelo Henrique Cerri <marcelo.cerri@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Roman Drahtmueller <draht@schaltsekun.de>
Tested-by: Roman Drahtmüller <draht@schaltsekun.de>
Tested-by: Marcelo Henrique Cerri <marcelo.cerri@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
---
MAINTAINERS | 7 +
drivers/char/Kconfig | 2 +
drivers/char/Makefile | 9 +-
drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig | 55 +++
drivers/char/lrng/Makefile | 9 +
drivers/char/lrng/lrng_archrandom.c | 92 ++++
drivers/char/lrng/lrng_aux.c | 148 ++++++
drivers/char/lrng/lrng_chacha20.c | 329 ++++++++++++++
drivers/char/lrng/lrng_interfaces.c | 666 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/char/lrng/lrng_internal.h | 311 +++++++++++++
drivers/char/lrng/lrng_pool.c | 671 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/char/lrng/lrng_sdrng.c | 420 +++++++++++++++++
drivers/char/lrng/lrng_sw_noise.c | 144 ++++++
include/linux/lrng.h | 71 +++
14 files changed, 2933 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig
create mode 100644 drivers/char/lrng/Makefile
create mode 100644 drivers/char/lrng/lrng_archrandom.c
create mode 100644 drivers/char/lrng/lrng_aux.c
create mode 100644 drivers/char/lrng/lrng_chacha20.c
create mode 100644 drivers/char/lrng/lrng_interfaces.c
create mode 100644 drivers/char/lrng/lrng_internal.h
create mode 100644 drivers/char/lrng/lrng_pool.c
create mode 100644 drivers/char/lrng/lrng_sdrng.c
create mode 100644 drivers/char/lrng/lrng_sw_noise.c
create mode 100644 include/linux/lrng.h
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index e4f170d8bc29..851d3c2ea1af 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -9490,6 +9490,13 @@ F: Documentation/core-api/atomic_ops.rst
F: Documentation/core-api/refcount-vs-atomic.rst
F: Documentation/memory-barriers.txt
+LINUX RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR (LRNG) DRIVER
+M: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
+S: Maintained
+W: https://www.chronox.de/lrng.html
+F: drivers/char/lrng/*
+F: include/linux/lrng.h
+
LIS3LV02D ACCELEROMETER DRIVER
M: Eric Piel <eric.piel@tremplin-utc.net>
S: Maintained
diff --git a/drivers/char/Kconfig b/drivers/char/Kconfig
index df0fc997dc3e..cebb3a62c2ca 100644
--- a/drivers/char/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/char/Kconfig
@@ -535,6 +535,8 @@ config ADI
and SSM (Silicon Secured Memory). Intended consumers of this
driver include crash and makedumpfile.
+source "drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig"
+
endmenu
config RANDOM_TRUST_CPU
diff --git a/drivers/char/Makefile b/drivers/char/Makefile
index 7c5ea6f9df14..46ede09fd6d3 100644
--- a/drivers/char/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/char/Makefile
@@ -3,7 +3,14 @@
# Makefile for the kernel character device drivers.
#
-obj-y += mem.o random.o
+obj-y += mem.o
+
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_LRNG),y)
+ obj-y += lrng/
+else
+ obj-y += random.o
+endif
+
obj-$(CONFIG_TTY_PRINTK) += ttyprintk.o
obj-y += misc.o
obj-$(CONFIG_ATARI_DSP56K) += dsp56k.o
diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig b/drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..1ba10fd421f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Linux Random Number Generator configuration
+#
+
+menuconfig LRNG
+ bool "Linux Random Number Generator"
+ help
+ The Linux Random Number Generator (LRNG) is the replacement
+ of the existing /dev/random provided with drivers/char/random.c.
+ It generates entropy from different noise sources and
+ delivers significant entropy during boot.
+
+if LRNG
+
+choice
+ prompt "LRNG Entropy Pool Size"
+ default LRNG_POOL_SIZE_4096
+ help
+ Select the size of the LRNG entropy pool. The size of the
+ entropy pool is relevant for the amount of entropy that
+ the LRNG can maintain as a maximum. The larger the size
+ of the entropy pool is the more entropy can be maintained
+ but the less often older entropic values are overwritten
+ with new entropy.
+
+ config LRNG_POOL_SIZE_4096
+ bool "4096 bits (default)"
+
+ config LRNG_POOL_SIZE_8192
+ bool "8192 bits"
+
+ config LRNG_POOL_SIZE_16384
+ bool "16384 bits"
+
+ config LRNG_POOL_SIZE_32768
+ bool "32768 bits"
+
+ config LRNG_POOL_SIZE_65536
+ bool "65536 bits"
+
+ config LRNG_POOL_SIZE_131072
+ bool "131072 bits"
+endchoice
+
+config LRNG_POOL_SIZE
+ int
+ default 0 if LRNG_POOL_SIZE_4096
+ default 1 if LRNG_POOL_SIZE_8192
+ default 2 if LRNG_POOL_SIZE_16384
+ default 3 if LRNG_POOL_SIZE_32768
+ default 4 if LRNG_POOL_SIZE_65536
+ default 5 if LRNG_POOL_SIZE_131072
+
+endif # LRNG
diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile b/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2761623715d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Makefile for the Linux Random Number Generator.
+#
+
+obj-y += lrng_pool.o lrng_aux.o \
+ lrng_sw_noise.o lrng_archrandom.o \
+ lrng_sdrng.o lrng_chacha20.o \
+ lrng_interfaces.o \
diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_archrandom.c b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_archrandom.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e03dc57c56f6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_archrandom.c
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR BSD-2-Clause
+/*
+ * LRNG Fast Noise Source: CPU-based noise source
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 - 2019, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/random.h>
+
+#include "lrng_internal.h"
+
+/*
+ * Estimated entropy of data is a 32th of LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BITS.
+ * As we have no ability to review the implementation of those noise sources,
+ * it is prudent to have a conservative estimate here.
+ */
+#define LRNG_ARCHRANDOM_DEFAULT_STRENGTH (LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BITS>>5)
+#define LRNG_ARCHRANDOM_TRUST_CPU_STRENGTH LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BITS
+#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU
+static u32 archrandom = LRNG_ARCHRANDOM_TRUST_CPU_STRENGTH;
+#else
+static u32 archrandom = LRNG_ARCHRANDOM_DEFAULT_STRENGTH;
+#endif
+module_param(archrandom, uint, 0644);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(archrandom, "Entropy in bits of 256 data bits from CPU noise "
+ "source (e.g. RDRAND)");
+
+static int __init lrng_parse_trust_cpu(char *arg)
+{
+ int ret;
+ bool trust_cpu = false;
+
+ ret = kstrtobool(arg, &trust_cpu);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (trust_cpu)
+ archrandom = LRNG_ARCHRANDOM_TRUST_CPU_STRENGTH;
+ else
+ archrandom = LRNG_ARCHRANDOM_DEFAULT_STRENGTH;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("random.trust_cpu", lrng_parse_trust_cpu);
+
+/**
+ * Get CPU noise source entropy
+ *
+ * @outbuf: buffer to store entropy of size LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BYTES
+ * @return: > 0 on success where value provides the added entropy in bits
+ * 0 if no fast source was available
+ */
+u32 lrng_get_arch(u8 *outbuf)
+{
+ u32 i, ent_bits = archrandom;
+
+ /* operate on full blocks */
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BYTES % sizeof(unsigned long));
+ /* ensure we have aligned buffers */
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(LRNG_KCAPI_ALIGN % sizeof(unsigned long));
+
+ if (!ent_bits)
+ return 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BYTES;
+ i += sizeof(unsigned long)) {
+ if (!arch_get_random_seed_long((unsigned long *)(outbuf + i)) &&
+ !arch_get_random_long((unsigned long *)(outbuf + i))) {
+ archrandom = 0;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Obtain entropy statement -- cap entropy to buffer size in bits */
+ ent_bits = min_t(u32, ent_bits, LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BITS);
+ pr_debug("obtained %u bits of entropy from CPU RNG noise source\n",
+ ent_bits);
+ return ent_bits;
+}
+
+u32 lrng_slow_noise_req_entropy(u32 required_entropy_bits)
+{
+ u32 arch_ent_bits = min_t(u32, archrandom,
+ LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BITS);
+ u32 fast_noise_entropy = arch_ent_bits + lrng_jent_entropylevel();
+
+ if (fast_noise_entropy > required_entropy_bits)
+ return 0;
+ return (required_entropy_bits - fast_noise_entropy);
+}
diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_aux.c b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_aux.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..de2904523ea2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_aux.c
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR BSD-2-Clause
+/*
+ * LRNG auxiliary interfaces
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
+ * Copyright (C) 2017 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All
+ * Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+
+#include "lrng_internal.h"
+
+struct batched_entropy {
+ union {
+ u64 entropy_u64[LRNG_DRNG_BLOCKSIZE / sizeof(u64)];
+ u32 entropy_u32[LRNG_DRNG_BLOCKSIZE / sizeof(u32)];
+ };
+ unsigned int position;
+ spinlock_t batch_lock;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. The quality of the random
+ * number is either as good as RDRAND or as good as /dev/urandom, with the
+ * goal of being quite fast and not depleting entropy.
+ */
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u64) = {
+ .batch_lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_u64.lock),
+};
+
+u64 get_random_u64(void)
+{
+ u64 ret;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ struct batched_entropy *batch;
+
+#if BITS_PER_LONG == 64
+ if (arch_get_random_long((unsigned long *)&ret))
+ return ret;
+#else
+ if (arch_get_random_long((unsigned long *)&ret) &&
+ arch_get_random_long((unsigned long *)&ret + 1))
+ return ret;
+#endif
+
+ lrng_debug_report_seedlevel("get_random_u64");
+
+ batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&batch->batch_lock, flags);
+ if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u64) == 0) {
+ lrng_sdrng_get_atomic((u8 *)batch->entropy_u64,
+ LRNG_DRNG_BLOCKSIZE);
+ batch->position = 0;
+ }
+ ret = batch->entropy_u64[batch->position++];
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&batch->batch_lock, flags);
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u64);
+
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u32) = {
+ .batch_lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_u32.lock),
+};
+
+u32 get_random_u32(void)
+{
+ u32 ret;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ struct batched_entropy *batch;
+
+ if (arch_get_random_int(&ret))
+ return ret;
+
+ lrng_debug_report_seedlevel("get_random_u32");
+
+ batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&batch->batch_lock, flags);
+ if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u32) == 0) {
+ lrng_sdrng_get_atomic((u8 *)batch->entropy_u32,
+ LRNG_DRNG_BLOCKSIZE);
+ batch->position = 0;
+ }
+ ret = batch->entropy_u32[batch->position++];
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&batch->batch_lock, flags);
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u32);
+
+/*
+ * It's important to invalidate all potential batched entropy that might
+ * be stored before the crng is initialized, which we can do lazily by
+ * simply resetting the counter to zero so that it's re-extracted on the
+ * next usage.
+ */
+void invalidate_batched_entropy(void)
+{
+ int cpu;
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
+ struct batched_entropy *batched_entropy;
+
+ batched_entropy = per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32, cpu);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy->batch_lock, flags);
+ batched_entropy->position = 0;
+ spin_unlock(&batched_entropy->batch_lock);
+
+ batched_entropy = per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64, cpu);
+ spin_lock(&batched_entropy->batch_lock);
+ batched_entropy->position = 0;
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&batched_entropy->batch_lock, flags);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * randomize_page - Generate a random, page aligned address
+ * @start: The smallest acceptable address the caller will take.
+ * @range: The size of the area, starting at @start, within which the
+ * random address must fall.
+ *
+ * If @start + @range would overflow, @range is capped.
+ *
+ * NOTE: Historical use of randomize_range, which this replaces, presumed that
+ * @start was already page aligned. We now align it regardless.
+ *
+ * Return: A page aligned address within [start, start + range). On error,
+ * @start is returned.
+ */
+unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range)
+{
+ if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(start)) {
+ range -= PAGE_ALIGN(start) - start;
+ start = PAGE_ALIGN(start);
+ }
+
+ if (start > ULONG_MAX - range)
+ range = ULONG_MAX - start;
+
+ range >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+ if (range == 0)
+ return start;
+
+ return start + (get_random_long() % range << PAGE_SHIFT);
+}
diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_chacha20.c b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_chacha20.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..439b449b3f3e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_chacha20.c
@@ -0,0 +1,329 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR BSD-2-Clause
+/*
+ * Backend for the LRNG providing the cryptographic primitives using
+ * ChaCha20 cipher implementations.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 - 2019, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <crypto/chacha.h>
+#include <linux/cryptohash.h>
+#include <linux/lrng.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+
+#include "lrng_internal.h"
+
+/******************************* ChaCha20 DRNG *******************************/
+
+/* State according to RFC 7539 section 2.3 */
+struct chacha20_block {
+ u32 constants[4];
+#define CHACHA_KEY_SIZE_WORDS (CHACHA_KEY_SIZE / sizeof(u32))
+ union {
+ u32 u[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE_WORDS];
+ u8 b[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE];
+ } key;
+ u32 counter;
+ u32 nonce[3];
+};
+
+#define CHACHA_BLOCK_WORDS (CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32))
+
+struct chacha20_state {
+ struct chacha20_block block;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Have two static memory blocks for two ChaCha20 DRNG instances (the primary
+ * and the secondary DRNG) to avoid calling kmalloc too early in the boot cycle.
+ * for subsequent allocation requests, such as per-NUMA-node DRNG instances,
+ * kmalloc will be used.
+ */
+struct chacha20_state primary_chacha20;
+struct chacha20_state secondary_chacha20;
+
+/**
+ * Update of the ChaCha20 state by either using an unused buffer part or by
+ * generating one ChaCha20 block which is half of the state of the ChaCha20.
+ * The block is XORed into the key part of the state. This shall ensure
+ * backtracking resistance as well as a proper mix of the ChaCha20 state once
+ * the key is injected.
+ */
+static void lrng_chacha20_update(struct chacha20_state *chacha20_state,
+ u32 *buf, u32 used_words)
+{
+ struct chacha20_block *chacha20 = &chacha20_state->block;
+ u32 i, tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_WORDS];
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct chacha20_block) != CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE != 2 * CHACHA_KEY_SIZE);
+
+ if (used_words > CHACHA_KEY_SIZE_WORDS) {
+ chacha20_block(&chacha20->constants[0], (u8 *)tmp);
+ for (i = 0; i < CHACHA_KEY_SIZE_WORDS; i++)
+ chacha20->key.u[i] ^= tmp[i];
+ memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+ } else {
+ for (i = 0; i < CHACHA_KEY_SIZE_WORDS; i++)
+ chacha20->key.u[i] ^= buf[i + used_words];
+ }
+
+ /* Deterministic increment of nonce as required in RFC 7539 chapter 4 */
+ chacha20->nonce[0]++;
+ if (chacha20->nonce[0] == 0)
+ chacha20->nonce[1]++;
+ if (chacha20->nonce[1] == 0)
+ chacha20->nonce[2]++;
+
+ /* Leave counter untouched as it is start value is undefined in RFC */
+}
+
+/**
+ * Seed the ChaCha20 DRNG by injecting the input data into the key part of
+ * the ChaCha20 state. If the input data is longer than the ChaCha20 key size,
+ * perform a ChaCha20 operation after processing of key size input data.
+ * This operation shall spread out the entropy into the ChaCha20 state before
+ * new entropy is injected into the key part.
+ */
+static int lrng_cc20_drng_seed_helper(void *drng, const u8 *inbuf, u32 inbuflen)
+{
+ struct chacha20_state *chacha20_state = (struct chacha20_state *)drng;
+ struct chacha20_block *chacha20 = &chacha20_state->block;
+
+ while (inbuflen) {
+ u32 i, todo = min_t(u32, inbuflen, CHACHA_KEY_SIZE);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < todo; i++)
+ chacha20->key.b[i] ^= inbuf[i];
+
+ /* Break potential dependencies between the inbuf key blocks */
+ lrng_chacha20_update(chacha20_state, NULL,
+ CHACHA_BLOCK_WORDS);
+ inbuf += todo;
+ inbuflen -= todo;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Chacha20 DRNG generation of random numbers: the stream output of ChaCha20
+ * is the random number. After the completion of the generation of the
+ * stream, the entire ChaCha20 state is updated.
+ *
+ * Note, as the ChaCha20 implements a 32 bit counter, we must ensure
+ * that this function is only invoked for at most 2^32 - 1 ChaCha20 blocks
+ * before a reseed or an update happens. This is ensured by the variable
+ * outbuflen which is a 32 bit integer defining the number of bytes to be
+ * generated by the ChaCha20 DRNG. At the end of this function, an update
+ * operation is invoked which implies that the 32 bit counter will never be
+ * overflown in this implementation.
+ */
+static int lrng_cc20_drng_generate_helper(void *drng, u8 *outbuf, u32 outbuflen)
+{
+ struct chacha20_state *chacha20_state = (struct chacha20_state *)drng;
+ struct chacha20_block *chacha20 = &chacha20_state->block;
+ u32 aligned_buf[CHACHA_BLOCK_WORDS], ret = outbuflen,
+ used = CHACHA_BLOCK_WORDS;
+ int zeroize_buf = 0;
+
+ while (outbuflen >= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ chacha20_block(&chacha20->constants[0], outbuf);
+ outbuf += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ outbuflen -= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ if (outbuflen) {
+ chacha20_block(&chacha20->constants[0], (u8 *)aligned_buf);
+ memcpy(outbuf, aligned_buf, outbuflen);
+ used = ((outbuflen + sizeof(aligned_buf[0]) - 1) /
+ sizeof(aligned_buf[0]));
+ zeroize_buf = 1;
+ }
+
+ lrng_chacha20_update(chacha20_state, aligned_buf, used);
+
+ if (zeroize_buf)
+ memzero_explicit(aligned_buf, sizeof(aligned_buf));
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ChaCha20 DRNG that provides full strength, i.e. the output is capable
+ * of transporting 1 bit of entropy per data bit, provided the DRNG was
+ * seeded with 256 bits of entropy. This is achieved by folding the ChaCha20
+ * block output of 512 bits in half using XOR.
+ *
+ * Other than the output handling, the implementation is conceptually
+ * identical to lrng_drng_generate_helper.
+ */
+static int lrng_cc20_drng_generate_helper_full(void *drng, u8 *outbuf,
+ u32 outbuflen)
+{
+ struct chacha20_state *chacha20_state = (struct chacha20_state *)drng;
+ struct chacha20_block *chacha20 = &chacha20_state->block;
+ u32 aligned_buf[CHACHA_BLOCK_WORDS];
+ u32 ret = outbuflen;
+
+ while (outbuflen >= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ u32 i;
+
+ chacha20_block(&chacha20->constants[0], outbuf);
+
+ /* fold output in half */
+ for (i = 0; i < (CHACHA_BLOCK_WORDS / 2); i++)
+ outbuf[i] ^= outbuf[i + (CHACHA_BLOCK_WORDS / 2)];
+
+ outbuf += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / 2;
+ outbuflen -= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / 2;
+ }
+
+ while (outbuflen) {
+ u32 i, todo = min_t(u32, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / 2, outbuflen);
+
+ chacha20_block(&chacha20->constants[0], (u8 *)aligned_buf);
+
+ /* fold output in half */
+ for (i = 0; i < (CHACHA_BLOCK_WORDS / 2); i++)
+ aligned_buf[i] ^=
+ aligned_buf[i + (CHACHA_BLOCK_WORDS / 2)];
+
+ memcpy(outbuf, aligned_buf, todo);
+ outbuflen -= todo;
+ outbuf += todo;
+ }
+ memzero_explicit(aligned_buf, sizeof(aligned_buf));
+
+ lrng_chacha20_update(chacha20_state, NULL, CHACHA_BLOCK_WORDS);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void lrng_cc20_init_state(struct chacha20_state *state)
+{
+ struct chacha20_block *chacha20 = &state->block;
+ unsigned long v;
+ u32 i;
+
+ memcpy(&chacha20->constants[0], "expand 32-byte k", 16);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < CHACHA_KEY_SIZE_WORDS; i++) {
+ chacha20->key.u[i] ^= jiffies;
+ chacha20->key.u[i] ^= random_get_entropy();
+ if (arch_get_random_seed_long(&v) || arch_get_random_long(&v))
+ chacha20->key.u[i] ^= v;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
+ chacha20->nonce[i] ^= jiffies;
+ chacha20->nonce[i] ^= random_get_entropy();
+ if (arch_get_random_seed_long(&v) || arch_get_random_long(&v))
+ chacha20->nonce[i] ^= v;
+ }
+
+ pr_info("ChaCha20 core initialized\n");
+}
+
+/**
+ * Allocation of the DRNG state
+ */
+static void *lrng_cc20_drng_alloc(u32 sec_strength)
+{
+ struct chacha20_state *state = NULL;
+
+ if (sec_strength > CHACHA_KEY_SIZE) {
+ pr_err("Security strength of ChaCha20 DRNG (%u bits) lower "
+ "than requested by LRNG (%u bits)\n",
+ CHACHA_KEY_SIZE * 8, sec_strength * 8);
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ }
+ if (sec_strength < CHACHA_KEY_SIZE)
+ pr_warn("Security strength of ChaCha20 DRNG (%u bits) higher "
+ "than requested by LRNG (%u bits)\n",
+ CHACHA_KEY_SIZE * 8, sec_strength * 8);
+
+ state = kmalloc(sizeof(struct chacha20_state), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!state)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ pr_debug("memory for ChaCha20 core allocated\n");
+
+ lrng_cc20_init_state(state);
+
+ return state;
+}
+
+static void lrng_cc20_drng_dealloc(void *drng)
+{
+ struct chacha20_state *chacha20_state = (struct chacha20_state *)drng;
+
+ if (drng == &primary_chacha20 || drng == &secondary_chacha20) {
+ memzero_explicit(chacha20_state, sizeof(*chacha20_state));
+ pr_debug("static ChaCha20 core zeroized\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ pr_debug("ChaCha20 core zeroized and freed\n");
+ kzfree(chacha20_state);
+}
+
+/******************************* Hash Operation *******************************/
+
+static void *lrng_cc20_hash_alloc(const u8 *key, u32 keylen)
+{
+ pr_info("Hash SHA-1 allocated\n");
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void lrng_cc20_hash_dealloc(void *hash)
+{
+}
+
+static u32 lrng_cc20_hash_digestsize(void *hash)
+{
+ return (SHA_DIGEST_WORDS * sizeof(u32));
+}
+
+static int lrng_cc20_hash_buffer(void *hash, const u8 *inbuf, u32 inbuflen,
+ u8 *digest)
+{
+ u32 i;
+ u32 workspace[SHA_WORKSPACE_WORDS];
+
+ WARN_ON(inbuflen % (SHA_WORKSPACE_WORDS * sizeof(u32)));
+
+ for (i = 0; i < inbuflen; i += (SHA_WORKSPACE_WORDS * sizeof(u32)))
+ sha_transform((u32 *)digest, (inbuf + i), workspace);
+ memzero_explicit(workspace, sizeof(workspace));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static const char *lrng_cc20_drng_name(void)
+{
+ const char *cc20_drng_name = "ChaCha20 DRNG";
+ return cc20_drng_name;
+}
+
+static const char *lrng_cc20_hash_name(void)
+{
+ const char *cc20_hash_name = "SHA-1";
+ return cc20_hash_name;
+}
+
+const struct lrng_crypto_cb lrng_cc20_crypto_cb = {
+ .lrng_drng_name = lrng_cc20_drng_name,
+ .lrng_hash_name = lrng_cc20_hash_name,
+ .lrng_drng_alloc = lrng_cc20_drng_alloc,
+ .lrng_drng_dealloc = lrng_cc20_drng_dealloc,
+ .lrng_drng_seed_helper = lrng_cc20_drng_seed_helper,
+ .lrng_drng_generate_helper = lrng_cc20_drng_generate_helper,
+ .lrng_drng_generate_helper_full = lrng_cc20_drng_generate_helper_full,
+ .lrng_hash_alloc = lrng_cc20_hash_alloc,
+ .lrng_hash_dealloc = lrng_cc20_hash_dealloc,
+ .lrng_hash_digestsize = lrng_cc20_hash_digestsize,
+ .lrng_hash_buffer = lrng_cc20_hash_buffer,
+};
diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_interfaces.c b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_interfaces.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..39fc3282843e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_interfaces.c
@@ -0,0 +1,666 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR BSD-2-Clause
+/*
+ * LRNG User and kernel space interfaces
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 - 2019, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/freezer.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/genhd.h>
+#include <linux/kthread.h>
+#include <linux/poll.h>
+#include <linux/preempt.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/timex.h>
+
+#include "lrng_internal.h"
+
+/*
+ * The minimum number of bits of entropy before we wake up a read on
+ * /dev/random.
+ */
+u32 lrng_read_wakeup_bits = LRNG_MIN_SEED_ENTROPY_BITS +
+ LRNG_CONDITIONING_ENTROPY_LOSS;
+
+/*
+ * If the entropy count falls under this number of bits, then we
+ * should wake up processes which are selecting or polling on write
+ * access to /dev/random.
+ */
+u32 lrng_write_wakeup_bits = LRNG_EMERG_ENTROPY +
+ 2 * LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BITS;
+
+static LIST_HEAD(lrng_ready_list);
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lrng_ready_list_lock);
+
+static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(lrng_read_wait);
+static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(lrng_write_wait);
+static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(lrng_init_wait);
+static struct fasync_struct *fasync;
+
+struct ctl_table random_table[];
+/********************************** Helper ***********************************/
+
+/* Is the primary DRNG seed level too low? */
+static inline bool lrng_need_entropy(void)
+{
+ return (lrng_avail_entropy() < lrng_write_wakeup_bits);
+}
+
+/* Is the entropy pool filled for TRNG pull or DRNG fully seeded? */
+static inline bool lrng_have_entropy_full(void)
+{
+ return (lrng_avail_entropy() >= lrng_read_wakeup_bits);
+}
+
+static inline bool lrng_have_entropy_full_trng(void)
+{
+ return (lrng_avail_entropy() >= lrng_read_wakeup_bits +
+ lrng_trng_retain());
+}
+
+void lrng_reader_wakeup(void)
+{
+ if (lrng_have_entropy_full() && wq_has_sleeper(&lrng_read_wait)) {
+ wake_up_interruptible(&lrng_read_wait);
+ kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
+ }
+}
+
+void lrng_writer_wakeup(void)
+{
+ if (lrng_need_entropy() && wq_has_sleeper(&lrng_write_wait)) {
+ wake_up_interruptible(&lrng_write_wait);
+ kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT);
+ }
+}
+
+void lrng_init_wakeup(void)
+{
+ wake_up_all(&lrng_init_wait);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Ping all kernel internal callers waiting until the DRNG is fully
+ * seeded that the DRNG is now fully seeded.
+ *
+ * When the SP800-90B testing is enabled, the ping only happens if the SP800-90B
+ * startup health tests are completed. This implies that kernel internal
+ * callers always have an SP800-90B compliant noise source when being
+ * pinged.
+ */
+void lrng_process_ready_list(void)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+ struct random_ready_callback *rdy, *tmp;
+
+ if (!lrng_sp80090b_startup_complete())
+ return;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&lrng_ready_list_lock, flags);
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(rdy, tmp, &lrng_ready_list, list) {
+ struct module *owner = rdy->owner;
+
+ list_del_init(&rdy->list);
+ rdy->func(rdy);
+ module_put(owner);
+ }
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&lrng_ready_list_lock, flags);
+}
+
+void lrng_debug_report_seedlevel(const char *name)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM
+ static void *previous = NULL;
+ void *caller = (void *) _RET_IP_;
+
+ if (READ_ONCE(previous) == caller)
+ return;
+
+ if (!lrng_state_min_seeded())
+ pr_notice("%pS %s called without reaching mimimally seeded "
+ "level (available entropy %u)\n", caller, name,
+ lrng_avail_entropy());
+
+ WRITE_ONCE(previous, caller);
+#endif
+}
+
+/************************ LRNG kernel input interfaces ************************/
+
+/**
+ * Interface for in-kernel drivers of true hardware RNGs.
+ * Those devices may produce endless random bits and will be throttled
+ * when our pool is full.
+ *
+ * @buffer: buffer holding the entropic data from HW noise sources to be used to
+ * (re)seed the DRNG.
+ * @count: length of buffer
+ * @entropy_bits: amount of entropy in buffer (value is in bits)
+ */
+void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count,
+ size_t entropy_bits)
+{
+ /* DRNG is not yet online */
+ if (!lrng_get_available())
+ return;
+ /*
+ * Suspend writing if we are fully loaded with entropy.
+ * We'll be woken up again once below lrng_write_wakeup_thresh,
+ * or when the calling thread is about to terminate.
+ */
+ wait_event_interruptible(lrng_write_wait, lrng_need_entropy() ||
+ kthread_should_stop() ||
+ freezing(current));
+ lrng_pool_lfsr_nonaligned(buffer, count);
+ lrng_pool_add_entropy(entropy_bits);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_randomness);
+
+/* Handle random seed passed by bootloader.
+ * If the seed is trustworthy, it would be regarded as hardware RNGs. Otherwise
+ * it would be regarded as device data.
+ * The decision is controlled by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER.
+ */
+void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size)
+{
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER))
+ add_hwgenerator_randomness(buf, size, size * 8);
+ else
+ add_device_randomness(buf, size);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_bootloader_randomness);
+
+/**
+ * Callback for HID layer -- use the HID event values to stir the entropy pool
+ */
+void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
+ unsigned int value)
+{
+ static unsigned char last_value;
+
+ /* ignore autorepeat and the like */
+ if (value == last_value)
+ return;
+
+ last_value = value;
+
+ lrng_pool_lfsr_u32((type << 4) ^ code ^ (code >> 4) ^ value);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_input_randomness);
+
+/*
+ * Add device- or boot-specific data to the input pool to help
+ * initialize it.
+ *
+ * None of this adds any entropy; it is meant to avoid the problem of
+ * the entropy pool having similar initial state across largely
+ * identical devices.
+ */
+void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size)
+{
+ lrng_pool_lfsr_nonaligned((u8 *)buf, size);
+ lrng_pool_lfsr_u32(random_get_entropy());
+ lrng_pool_lfsr_u32(jiffies);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_device_randomness);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
+void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk) { }
+void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk) { }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_disk_randomness);
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * Delete a previously registered readiness callback function.
+ */
+void del_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+ struct module *owner = NULL;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&lrng_ready_list_lock, flags);
+ if (!list_empty(&rdy->list)) {
+ list_del_init(&rdy->list);
+ owner = rdy->owner;
+ }
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&lrng_ready_list_lock, flags);
+
+ module_put(owner);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(del_random_ready_callback);
+
+/**
+ * Add a callback function that will be invoked when the DRNG is fully seeded.
+ *
+ * @return: 0 if callback is successfully added
+ * -EALREADY if pool is already initialised (callback not called)
+ * -ENOENT if module for callback is not alive
+ */
+int add_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy)
+{
+ struct module *owner;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ int err = -EALREADY;
+
+ if (likely(lrng_state_min_seeded()))
+ return err;
+
+ owner = rdy->owner;
+ if (!try_module_get(owner))
+ return -ENOENT;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&lrng_ready_list_lock, flags);
+ if (lrng_state_min_seeded())
+ goto out;
+
+ owner = NULL;
+
+ list_add(&rdy->list, &lrng_ready_list);
+ err = 0;
+
+out:
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&lrng_ready_list_lock, flags);
+
+ module_put(owner);
+
+ return err;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_random_ready_callback);
+
+/*********************** LRNG kernel output interfaces ************************/
+
+/**
+ * Provider of cryptographic strong random numbers for kernel-internal usage.
+ * This function is appropriate for all in-kernel use cases. However,
+ * it will always use the ChaCha20 DRNG.
+ *
+ * @buf: buffer to store the random bytes
+ * @nbytes: size of the buffer
+ */
+void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
+{
+ lrng_sdrng_get_atomic((u8 *)buf, (u32)nbytes);
+ lrng_debug_report_seedlevel("get_random_bytes");
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
+
+/**
+ * Provider of cryptographic strong random numbers for kernel-internal usage.
+ * This function is appropriate only for non-atomic use cases as this
+ * function may sleep. Though, it provides access to the full functionality
+ * of LRNG including the switchable DRNG support, that may support other
+ * DRNGs such as the SP800-90A DRBG.
+ *
+ * @buf: buffer to store the random bytes
+ * @nbytes: size of the buffer
+ */
+void get_random_bytes_full(void *buf, int nbytes)
+{
+ lrng_sdrng_get_sleep((u8 *)buf, (u32)nbytes);
+ lrng_debug_report_seedlevel("get_random_bytes_full");
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_full);
+
+/**
+ * Wait for the LRNG to be seeded and thus guaranteed to supply
+ * cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the /dev/urandom
+ * device, the get_random_bytes function, and the get_random_{u32,u64,int,long}
+ * family of functions. Using any of these functions without first calling
+ * this function forfeits the guarantee of security.
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 if the LRNG has been seeded.
+ * -ERESTARTSYS if the function was interrupted by a signal.
+ */
+int wait_for_random_bytes(void)
+{
+ if (likely(lrng_state_min_seeded()))
+ return 0;
+ return wait_event_interruptible(lrng_init_wait,
+ lrng_state_min_seeded());
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_random_bytes);
+
+/**
+ * This function will use the architecture-specific hardware random
+ * number generator if it is available. The arch-specific hw RNG will
+ * almost certainly be faster than what we can do in software, but it
+ * is impossible to verify that it is implemented securely (as
+ * opposed, to, say, the AES encryption of a sequence number using a
+ * key known by the NSA). So it's useful if we need the speed, but
+ * only if we're willing to trust the hardware manufacturer not to
+ * have put in a back door.
+ *
+ * @buf: buffer allocated by caller to store the random data in
+ * @nbytes: length of outbuf
+ *
+ * Return number of bytes filled in.
+ */
+int __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes)
+{
+ u8 *p = buf;
+
+ while (nbytes) {
+ unsigned long v;
+ int chunk = min_t(int, nbytes, sizeof(unsigned long));
+
+ if (!arch_get_random_long(&v))
+ break;
+
+ memcpy(p, &v, chunk);
+ p += chunk;
+ nbytes -= chunk;
+ }
+
+ if (nbytes)
+ lrng_sdrng_get_atomic((u8 *)p, (u32)nbytes);
+
+ return nbytes;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch);
+
+/************************ LRNG user output interfaces *************************/
+
+static ssize_t lrng_read_common(char __user *buf, size_t nbytes,
+ int (*lrng_read_random)(u8 *outbuf, u32 outbuflen))
+{
+ ssize_t ret = 0;
+ u8 tmpbuf[LRNG_DRNG_BLOCKSIZE] __aligned(LRNG_KCAPI_ALIGN);
+ u8 *tmp_large = NULL, *tmp = tmpbuf;
+ u32 tmplen = sizeof(tmpbuf);
+
+ if (nbytes == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Satisfy large read requests -- as the common case are smaller
+ * request sizes, such as 16 or 32 bytes, avoid a kmalloc overhead for
+ * those by using the stack variable of tmpbuf.
+ */
+ if (nbytes > sizeof(tmpbuf)) {
+ tmplen = min_t(u32, nbytes, LRNG_DRNG_MAX_REQSIZE);
+ tmp_large = kmalloc(tmplen + LRNG_KCAPI_ALIGN, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tmp_large)
+ tmplen = sizeof(tmpbuf);
+ else
+ tmp = PTR_ALIGN(tmp_large, LRNG_KCAPI_ALIGN);
+ }
+
+ while (nbytes) {
+ u32 todo = min_t(u32, nbytes, tmplen);
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ /* Reschedule if we received a large request. */
+ if ((tmp_large) && need_resched()) {
+ if (signal_pending(current)) {
+ if (ret == 0)
+ ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
+ break;
+ }
+ schedule();
+ }
+
+ rc = lrng_read_random(tmp, todo);
+ if (rc <= 0) {
+ if (rc < 0)
+ ret = rc;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (copy_to_user(buf, tmp, rc)) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ nbytes -= rc;
+ buf += rc;
+ ret += rc;
+ }
+
+ /* Wipe data just returned from memory */
+ if (tmp_large)
+ kzfree(tmp_large);
+ else
+ memzero_explicit(tmpbuf, sizeof(tmpbuf));
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static ssize_t
+lrng_read_common_block(int nonblock, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes,
+ int (*lrng_read_random)(u8 *outbuf, u32 outbuflen))
+{
+ if (nbytes == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (unlikely(!lrng_state_operational())) {
+ int ret;
+
+ if (nonblock)
+ return -EAGAIN;
+
+ ret = wait_event_interruptible(lrng_init_wait,
+ lrng_state_operational());
+ if (unlikely(ret))
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ while (1) {
+ ssize_t n = lrng_read_common(buf, nbytes, lrng_read_random);
+
+ if (n)
+ return n;
+
+ /* No entropy available. Maybe wait and retry. */
+ if (nonblock)
+ return -EAGAIN;
+
+ wait_event_interruptible(lrng_read_wait,
+ lrng_have_entropy_full_trng());
+ if (signal_pending(current))
+ return -ERESTARTSYS;
+ }
+}
+
+static ssize_t lrng_read_block(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+ size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ return lrng_read_common_block(file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK, buf, nbytes,
+ lrng_sdrng_get_sleep);
+}
+
+static unsigned int lrng_trng_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
+{
+ __poll_t mask;
+
+ poll_wait(file, &lrng_read_wait, wait);
+ poll_wait(file, &lrng_write_wait, wait);
+ mask = 0;
+ if (lrng_have_entropy_full())
+ mask |= EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM;
+ if (lrng_need_entropy())
+ mask |= EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM;
+ return mask;
+}
+
+static ssize_t lrng_drng_write_common(const char __user *buffer, size_t count,
+ u32 entropy_bits)
+{
+ ssize_t ret = 0;
+ u8 buf[64] __aligned(LRNG_KCAPI_ALIGN);
+ const char __user *p = buffer;
+ u32 orig_entropy_bits = entropy_bits;
+
+ if (!lrng_get_available())
+ return -EAGAIN;
+
+ count = min_t(size_t, count, INT_MAX);
+ while (count > 0) {
+ size_t bytes = min_t(size_t, count, sizeof(buf));
+ u32 ent = min_t(u32, bytes<<3, entropy_bits);
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&buf, p, bytes))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ /* Inject data into entropy pool */
+ lrng_pool_lfsr(buf, bytes);
+ lrng_pool_add_entropy(ent);
+
+ count -= bytes;
+ p += bytes;
+ ret += bytes;
+ entropy_bits -= ent;
+
+ cond_resched();
+ }
+
+ /* Force reseed of secondary DRNG during next data request. */
+ if (!orig_entropy_bits)
+ lrng_sdrng_force_reseed();
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static ssize_t lrng_sdrng_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+ size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ if (!lrng_state_min_seeded())
+ pr_notice_ratelimited("%s - use of insufficiently seeded DRNG "
+ "(%zu bytes read)\n", current->comm,
+ nbytes);
+ else if (!lrng_state_operational())
+ pr_debug_ratelimited("%s - use of not fully seeded DRNG (%zu "
+ "bytes read)\n", current->comm, nbytes);
+
+ return lrng_read_common(buf, nbytes, lrng_sdrng_get_sleep);
+}
+
+static ssize_t lrng_drng_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ return lrng_drng_write_common(buffer, count, 0);
+}
+
+static long lrng_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
+{
+ int size, ent_count_bits;
+ int __user *p = (int __user *)arg;
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case RNDGETENTCNT:
+ ent_count_bits = lrng_avail_entropy();
+ if (put_user(ent_count_bits, p))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ return 0;
+ case RNDADDTOENTCNT:
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+ if (get_user(ent_count_bits, p))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ ent_count_bits = (int)lrng_avail_entropy() + ent_count_bits;
+ if (ent_count_bits < 0)
+ ent_count_bits = 0;
+ if (ent_count_bits > LRNG_POOL_SIZE_BITS)
+ ent_count_bits = LRNG_POOL_SIZE_BITS;
+ lrng_pool_set_entropy(ent_count_bits);
+ return 0;
+ case RNDADDENTROPY:
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+ if (get_user(ent_count_bits, p++))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ if (ent_count_bits < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (get_user(size, p++))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ if (size < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ /* there cannot be more entropy than data */
+ ent_count_bits = min(ent_count_bits, size<<3);
+ return lrng_drng_write_common((const char __user *)p, size,
+ ent_count_bits);
+ case RNDZAPENTCNT:
+ case RNDCLEARPOOL:
+ /* Clear the entropy pool counter. */
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+ lrng_pool_set_entropy(0);
+ return 0;
+ case RNDRESEEDCRNG:
+ /*
+ * We leave the capability check here since it is present
+ * in the upstream's RNG implementation. Yet, user space
+ * can trigger a reseed as easy as writing into /dev/random
+ * or /dev/urandom where no privilege is needed.
+ */
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+ /* Force a reseed of all secondary DRNGs */
+ lrng_sdrng_force_reseed();
+ return 0;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+}
+
+static int lrng_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on)
+{
+ return fasync_helper(fd, filp, on, &fasync);
+}
+
+const struct file_operations random_fops = {
+ .read = lrng_read_block,
+ .write = lrng_drng_write,
+ .poll = lrng_trng_poll,
+ .unlocked_ioctl = lrng_ioctl,
+ .fasync = lrng_fasync,
+ .llseek = noop_llseek,
+};
+
+const struct file_operations urandom_fops = {
+ .read = lrng_sdrng_read,
+ .write = lrng_drng_write,
+ .unlocked_ioctl = lrng_ioctl,
+ .fasync = lrng_fasync,
+ .llseek = noop_llseek,
+};
+
+/* These defines need to go to include/uapi/linux/random.h */
+#define GRND_INSECURE 0x0004
+#define GRND_TRUERANDOM 0x0008
+SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count,
+ unsigned int, flags)
+{
+ if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK|GRND_RANDOM|GRND_INSECURE|GRND_TRUERANDOM))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * Requesting insecure and blocking randomness at the same time makes
+ * no sense.
+ */
+ if ((flags &
+ (GRND_INSECURE|GRND_RANDOM)) == (GRND_INSECURE|GRND_RANDOM))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Only allow GRND_TRUERANDOM by itself or with NONBLOCK */
+ if ((flags & GRND_TRUERANDOM) &&
+ ((flags &~ GRND_TRUERANDOM) != 0) &&
+ ((flags &~ (GRND_TRUERANDOM | GRND_NONBLOCK)) != 0))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (count > INT_MAX)
+ count = INT_MAX;
+
+ if (flags & GRND_TRUERANDOM)
+ return lrng_read_common_block(flags & GRND_NONBLOCK, buf,
+ count, lrng_trng_get);
+ if (flags & GRND_INSECURE)
+ return lrng_sdrng_read(NULL, buf, count, NULL);
+
+ return lrng_read_common_block(flags & GRND_NONBLOCK, buf, count,
+ lrng_sdrng_get_sleep);
+
+}
diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_internal.h b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_internal.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..675ba28bd2e6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_internal.h
@@ -0,0 +1,311 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR BSD-2-Clause */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 - 2019, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
+ */
+
+#ifndef _LRNG_INTERNAL_H
+#define _LRNG_INTERNAL_H
+
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+
+/*************************** General LRNG parameter ***************************/
+
+/* Security strength of LRNG -- this must match DRNG security strength */
+#define LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BYTES 32
+#define LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BITS (LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BYTES * 8)
+#define LRNG_DRNG_BLOCKSIZE 64 /* Maximum of DRNG block sizes */
+
+/*
+ * SP800-90A defines a maximum request size of 1<<16 bytes. The given value is
+ * considered a safer margin. This applies to the secondary DRNGs.
+ *
+ * This value is allowed to be changed.
+ */
+#define LRNG_DRNG_MAX_REQSIZE (1<<12)
+
+/*
+ * SP800-90A defines a maximum number of requests between reseeds of 2^48.
+ * The given value is considered a much safer margin, balancing requests for
+ * frequent reseeds with the need to conserve entropy. This value MUST NOT be
+ * larger than INT_MAX because it is used in an atomic_t. This applies to the
+ * secondary DRNGs.
+ *
+ * This value is allowed to be changed.
+ */
+#define LRNG_DRNG_RESEED_THRESH (1<<20)
+
+/*
+ * Number of interrupts to be recorded to assume that DRNG security strength
+ * bits of entropy are received.
+ * Note: a value below the DRNG security strength should not be defined as this
+ * may imply the DRNG can never be fully seeded in case other noise
+ * sources are unavailable.
+ *
+ * This value is allowed to be changed.
+ */
+#define LRNG_IRQ_ENTROPY_BITS LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BITS
+
+/*
+ * Leave given amount of entropy in bits in entropy pool to serve
+ * GRND_TRUERANDOM called with CAP_SYS_ADMIN while /dev/urandom is stressed.
+ *
+ * This value is allowed to be changed.
+ */
+#define LRNG_EMERG_ENTROPY (LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BITS * 2)
+
+/*
+ * Leave given amount of entropy in bits in entropy to serve GRND_TRUERANDOM
+ * called without CAP_SYS_ADMIN. Providing TRNG data to unprivileged users
+ * should have the least priority and should not affect other users of entropy.
+ */
+#define LRNG_EMERG_ENTROPY_TRNG_UNPRIV (LRNG_EMERG_ENTROPY * 2)
+
+/*
+ * Amount of entropy that is lost with the conditioning functions of LFSR and
+ * hash_df as shown with the entropy analysis compliant to SP800-90B.
+ */
+#define LRNG_CONDITIONING_ENTROPY_LOSS 1
+
+/*
+ * Min required seed entropy is 128 bits covering the minimum entropy
+ * requirement of SP800-131A and the German BSI's TR02102.
+ *
+ * This value is allowed to be changed.
+ */
+#define LRNG_FULL_SEED_ENTROPY_BITS LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BITS
+#define LRNG_MIN_SEED_ENTROPY_BITS 128
+#define LRNG_INIT_ENTROPY_BITS 32
+
+/*
+ * Oversampling factor of IRQ events to obtain
+ * LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BYTES. This factor is used when a
+ * high-resolution time stamp is not available. In this case, jiffies and
+ * register contents are used to fill the entropy pool. These noise sources
+ * are much less entropic than the high-resolution timer. The entropy content
+ * is the entropy content assumed with LRNG_IRQ_ENTROPY_BITS divided by
+ * LRNG_IRQ_OVERSAMPLING_FACTOR.
+ *
+ * This value is allowed to be changed.
+ */
+#define LRNG_IRQ_OVERSAMPLING_FACTOR 10
+
+/*
+ * Alignmask which should cover all cipher implementations
+ * WARNING: If this is changed to a value larger than 8, manual
+ * alignment is necessary as older versions of GCC may not be capable
+ * of aligning stack variables at boundaries greater than 8.
+ * In this case, PTR_ALIGN must be used.
+ */
+#define LRNG_KCAPI_ALIGN 8
+
+/************************ Default DRNG implementation *************************/
+
+extern struct chacha20_state primary_chacha20;
+extern struct chacha20_state secondary_chacha20;
+extern const struct lrng_crypto_cb lrng_cc20_crypto_cb;
+void lrng_cc20_init_state(struct chacha20_state *state);
+
+/********************************** /proc *************************************/
+
+static inline void lrng_pool_inc_numa_node(void) { }
+
+/****************************** LRNG interfaces *******************************/
+
+extern u32 lrng_read_wakeup_bits;
+extern u32 lrng_write_wakeup_bits;
+extern int lrng_sdrng_reseed_max_time;
+
+void lrng_reader_wakeup(void);
+void lrng_writer_wakeup(void);
+void lrng_init_wakeup(void);
+void lrng_debug_report_seedlevel(const char *name);
+void lrng_process_ready_list(void);
+
+/************************** Entropy pool management ***************************/
+
+#define LRNG_POOL_SIZE (128 << CONFIG_LRNG_POOL_SIZE)
+#define LRNG_POOL_WORD_BYTES (sizeof(atomic_t))
+#define LRNG_POOL_SIZE_BYTES (LRNG_POOL_SIZE * LRNG_POOL_WORD_BYTES)
+#define LRNG_POOL_SIZE_BITS (LRNG_POOL_SIZE_BYTES * 8)
+#define LRNG_POOL_WORD_BITS (LRNG_POOL_WORD_BYTES * 8)
+
+void lrng_state_init_seed_work(void);
+u32 lrng_avail_entropy(void);
+void lrng_set_entropy_thresh(u32 new);
+int lrng_pool_trylock(void);
+void lrng_pool_unlock(void);
+void lrng_reset_state(void);
+void lrng_pool_all_numa_nodes_seeded(void);
+bool lrng_state_min_seeded(void);
+bool lrng_state_fully_seeded(void);
+bool lrng_state_operational(void);
+bool lrng_pool_highres_timer(void);
+void lrng_pool_set_entropy(u32 entropy_bits);
+void lrng_pool_lfsr(const u8 *buf, u32 buflen);
+void lrng_pool_lfsr_nonaligned(const u8 *buf, u32 buflen);
+void lrng_pool_lfsr_u32(u32 value);
+void lrng_pool_add_irq(u32 irq_num);
+void lrng_pool_add_entropy(u32 entropy_bits);
+
+struct entropy_buf {
+ u8 a[LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BYTES];
+ u8 b[LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BYTES];
+ u8 c[LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BYTES];
+ u32 now;
+};
+
+int lrng_fill_seed_buffer(const struct lrng_crypto_cb *crypto_cb, void *hash,
+ struct entropy_buf *entropy_buf, u32 entropy_retain);
+void lrng_init_ops(u32 seed_bits);
+
+/************************** Jitter RNG Noise Source ***************************/
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_LRNG_JENT
+u32 lrng_get_jent(u8 *outbuf, unsigned int outbuflen);
+u32 lrng_jent_entropylevel(void);
+#else /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY */
+static inline u32 lrng_get_jent(u8 *outbuf, unsigned int outbuflen) {return 0; }
+static inline u32 lrng_jent_entropylevel(void) { return 0; }
+#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY */
+
+/*************************** CPU-based Noise Source ***************************/
+
+u32 lrng_get_arch(u8 *outbuf);
+u32 lrng_slow_noise_req_entropy(u32 required_entropy_bits);
+
+/****************** True Random Number Generator processing *******************/
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_LRNG_TRNG_SUPPORT
+
+void lrng_trng_reset(void);
+void lrng_trng_init(void);
+int lrng_trng_get(u8 *outbuf, u32 outbuflen);
+int lrng_trng_seed(u8 *outbuf, u32 outbuflen, u32 entropy_retain);
+u32 lrng_trng_retain(void);
+# ifdef CONFIG_LRNG_DRNG_SWITCH
+int lrng_trng_switch(const struct lrng_crypto_cb *cb);
+# endif
+
+#else /* CONFIG_LRNG_TRNG_SUPPORT */
+
+static inline void lrng_trng_reset(void) {}
+static inline void lrng_trng_init(void) {}
+static inline u32 lrng_trng_retain(void) { return 0; }
+
+static inline int lrng_trng_get(u8 *outbuf, u32 outbuflen)
+{
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
+# ifdef CONFIG_LRNG_DRNG_SWITCH
+static inline int lrng_trng_switch(const struct lrng_crypto_cb *cb) {return 0; }
+# endif
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_LRNG_TRNG_SUPPORT */
+
+/************************* secondary DRNG processing **************************/
+
+/* Secondary DRNG state handle */
+struct lrng_sdrng {
+ void *sdrng; /* DRNG handle */
+ void *hash; /* Hash handle */
+ const struct lrng_crypto_cb *crypto_cb; /* Crypto callbacks */
+ atomic_t requests; /* Number of DRNG requests */
+ unsigned long last_seeded; /* Last time it was seeded */
+ bool fully_seeded; /* Is DRNG fully seeded? */
+ bool force_reseed; /* Force a reseed */
+ struct mutex lock;
+ spinlock_t spin_lock;
+};
+
+extern struct mutex lrng_crypto_cb_update;
+
+struct lrng_sdrng *lrng_sdrng_init_instance(void);
+struct lrng_sdrng *lrng_sdrng_atomic_instance(void);
+
+static __always_inline bool lrng_sdrng_is_atomic(struct lrng_sdrng *sdrng)
+{
+ return (sdrng->sdrng == lrng_sdrng_atomic_instance()->sdrng);
+}
+
+/* Lock the secondary DRNG */
+static __always_inline void lrng_sdrng_lock(struct lrng_sdrng *sdrng,
+ unsigned long *flags)
+{
+ /* Use spin lock in case the atomic DRNG context is used */
+ if (lrng_sdrng_is_atomic(sdrng))
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&sdrng->spin_lock, *flags);
+ else
+ mutex_lock(&sdrng->lock);
+}
+
+/* Unlock the secondary DRNG */
+static __always_inline void lrng_sdrng_unlock(struct lrng_sdrng *sdrng,
+ unsigned long *flags)
+{
+ if (lrng_sdrng_is_atomic(sdrng))
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sdrng->spin_lock, *flags);
+ else
+ mutex_unlock(&sdrng->lock);
+}
+
+bool lrng_get_available(void);
+void lrng_set_available(void);
+void lrng_drngs_init_cc20(void);
+void lrng_sdrng_reset(struct lrng_sdrng *sdrng);
+int lrng_sdrng_get_atomic(u8 *outbuf, u32 outbuflen);
+int lrng_sdrng_get_sleep(u8 *outbuf, u32 outbuflen);
+void lrng_sdrng_force_reseed(void);
+void lrng_sdrng_seed_work(struct work_struct *dummy);
+
+static inline struct lrng_sdrng **lrng_sdrng_instances(void) { return NULL; }
+static inline void lrng_drngs_numa_alloc(void) { return; }
+
+/************************** Health Test linking code **************************/
+
+enum lrng_health_res {
+ lrng_health_pass, /* Health test passes on time stamp */
+ lrng_health_fail_use, /* Time stamp unhealthy, but mix in */
+ lrng_health_fail_drop /* Time stamp unhealthy, drop it */
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_LRNG_HEALTH_TESTS
+bool lrng_sp80090b_startup_complete(void);
+bool lrng_sp80090b_compliant(void);
+
+enum lrng_health_res lrng_health_test(u32 now_time);
+void lrng_health_disable(void);
+
+void lrng_reset(void);
+#else /* CONFIG_LRNG_HEALTH_TESTS */
+static inline bool lrng_sp80090b_startup_complete(void) { return true; }
+static inline bool lrng_sp80090b_compliant(void) { return false; }
+
+static inline enum lrng_health_res
+lrng_health_test(u32 now_time) { return lrng_health_pass; }
+static inline void lrng_health_disable(void) { }
+#endif /* CONFIG_LRNG_HEALTH_TESTS */
+
+/****************************** Helper code ***********************************/
+
+static inline u32 atomic_read_u32(atomic_t *v)
+{
+ return (u32)atomic_read(v);
+}
+
+/*************************** Auxiliary functions ******************************/
+
+void invalidate_batched_entropy(void);
+
+/***************************** Testing code ***********************************/
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_LRNG_TESTING
+bool lrng_raw_entropy_store(u32 value);
+#else /* CONFIG_LRNG_TESTING */
+static inline bool lrng_raw_entropy_store(u32 value) { return false; }
+#endif /* CONFIG_LRNG_TESTING */
+
+#endif /* _LRNG_INTERNAL_H */
diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_pool.c b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_pool.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6b46bf1a6b33
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_pool.c
@@ -0,0 +1,671 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR BSD-2-Clause
+/*
+ * LRNG Entropy pool management
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 - 2019, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <asm/irq_regs.h>
+#include <linux/lrng.h>
+#include <linux/percpu.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/utsname.h>
+#include <linux/workqueue.h>
+
+#include "lrng_internal.h"
+
+struct lrng_state {
+ bool lrng_operational; /* Is DRNG operational? */
+ bool lrng_fully_seeded; /* Is DRNG fully seeded? */
+ bool lrng_min_seeded; /* Is DRNG minimally seeded? */
+ struct work_struct lrng_seed_work; /* (re)seed work queue */
+};
+
+/* Status information about IRQ noise source */
+struct lrng_irq_info {
+ atomic_t num_events; /* Number of healthy IRQs since last read */
+ atomic_t num_events_thresh; /* Reseed threshold */
+ atomic_t reseed_in_progress; /* Flag for on executing reseed */
+ bool irq_highres_timer; /* Is high-resolution timer available? */
+ u32 irq_entropy_bits; /* LRNG_IRQ_ENTROPY_BITS? */
+};
+
+/*
+ * This is the entropy pool used by the slow noise source. Its size should
+ * be at least as large as LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BITS.
+ *
+ * The pool array is aligned to 8 bytes to comfort the kernel crypto API cipher
+ * implementations of the hash functions used to read the pool: for some
+ * accelerated implementations, we need an alignment to avoid a realignment
+ * which involves memcpy(). The alignment to 8 bytes should satisfy all crypto
+ * implementations.
+ *
+ * LRNG_POOL_SIZE is allowed to be changed only if the taps of the polynomial
+ * used for the LFSR are changed as well. The size must be in powers of 2 due
+ * to the mask handling in lrng_pool_lfsr_u32 which uses AND instead of modulo.
+ */
+struct lrng_pool {
+ union {
+ struct {
+ /*
+ * hash_df implementation: counter, requested_bits and
+ * pool form a linear buffer that is used in the
+ * hash_df function specified in SP800-90A section
+ * 10.3.1
+ */
+ unsigned char counter;
+ __be32 requested_bits;
+
+ /* Pool */
+ atomic_t pool[LRNG_POOL_SIZE];
+ /* Ptr into pool for next IRQ word injection */
+ atomic_t pool_ptr;
+ /* rotate for LFSR */
+ atomic_t input_rotate;
+ /* All NUMA DRNGs seeded? */
+ bool all_online_numa_node_seeded;
+ /* IRQ noise source status info */
+ struct lrng_irq_info irq_info;
+ /* Serialize read of entropy pool */
+ spinlock_t lock;
+ };
+ /*
+ * Static SHA-1 implementation in lrng_cc20_hash_buffer
+ * processes data 64-byte-wise. Hence, ensure proper size
+ * of LRNG entropy pool data structure.
+ */
+ u8 hash_input_buf[LRNG_POOL_SIZE_BYTES + 64];
+ };
+};
+
+static struct lrng_pool lrng_pool __aligned(LRNG_KCAPI_ALIGN) = {
+ .irq_info = {
+ .irq_entropy_bits = LRNG_IRQ_ENTROPY_BITS,
+ .num_events_thresh = ATOMIC_INIT(LRNG_INIT_ENTROPY_BITS +
+ LRNG_CONDITIONING_ENTROPY_LOSS),
+ /* Sample IRQ pointer data at least during boot */
+ .irq_highres_timer = false },
+ .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(lrng_pool.lock)
+};
+
+static struct lrng_state lrng_state = { false, false, false, };
+
+/********************************** Helper ***********************************/
+
+void lrng_state_init_seed_work(void)
+{
+ INIT_WORK(&lrng_state.lrng_seed_work, lrng_sdrng_seed_work);
+}
+
+static inline u32 lrng_entropy_to_data(u32 entropy_bits)
+{
+ return ((entropy_bits * lrng_pool.irq_info.irq_entropy_bits) /
+ LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BITS);
+}
+
+static inline u32 lrng_data_to_entropy(u32 irqnum)
+{
+ return ((irqnum * LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BITS) /
+ lrng_pool.irq_info.irq_entropy_bits);
+}
+
+u32 lrng_avail_entropy(void)
+{
+ return min_t(u32, LRNG_POOL_SIZE_BITS, lrng_data_to_entropy(
+ atomic_read_u32(&lrng_pool.irq_info.num_events)));
+}
+
+void lrng_set_entropy_thresh(u32 new)
+{
+ atomic_set(&lrng_pool.irq_info.num_events_thresh,
+ lrng_entropy_to_data(new));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reading of the LRNG pool is only allowed by one caller. The reading is
+ * only performed to (re)seed the TRNG or SDRNGs. Thus, if this "lock" is
+ * already taken, the reseeding operation is in progress. The caller is not
+ * intended to wait but continue with its other operation.
+ */
+int lrng_pool_trylock(void)
+{
+ return atomic_cmpxchg(&lrng_pool.irq_info.reseed_in_progress, 0, 1);
+}
+
+void lrng_pool_unlock(void)
+{
+ atomic_set(&lrng_pool.irq_info.reseed_in_progress, 0);
+}
+
+void lrng_reset_state(void)
+{
+ struct lrng_irq_info *irq_info = &lrng_pool.irq_info;
+
+ atomic_set(&irq_info->num_events, 0);
+ lrng_state.lrng_operational = false;
+ lrng_state.lrng_fully_seeded = false;
+ lrng_state.lrng_min_seeded = false;
+ pr_debug("reset LRNG\n");
+}
+
+void lrng_pool_all_numa_nodes_seeded(void)
+{
+ lrng_pool.all_online_numa_node_seeded = true;
+}
+
+bool lrng_state_min_seeded(void)
+{
+ return lrng_state.lrng_min_seeded;
+}
+
+bool lrng_state_fully_seeded(void)
+{
+ return lrng_state.lrng_fully_seeded;
+}
+
+bool lrng_state_operational(void)
+{
+ return lrng_state.lrng_operational;
+}
+
+bool lrng_pool_highres_timer(void)
+{
+ return lrng_pool.irq_info.irq_highres_timer;
+}
+
+void lrng_pool_set_entropy(u32 entropy_bits)
+{
+ atomic_set(&lrng_pool.irq_info.num_events,
+ lrng_entropy_to_data(entropy_bits));
+}
+
+static void lrng_pool_configure(bool highres_timer, u32 irq_entropy_bits)
+{
+ struct lrng_irq_info *irq_info = &lrng_pool.irq_info;
+
+ irq_info->irq_highres_timer = highres_timer;
+ if (irq_info->irq_entropy_bits != irq_entropy_bits) {
+ irq_info->irq_entropy_bits = irq_entropy_bits;
+ /* Reset the threshold based on new oversampling factor. */
+ lrng_set_entropy_thresh(atomic_read_u32(
+ &irq_info->num_events_thresh));
+ }
+}
+
+static void __init lrng_init_time_source(void)
+{
+ if (random_get_entropy() || random_get_entropy()) {
+ /*
+ * As the highres timer is identified here, previous interrupts
+ * obtained during boot time are treated like a lowres-timer
+ * would have been present.
+ */
+ lrng_pool_configure(true, LRNG_IRQ_ENTROPY_BITS);
+ } else {
+ lrng_health_disable();
+ lrng_pool_configure(false, LRNG_IRQ_ENTROPY_BITS *
+ LRNG_IRQ_OVERSAMPLING_FACTOR);
+ pr_warn("operating without high-resolution timer and applying "
+ "IRQ oversampling factor %u\n",
+ LRNG_IRQ_OVERSAMPLING_FACTOR);
+ }
+}
+
+core_initcall(lrng_init_time_source);
+
+/* invoke function with buffer aligned to 4 bytes */
+void lrng_pool_lfsr(const u8 *buf, u32 buflen)
+{
+ u32 *p_buf = (u32 *)buf;
+
+ for (; buflen >= 4; buflen -= 4)
+ lrng_pool_lfsr_u32(*p_buf++);
+
+ buf = (u8 *)p_buf;
+ while (buflen--)
+ lrng_pool_lfsr_u32(*buf++);
+}
+
+void lrng_pool_lfsr_nonaligned(const u8 *buf, u32 buflen)
+{
+ while (buflen) {
+ if (!((unsigned long)buf & (sizeof(u32) - 1))) {
+ lrng_pool_lfsr(buf, buflen);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ lrng_pool_lfsr_u32(*buf++);
+ buflen--;
+ }
+}
+
+/**************************** Interrupt processing ****************************/
+
+/*
+ * Implement a (modified) twisted Generalized Feedback Shift Register. (See M.
+ * Matsumoto & Y. Kurita, 1992. Twisted GFSR generators. ACM Transactions on
+ * Modeling and Computer Simulation 2(3):179-194. Also see M. Matsumoto & Y.
+ * Kurita, 1994. Twisted GFSR generators II. ACM Transactions on Modeling and
+ * Computer Simulation 4:254-266).
+ */
+static u32 const lrng_twist_table[8] = {
+ 0x00000000, 0x3b6e20c8, 0x76dc4190, 0x4db26158,
+ 0xedb88320, 0xd6d6a3e8, 0x9b64c2b0, 0xa00ae278 };
+
+/*
+ * The polynomials for the LFSR are taken from the document "Table of Linear
+ * Feedback Shift Registers" by Roy Ward, Tim Molteno, October 26, 2007.
+ * The first polynomial is from "Primitive Binary Polynomials" by Wayne
+ * Stahnke (1973) and is primitive as well as irreducible.
+ *
+ * Note, the tap values are smaller by one compared to the documentation because
+ * they are used as an index into an array where the index starts by zero.
+ *
+ * All polynomials were also checked to be primitive and irreducible with magma
+ * which ensures that the key property of the LFSR providing a compression
+ * function for entropy is guaranteed.
+ */
+static u32 const lrng_lfsr_polynomial[][4] = {
+ { 127, 28, 26, 1 }, /* 128 words by Stahnke */
+ { 255, 253, 250, 245 }, /* 256 words */
+ { 511, 509, 506, 503 }, /* 512 words */
+ { 1023, 1014, 1001, 1000 }, /* 1024 words */
+ { 2047, 2034, 2033, 2028 }, /* 2048 words */
+ { 4095, 4094, 4080, 4068 }, /* 4096 words */
+};
+
+/**
+ * Hot code path - inject data into entropy pool using LFSR
+ */
+void lrng_pool_lfsr_u32(u32 value)
+{
+ /*
+ * Process the LFSR by altering not adjacent words but rather
+ * more spaced apart words. Using a prime number ensures that all words
+ * are processed evenly. As some the LFSR polynomials taps are close
+ * together, processing adjacent words with the LSFR taps may be
+ * inappropriate as the data just mixed-in at these taps may be not
+ * independent from the current data to be mixed in.
+ */
+ u32 ptr = (u32)atomic_add_return_relaxed(67, &lrng_pool.pool_ptr) &
+ (LRNG_POOL_SIZE - 1);
+ /*
+ * Add 7 bits of rotation to the pool. At the beginning of the
+ * pool, add an extra 7 bits rotation, so that successive passes
+ * spread the input bits across the pool evenly.
+ *
+ * Note, there is a race between getting ptr and calculating
+ * input_rotate when ptr is is obtained on two or more CPUs at the
+ * same time. This race is irrelevant as it may only come into effect
+ * if 3 or more CPUs race at the same time which is very unlikely. If
+ * the race happens, it applies to one event only. As this rolling
+ * supports the LFSR without being strictly needed, we accept this
+ * race.
+ */
+ u32 input_rotate = (u32)atomic_add_return_relaxed((ptr ? 7 : 14),
+ &lrng_pool.input_rotate) & 31;
+ u32 word = rol32(value, input_rotate);
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(LRNG_POOL_SIZE - 1 !=
+ lrng_lfsr_polynomial[CONFIG_LRNG_POOL_SIZE][0]);
+ word ^= atomic_read_u32(&lrng_pool.pool[ptr]);
+ word ^= atomic_read_u32(&lrng_pool.pool[
+ (ptr + lrng_lfsr_polynomial[CONFIG_LRNG_POOL_SIZE][0]) &
+ (LRNG_POOL_SIZE - 1)]);
+ word ^= atomic_read_u32(&lrng_pool.pool[
+ (ptr + lrng_lfsr_polynomial[CONFIG_LRNG_POOL_SIZE][1]) &
+ (LRNG_POOL_SIZE - 1)]);
+ word ^= atomic_read_u32(&lrng_pool.pool[
+ (ptr + lrng_lfsr_polynomial[CONFIG_LRNG_POOL_SIZE][2]) &
+ (LRNG_POOL_SIZE - 1)]);
+ word ^= atomic_read_u32(&lrng_pool.pool[
+ (ptr + lrng_lfsr_polynomial[CONFIG_LRNG_POOL_SIZE][3]) &
+ (LRNG_POOL_SIZE - 1)]);
+
+ word = (word >> 3) ^ lrng_twist_table[word & 7];
+ atomic_set(&lrng_pool.pool[ptr], word);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Hot code path - mix data into entropy pool
+ */
+void lrng_pool_add_irq(u32 irq_num)
+{
+ struct lrng_irq_info *irq_info = &lrng_pool.irq_info;
+
+ atomic_add(irq_num, &irq_info->num_events);
+
+ /* Wake sleeping readers */
+ lrng_reader_wakeup();
+
+ /*
+ * Once all secondary DRNGs are fully seeded, the interrupt noise
+ * sources will not trigger any reseeding any more.
+ */
+ if (likely(lrng_pool.all_online_numa_node_seeded))
+ return;
+
+ /* Only try to reseed if the DRNG is alive. */
+ if (!lrng_get_available())
+ return;
+
+ /* Only trigger the DRNG reseed if we have collected enough IRQs. */
+ if (atomic_read_u32(&lrng_pool.irq_info.num_events) <
+ atomic_read_u32(&lrng_pool.irq_info.num_events_thresh))
+ return;
+
+ /* Ensure that the seeding only occurs once at any given time. */
+ if (lrng_pool_trylock())
+ return;
+
+ /* Seed the DRNG with IRQ noise. */
+ schedule_work(&lrng_state.lrng_seed_work);
+}
+
+void lrng_pool_add_entropy(u32 entropy_bits)
+{
+ lrng_pool_add_irq(lrng_entropy_to_data(entropy_bits));
+}
+
+/**
+ * Generate a hashed output of pool using the SP800-90A section 10.3.1 hash_df
+ * function
+ */
+static inline u32 lrng_pool_hash_df(const struct lrng_crypto_cb *crypto_cb,
+ void *hash, u8 *outbuf, u32 requested_bits)
+{
+ struct lrng_pool *pool = &lrng_pool;
+ u32 digestsize, requested_bytes = requested_bits >> 3,
+ generated_bytes = 0;
+ u8 digest[64] __aligned(LRNG_KCAPI_ALIGN);
+
+ digestsize = crypto_cb->lrng_hash_digestsize(hash);
+ if (digestsize > sizeof(digest)) {
+ pr_err("Digest buffer too small\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ pool->counter = 1;
+ pool->requested_bits = cpu_to_be32(requested_bytes << 3);
+
+ while (requested_bytes) {
+ u32 tocopy = min_t(u32, requested_bytes, digestsize);
+
+ /* The counter must not wrap */
+ if (pool->counter == 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (crypto_cb->lrng_hash_buffer(hash, (u8 *)pool,
+ LRNG_POOL_SIZE_BYTES + 64,
+ digest))
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Copy the data out to the caller */
+ memcpy(outbuf + generated_bytes, digest, tocopy);
+ requested_bytes -= tocopy;
+ generated_bytes += tocopy;
+ pool->counter++;
+ }
+
+out:
+ /* Mix read data back into pool for backtracking resistance */
+ if (generated_bytes)
+ lrng_pool_lfsr(outbuf, generated_bytes);
+ memzero_explicit(digest, digestsize);
+ return (generated_bytes<<3);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Read the entropy pool out for use.
+ *
+ * This function handles the translation from the number of received interrupts
+ * into an entropy statement. The conversion depends on LRNG_IRQ_ENTROPY_BITS
+ * which defines how many interrupts must be received to obtain 256 bits of
+ * entropy. With this value, the function lrng_data_to_entropy converts a given
+ * data size (received interrupts, requested amount of data, etc.) into an
+ * entropy statement. lrng_entropy_to_data does the reverse.
+ *
+ * Both functions are agnostic about the type of data: when the number of
+ * interrupts is processed by these functions, the resulting entropy value is in
+ * bits as we assume the entropy of interrupts is measured in bits. When data is
+ * processed, the entropy value is in bytes as the data is measured in bytes.
+ *
+ * @outbuf: buffer to store data in with size LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BYTES
+ * @requested_entropy_bits: requested bits of entropy -- the function will
+ * return at least this amount of entropy if available
+ * @entropy_retain: amount of entropy in bits that should be left in the pool
+ * @return: estimated entropy from the IRQs that was obtained
+ */
+static u32 lrng_get_pool(const struct lrng_crypto_cb *crypto_cb, void *hash,
+ u8 *outbuf, u32 requested_entropy_bits,
+ u32 entropy_retain)
+{
+ struct lrng_pool *pool = &lrng_pool;
+ struct lrng_state *state = &lrng_state;
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ u32 irq_num_events_used, irq_num_events, avail_entropy_bits;
+
+ /* This get_pool operation must only be called once at a given time! */
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&pool->lock, flags);
+
+ /* How many unused interrupts are in entropy pool? */
+ irq_num_events = atomic_read_u32(&lrng_pool.irq_info.num_events);
+ /* Convert available interrupts into entropy statement */
+ avail_entropy_bits = lrng_data_to_entropy(irq_num_events);
+
+ /* Cap available entropy to pool size */
+ avail_entropy_bits =
+ min_t(u32, avail_entropy_bits, LRNG_POOL_SIZE_BITS);
+
+ /* How much entropy we need to and can we use? */
+ if (unlikely(!state->lrng_fully_seeded)) {
+ /*
+ * During boot time, we read 256 bits data with
+ * avail_entropy_bits entropy. In case our conservative
+ * entropy estimate underestimates the available entropy
+ * we can transport as much available entropy as
+ * possible. The TRNG does not operate as a TRNG yet.
+ */
+ requested_entropy_bits =
+ LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BITS;
+ } else {
+ /* Provide all entropy above retaining level */
+ if (avail_entropy_bits < entropy_retain) {
+ requested_entropy_bits = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ avail_entropy_bits -= entropy_retain;
+ requested_entropy_bits = min_t(u32, avail_entropy_bits,
+ requested_entropy_bits);
+ }
+
+ /* Hash is a compression function: we generate entropy amount of data */
+ requested_entropy_bits = round_down(requested_entropy_bits, 8);
+
+ requested_entropy_bits = lrng_pool_hash_df(crypto_cb, hash, outbuf,
+ requested_entropy_bits);
+
+ /* Boot time: After getting the full buffer adjust the entropy value. */
+ requested_entropy_bits = min_t(u32, avail_entropy_bits,
+ requested_entropy_bits);
+
+out:
+ /* Convert used entropy into interrupt number for subtraction */
+ irq_num_events_used = lrng_entropy_to_data(requested_entropy_bits);
+
+ /*
+ * The hash_df operation entropy assessment shows that the output
+ * entropy is one bit smaller than the input entropy. Therefore we
+ * account for this one bit of entropy here: if we have sufficient
+ * entropy in the LFSR, we say we used one bit of entropy more.
+ * Otherwise we reduce the amount of entropy we say we generated with
+ * the hash_df.
+ */
+ if (irq_num_events_used) {
+ if ((irq_num_events_used + LRNG_CONDITIONING_ENTROPY_LOSS) <=
+ lrng_entropy_to_data(avail_entropy_bits)) {
+ irq_num_events_used += LRNG_CONDITIONING_ENTROPY_LOSS;
+ } else {
+ if (unlikely(requested_entropy_bits <
+ LRNG_CONDITIONING_ENTROPY_LOSS))
+ requested_entropy_bits = 0;
+ else
+ requested_entropy_bits -=
+ LRNG_CONDITIONING_ENTROPY_LOSS;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * New events might have arrived in the meanwhile and we don't
+ * want to throw them away unconditionally. On the other hand,
+ * these new events might have been mixed in before
+ * lrng_hash_df_pool() had been able to draw any entropy
+ * from the pool and thus, the pool capacity might have been
+ * exceeded at some point. Note that in theory, some events
+ * might get lost inbetween the atomic_read() and
+ * atomic_set() below. But that's fine, because it's no real
+ * concern while code preventing this would come at the cost of
+ * additional complexity. Likewise, some events which arrived
+ * after full or partial completion of the __lrng_hash_df_pool()
+ * above might get unnecessarily thrown away by the min()
+ * operation below; the same argument applies there.
+ */
+ irq_num_events = atomic_read_u32(&lrng_pool.irq_info.num_events);
+ irq_num_events = min_t(u32, irq_num_events,
+ lrng_entropy_to_data(LRNG_POOL_SIZE_BITS));
+ irq_num_events -= irq_num_events_used;
+ atomic_set(&lrng_pool.irq_info.num_events, irq_num_events);
+
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pool->lock, flags);
+
+ /* Obtain entropy statement in bits from the used entropy */
+ pr_debug("obtained %u bits of entropy from %u newly collected "
+ "interrupts - not using %u interrupts\n",
+ requested_entropy_bits, irq_num_events_used,
+ irq_num_events);
+
+ return requested_entropy_bits;
+}
+
+/* Fill the seed buffer with data from the noise sources */
+int lrng_fill_seed_buffer(const struct lrng_crypto_cb *crypto_cb, void *hash,
+ struct entropy_buf *entropy_buf, u32 entropy_retain)
+{
+ struct lrng_state *state = &lrng_state;
+ u32 total_entropy_bits = 0;
+
+ /* Require at least 128 bits of entropy for any reseed. */
+ if (state->lrng_fully_seeded &&
+ (lrng_avail_entropy() <
+ lrng_slow_noise_req_entropy(lrng_read_wakeup_bits) +
+ entropy_retain))
+ goto wakeup;
+
+ /*
+ * Concatenate the output of the noise sources. This would be the
+ * spot to add an entropy extractor logic if desired. Note, this
+ * has the ability to collect entropy equal or larger than the DRNG
+ * strength to be able to feed GRND_TRUERANDOM.
+ */
+ total_entropy_bits = lrng_get_pool(crypto_cb, hash, entropy_buf->a,
+ LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BITS,
+ entropy_retain);
+ total_entropy_bits += lrng_get_arch(entropy_buf->b);
+ total_entropy_bits += lrng_get_jent(entropy_buf->c,
+ LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BYTES);
+
+ /* also reseed the DRNG with the current time stamp */
+ entropy_buf->now = random_get_entropy();
+
+wakeup:
+ /*
+ * Shall we wake up user space writers? This location covers
+ * /dev/urandom as well, but also ensures that the user space provider
+ * does not dominate the internal noise sources since in case the
+ * first call of this function finds sufficient entropy in the TRNG, it
+ * will not trigger the wakeup. This implies that when the next
+ * /dev/urandom read happens, the TRNG is drained and the internal
+ * noise sources are asked to feed the TRNG.
+ */
+ lrng_writer_wakeup();
+
+ return total_entropy_bits;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Set the slow noise source reseed trigger threshold. The initial threshold
+ * is set to the minimum data size that can be read from the pool: a word. Upon
+ * reaching this value, the next seed threshold of 128 bits is set followed
+ * by 256 bits.
+ *
+ * @entropy_bits: size of entropy currently injected into DRNG
+ */
+void lrng_init_ops(u32 seed_bits)
+{
+ struct lrng_state *state = &lrng_state;
+
+ if (state->lrng_operational)
+ return;
+
+ /* DRNG is seeded with full security strength */
+ if (state->lrng_fully_seeded) {
+ state->lrng_operational = lrng_sp80090b_startup_complete();
+ lrng_init_wakeup();
+ } else if (seed_bits >= LRNG_FULL_SEED_ENTROPY_BITS) {
+ invalidate_batched_entropy();
+ state->lrng_fully_seeded = true;
+ state->lrng_operational = lrng_sp80090b_startup_complete();
+ state->lrng_min_seeded = true;
+ pr_info("LRNG fully seeded with %u bits of entropy\n",
+ seed_bits);
+ lrng_set_entropy_thresh(LRNG_FULL_SEED_ENTROPY_BITS +
+ LRNG_CONDITIONING_ENTROPY_LOSS);
+ lrng_process_ready_list();
+ lrng_init_wakeup();
+
+ } else if (!state->lrng_min_seeded) {
+
+ /* DRNG is seeded with at least 128 bits of entropy */
+ if (seed_bits >= LRNG_MIN_SEED_ENTROPY_BITS) {
+ invalidate_batched_entropy();
+ state->lrng_min_seeded = true;
+ pr_info("LRNG minimally seeded with %u bits of "
+ "entropy\n", seed_bits);
+ lrng_set_entropy_thresh(
+ lrng_slow_noise_req_entropy(
+ LRNG_FULL_SEED_ENTROPY_BITS +
+ LRNG_CONDITIONING_ENTROPY_LOSS));
+ lrng_process_ready_list();
+ lrng_init_wakeup();
+
+ /* DRNG is seeded with at least LRNG_INIT_ENTROPY_BITS bits */
+ } else if (seed_bits >= LRNG_INIT_ENTROPY_BITS) {
+ pr_info("LRNG initial entropy level %u bits of "
+ "entropy\n", seed_bits);
+ lrng_set_entropy_thresh(
+ lrng_slow_noise_req_entropy(
+ LRNG_MIN_SEED_ENTROPY_BITS +
+ LRNG_CONDITIONING_ENTROPY_LOSS));
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+int __init rand_initialize(void)
+{
+ ktime_t now_time = ktime_get_real();
+ unsigned int i, rand;
+
+ lrng_pool_lfsr_u32(now_time);
+ for (i = 0; i < LRNG_POOL_SIZE; i++) {
+ if (!arch_get_random_seed_int(&rand) &&
+ !arch_get_random_int(&rand))
+ rand = random_get_entropy();
+ lrng_pool_lfsr_u32(rand);
+ }
+ lrng_pool_lfsr_nonaligned((u8 *)utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname())));
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_sdrng.c b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_sdrng.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b01acfa05177
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_sdrng.c
@@ -0,0 +1,420 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR BSD-2-Clause
+/*
+ * LRNG secondary DRNG processing
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 - 2019, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/lrng.h>
+
+#include "lrng_internal.h"
+
+/*
+ * Maximum number of seconds between DRNG reseed intervals of the secondary
+ * DRNG. Note, this is enforced with the next request of random numbers from
+ * the secondary DRNG. Setting this value to zero implies a reseeding attempt
+ * before every generated random number.
+ */
+int lrng_sdrng_reseed_max_time = 600;
+
+static atomic_t lrng_avail = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
+
+DEFINE_MUTEX(lrng_crypto_cb_update);
+
+/* Secondary DRNG for /dev/urandom, getrandom(2), get_random_bytes */
+static struct lrng_sdrng lrng_sdrng_init = {
+ .sdrng = &secondary_chacha20,
+ .crypto_cb = &lrng_cc20_crypto_cb,
+ .lock = __MUTEX_INITIALIZER(lrng_sdrng_init.lock),
+ .spin_lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(lrng_sdrng_init.spin_lock)
+};
+
+/*
+ * Secondary DRNG for get_random_bytes when called in atomic context. This
+ * DRNG will always use the ChaCha20 DRNG. It will never benefit from a
+ * DRNG switch like the "regular" secondary DRNG. If there was no DRNG
+ * switch, the atomic secondary DRNG is identical to the "regular" secondary
+ * DRNG.
+ *
+ * The reason for having this is due to the fact that DRNGs other than
+ * the ChaCha20 DRNG may sleep.
+ */
+static struct lrng_sdrng lrng_sdrng_atomic = {
+ .sdrng = &secondary_chacha20,
+ .crypto_cb = &lrng_cc20_crypto_cb,
+ .spin_lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(lrng_sdrng_atomic.spin_lock)
+};
+
+/********************************** Helper ************************************/
+
+bool lrng_get_available(void)
+{
+ return likely(atomic_read(&lrng_avail));
+}
+
+void lrng_set_available(void)
+{
+ atomic_set(&lrng_avail, 1);
+}
+
+struct lrng_sdrng *lrng_sdrng_init_instance(void)
+{
+ return &lrng_sdrng_init;
+}
+
+struct lrng_sdrng *lrng_sdrng_atomic_instance(void)
+{
+ return &lrng_sdrng_atomic;
+}
+
+void lrng_sdrng_reset(struct lrng_sdrng *sdrng)
+{
+ atomic_set(&sdrng->requests, LRNG_DRNG_RESEED_THRESH);
+ sdrng->last_seeded = jiffies;
+ sdrng->fully_seeded = false;
+ sdrng->force_reseed = true;
+ pr_debug("reset secondary DRNG\n");
+}
+
+/************************* Random Number Generation ***************************/
+
+/* Inject a data buffer into the secondary DRNG */
+static void lrng_sdrng_inject(struct lrng_sdrng *sdrng,
+ const u8 *inbuf, u32 inbuflen)
+{
+ const char *drng_type = unlikely(sdrng == &lrng_sdrng_atomic) ?
+ "atomic" : "secondary";
+ unsigned long flags = 0;
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(LRNG_DRNG_RESEED_THRESH > INT_MAX);
+ pr_debug("seeding %s DRNG with %u bytes\n", drng_type, inbuflen);
+ lrng_sdrng_lock(sdrng, &flags);
+ if (sdrng->crypto_cb->lrng_drng_seed_helper(sdrng->sdrng,
+ inbuf, inbuflen) < 0) {
+ pr_warn("seeding of %s DRNG failed\n", drng_type);
+ atomic_set(&sdrng->requests, 1);
+ } else {
+ pr_debug("%s DRNG stats since last seeding: %lu secs; "
+ "generate calls: %d\n", drng_type,
+ (time_after(jiffies, sdrng->last_seeded) ?
+ (jiffies - sdrng->last_seeded) : 0) / HZ,
+ (LRNG_DRNG_RESEED_THRESH -
+ atomic_read(&sdrng->requests)));
+ sdrng->last_seeded = jiffies;
+ atomic_set(&sdrng->requests, LRNG_DRNG_RESEED_THRESH);
+ sdrng->force_reseed = false;
+
+ if (sdrng->sdrng == lrng_sdrng_atomic.sdrng) {
+ lrng_sdrng_atomic.last_seeded = jiffies;
+ atomic_set(&lrng_sdrng_atomic.requests,
+ LRNG_DRNG_RESEED_THRESH);
+ lrng_sdrng_atomic.force_reseed = false;
+ }
+ }
+ lrng_sdrng_unlock(sdrng, &flags);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_LRNG_TRNG_SUPPORT
+static inline int _lrng_sdrng_seed(struct lrng_sdrng *sdrng)
+{
+ u8 seedbuf[LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BYTES]
+ __aligned(LRNG_KCAPI_ALIGN);
+ int ret = lrng_trng_seed(seedbuf, sizeof(seedbuf),
+ sdrng->fully_seeded ? LRNG_EMERG_ENTROPY : 0);
+
+ /* Update the DRNG state even though we received zero random data */
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ /* Try to reseed at next round */
+ atomic_set(&sdrng->requests, 1);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ lrng_sdrng_inject(sdrng, seedbuf, sizeof(seedbuf));
+ memzero_explicit(seedbuf, sizeof(seedbuf));
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#else /* CONFIG_LRNG_TRNG_SUPPORT */
+static inline int _lrng_sdrng_seed(struct lrng_sdrng *sdrng)
+{
+ struct entropy_buf seedbuf __aligned(LRNG_KCAPI_ALIGN);
+ unsigned long flags = 0;
+ u32 total_entropy_bits;
+ int ret;
+
+ lrng_sdrng_lock(sdrng, &flags);
+ total_entropy_bits = lrng_fill_seed_buffer(sdrng->crypto_cb,
+ sdrng->hash, &seedbuf, 0);
+ lrng_sdrng_unlock(sdrng, &flags);
+
+ /* Allow the seeding operation to be called again */
+ lrng_pool_unlock();
+ lrng_init_ops(total_entropy_bits);
+ ret = total_entropy_bits >> 3;
+
+ lrng_sdrng_inject(sdrng, (u8 *)&seedbuf, sizeof(seedbuf));
+ memzero_explicit(&seedbuf, sizeof(seedbuf));
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_LRNG_TRNG_SUPPORT */
+
+static int lrng_sdrng_get(struct lrng_sdrng *sdrng, u8 *outbuf, u32 outbuflen);
+static void lrng_sdrng_seed(struct lrng_sdrng *sdrng)
+{
+ int ret = _lrng_sdrng_seed(sdrng);
+
+ if (ret >= LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BYTES)
+ sdrng->fully_seeded = true;
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(LRNG_MIN_SEED_ENTROPY_BITS >
+ LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BITS);
+
+ /*
+ * Reseed atomic DRNG from current secondary DRNG,
+ *
+ * We can obtain random numbers from secondary DRNG as the lock type
+ * chosen by lrng_sdrng_get is usable with the current caller.
+ */
+ if ((sdrng->sdrng != lrng_sdrng_atomic.sdrng) &&
+ (lrng_sdrng_atomic.force_reseed ||
+ atomic_read(&lrng_sdrng_atomic.requests) <= 0 ||
+ time_after(jiffies, lrng_sdrng_atomic.last_seeded +
+ lrng_sdrng_reseed_max_time * HZ))) {
+ u8 seedbuf[LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BYTES]
+ __aligned(LRNG_KCAPI_ALIGN);
+
+ ret = lrng_sdrng_get(sdrng, seedbuf, sizeof(seedbuf));
+
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_warn("Error generating random numbers for atomic "
+ "DRNG: %d\n", ret);
+ } else {
+ lrng_sdrng_inject(&lrng_sdrng_atomic, seedbuf, ret);
+ }
+ memzero_explicit(&seedbuf, sizeof(seedbuf));
+ }
+}
+
+static inline void _lrng_sdrng_seed_work(struct lrng_sdrng *sdrng, u32 node)
+{
+ pr_debug("reseed triggered by interrupt noise source "
+ "for secondary DRNG on NUMA node %d\n", node);
+ lrng_sdrng_seed(sdrng);
+ if (sdrng->fully_seeded) {
+ /* Prevent reseed storm */
+ sdrng->last_seeded += node * 100 * HZ;
+ /* Prevent draining of pool on idle systems */
+ lrng_sdrng_reseed_max_time += 100;
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * DRNG reseed trigger: Kernel thread handler triggered by the schedule_work()
+ */
+void lrng_sdrng_seed_work(struct work_struct *dummy)
+{
+ struct lrng_sdrng **lrng_sdrng = lrng_sdrng_instances();
+ u32 node;
+
+ if (lrng_sdrng) {
+ for_each_online_node(node) {
+ struct lrng_sdrng *sdrng = lrng_sdrng[node];
+
+ if (sdrng && !sdrng->fully_seeded) {
+ _lrng_sdrng_seed_work(sdrng, node);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ lrng_pool_all_numa_nodes_seeded();
+ } else {
+ if (!lrng_sdrng_init.fully_seeded)
+ _lrng_sdrng_seed_work(&lrng_sdrng_init, 0);
+ }
+
+out:
+ /* Allow the seeding operation to be called again */
+ lrng_pool_unlock();
+}
+
+/* Force all secondary DRNGs to reseed before next generation */
+void lrng_sdrng_force_reseed(void)
+{
+ struct lrng_sdrng **lrng_sdrng = lrng_sdrng_instances();
+ u32 node;
+
+ if (!lrng_sdrng) {
+ lrng_sdrng_init.force_reseed = true;
+ pr_debug("force reseed of initial secondary DRNG\n");
+ return;
+ }
+ for_each_online_node(node) {
+ struct lrng_sdrng *sdrng = lrng_sdrng[node];
+
+ if (!sdrng)
+ continue;
+
+ sdrng->force_reseed = true;
+ pr_debug("force reseed of secondary DRNG on node %u\n", node);
+ }
+ lrng_sdrng_atomic.force_reseed = true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Get random data out of the secondary DRNG which is reseeded frequently.
+ *
+ * @outbuf: buffer for storing random data
+ * @outbuflen: length of outbuf
+ * @return: < 0 in error case (DRNG generation or update failed)
+ * >=0 returning the returned number of bytes
+ */
+static int lrng_sdrng_get(struct lrng_sdrng *sdrng, u8 *outbuf, u32 outbuflen)
+{
+ unsigned long flags = 0;
+ u32 processed = 0;
+
+ if (!outbuf || !outbuflen)
+ return 0;
+
+ outbuflen = min_t(size_t, outbuflen, INT_MAX);
+
+ lrng_drngs_init_cc20();
+
+ while (outbuflen) {
+ u32 todo = min_t(u32, outbuflen, LRNG_DRNG_MAX_REQSIZE);
+ int ret;
+
+ /* All but the atomic DRNG are seeded during generation */
+ if (atomic_dec_and_test(&sdrng->requests) ||
+ sdrng->force_reseed ||
+ time_after(jiffies, sdrng->last_seeded +
+ lrng_sdrng_reseed_max_time * HZ)) {
+ if (likely(sdrng != &lrng_sdrng_atomic)) {
+ if (lrng_pool_trylock())
+ atomic_set(&sdrng->requests, 1);
+ else
+ lrng_sdrng_seed(sdrng);
+ }
+ }
+
+ lrng_sdrng_lock(sdrng, &flags);
+ ret = sdrng->crypto_cb->lrng_drng_generate_helper(
+ sdrng->sdrng, outbuf + processed, todo);
+ lrng_sdrng_unlock(sdrng, &flags);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ pr_warn("getting random data from secondary DRNG "
+ "failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+ processed += ret;
+ outbuflen -= ret;
+ }
+
+ return processed;
+}
+
+int lrng_sdrng_get_atomic(u8 *outbuf, u32 outbuflen)
+{
+ return lrng_sdrng_get(&lrng_sdrng_atomic, outbuf, outbuflen);
+}
+
+int lrng_sdrng_get_sleep(u8 *outbuf, u32 outbuflen)
+{
+ struct lrng_sdrng **lrng_sdrng = lrng_sdrng_instances();
+ struct lrng_sdrng *sdrng = &lrng_sdrng_init;
+ int node = numa_node_id();
+
+ might_sleep();
+
+ if (lrng_sdrng && lrng_sdrng[node] && lrng_sdrng[node]->fully_seeded)
+ sdrng = lrng_sdrng[node];
+
+ return lrng_sdrng_get(sdrng, outbuf, outbuflen);
+}
+
+/* Initialize the default DRNG during boot */
+void lrng_drngs_init_cc20(void)
+{
+ unsigned long flags = 0;
+
+ if (lrng_get_available())
+ return;
+
+ lrng_sdrng_lock(&lrng_sdrng_init, &flags);
+ if (lrng_get_available()) {
+ lrng_sdrng_unlock(&lrng_sdrng_init, &flags);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ lrng_sdrng_reset(&lrng_sdrng_init);
+ lrng_cc20_init_state(&secondary_chacha20);
+ lrng_state_init_seed_work();
+ lrng_sdrng_unlock(&lrng_sdrng_init, &flags);
+
+ lrng_sdrng_lock(&lrng_sdrng_atomic, &flags);
+ lrng_sdrng_reset(&lrng_sdrng_atomic);
+ /*
+ * We do not initialize the state of the atomic DRNG as it is identical
+ * to the secondary DRNG at this point.
+ */
+ lrng_sdrng_unlock(&lrng_sdrng_atomic, &flags);
+
+ lrng_trng_init();
+
+ lrng_set_available();
+}
+
+/* Reset LRNG such that all existing entropy is gone */
+static void _lrng_reset(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+ struct lrng_sdrng **lrng_sdrng = lrng_sdrng_instances();
+ unsigned long flags = 0;
+
+ lrng_reset_state();
+ lrng_trng_reset();
+
+ if (!lrng_sdrng) {
+ lrng_sdrng_lock(&lrng_sdrng_init, &flags);
+ lrng_sdrng_reset(&lrng_sdrng_init);
+ lrng_sdrng_unlock(&lrng_sdrng_init, &flags);
+ } else {
+ u32 node;
+
+ for_each_online_node(node) {
+ struct lrng_sdrng *sdrng = lrng_sdrng[node];
+
+ if (!sdrng)
+ continue;
+ lrng_sdrng_lock(sdrng, &flags);
+ lrng_sdrng_reset(sdrng);
+ lrng_sdrng_unlock(sdrng, &flags);
+ }
+ }
+ lrng_set_entropy_thresh(LRNG_INIT_ENTROPY_BITS +
+ LRNG_CONDITIONING_ENTROPY_LOSS);
+}
+
+static DECLARE_WORK(lrng_reset_work, _lrng_reset);
+
+void lrng_reset(void)
+{
+ schedule_work(&lrng_reset_work);
+}
+
+/***************************** Initialize LRNG *******************************/
+
+static int __init lrng_init(void)
+{
+ lrng_drngs_init_cc20();
+
+ lrng_drngs_numa_alloc();
+ return 0;
+}
+
+late_initcall(lrng_init);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("Dual BSD/GPL");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Linux Random Number Generator");
diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_sw_noise.c b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_sw_noise.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..36b6382ffe6d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_sw_noise.c
@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR BSD-2-Clause
+/*
+ * LRNG Slow Noise Source: Interrupt data collection
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 - 2019, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
+ */
+
+#include <asm/irq_regs.h>
+#include <asm/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+
+#include "lrng_internal.h"
+
+/*
+ * To limit the impact on the interrupt handling, the LRNG concatenates
+ * entropic LSB parts of the time stamps in a per-CPU array and only
+ * injects them into the entropy pool when the array is full.
+ */
+/* Number of time values to store in the array */
+#define LRNG_TIME_NUM_VALUES (64)
+/* Mask of LSB of time stamp to store */
+#define LRNG_TIME_WORD_MASK (LRNG_TIME_NUM_VALUES - 1)
+
+/* Store multiple integers in one u32 */
+#define LRNG_TIME_SLOTSIZE_BITS (8)
+#define LRNG_TIME_SLOTSIZE_MASK ((1 << LRNG_TIME_SLOTSIZE_BITS) - 1)
+#define LRNG_TIME_ARRAY_MEMBER_BITS (sizeof(u32) << 3)
+#define LRNG_TIME_SLOTS_PER_UINT (LRNG_TIME_ARRAY_MEMBER_BITS / \
+ LRNG_TIME_SLOTSIZE_BITS)
+#define LRNG_TIME_SLOTS_MASK (LRNG_TIME_SLOTS_PER_UINT - 1)
+#define LRNG_TIME_ARRAY_SIZE (LRNG_TIME_NUM_VALUES / \
+ LRNG_TIME_SLOTS_PER_UINT)
+
+/* Holder of time stamps before mixing them into the entropy pool */
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(u32 [LRNG_TIME_ARRAY_SIZE], lrng_time);
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(u32, lrng_time_ptr) = 0;
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(u8, lrng_time_irqs) = 0;
+
+/* Starting bit index of slot */
+static inline unsigned int lrng_time_slot2bitindex(unsigned int slot)
+{
+ return (LRNG_TIME_SLOTSIZE_BITS * slot);
+}
+
+/* Convert index into the array index */
+static inline unsigned int lrng_time_idx2array(unsigned int idx)
+{
+ return idx / LRNG_TIME_SLOTS_PER_UINT;
+}
+
+/* Convert index into the slot of a given array index */
+static inline unsigned int lrng_time_idx2slot(unsigned int idx)
+{
+ return idx & LRNG_TIME_SLOTS_MASK;
+}
+
+/* Convert value into slot value */
+static inline unsigned int lrng_time_slot_val(unsigned int val,
+ unsigned int slot)
+{
+ return val << lrng_time_slot2bitindex(slot);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Batching up of entropy in per-CPU array before injecting into entropy pool.
+ */
+static inline void lrng_time_process(void)
+{
+ u32 i, ptr, now_time = random_get_entropy() &
+ (likely(lrng_state_fully_seeded()) ?
+ LRNG_TIME_SLOTSIZE_MASK : (u32)-1);
+ enum lrng_health_res health_test;
+
+ /* Ensure sufficient space in lrng_time_irqs */
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(LRNG_TIME_NUM_VALUES >= (1 << (sizeof(u8) << 3)));
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(LRNG_TIME_ARRAY_MEMBER_BITS % LRNG_TIME_SLOTSIZE_BITS);
+
+ if (lrng_raw_entropy_store(now_time))
+ return;
+
+ health_test = lrng_health_test(now_time);
+ if (health_test > lrng_health_fail_use)
+ return;
+
+ /* During boot time, we mix the full time stamp directly into LFSR */
+ if (unlikely(!lrng_state_fully_seeded())) {
+ lrng_pool_lfsr_u32(now_time);
+ if (health_test == lrng_health_pass)
+ lrng_pool_add_irq(1);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ptr = this_cpu_inc_return(lrng_time_ptr) & LRNG_TIME_WORD_MASK;
+ this_cpu_or(lrng_time[lrng_time_idx2array(ptr)],
+ lrng_time_slot_val(now_time & LRNG_TIME_SLOTSIZE_MASK,
+ lrng_time_idx2slot(ptr)));
+
+ /* Interrupt delivers entropy if health test passes */
+ if (health_test == lrng_health_pass)
+ this_cpu_inc(lrng_time_irqs);
+
+ /* Only mix the buffer of time stamps into LFSR when wrapping */
+ if (ptr < LRNG_TIME_WORD_MASK)
+ return;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < LRNG_TIME_ARRAY_SIZE; i++) {
+ lrng_pool_lfsr_u32(this_cpu_read(lrng_time[i]));
+ this_cpu_write(lrng_time[i], 0);
+ }
+ lrng_pool_add_irq(this_cpu_read(lrng_time_irqs));
+ this_cpu_write(lrng_time_irqs, 0);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Hot code path - Callback for interrupt handler
+ */
+void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags)
+{
+ lrng_time_process();
+
+ if (!lrng_pool_highres_timer()) {
+ struct pt_regs *regs = get_irq_regs();
+ static atomic_t reg_idx = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
+ u64 ip;
+
+ lrng_pool_lfsr_u32(jiffies);
+ lrng_pool_lfsr_u32(irq);
+ lrng_pool_lfsr_u32(irq_flags);
+
+ if (regs) {
+ u32 *ptr = (u32 *)regs;
+ int reg_ptr = atomic_add_return_relaxed(1, ®_idx);
+ size_t n = (sizeof(struct pt_regs) / sizeof(u32));
+
+ ip = instruction_pointer(regs);
+ lrng_pool_lfsr_u32(*(ptr + (reg_ptr % n)));
+ } else
+ ip = _RET_IP_;
+
+ lrng_pool_lfsr_u32(ip >> 32);
+ lrng_pool_lfsr_u32(ip);
+ }
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_interrupt_randomness);
diff --git a/include/linux/lrng.h b/include/linux/lrng.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..794c061d3514
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/lrng.h
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR BSD-2-Clause */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 - 2019, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
+ */
+
+#ifndef _LRNG_H
+#define _LRNG_H
+
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+/**
+ * struct lrng_crypto_cb - cryptographic callback functions
+ * @lrng_drng_name Name of DRNG
+ * @lrng_hash_name Name of Hash used for reading entropy pool
+ * @lrng_drng_alloc: Allocate DRNG -- the provided integer should be
+ * used for sanity checks.
+ * return: allocated data structure or PTR_ERR on
+ * error
+ * @lrng_drng_dealloc: Deallocate DRNG
+ * @lrng_drng_seed_helper: Seed the DRNG with data of arbitrary length
+ * drng: is pointer to data structure allocated
+ * with lrng_drng_alloc
+ * return: >= 0 on success, < 0 on error
+ * @lrng_drng_generate_helper: Generate random numbers from the DRNG with
+ * arbitrary length
+ * @lrng_drng_generate_helper_full: Generate random numbers from the DRNG with
+ * arbitrary length where the output is
+ * capable of providing 1 bit of entropy per
+ * data bit.
+ * return: generated number of bytes,
+ * < 0 on error
+ * @lrng_hash_alloc: Allocate the hash for reading the entropy pool
+ * return: allocated data structure (NULL is
+ * success too) or ERR_PTR on error
+ * @lrng_hash_dealloc: Deallocate Hash
+ * @lrng_hash_digestsize: Return the digestsize for the used hash to read
+ * out entropy pool
+ * hash: is pointer to data structure allocated
+ * with lrng_hash_alloc
+ * return: size of digest of hash in bytes
+ * @lrng_hash_buffer: Generate hash
+ * hash: is pointer to data structure allocated
+ * with lrng_hash_alloc
+ * return: 0 on success, < 0 on error
+ */
+struct lrng_crypto_cb {
+ const char *(*lrng_drng_name)(void);
+ const char *(*lrng_hash_name)(void);
+ void *(*lrng_drng_alloc)(u32 sec_strength);
+ void (*lrng_drng_dealloc)(void *drng);
+ int (*lrng_drng_seed_helper)(void *drng, const u8 *inbuf, u32 inbuflen);
+ int (*lrng_drng_generate_helper)(void *drng, u8 *outbuf, u32 outbuflen);
+ int (*lrng_drng_generate_helper_full)(void *drng, u8 *outbuf,
+ u32 outbuflen);
+ void *(*lrng_hash_alloc)(const u8 *key, u32 keylen);
+ void (*lrng_hash_dealloc)(void *hash);
+ u32 (*lrng_hash_digestsize)(void *hash);
+ int (*lrng_hash_buffer)(void *hash, const u8 *inbuf, u32 inbuflen,
+ u8 *digest);
+};
+
+/* Register cryptographic backend */
+#ifdef CONFIG_LRNG_DRNG_SWITCH
+int lrng_set_drng_cb(const struct lrng_crypto_cb *cb);
+#else /* CONFIG_LRNG_DRNG_SWITCH */
+static inline int
+lrng_set_drng_cb(const struct lrng_crypto_cb *cb) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
+#endif /* CONFIG_LRNG_DRNG_SWITCH */
+
+#endif /* _LRNG_H */
--
2.23.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v26 02/12] LRNG - allocate one SDRNG instance per NUMA node
From: Stephan Müller @ 2019-11-23 20:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Arnd Bergmann
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, linux-crypto, LKML, linux-api,
Eric W. Biederman, Alexander E. Patrakov, Ahmed S. Darwish,
Theodore Y. Ts'o, Willy Tarreau, Matthew Garrett, Vito Caputo,
Andreas Dilger, Jan Kara, Ray Strode, William Jon McCann, zhangjs,
Andy Lutomirski, Florian Weimer, Lennart Poettering,
Nicolai Stange, "Peter, Matthias" <matth>
In-Reply-To: <2722222.P16TYeLAVu@positron.chronox.de>
In order to improve NUMA-locality when serving getrandom(2) requests,
allocate one DRNG instance per node.
The SDRNG instance that is present right from the start of the kernel is
reused as the first per-NUMA-node SDRNG. For all remaining online NUMA
nodes a new SDRNG instance is allocated.
During boot time, the multiple SDRNG instances are seeded sequentially.
With this, the first SDRNG instance (referenced as the initial SDRNG
in the code) is completely seeded with 256 bits of entropy before the
next SDRNG instance is completely seeded.
When random numbers are requested, the NUMA-node-local SDRNG is checked
whether it has been already fully seeded. If this is not the case, the
initial SDRNG is used to serve the request.
CC: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CC: "Alexander E. Patrakov" <patrakov@gmail.com>
CC: "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com>
CC: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CC: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
CC: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
CC: Vito Caputo <vcaputo@pengaru.com>
CC: Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca>
CC: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CC: Ray Strode <rstrode@redhat.com>
CC: William Jon McCann <mccann@jhu.edu>
CC: zhangjs <zachary@baishancloud.com>
CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
CC: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
CC: Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@0pointer.de>
CC: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Marcelo Henrique Cerri <marcelo.cerri@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Roman Drahtmueller <draht@schaltsekun.de>
Tested-by: Roman Drahtmüller <draht@schaltsekun.de>
Tested-by: Marcelo Henrique Cerri <marcelo.cerri@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
---
drivers/char/lrng/Makefile | 2 +
drivers/char/lrng/lrng_internal.h | 5 ++
drivers/char/lrng/lrng_numa.c | 101 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 108 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 drivers/char/lrng/lrng_numa.c
diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile b/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile
index 2761623715d2..a00cddb45773 100644
--- a/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile
@@ -7,3 +7,5 @@ obj-y += lrng_pool.o lrng_aux.o \
lrng_sw_noise.o lrng_archrandom.o \
lrng_sdrng.o lrng_chacha20.o \
lrng_interfaces.o \
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_NUMA) += lrng_numa.o
diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_internal.h b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_internal.h
index 675ba28bd2e6..fb7890939089 100644
--- a/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_internal.h
+++ b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_internal.h
@@ -261,8 +261,13 @@ int lrng_sdrng_get_sleep(u8 *outbuf, u32 outbuflen);
void lrng_sdrng_force_reseed(void);
void lrng_sdrng_seed_work(struct work_struct *dummy);
+#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
+struct lrng_sdrng **lrng_sdrng_instances(void);
+void lrng_drngs_numa_alloc(void);
+#else /* CONFIG_NUMA */
static inline struct lrng_sdrng **lrng_sdrng_instances(void) { return NULL; }
static inline void lrng_drngs_numa_alloc(void) { return; }
+#endif /* CONFIG_NUMA */
/************************** Health Test linking code **************************/
diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_numa.c b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_numa.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5401f927919a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_numa.c
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR BSD-2-Clause
+/*
+ * LRNG NUMA support
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 - 2019, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/lrng.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+
+#include "lrng_internal.h"
+
+static struct lrng_sdrng **lrng_sdrng __read_mostly = NULL;
+
+struct lrng_sdrng **lrng_sdrng_instances(void)
+{
+ return lrng_sdrng;
+}
+
+/* Allocate the data structures for the per-NUMA node DRNGs */
+static void _lrng_drngs_numa_alloc(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+ struct lrng_sdrng **sdrngs;
+ struct lrng_sdrng *lrng_sdrng_init = lrng_sdrng_init_instance();
+ u32 node;
+ bool init_sdrng_used = false;
+
+ mutex_lock(&lrng_crypto_cb_update);
+
+ /* per-NUMA-node DRNGs are already present */
+ if (lrng_sdrng)
+ goto unlock;
+
+ sdrngs = kcalloc(nr_node_ids, sizeof(void *), GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOFAIL);
+ for_each_online_node(node) {
+ struct lrng_sdrng *sdrng;
+
+ if (!init_sdrng_used) {
+ sdrngs[node] = lrng_sdrng_init;
+ init_sdrng_used = true;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ sdrng = kmalloc_node(sizeof(struct lrng_sdrng),
+ GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOFAIL, node);
+ memset(sdrng, 0, sizeof(lrng_sdrng));
+
+ sdrng->crypto_cb = lrng_sdrng_init->crypto_cb;
+ sdrng->sdrng = sdrng->crypto_cb->lrng_drng_alloc(
+ LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BYTES);
+ if (IS_ERR(sdrng->sdrng)) {
+ kfree(sdrng);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ mutex_init(&sdrng->lock);
+ spin_lock_init(&sdrng->spin_lock);
+
+ /*
+ * No reseeding of NUMA DRNGs from previous DRNGs as this
+ * would complicate the code. Let it simply reseed.
+ */
+ lrng_sdrng_reset(sdrng);
+ sdrngs[node] = sdrng;
+
+ lrng_pool_inc_numa_node();
+ pr_info("secondary DRNG for NUMA node %d allocated\n", node);
+ }
+
+ /* Ensure that all NUMA nodes receive changed memory here. */
+ mb();
+
+ if (!cmpxchg(&lrng_sdrng, NULL, sdrngs))
+ goto unlock;
+
+err:
+ for_each_online_node(node) {
+ struct lrng_sdrng *sdrng = sdrngs[node];
+
+ if (sdrng == lrng_sdrng_init)
+ continue;
+
+ if (sdrng) {
+ sdrng->crypto_cb->lrng_drng_dealloc(sdrng->sdrng);
+ kfree(sdrng);
+ }
+ }
+ kfree(sdrngs);
+
+unlock:
+ mutex_unlock(&lrng_crypto_cb_update);
+}
+
+static DECLARE_WORK(lrng_drngs_numa_alloc_work, _lrng_drngs_numa_alloc);
+
+void lrng_drngs_numa_alloc(void)
+{
+ schedule_work(&lrng_drngs_numa_alloc_work);
+}
--
2.23.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v26 03/12] LRNG - sysctls and /proc interface
From: Stephan Müller @ 2019-11-23 20:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Arnd Bergmann
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, linux-crypto, LKML, linux-api,
Eric W. Biederman, Alexander E. Patrakov, Ahmed S. Darwish,
Theodore Y. Ts'o, Willy Tarreau, Matthew Garrett, Vito Caputo,
Andreas Dilger, Jan Kara, Ray Strode, William Jon McCann, zhangjs,
Andy Lutomirski, Florian Weimer, Lennart Poettering,
Nicolai Stange, "Peter, Matthias" <matth>
In-Reply-To: <2722222.P16TYeLAVu@positron.chronox.de>
The LRNG sysctl interface provides the same controls as the existing
/dev/random implementation. These sysctls behave identically and are
implemented identically. The goal is to allow a possible merge of the
existing /dev/random implementation with this implementation which
implies that this patch tries have a very close similarity. Yet, all
sysctls are documented at [1].
In addition, it provides the file lrng_type which provides details about
the LRNG:
- is the TRNG present
- the name of the DRNG that produces the random numbers for /dev/random,
/dev/urandom, getrandom(2)
- the hash used to produce random numbers from the entropy pool
- the number of secondary DRNG instances
- indicator whether the LRNG operates SP800-90B compliant
- indicator whether a high-resolution timer is identified - only with a
high-resolution timer the interrupt noise source will deliver sufficient
entropy
- indicator whether the LRNG has been minimally seeded (i.e. is the
secondary DRNG seeded with at least 128 bits of of entropy)
- indicator whether the LRNG has been fully seeded (i.e. is the
secondary DRNG seeded with at least 256 bits of entropy)
[1] https://www.chronox.de/lrng.html
CC: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CC: "Alexander E. Patrakov" <patrakov@gmail.com>
CC: "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com>
CC: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CC: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
CC: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
CC: Vito Caputo <vcaputo@pengaru.com>
CC: Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca>
CC: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CC: Ray Strode <rstrode@redhat.com>
CC: William Jon McCann <mccann@jhu.edu>
CC: zhangjs <zachary@baishancloud.com>
CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
CC: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
CC: Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@0pointer.de>
CC: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Marcelo Henrique Cerri <marcelo.cerri@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Roman Drahtmueller <draht@schaltsekun.de>
Tested-by: Roman Drahtmüller <draht@schaltsekun.de>
Tested-by: Marcelo Henrique Cerri <marcelo.cerri@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
---
drivers/char/lrng/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/char/lrng/lrng_interfaces.c | 1 -
drivers/char/lrng/lrng_internal.h | 4 +
drivers/char/lrng/lrng_proc.c | 179 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 184 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 drivers/char/lrng/lrng_proc.c
diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile b/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile
index a00cddb45773..b6240b73e33d 100644
--- a/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile
@@ -9,3 +9,4 @@ obj-y += lrng_pool.o lrng_aux.o \
lrng_interfaces.o \
obj-$(CONFIG_NUMA) += lrng_numa.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += lrng_proc.o
diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_interfaces.c b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_interfaces.c
index 39fc3282843e..11a810c09720 100644
--- a/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_interfaces.c
+++ b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_interfaces.c
@@ -43,7 +43,6 @@ static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(lrng_write_wait);
static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(lrng_init_wait);
static struct fasync_struct *fasync;
-struct ctl_table random_table[];
/********************************** Helper ***********************************/
/* Is the primary DRNG seed level too low? */
diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_internal.h b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_internal.h
index fb7890939089..cca6e3580030 100644
--- a/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_internal.h
+++ b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_internal.h
@@ -110,7 +110,11 @@ void lrng_cc20_init_state(struct chacha20_state *state);
/********************************** /proc *************************************/
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+void lrng_pool_inc_numa_node(void);
+#else
static inline void lrng_pool_inc_numa_node(void) { }
+#endif
/****************************** LRNG interfaces *******************************/
diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_proc.c b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_proc.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..408bbbf4fa4e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_proc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR BSD-2-Clause
+/*
+ * LRNG proc and sysctl interfaces
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 - 2019, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/lrng.h>
+#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/sysctl.h>
+#include <linux/uuid.h>
+
+#include "lrng_internal.h"
+
+/*
+ * This function is used to return both the bootid UUID, and random
+ * UUID. The difference is in whether table->data is NULL; if it is,
+ * then a new UUID is generated and returned to the user.
+ *
+ * If the user accesses this via the proc interface, the UUID will be
+ * returned as an ASCII string in the standard UUID format; if via the
+ * sysctl system call, as 16 bytes of binary data.
+ */
+static int lrng_proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+ void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct ctl_table fake_table;
+ unsigned char buf[64], tmp_uuid[16], *uuid;
+
+ uuid = table->data;
+ if (!uuid) {
+ uuid = tmp_uuid;
+ generate_random_uuid(uuid);
+ } else {
+ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(bootid_spinlock);
+
+ spin_lock(&bootid_spinlock);
+ if (!uuid[8])
+ generate_random_uuid(uuid);
+ spin_unlock(&bootid_spinlock);
+ }
+
+ sprintf(buf, "%pU", uuid);
+
+ fake_table.data = buf;
+ fake_table.maxlen = sizeof(buf);
+
+ return proc_dostring(&fake_table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+}
+
+static int lrng_proc_do_entropy(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+ void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct ctl_table fake_table;
+ int entropy_count;
+
+ entropy_count = lrng_avail_entropy();
+
+ fake_table.data = &entropy_count;
+ fake_table.maxlen = sizeof(entropy_count);
+
+ return proc_dointvec(&fake_table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+}
+
+static int lrng_sysctl_poolsize = LRNG_POOL_SIZE_BITS;
+static int lrng_min_read_thresh = LRNG_POOL_WORD_BITS;
+static int lrng_min_write_thresh;
+static int lrng_max_read_thresh = LRNG_POOL_SIZE_BITS;
+static int lrng_max_write_thresh = LRNG_POOL_SIZE_BITS;
+static char lrng_sysctl_bootid[16];
+static int lrng_sdrng_reseed_max_min;
+
+struct ctl_table random_table[] = {
+ {
+ .procname = "poolsize",
+ .data = &lrng_sysctl_poolsize,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .mode = 0444,
+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
+ },
+ {
+ .procname = "entropy_avail",
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .mode = 0444,
+ .proc_handler = lrng_proc_do_entropy,
+ },
+ {
+ .procname = "read_wakeup_threshold",
+ .data = &lrng_read_wakeup_bits,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
+ .extra1 = &lrng_min_read_thresh,
+ .extra2 = &lrng_max_read_thresh,
+ },
+ {
+ .procname = "write_wakeup_threshold",
+ .data = &lrng_write_wakeup_bits,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
+ .extra1 = &lrng_min_write_thresh,
+ .extra2 = &lrng_max_write_thresh,
+ },
+ {
+ .procname = "boot_id",
+ .data = &lrng_sysctl_bootid,
+ .maxlen = 16,
+ .mode = 0444,
+ .proc_handler = lrng_proc_do_uuid,
+ },
+ {
+ .procname = "uuid",
+ .maxlen = 16,
+ .mode = 0444,
+ .proc_handler = lrng_proc_do_uuid,
+ },
+ {
+ .procname = "urandom_min_reseed_secs",
+ .data = &lrng_sdrng_reseed_max_time,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
+ .extra1 = &lrng_sdrng_reseed_max_min,
+ },
+ { }
+};
+
+/* Number of online DRNGs */
+static u32 numa_drngs = 1;
+
+void lrng_pool_inc_numa_node(void)
+{
+ numa_drngs++;
+}
+
+static int lrng_proc_type_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
+{
+ struct lrng_sdrng *lrng_sdrng_init = lrng_sdrng_init_instance();
+ unsigned long flags = 0;
+ unsigned char buf[300];
+
+ lrng_sdrng_lock(lrng_sdrng_init, &flags);
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
+#ifdef CONFIG_LRNG_TRNG_SUPPORT
+ "TRNG present: true\n"
+#else
+ "TRNG present: false\n"
+#endif
+ "DRNG name: %s\n"
+ "Hash for reading entropy pool: %s\n"
+ "DRNG security strength: %d bits\n"
+ "number of secondary DRNG instances: %u\n"
+ "SP800-90B compliance: %s\n"
+ "High-resolution timer: %s\n"
+ "LRNG minimally seeded: %s\n"
+ "LRNG fully seeded: %s\n",
+ lrng_sdrng_init->crypto_cb->lrng_drng_name(),
+ lrng_sdrng_init->crypto_cb->lrng_hash_name(),
+ LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BITS, numa_drngs,
+ lrng_sp80090b_compliant() ? "true" : "false",
+ lrng_pool_highres_timer() ? "true" : "false",
+ lrng_state_min_seeded() ? "true" : "false",
+ lrng_state_fully_seeded() ? "true" : "false");
+ lrng_sdrng_unlock(lrng_sdrng_init, &flags);
+
+ seq_write(m, buf, strlen(buf));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init lrng_proc_type_init(void)
+{
+ proc_create_single("lrng_type", 0444, NULL, &lrng_proc_type_show);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+module_init(lrng_proc_type_init);
--
2.23.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v26 04/12] LRNG - add switchable DRNG support
From: Stephan Müller @ 2019-11-23 20:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Arnd Bergmann
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, linux-crypto, LKML, linux-api,
Eric W. Biederman, Alexander E. Patrakov, Ahmed S. Darwish,
Theodore Y. Ts'o, Willy Tarreau, Matthew Garrett, Vito Caputo,
Andreas Dilger, Jan Kara, Ray Strode, William Jon McCann, zhangjs,
Andy Lutomirski, Florian Weimer, Lennart Poettering,
Nicolai Stange, "Peter, Matthias" <matth>
In-Reply-To: <2722222.P16TYeLAVu@positron.chronox.de>
The DRNG switch support allows replacing the DRNG mechanism of the
LRNG. The switching support rests on the interface definition of
include/linux/lrng.h. A new DRNG is implemented by filling in the
interface defined in this header file.
In addition to the DRNG, the extension also has to provide a hash
implementation that is used to hash the entropy pool for random number
extraction.
Note: It is permissible to implement a DRNG whose operations may sleep.
However, the hash function must not sleep.
The switchable DRNG support allows replacing the DRNG at runtime.
However, only one DRNG extension is allowed to be loaded at any given
time. Before replacing it with another DRNG implementation, the possibly
existing DRNG extension must be unloaded.
The switchable DRNG extension activates the new DRNG during load time.
It is expected, however, that such a DRNG switch would be done only once
by an administrator to load the intended DRNG implementation.
It is permissible to compile DRNG extensions either as kernel modules or
statically. The initialization of the DRNG extension should be performed
with a late_initcall to ensure the extension is available when user
space starts but after all other initialization completed.
The initialization is performed by registering the function call data
structure with the lrng_set_drng_cb function. In order to unload the
DRNG extension, lrng_set_drng_cb must be invoked with the NULL
parameter.
The DRNG extension should always provide a security strength that is at
least as strong as LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BITS.
CC: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CC: "Alexander E. Patrakov" <patrakov@gmail.com>
CC: "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com>
CC: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CC: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
CC: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
CC: Vito Caputo <vcaputo@pengaru.com>
CC: Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca>
CC: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CC: Ray Strode <rstrode@redhat.com>
CC: William Jon McCann <mccann@jhu.edu>
CC: zhangjs <zachary@baishancloud.com>
CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
CC: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
CC: Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@0pointer.de>
CC: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Marcelo Henrique Cerri <marcelo.cerri@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Roman Drahtmueller <draht@schaltsekun.de>
Tested-by: Roman Drahtmüller <draht@schaltsekun.de>
Tested-by: Marcelo Henrique Cerri <marcelo.cerri@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
---
drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig | 7 ++
drivers/char/lrng/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/char/lrng/lrng_switch.c | 185 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 193 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 drivers/char/lrng/lrng_switch.c
diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig b/drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig
index 1ba10fd421f3..c6e8eafd836c 100644
--- a/drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig
@@ -52,4 +52,11 @@ config LRNG_POOL_SIZE
default 4 if LRNG_POOL_SIZE_65536
default 5 if LRNG_POOL_SIZE_131072
+menuconfig LRNG_DRNG_SWITCH
+ bool "Support DRNG runtime switching"
+ help
+ The Linux RNG per default uses a ChaCha20 DRNG that is
+ accessible via the external interfaces. With this configuration
+ option other DRNGs can be selected and loaded at runtime.
+
endif # LRNG
diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile b/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile
index b6240b73e33d..6bac97638767 100644
--- a/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile
@@ -10,3 +10,4 @@ obj-y += lrng_pool.o lrng_aux.o \
obj-$(CONFIG_NUMA) += lrng_numa.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += lrng_proc.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_LRNG_DRNG_SWITCH) += lrng_switch.o
diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_switch.c b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_switch.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..1e91a0d6df08
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_switch.c
@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR BSD-2-Clause
+/*
+ * LRNG DRNG switching support
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 - 2019, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/lrng.h>
+
+#include "lrng_internal.h"
+
+static void lrng_sdrng_switch(struct lrng_sdrng *sdrng_store,
+ const struct lrng_crypto_cb *cb, int node)
+{
+ const struct lrng_crypto_cb *old_cb;
+ unsigned long flags = 0;
+ int ret;
+ u8 seed[LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BYTES];
+ void *new_sdrng =
+ cb->lrng_drng_alloc(LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BYTES);
+ void *old_sdrng, *new_hash = NULL, *old_hash = NULL;
+ bool sl = false, reset_sdrng = !lrng_get_available();
+
+ if (IS_ERR(new_sdrng)) {
+ pr_warn("could not allocate new secondary DRNG for NUMA node "
+ "%d (%ld)\n", node, PTR_ERR(new_sdrng));
+ return;
+ }
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_LRNG_TRNG_SUPPORT
+ new_hash = cb->lrng_hash_alloc(seed, sizeof(seed));
+#endif /* CONFIG_LRNG_TRNG_SUPPORT */
+ if (IS_ERR(new_hash)) {
+ pr_warn("could not allocate new LRNG pool hash (%ld)\n",
+ PTR_ERR(new_hash));
+ cb->lrng_drng_dealloc(new_sdrng);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ lrng_sdrng_lock(sdrng_store, &flags);
+
+ /*
+ * Pull from existing DRNG to seed new DRNG regardless of seed status
+ * of old DRNG -- the entropy state for the secondary DRNG is left
+ * unchanged which implies that als the new DRNG is reseeded when deemed
+ * necessary. This seeding of the new DRNG shall only ensure that the
+ * new DRNG has the same entropy as the old DRNG.
+ */
+ ret = sdrng_store->crypto_cb->lrng_drng_generate_helper(
+ sdrng_store->sdrng, seed, sizeof(seed));
+ lrng_sdrng_unlock(sdrng_store, &flags);
+
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ reset_sdrng = true;
+ pr_warn("getting random data from secondary DRNG failed for "
+ "NUMA node %d (%d)\n", node, ret);
+ } else {
+ /* seed new DRNG with data */
+ ret = cb->lrng_drng_seed_helper(new_sdrng, seed, ret);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ reset_sdrng = true;
+ pr_warn("seeding of new secondary DRNG failed for NUMA "
+ "node %d (%d)\n", node, ret);
+ } else {
+ pr_debug("seeded new secondary DRNG of NUMA node %d "
+ "instance from old secondary DRNG instance\n",
+ node);
+ }
+ }
+
+ mutex_lock(&sdrng_store->lock);
+ /*
+ * If we switch the secondary DRNG from the initial ChaCha20 DRNG to
+ * something else, there is a lock transition from spin lock to mutex
+ * (see lrng_sdrng_is_atomic and how the lock is taken in
+ * lrng_sdrng_lock). Thus, we need to take both locks during the
+ * transition phase.
+ */
+ if (lrng_sdrng_is_atomic(sdrng_store)) {
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&sdrng_store->spin_lock, flags);
+ sl = true;
+ }
+
+ if (reset_sdrng)
+ lrng_sdrng_reset(sdrng_store);
+
+ old_sdrng = sdrng_store->sdrng;
+ old_cb = sdrng_store->crypto_cb;
+ sdrng_store->sdrng = new_sdrng;
+ sdrng_store->crypto_cb = cb;
+
+ if (new_hash) {
+ old_hash = sdrng_store->hash;
+ sdrng_store->hash = new_hash;
+ pr_info("Entropy pool read-hash allocated for DRNG for NUMA "
+ "node %d\n", node);
+ }
+
+ if (sl)
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sdrng_store->spin_lock, flags);
+ mutex_unlock(&sdrng_store->lock);
+
+ /* Secondary ChaCha20 serves as atomic instance left untouched. */
+ if (old_sdrng != &secondary_chacha20) {
+ old_cb->lrng_drng_dealloc(old_sdrng);
+ if (old_hash)
+ old_cb->lrng_hash_dealloc(old_hash);
+ }
+
+ pr_info("secondary DRNG of NUMA node %d switched\n", node);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Switch the existing DRNG instances with new using the new crypto callbacks.
+ * The caller must hold the lrng_crypto_cb_update lock.
+ */
+static int lrng_drngs_switch(const struct lrng_crypto_cb *cb)
+{
+ struct lrng_sdrng **lrng_sdrng = lrng_sdrng_instances();
+ struct lrng_sdrng *lrng_sdrng_init = lrng_sdrng_init_instance();
+ int ret = lrng_trng_switch(cb);
+
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ /* Update secondary DRNG */
+ if (lrng_sdrng) {
+ u32 node;
+
+ for_each_online_node(node) {
+ if (lrng_sdrng[node])
+ lrng_sdrng_switch(lrng_sdrng[node], cb, node);
+ }
+ } else
+ lrng_sdrng_switch(lrng_sdrng_init, cb, 0);
+
+ lrng_set_available();
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * lrng_set_drng_cb - Register new cryptographic callback functions for DRNG
+ * The registering implies that all old DRNG states are replaced with new
+ * DRNG states.
+ * @cb: Callback functions to be registered -- if NULL, use the default
+ * callbacks pointing to the ChaCha20 DRNG.
+ * @return: 0 on success, < 0 on error
+ */
+int lrng_set_drng_cb(const struct lrng_crypto_cb *cb)
+{
+ struct lrng_sdrng *lrng_sdrng_init = lrng_sdrng_init_instance();
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!cb)
+ cb = &lrng_cc20_crypto_cb;
+
+ mutex_lock(&lrng_crypto_cb_update);
+
+ /*
+ * If a callback other than the default is set, allow it only to be
+ * set back to the default callback. This ensures that multiple
+ * different callbacks can be registered at the same time. If a
+ * callback different from the current callback and the default
+ * callback shall be set, the current callback must be deregistered
+ * (e.g. the kernel module providing it must be unloaded) and the new
+ * implementation can be registered.
+ */
+ if ((cb != &lrng_cc20_crypto_cb) &&
+ (lrng_sdrng_init->crypto_cb != &lrng_cc20_crypto_cb)) {
+ pr_warn("disallow setting new cipher callbacks, unload the old "
+ "callbacks first!\n");
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = lrng_drngs_switch(cb);
+
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&lrng_crypto_cb_update);
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(lrng_set_drng_cb);
--
2.23.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v26 05/12] crypto: DRBG - externalize DRBG functions for LRNG
From: Stephan Müller @ 2019-11-23 20:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Arnd Bergmann
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, linux-crypto, LKML, linux-api,
Eric W. Biederman, Alexander E. Patrakov, Ahmed S. Darwish,
Theodore Y. Ts'o, Willy Tarreau, Matthew Garrett, Vito Caputo,
Andreas Dilger, Jan Kara, Ray Strode, William Jon McCann, zhangjs,
Andy Lutomirski, Florian Weimer, Lennart Poettering,
Nicolai Stange, "Peter, Matthias" <matth>
In-Reply-To: <2722222.P16TYeLAVu@positron.chronox.de>
This patch allows several DRBG functions to be called by the LRNG kernel
code paths outside the drbg.c file.
CC: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CC: "Alexander E. Patrakov" <patrakov@gmail.com>
CC: "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com>
CC: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CC: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
CC: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
CC: Vito Caputo <vcaputo@pengaru.com>
CC: Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca>
CC: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CC: Ray Strode <rstrode@redhat.com>
CC: William Jon McCann <mccann@jhu.edu>
CC: zhangjs <zachary@baishancloud.com>
CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
CC: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
CC: Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@0pointer.de>
CC: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Roman Drahtmueller <draht@schaltsekun.de>
Tested-by: Roman Drahtmüller <draht@schaltsekun.de>
Tested-by: Marcelo Henrique Cerri <marcelo.cerri@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
---
crypto/drbg.c | 16 ++++++++++------
include/crypto/drbg.h | 7 +++++++
2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/drbg.c b/crypto/drbg.c
index b6929eb5f565..5561dd0f09e1 100644
--- a/crypto/drbg.c
+++ b/crypto/drbg.c
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@
* the SHA256 / AES 256 over other ciphers. Thus, the favored
* DRBGs are the latest entries in this array.
*/
-static const struct drbg_core drbg_cores[] = {
+const struct drbg_core drbg_cores[] = {
#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_CTR
{
.flags = DRBG_CTR | DRBG_STRENGTH128,
@@ -190,6 +190,7 @@ static const struct drbg_core drbg_cores[] = {
},
#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC */
};
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(drbg_cores);
static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg);
@@ -205,7 +206,7 @@ static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg);
* Return: normalized strength in *bytes* value or 32 as default
* to counter programming errors
*/
-static inline unsigned short drbg_sec_strength(drbg_flag_t flags)
+unsigned short drbg_sec_strength(drbg_flag_t flags)
{
switch (flags & DRBG_STRENGTH_MASK) {
case DRBG_STRENGTH128:
@@ -218,6 +219,7 @@ static inline unsigned short drbg_sec_strength(drbg_flag_t flags)
return 32;
}
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(drbg_sec_strength);
/*
* FIPS 140-2 continuous self test for the noise source
@@ -1202,7 +1204,7 @@ static int drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *pers,
}
/* Free all substructures in a DRBG state without the DRBG state structure */
-static inline void drbg_dealloc_state(struct drbg_state *drbg)
+void drbg_dealloc_state(struct drbg_state *drbg)
{
if (!drbg)
return;
@@ -1223,12 +1225,13 @@ static inline void drbg_dealloc_state(struct drbg_state *drbg)
drbg->fips_primed = false;
}
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(drbg_dealloc_state);
/*
* Allocate all sub-structures for a DRBG state.
* The DRBG state structure must already be allocated.
*/
-static inline int drbg_alloc_state(struct drbg_state *drbg)
+int drbg_alloc_state(struct drbg_state *drbg)
{
int ret = -ENOMEM;
unsigned int sb_size = 0;
@@ -1307,6 +1310,7 @@ static inline int drbg_alloc_state(struct drbg_state *drbg)
drbg_dealloc_state(drbg);
return ret;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(drbg_alloc_state);
/*************************************************************************
* DRBG interface functions
@@ -1874,8 +1878,7 @@ static int drbg_kcapi_sym_ctr(struct drbg_state *drbg,
*
* return: flags
*/
-static inline void drbg_convert_tfm_core(const char *cra_driver_name,
- int *coreref, bool *pr)
+void drbg_convert_tfm_core(const char *cra_driver_name, int *coreref, bool *pr)
{
int i = 0;
size_t start = 0;
@@ -1902,6 +1905,7 @@ static inline void drbg_convert_tfm_core(const char *cra_driver_name,
}
}
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(drbg_convert_tfm_core);
static int drbg_kcapi_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
diff --git a/include/crypto/drbg.h b/include/crypto/drbg.h
index 8c9af21efce1..c63b20375235 100644
--- a/include/crypto/drbg.h
+++ b/include/crypto/drbg.h
@@ -282,4 +282,11 @@ enum drbg_prefixes {
DRBG_PREFIX3
};
+extern int drbg_alloc_state(struct drbg_state *drbg);
+extern void drbg_dealloc_state(struct drbg_state *drbg);
+extern void drbg_convert_tfm_core(const char *cra_driver_name, int *coreref,
+ bool *pr);
+extern const struct drbg_core drbg_cores[];
+extern unsigned short drbg_sec_strength(drbg_flag_t flags);
+
#endif /* _DRBG_H */
--
2.23.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v26 06/12] LRNG - add SP800-90A DRBG extension
From: Stephan Müller @ 2019-11-23 20:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Arnd Bergmann
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, linux-crypto, LKML, linux-api,
Eric W. Biederman, Alexander E. Patrakov, Ahmed S. Darwish,
Theodore Y. Ts'o, Willy Tarreau, Matthew Garrett, Vito Caputo,
Andreas Dilger, Jan Kara, Ray Strode, William Jon McCann, zhangjs,
Andy Lutomirski, Florian Weimer, Lennart Poettering,
Nicolai Stange, "Peter, Matthias" <matth>
In-Reply-To: <2722222.P16TYeLAVu@positron.chronox.de>
Using the LRNG switchable DRNG support, the SP800-90A DRBG extension is
implemented.
The DRBG uses the kernel crypto API DRBG implementation. In addition, it
uses the kernel crypto API SHASH support to provide the hashing
operation.
The DRBG supports the choice of either a CTR DRBG using AES-256, HMAC
DRBG with SHA-512 core or Hash DRBG with SHA-512 core. The used core can
be selected with the module parameter lrng_drbg_type. The default is the
CTR DRBG.
When compiling the DRBG extension statically, the DRBG is loaded at
late_initcall stage which implies that with the start of user space, the
user space interfaces of getrandom(2), /dev/random and /dev/urandom
provide random data produced by an SP800-90A DRBG.
CC: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CC: "Alexander E. Patrakov" <patrakov@gmail.com>
CC: "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com>
CC: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CC: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
CC: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
CC: Vito Caputo <vcaputo@pengaru.com>
CC: Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca>
CC: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CC: Ray Strode <rstrode@redhat.com>
CC: William Jon McCann <mccann@jhu.edu>
CC: zhangjs <zachary@baishancloud.com>
CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
CC: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
CC: Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@0pointer.de>
CC: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Roman Drahtmueller <draht@schaltsekun.de>
Tested-by: Roman Drahtmüller <draht@schaltsekun.de>
Tested-by: Marcelo Henrique Cerri <marcelo.cerri@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
---
drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig | 11 ++
drivers/char/lrng/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/char/lrng/lrng_drbg.c | 261 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 273 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 drivers/char/lrng/lrng_drbg.c
diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig b/drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig
index c6e8eafd836c..dcdf4ef83da5 100644
--- a/drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig
@@ -59,4 +59,15 @@ menuconfig LRNG_DRNG_SWITCH
accessible via the external interfaces. With this configuration
option other DRNGs can be selected and loaded at runtime.
+if LRNG_DRNG_SWITCH
+config LRNG_DRBG
+ tristate "SP800-90A support for the LRNG"
+ select CRYPTO_DRBG_MENU
+ select CRYPTO_CMAC if CRYPTO_DRBG_CTR
+ help
+ Enable the SP800-90A DRBG support for the LRNG. Once the
+ module is loaded, output from /dev/random, /dev/urandom,
+ getrandom(2), or get_random_bytes is provided by a DRBG.
+endif # LRNG_DRNG_SWITCH
+
endif # LRNG
diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile b/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile
index 6bac97638767..e3a704b3466c 100644
--- a/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile
@@ -11,3 +11,4 @@ obj-y += lrng_pool.o lrng_aux.o \
obj-$(CONFIG_NUMA) += lrng_numa.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += lrng_proc.o
obj-$(CONFIG_LRNG_DRNG_SWITCH) += lrng_switch.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_LRNG_DRBG) += lrng_drbg.o
diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_drbg.c b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_drbg.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..3b5314f399a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_drbg.c
@@ -0,0 +1,261 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR BSD-2-Clause
+/*
+ * Backend for the LRNG providing the cryptographic primitives using the
+ * kernel crypto API and its DRBG.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 - 2019, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <crypto/drbg.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/lrng.h>
+
+/*
+ * Define a DRBG plus a hash / MAC used to extract data from the entropy pool.
+ * For LRNG_HASH_NAME you can use a hash or a MAC (HMAC or CMAC) of your choice
+ * (Note, you should use the suggested selections below -- using SHA-1 or MD5
+ * is not wise). The idea is that the used cipher primitive can be selected to
+ * be the same as used for the DRBG. I.e. the LRNG only uses one cipher
+ * primitive using the same cipher implementation with the options offered in
+ * the following. This means, if the CTR DRBG is selected and AES-NI is present,
+ * both the CTR DRBG and the selected cmac(aes) use AES-NI.
+ *
+ * The security strengths of the DRBGs are all 256 bits according to
+ * SP800-57 section 5.6.1.
+ *
+ * This definition is allowed to be changed.
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_CTR
+static unsigned int lrng_drbg_type = 0;
+#elif defined CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC
+static unsigned int lrng_drbg_type = 1;
+#elif defined CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HASH
+static unsigned int lrng_drbg_type = 2;
+#else
+#error "Unknown DRBG in use"
+#endif
+
+/* The parameter must be r/o in sysfs as otherwise races appear. */
+module_param(lrng_drbg_type, uint, 0444);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(lrng_drbg_type, "DRBG type used for LRNG (0->CTR_DRBG, "
+ "1->HMAC_DRBG, 2->Hash_DRBG)");
+
+struct lrng_drbg {
+ const char *hash_name;
+ const char *drbg_core;
+};
+
+static const struct lrng_drbg lrng_drbg_types[] = {
+ { /* CTR_DRBG with AES-256 using derivation function */
+ .hash_name = "cmac(aes)",
+ .drbg_core = "drbg_nopr_ctr_aes256",
+ }, { /* HMAC_DRBG with SHA-512 */
+ .hash_name = "sha512",
+ .drbg_core = "drbg_nopr_hmac_sha512",
+ }, { /* Hash_DRBG with SHA-512 using derivation function */
+ .hash_name = "sha512",
+ .drbg_core = "drbg_nopr_sha512"
+ }
+};
+
+struct lrng_hash_info {
+ struct shash_desc shash;
+ char ctx[];
+};
+
+static int lrng_drbg_drng_seed_helper(void *drng, const u8 *inbuf, u32 inbuflen)
+{
+ struct drbg_state *drbg = (struct drbg_state *)drng;
+ LIST_HEAD(seedlist);
+ struct drbg_string data;
+ int ret;
+
+ drbg_string_fill(&data, inbuf, inbuflen);
+ list_add_tail(&data.list, &seedlist);
+ ret = drbg->d_ops->update(drbg, &seedlist, drbg->seeded);
+
+ if (ret >= 0)
+ drbg->seeded = true;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int lrng_drbg_drng_generate_helper(void *drng, u8 *outbuf, u32 outbuflen)
+{
+ struct drbg_state *drbg = (struct drbg_state *)drng;
+
+ return drbg->d_ops->generate(drbg, outbuf, outbuflen, NULL);
+}
+
+static void *lrng_drbg_drng_alloc(u32 sec_strength)
+{
+ struct drbg_state *drbg;
+ int coreref = -1;
+ bool pr = false;
+ int ret;
+
+ drbg_convert_tfm_core(lrng_drbg_types[lrng_drbg_type].drbg_core,
+ &coreref, &pr);
+ if (coreref < 0)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+
+ drbg = kzalloc(sizeof(struct drbg_state), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!drbg)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ drbg->core = &drbg_cores[coreref];
+ drbg->seeded = false;
+ ret = drbg_alloc_state(drbg);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (sec_strength > drbg_sec_strength(drbg->core->flags)) {
+ pr_err("Security strength of DRBG (%u bits) lower than "
+ "requested by LRNG (%u bits)\n",
+ drbg_sec_strength(drbg->core->flags) * 8,
+ sec_strength * 8);
+ goto dealloc;
+ }
+
+ if (sec_strength < drbg_sec_strength(drbg->core->flags))
+ pr_warn("Security strength of DRBG (%u bits) higher than "
+ "requested by LRNG (%u bits)\n",
+ drbg_sec_strength(drbg->core->flags) * 8,
+ sec_strength * 8);
+
+ pr_info("DRBG with %s core allocated\n", drbg->core->backend_cra_name);
+
+ return drbg;
+
+dealloc:
+ if (drbg->d_ops)
+ drbg->d_ops->crypto_fini(drbg);
+ drbg_dealloc_state(drbg);
+err:
+ kfree(drbg);
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+}
+
+static void lrng_drbg_drng_dealloc(void *drng)
+{
+ struct drbg_state *drbg = (struct drbg_state *)drng;
+
+ drbg_dealloc_state(drbg);
+ kzfree(drbg);
+ pr_info("DRBG deallocated\n");
+}
+
+static void *lrng_drbg_hash_alloc(const u8 *key, u32 keylen)
+{
+ struct lrng_hash_info *lrng_hash;
+ struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+ int size, ret;
+
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(lrng_drbg_types[lrng_drbg_type].hash_name,
+ 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+ pr_err("could not allocate hash %s\n",
+ lrng_drbg_types[lrng_drbg_type].hash_name);
+ return ERR_CAST(tfm);
+ }
+
+ size = sizeof(struct lrng_hash_info) + crypto_shash_descsize(tfm);
+ lrng_hash = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!lrng_hash) {
+ crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ }
+
+ lrng_hash->shash.tfm = tfm;
+
+ /* If the used hash is no MAC, ignore the ENOSYS return code */
+ ret = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm, key, keylen);
+ if (ret && ret != -ENOSYS) {
+ pr_err("could not set the key for MAC\n");
+ crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+ kfree(lrng_hash);
+ return ERR_PTR(ret);
+ }
+
+ pr_info("Hash %s allocated\n",
+ lrng_drbg_types[lrng_drbg_type].hash_name);
+
+ return lrng_hash;
+}
+
+static void lrng_drbg_hash_dealloc(void *hash)
+{
+ struct lrng_hash_info *lrng_hash = (struct lrng_hash_info *)hash;
+ struct shash_desc *shash = &lrng_hash->shash;
+ struct crypto_shash *tfm = shash->tfm;
+
+ crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+ kfree(lrng_hash);
+ pr_info("Hash deallocated\n");
+}
+
+static u32 lrng_drbg_hash_digestsize(void *hash)
+{
+ struct lrng_hash_info *lrng_hash = (struct lrng_hash_info *)hash;
+ struct shash_desc *shash = &lrng_hash->shash;
+
+ return crypto_shash_digestsize(shash->tfm);
+}
+
+static int lrng_drbg_hash_buffer(void *hash, const u8 *inbuf, u32 inbuflen,
+ u8 *digest)
+{
+ struct lrng_hash_info *lrng_hash = (struct lrng_hash_info *)hash;
+ struct shash_desc *shash = &lrng_hash->shash;
+
+ return crypto_shash_digest(shash, inbuf, inbuflen, digest);
+}
+
+static const char *lrng_drbg_name(void)
+{
+ return lrng_drbg_types[lrng_drbg_type].drbg_core;
+}
+
+static const char *lrng_hash_name(void)
+{
+ return lrng_drbg_types[lrng_drbg_type].hash_name;
+}
+
+const static struct lrng_crypto_cb lrng_drbg_crypto_cb = {
+ .lrng_drng_name = lrng_drbg_name,
+ .lrng_hash_name = lrng_hash_name,
+ .lrng_drng_alloc = lrng_drbg_drng_alloc,
+ .lrng_drng_dealloc = lrng_drbg_drng_dealloc,
+ .lrng_drng_seed_helper = lrng_drbg_drng_seed_helper,
+ .lrng_drng_generate_helper = lrng_drbg_drng_generate_helper,
+ .lrng_drng_generate_helper_full = lrng_drbg_drng_generate_helper,
+ .lrng_hash_alloc = lrng_drbg_hash_alloc,
+ .lrng_hash_dealloc = lrng_drbg_hash_dealloc,
+ .lrng_hash_digestsize = lrng_drbg_hash_digestsize,
+ .lrng_hash_buffer = lrng_drbg_hash_buffer,
+};
+
+static int __init lrng_drbg_init(void)
+{
+ if (lrng_drbg_type >= ARRAY_SIZE(lrng_drbg_types)) {
+ pr_err("lrng_drbg_type parameter too large (given %u - max: %lu)",
+ lrng_drbg_type,
+ (unsigned long)ARRAY_SIZE(lrng_drbg_types) - 1);
+ return -EAGAIN;
+ }
+ return lrng_set_drng_cb(&lrng_drbg_crypto_cb);
+}
+
+static void __exit lrng_drbg_exit(void)
+{
+ lrng_set_drng_cb(NULL);
+}
+
+late_initcall(lrng_drbg_init);
+module_exit(lrng_drbg_exit);
+MODULE_LICENSE("Dual BSD/GPL");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Linux Random Number Generator - SP800-90A DRBG backend");
--
2.23.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v26 07/12] LRNG - add kernel crypto API PRNG extension
From: Stephan Müller @ 2019-11-23 20:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Arnd Bergmann
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, linux-crypto, LKML, linux-api,
Eric W. Biederman, Alexander E. Patrakov, Ahmed S. Darwish,
Theodore Y. Ts'o, Willy Tarreau, Matthew Garrett, Vito Caputo,
Andreas Dilger, Jan Kara, Ray Strode, William Jon McCann, zhangjs,
Andy Lutomirski, Florian Weimer, Lennart Poettering,
Nicolai Stange, "Peter, Matthias" <matth>
In-Reply-To: <2722222.P16TYeLAVu@positron.chronox.de>
Add runtime-pluggable support for all PRNGs that are accessible via
the kernel crypto API, including hardware PRNGs. The PRNG is selected
with the module parameter drng_name where the name must be one that the
kernel crypto API can resolve into an RNG.
This allows using of the kernel crypto API PRNG implementations that
provide an interface to hardware PRNGs. Using this extension,
the LRNG uses the hardware PRNGs to generate random numbers. An
example is the S390 CPACF support providing such a PRNG.
The hash is provided by a kernel crypto API SHASH whose digest size
complies with the seedsize of the PRNG.
CC: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CC: "Alexander E. Patrakov" <patrakov@gmail.com>
CC: "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com>
CC: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CC: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
CC: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
CC: Vito Caputo <vcaputo@pengaru.com>
CC: Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca>
CC: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CC: Ray Strode <rstrode@redhat.com>
CC: William Jon McCann <mccann@jhu.edu>
CC: zhangjs <zachary@baishancloud.com>
CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
CC: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
CC: Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@0pointer.de>
CC: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Marcelo Henrique Cerri <marcelo.cerri@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Roman Drahtmueller <draht@schaltsekun.de>
Tested-by: Roman Drahtmüller <draht@schaltsekun.de>
Tested-by: Marcelo Henrique Cerri <marcelo.cerri@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
---
drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig | 10 +
drivers/char/lrng/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/char/lrng/lrng_kcapi.c | 328 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 339 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 drivers/char/lrng/lrng_kcapi.c
diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig b/drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig
index dcdf4ef83da5..03e6e2ec356b 100644
--- a/drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig
@@ -68,6 +68,16 @@ config LRNG_DRBG
Enable the SP800-90A DRBG support for the LRNG. Once the
module is loaded, output from /dev/random, /dev/urandom,
getrandom(2), or get_random_bytes is provided by a DRBG.
+
+config LRNG_KCAPI
+ tristate "Kernel Crypto API support for the LRNG"
+ select CRYPTO_RNG
+ help
+ Enable the support for generic pseudo-random number
+ generators offered by the kernel crypto API with the
+ LRNG. Once the module is loaded, output from /dev/random,
+ /dev/urandom, getrandom(2), or get_random_bytes is
+ provided by the selected kernel crypto API RNG.
endif # LRNG_DRNG_SWITCH
endif # LRNG
diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile b/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile
index e3a704b3466c..027b6ea51c20 100644
--- a/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile
@@ -12,3 +12,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_NUMA) += lrng_numa.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += lrng_proc.o
obj-$(CONFIG_LRNG_DRNG_SWITCH) += lrng_switch.o
obj-$(CONFIG_LRNG_DRBG) += lrng_drbg.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_LRNG_KCAPI) += lrng_kcapi.o
diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_kcapi.c b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_kcapi.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f887447e524d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_kcapi.c
@@ -0,0 +1,328 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR BSD-2-Clause
+/*
+ * Backend for the LRNG providing the cryptographic primitives using the
+ * kernel crypto API.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 - 2019, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/rng.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/lrng.h>
+
+static char *drng_name = NULL;
+module_param(drng_name, charp, 0444);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(drng_name, "Kernel crypto API name of DRNG");
+
+static char *pool_hash = "sha512";
+module_param(pool_hash, charp, 0444);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(pool_hash,
+ "Kernel crypto API name of hash or keyed message digest to read the entropy pool");
+
+static char *seed_hash = NULL;
+module_param(seed_hash, charp, 0444);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(seed_hash,
+ "Kernel crypto API name of hash with output size equal to seedsize of DRNG to bring seed string to the size required by the DRNG");
+
+struct lrng_hash_info {
+ struct shash_desc shash;
+ char ctx[];
+};
+
+struct lrng_drng_info {
+ struct crypto_rng *kcapi_rng;
+ struct lrng_hash_info *lrng_hash;
+};
+
+static struct lrng_hash_info *_lrng_kcapi_hash_alloc(const char *name)
+{
+ struct lrng_hash_info *lrng_hash;
+ struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+ int size;
+
+ if (!name) {
+ pr_err("Hash name missing\n");
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ }
+
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(name, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+ pr_err("could not allocate hash %s\n", name);
+ return ERR_CAST(tfm);
+ }
+
+ size = sizeof(struct lrng_hash_info) + crypto_shash_descsize(tfm);
+ lrng_hash = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!lrng_hash) {
+ crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ }
+
+ lrng_hash->shash.tfm = tfm;
+
+ return lrng_hash;
+}
+
+static inline u32 _lrng_kcapi_hash_digestsize(struct lrng_hash_info *lrng_hash)
+{
+ struct shash_desc *shash = &lrng_hash->shash;
+ struct crypto_shash *tfm = shash->tfm;
+
+ return crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+}
+
+static inline void _lrng_kcapi_hash_free(struct lrng_hash_info *lrng_hash)
+{
+ struct shash_desc *shash = &lrng_hash->shash;
+ struct crypto_shash *tfm = shash->tfm;
+
+ crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+ kfree(lrng_hash);
+}
+
+static void *lrng_kcapi_hash_alloc(const u8 *key, u32 keylen)
+{
+ struct lrng_hash_info *lrng_hash;
+ int ret;
+
+ lrng_hash = _lrng_kcapi_hash_alloc(pool_hash);
+ if (IS_ERR(lrng_hash))
+ return ERR_CAST(lrng_hash);
+
+ /* If the used hash is no MAC, ignore the ENOSYS return code */
+ ret = crypto_shash_setkey(lrng_hash->shash.tfm, key, keylen);
+ if (ret && ret != -ENOSYS) {
+ pr_err("could not set the key for MAC\n");
+ _lrng_kcapi_hash_free(lrng_hash);
+ return ERR_PTR(ret);
+ }
+
+ pr_info("Hash %s allocated\n", pool_hash);
+
+ return lrng_hash;
+}
+
+static void lrng_kcapi_hash_dealloc(void *hash)
+{
+ struct lrng_hash_info *lrng_hash = (struct lrng_hash_info *)hash;
+
+ _lrng_kcapi_hash_free(lrng_hash);
+ pr_info("Hash %s deallocated\n", pool_hash);
+}
+
+static u32 lrng_kcapi_hash_digestsize(void *hash)
+{
+ struct lrng_hash_info *lrng_hash = (struct lrng_hash_info *)hash;
+
+ return _lrng_kcapi_hash_digestsize(lrng_hash);
+}
+
+static int lrng_kcapi_hash_buffer(void *hash, const u8 *inbuf, u32 inbuflen,
+ u8 *digest)
+{
+ struct lrng_hash_info *lrng_hash = (struct lrng_hash_info *)hash;
+ struct shash_desc *shash = &lrng_hash->shash;
+
+ return crypto_shash_digest(shash, inbuf, inbuflen, digest);
+}
+
+static int lrng_kcapi_drng_seed_helper(void *drng, const u8 *inbuf,
+ u32 inbuflen)
+{
+ struct lrng_drng_info *lrng_drng_info = (struct lrng_drng_info *)drng;
+ struct crypto_rng *kcapi_rng = lrng_drng_info->kcapi_rng;
+ struct lrng_hash_info *lrng_hash = lrng_drng_info->lrng_hash;
+
+ if (lrng_hash) {
+ struct shash_desc *shash = &lrng_hash->shash;
+ u32 digestsize = _lrng_kcapi_hash_digestsize(lrng_hash);
+ u8 digest[64] __aligned(8);
+ int ret;
+
+ BUG_ON(digestsize > sizeof(digest));
+
+ ret = crypto_shash_digest(shash, inbuf, inbuflen, digest);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = crypto_rng_reset(kcapi_rng, digest, digestsize);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ memzero_explicit(digest, digestsize);
+
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ return crypto_rng_reset(kcapi_rng, inbuf, inbuflen);
+ }
+}
+
+static int lrng_kcapi_drng_generate_helper(void *drng, u8 *outbuf,
+ u32 outbuflen)
+{
+ struct lrng_drng_info *lrng_drng_info = (struct lrng_drng_info *)drng;
+ struct crypto_rng *kcapi_rng = lrng_drng_info->kcapi_rng;
+ int ret = crypto_rng_get_bytes(kcapi_rng, outbuf, outbuflen);
+
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ return outbuflen;
+}
+
+static void *lrng_kcapi_drng_alloc(u32 sec_strength)
+{
+ struct lrng_drng_info *lrng_drng_info;
+ struct crypto_rng *kcapi_rng;
+ int seedsize;
+ void *ret = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ if (!drng_name) {
+ pr_err("DRNG name missing\n");
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ }
+
+ if (!memcmp(drng_name, "drbg", 4)) {
+ pr_err("SP800-90A DRBG cannot be allocated using lrng_kcapi "
+ "backend, use lrng_drbg backend instead\n");
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ }
+
+ if (!memcmp(drng_name, "stdrng", 6)) {
+ pr_err("stdrng cannot be allocated using lrng_kcapi backend, "
+ "it is too unspecific and potentially may allocate the "
+ "DRBG\n");
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ }
+
+ lrng_drng_info = kmalloc(sizeof(*lrng_drng_info), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!lrng_drng_info)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ kcapi_rng = crypto_alloc_rng(drng_name, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(kcapi_rng)) {
+ pr_err("DRNG %s cannot be allocated\n", drng_name);
+ ret = ERR_CAST(kcapi_rng);
+ goto free;
+ }
+ lrng_drng_info->kcapi_rng = kcapi_rng;
+
+ seedsize = crypto_rng_seedsize(kcapi_rng);
+
+ if (sec_strength > seedsize)
+ pr_info("Seedsize DRNG (%u bits) lower than "
+ "security strength of LRNG noise source (%u bits)\n",
+ crypto_rng_seedsize(kcapi_rng) * 8,
+ sec_strength * 8);
+
+ if (seedsize) {
+ struct lrng_hash_info *lrng_hash;
+
+ if (!seed_hash) {
+ switch (seedsize) {
+ case 32:
+ seed_hash = "sha256";
+ break;
+ case 48:
+ seed_hash = "sha384";
+ break;
+ case 64:
+ seed_hash = "sha512";
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_err("Seed size %d cannot be processed\n",
+ seedsize);
+ goto dealloc;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ lrng_hash = _lrng_kcapi_hash_alloc(seed_hash);
+ if (IS_ERR(lrng_hash)) {
+ ret = ERR_CAST(lrng_hash);
+ goto dealloc;
+ }
+
+ if (seedsize != _lrng_kcapi_hash_digestsize(lrng_hash)) {
+ pr_err("Seed hash output size not equal to DRNG seed "
+ "size\n");
+ _lrng_kcapi_hash_free(lrng_hash);
+ ret = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ goto dealloc;
+ }
+
+ lrng_drng_info->lrng_hash = lrng_hash;
+
+ pr_info("Seed hash %s allocated\n", seed_hash);
+ } else {
+ lrng_drng_info->lrng_hash = NULL;
+ }
+
+ pr_info("Kernel crypto API DRNG %s allocated\n", drng_name);
+
+ return lrng_drng_info;
+
+dealloc:
+ crypto_free_rng(kcapi_rng);
+free:
+ kfree(lrng_drng_info);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void lrng_kcapi_drng_dealloc(void *drng)
+{
+ struct lrng_drng_info *lrng_drng_info = (struct lrng_drng_info *)drng;
+ struct crypto_rng *kcapi_rng = lrng_drng_info->kcapi_rng;
+ struct lrng_hash_info *lrng_hash = lrng_drng_info->lrng_hash;
+
+ crypto_free_rng(kcapi_rng);
+ if (lrng_hash) {
+ _lrng_kcapi_hash_free(lrng_hash);
+ pr_info("Seed hash %s deallocated\n", seed_hash);
+ }
+ kfree(lrng_drng_info);
+ pr_info("DRNG %s deallocated\n", drng_name);
+}
+
+static const char *lrng_kcapi_drng_name(void)
+{
+ return drng_name;
+}
+
+static const char *lrng_kcapi_pool_hash(void)
+{
+ return pool_hash;
+}
+
+const static struct lrng_crypto_cb lrng_kcapi_crypto_cb = {
+ .lrng_drng_name = lrng_kcapi_drng_name,
+ .lrng_hash_name = lrng_kcapi_pool_hash,
+ .lrng_drng_alloc = lrng_kcapi_drng_alloc,
+ .lrng_drng_dealloc = lrng_kcapi_drng_dealloc,
+ .lrng_drng_seed_helper = lrng_kcapi_drng_seed_helper,
+ .lrng_drng_generate_helper = lrng_kcapi_drng_generate_helper,
+ .lrng_drng_generate_helper_full = lrng_kcapi_drng_generate_helper,
+ .lrng_hash_alloc = lrng_kcapi_hash_alloc,
+ .lrng_hash_dealloc = lrng_kcapi_hash_dealloc,
+ .lrng_hash_digestsize = lrng_kcapi_hash_digestsize,
+ .lrng_hash_buffer = lrng_kcapi_hash_buffer,
+};
+
+static int __init lrng_kcapi_init(void)
+{
+ return lrng_set_drng_cb(&lrng_kcapi_crypto_cb);
+}
+static void __exit lrng_kcapi_exit(void)
+{
+ lrng_set_drng_cb(NULL);
+}
+
+late_initcall(lrng_kcapi_init);
+module_exit(lrng_kcapi_exit);
+MODULE_LICENSE("Dual BSD/GPL");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Linux Random Number Generator - kernel crypto API DRNG backend");
--
2.23.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v26 08/12] crypto: provide access to a static Jitter RNG state
From: Stephan Müller @ 2019-11-23 20:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Arnd Bergmann
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, linux-crypto, LKML, linux-api,
Eric W. Biederman, Alexander E. Patrakov, Ahmed S. Darwish,
Theodore Y. Ts'o, Willy Tarreau, Matthew Garrett, Vito Caputo,
Andreas Dilger, Jan Kara, Ray Strode, William Jon McCann, zhangjs,
Andy Lutomirski, Florian Weimer, Lennart Poettering,
Nicolai Stange, "Peter, Matthias" <matth>
In-Reply-To: <2722222.P16TYeLAVu@positron.chronox.de>
To support the LRNG operation which uses the Jitter RNG separately
from the kernel crypto API, at a time where potentially the regular
memory management is not yet initialized, the Jitter RNG needs to
provide a state whose memory is defined at compile time. As only once
instance will ever be needed by the LRNG, define once static memory
block which is solely to be used by the LRNG.
CC: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CC: "Alexander E. Patrakov" <patrakov@gmail.com>
CC: "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com>
CC: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CC: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
CC: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
CC: Vito Caputo <vcaputo@pengaru.com>
CC: Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca>
CC: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CC: Ray Strode <rstrode@redhat.com>
CC: William Jon McCann <mccann@jhu.edu>
CC: zhangjs <zachary@baishancloud.com>
CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
CC: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
CC: Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@0pointer.de>
CC: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Roman Drahtmueller <draht@schaltsekun.de>
Tested-by: Roman Drahtmüller <draht@schaltsekun.de>
Tested-by: Marcelo Henrique Cerri <marcelo.cerri@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
---
crypto/jitterentropy.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 23 insertions(+)
diff --git a/crypto/jitterentropy.c b/crypto/jitterentropy.c
index 77fa2120fe0c..3a815495f778 100644
--- a/crypto/jitterentropy.c
+++ b/crypto/jitterentropy.c
@@ -644,3 +644,26 @@ int jent_entropy_init(void)
return 0;
}
+
+struct rand_data *jent_lrng_entropy_collector(void)
+{
+ static unsigned char lrng_jent_mem[JENT_MEMORY_SIZE];
+ static struct rand_data lrng_jent_state = {
+ .data = 0,
+ .old_data = 0,
+ .prev_time = 0,
+ .last_delta = 0,
+ .last_delta2 = 0,
+ .osr = 1,
+ .mem = lrng_jent_mem,
+ .memlocation = 0,
+ .memblocks = JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKSIZE,
+ .memblocksize = JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKS,
+ .memaccessloops = JENT_MEMORY_ACCESSLOOPS,
+ };
+
+ if (jent_entropy_init())
+ return NULL;
+
+ return &lrng_jent_state;
+}
--
2.23.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v26 09/12] LRNG - add Jitter RNG fast noise source
From: Stephan Müller @ 2019-11-23 20:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Arnd Bergmann
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, linux-crypto, LKML, linux-api,
Eric W. Biederman, Alexander E. Patrakov, Ahmed S. Darwish,
Theodore Y. Ts'o, Willy Tarreau, Matthew Garrett, Vito Caputo,
Andreas Dilger, Jan Kara, Ray Strode, William Jon McCann, zhangjs,
Andy Lutomirski, Florian Weimer, Lennart Poettering,
Nicolai Stange, "Peter, Matthias" <matth>
In-Reply-To: <2722222.P16TYeLAVu@positron.chronox.de>
The Jitter RNG fast noise source implemented as part of the kernel
crypto API is queried for 256 bits of entropy at the time the seed
buffer managed by the LRNG is about to be filled.
CC: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CC: "Alexander E. Patrakov" <patrakov@gmail.com>
CC: "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com>
CC: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CC: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
CC: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
CC: Vito Caputo <vcaputo@pengaru.com>
CC: Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca>
CC: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CC: Ray Strode <rstrode@redhat.com>
CC: William Jon McCann <mccann@jhu.edu>
CC: zhangjs <zachary@baishancloud.com>
CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
CC: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
CC: Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@0pointer.de>
CC: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Marcelo Henrique Cerri <marcelo.cerri@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Roman Drahtmueller <draht@schaltsekun.de>
Tested-by: Roman Drahtmüller <draht@schaltsekun.de>
Tested-by: Marcelo Henrique Cerri <marcelo.cerri@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
---
drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig | 11 +++++
drivers/char/lrng/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/char/lrng/lrng_jent.c | 88 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 100 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 drivers/char/lrng/lrng_jent.c
diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig b/drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig
index 03e6e2ec356b..80fc723c67d2 100644
--- a/drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig
@@ -80,4 +80,15 @@ config LRNG_KCAPI
provided by the selected kernel crypto API RNG.
endif # LRNG_DRNG_SWITCH
+config LRNG_JENT
+ bool "Enable Jitter RNG as LRNG Seed Source"
+ select CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY
+ help
+ The Linux RNG may use the Jitter RNG as noise source. Enabling
+ this option enables the use of the Jitter RNG. Its default
+ entropy level is 16 bits of entropy per 256 data bits delivered
+ by the Jitter RNG. This entropy level can be changed at boot
+ time or at runtime with the lrng_base.jitterrng configuration
+ variable.
+
endif # LRNG
diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile b/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile
index 027b6ea51c20..a87d800c9aae 100644
--- a/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile
@@ -13,3 +13,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += lrng_proc.o
obj-$(CONFIG_LRNG_DRNG_SWITCH) += lrng_switch.o
obj-$(CONFIG_LRNG_DRBG) += lrng_drbg.o
obj-$(CONFIG_LRNG_KCAPI) += lrng_kcapi.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_LRNG_JENT) += lrng_jent.o
diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_jent.c b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_jent.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..43114a44b8f5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_jent.c
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR BSD-2-Clause
+/*
+ * LRNG Fast Noise Source: Jitter RNG
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 - 2019, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include "lrng_internal.h"
+
+/*
+ * Estimated entropy of data is a 16th of LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BITS.
+ * Albeit a full entropy assessment is provided for the noise source indicating
+ * that it provides high entropy rates and considering that it deactivates
+ * when it detects insufficient hardware, the chosen under estimation of
+ * entropy is considered to be acceptable to all reviewers.
+ */
+static u32 jitterrng = LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BITS>>4;
+module_param(jitterrng, uint, 0644);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(jitterrng, "Entropy in bits of 256 data bits from Jitter "
+ "RNG noise source");
+
+/**
+ * Get Jitter RNG entropy
+ *
+ * @outbuf buffer to store entropy
+ * @outbuflen length of buffer
+ * @return > 0 on success where value provides the added entropy in bits
+ * 0 if no fast source was available
+ */
+struct rand_data;
+struct rand_data *jent_lrng_entropy_collector(void);
+int jent_read_entropy(struct rand_data *ec, unsigned char *data,
+ unsigned int len);
+static struct rand_data *lrng_jent_state;
+
+u32 lrng_get_jent(u8 *outbuf, unsigned int outbuflen)
+{
+ int ret;
+ u32 ent_bits = jitterrng;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lrng_jent_lock);
+ static int lrng_jent_initialized = 0;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&lrng_jent_lock, flags);
+
+ if (!ent_bits || (lrng_jent_initialized == -1)) {
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&lrng_jent_lock, flags);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!lrng_jent_initialized) {
+ lrng_jent_state = jent_lrng_entropy_collector();
+ if (!lrng_jent_state) {
+ jitterrng = 0;
+ lrng_jent_initialized = -1;
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&lrng_jent_lock, flags);
+ pr_info("Jitter RNG unusable on current system\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ lrng_jent_initialized = 1;
+ pr_debug("Jitter RNG working on current system\n");
+ }
+ ret = jent_read_entropy(lrng_jent_state, outbuf, outbuflen);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&lrng_jent_lock, flags);
+
+ if (ret) {
+ pr_debug("Jitter RNG failed with %d\n", ret);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Obtain entropy statement */
+ if (outbuflen != LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BYTES)
+ ent_bits = (ent_bits * outbuflen<<3) /
+ LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BITS;
+ /* Cap entropy to buffer size in bits */
+ ent_bits = min_t(u32, ent_bits, outbuflen<<3);
+ pr_debug("obtained %u bits of entropy from Jitter RNG noise source\n",
+ ent_bits);
+
+ return ent_bits;
+}
+
+u32 lrng_jent_entropylevel(void)
+{
+ return min_t(u32, jitterrng, LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BITS);
+}
--
2.23.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v26 10/12] LRNG - add TRNG support
From: Stephan Müller @ 2019-11-23 20:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Arnd Bergmann
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, linux-crypto, LKML, linux-api,
Eric W. Biederman, Alexander E. Patrakov, Ahmed S. Darwish,
Theodore Y. Ts'o, Willy Tarreau, Matthew Garrett, Vito Caputo,
Andreas Dilger, Jan Kara, Ray Strode, William Jon McCann, zhangjs,
Andy Lutomirski, Florian Weimer, Lennart Poettering,
Nicolai Stange, "Peter, Matthias" <matth>
In-Reply-To: <2722222.P16TYeLAVu@positron.chronox.de>
The True Random Number Generator (TRNG) provides a random number
generator with prediction resistance (SP800-90A terminology) or an NTG.1
(AIS 31 terminology).
When enabled, it obtains random numbers from the entropy pool and
maintains the information with how much entropy it was seeded with. The
TRNG only generates as much output data as it has as entropy.
The secondary DRNGs seed from the TRNG if it is present. In addition,
the TRNG is accessible from user space using the getrandom system call
with the GRND_TRUERANDOM flag.
When getrandom(GRND_TRUERANDOM) is invoked by a process possessing
CAP_SYS_ADMIN, all available entropy in the entropy pool is used to
serve the request. If the calling process does not possess that
capability, entropy is drawn to the extent that the entropy pool
will retain at least 1024 bits of entropy. This approach prevents
unprivileged processes to deplete existing entropy preventing
privileged callers from obtaining that entropy.
Since the secondary DRNG can draw from the entropy pool down to
a minimum entropy level of 512 bits, it will be provided with
entropy while an unprivileged user stresses
getrandom(GRND_TRUERANDOM).
If the TRNG is disabled, the secondary DRNGs seed from the entropy
pool. The getrandom(GRND_TRUERANDOM) call will return -EOPNOTSUPP
in this case.
The TRNG benefits from the switchable DRNG support which implies that
data provided via /dev/random is generated by the loaded DRNG.
CC: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CC: "Alexander E. Patrakov" <patrakov@gmail.com>
CC: "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com>
CC: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CC: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
CC: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
CC: Vito Caputo <vcaputo@pengaru.com>
CC: Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca>
CC: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CC: Ray Strode <rstrode@redhat.com>
CC: William Jon McCann <mccann@jhu.edu>
CC: zhangjs <zachary@baishancloud.com>
CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
CC: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
CC: Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@0pointer.de>
CC: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Marcelo Henrique Cerri <marcelo.cerri@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Roman Drahtmueller <draht@schaltsekun.de>
Tested-by: Roman Drahtmüller <draht@schaltsekun.de>
Tested-by: Marcelo Henrique Cerri <marcelo.cerri@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
---
drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig | 22 +++
drivers/char/lrng/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/char/lrng/lrng_trng.c | 297 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 320 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 drivers/char/lrng/lrng_trng.c
diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig b/drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig
index 80fc723c67d2..122d67ee110e 100644
--- a/drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig
@@ -91,4 +91,26 @@ config LRNG_JENT
time or at runtime with the lrng_base.jitterrng configuration
variable.
+config LRNG_TRNG_SUPPORT
+ bool "Enable True Random Number Generator support"
+ default y
+ help
+ The true random number generator (TRNG) support, also
+ known as DRNG with prediction resistance (SP800-90A
+ terminology) or NTG.1 (AIS 31 terminology), generates
+ random numbers after a successful reseed with entropy.
+ Only when new entropy is provided for a new generation
+ request, random data is provided with an equal amount
+ as entropy was added. The TRNG is available via
+ /dev/random.
+
+ If the support is not enabled, /dev/random ensures that
+ it received sufficient initial entropy and will produce
+ random data without requiring a constant reseed with
+ entropy. Yet it tries to regularly reseed itself with
+ fresh entropy.
+
+ With the TRNG support the /dev/random device will block
+ if insufficient entropy is available.
+
endif # LRNG
diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile b/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile
index a87d800c9aae..1c72bc060bce 100644
--- a/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile
@@ -14,3 +14,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_LRNG_DRNG_SWITCH) += lrng_switch.o
obj-$(CONFIG_LRNG_DRBG) += lrng_drbg.o
obj-$(CONFIG_LRNG_KCAPI) += lrng_kcapi.o
obj-$(CONFIG_LRNG_JENT) += lrng_jent.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_LRNG_TRNG_SUPPORT) += lrng_trng.o
diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_trng.c b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_trng.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d594d5d5bffb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_trng.c
@@ -0,0 +1,297 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR BSD-2-Clause
+/*
+ * LRNG True Random Number Generator (TRNG) processing
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 - 2019, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/lrng.h>
+
+#include "lrng_internal.h"
+
+/* TRNG state handle */
+struct lrng_trng {
+ void *trng; /* TRNG handle */
+ void *hash; /* Hash handle */
+ u32 trng_entropy_bits; /* TRNG entropy level */
+ const struct lrng_crypto_cb *crypto_cb; /* Crypto callbacks */
+ struct mutex lock;
+};
+
+/* TRNG for GRND_TRUERANDOM and seed source for the secondary DRNG(s) */
+static struct lrng_trng lrng_trng = {
+ .trng = &primary_chacha20,
+ .crypto_cb = &lrng_cc20_crypto_cb,
+ .lock = __MUTEX_INITIALIZER(lrng_trng.lock)
+};
+
+/********************************** Helper ************************************/
+
+void lrng_trng_reset(void)
+{
+ lrng_trng.trng_entropy_bits = 0;
+ pr_debug("reset TRNG\n");
+}
+
+void lrng_trng_init(void)
+{
+ mutex_lock(&lrng_trng.lock);
+ lrng_trng_reset();
+ lrng_cc20_init_state(&primary_chacha20);
+ mutex_unlock(&lrng_trng.lock);
+}
+
+u32 lrng_trng_retain(void)
+{
+ if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return 0;
+ return LRNG_EMERG_ENTROPY_TRNG_UNPRIV;
+}
+
+/************************* Random Number Generation ***************************/
+
+/* Caller must hold lrng_trng.lock */
+static int lrng_trng_generate(u8 *outbuf, u32 outbuflen)
+{
+ struct lrng_trng *trng = &lrng_trng;
+ const struct lrng_crypto_cb *crypto_cb = trng->crypto_cb;
+ int ret;
+
+ /*
+ * Only deliver as many bytes as the DRNG is seeded with except during
+ * initialization to provide a first seed to the secondary DRNG.
+ */
+ if (lrng_state_min_seeded())
+ outbuflen = min_t(u32, outbuflen, trng->trng_entropy_bits>>3);
+ else
+ outbuflen = min_t(u32, outbuflen,
+ LRNG_MIN_SEED_ENTROPY_BITS>>3);
+ if (!outbuflen)
+ return 0;
+
+ ret = crypto_cb->lrng_drng_generate_helper_full(trng->trng, outbuf,
+ outbuflen);
+ if (ret != outbuflen) {
+ pr_warn("getting random data from TRNG failed (%d)\n",
+ ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (trng->trng_entropy_bits > (u32)(ret<<3))
+ trng->trng_entropy_bits -= ret<<3;
+ else
+ trng->trng_entropy_bits = 0;
+ pr_debug("obtained %d bytes of random data from TRNG\n", ret);
+ pr_debug("TRNG entropy level at %u bits\n",
+ trng->trng_entropy_bits);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Inject data into the TRNG with a given entropy value. The function calls
+ * the DRNG's update function. This function also generates random data if
+ * requested by caller. The caller is only returned the amount of random data
+ * that is at most equal to the amount of entropy that just seeded the DRNG.
+ *
+ * Note, this function seeds the TRNG and generates data in an atomic operation.
+ *
+ * @inbuf: buffer to inject
+ * @inbuflen: length of inbuf
+ * @entropy_bits: entropy value of the data in inbuf in bits
+ * @outbuf: buffer to fill immediately after seeding to get full entropy
+ * @outbuflen: length of outbuf
+ * @return: number of bytes written to outbuf, 0 if outbuf is not supplied,
+ * or < 0 in case of error
+ */
+static int lrng_trng_inject(const u8 *inbuf, u32 inbuflen, u32 entropy_bits,
+ u8 *outbuf, u32 outbuflen)
+{
+ struct lrng_trng *trng = &lrng_trng;
+ int ret;
+
+ /* cap the maximum entropy value to the provided data length */
+ entropy_bits = min_t(u32, entropy_bits, inbuflen<<3);
+
+ mutex_lock(&trng->lock);
+ ret = trng->crypto_cb->lrng_drng_seed_helper(trng->trng, inbuf,
+ inbuflen);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_warn("(re)seeding of TRNG failed\n");
+ goto unlock;
+ }
+ pr_debug("inject %u bytes with %u bits of entropy into TRNG\n",
+ inbuflen, entropy_bits);
+
+ /* Adjust the fill level indicator to at most the DRNG sec strength */
+ trng->trng_entropy_bits =
+ min_t(u32, trng->trng_entropy_bits + entropy_bits,
+ LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BITS);
+ lrng_init_ops(trng->trng_entropy_bits);
+
+ if (outbuf && outbuflen)
+ ret = lrng_trng_generate(outbuf, outbuflen);
+
+unlock:
+ mutex_unlock(&trng->lock);
+ lrng_reader_wakeup();
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Seed the TRNG from the internal noise sources and generate random data. The
+ * seeding and the generation of random data is an atomic operation.
+ *
+ * lrng_pool_trylock() must be invoked successfully by caller.
+ */
+int lrng_trng_seed(u8 *outbuf, u32 outbuflen, u32 entropy_retain)
+{
+ struct entropy_buf entropy_buf __aligned(LRNG_KCAPI_ALIGN);
+ struct lrng_trng *trng = &lrng_trng;
+ u32 total_entropy_bits;
+ int ret = 0, retrieved = 0;
+
+ /* Get available entropy in primary DRNG */
+ if (trng->trng_entropy_bits>>3) {
+ mutex_lock(&trng->lock);
+ ret = lrng_trng_generate(outbuf, outbuflen);
+ mutex_unlock(&trng->lock);
+ if (ret > 0) {
+ retrieved += ret;
+ if (ret == outbuflen)
+ goto out;
+
+ outbuf += ret;
+ outbuflen -= ret;
+ }
+ /* Disregard error code as another generate request is below. */
+ }
+
+ mutex_lock(&trng->lock);
+ total_entropy_bits = lrng_fill_seed_buffer(trng->crypto_cb, trng->hash,
+ &entropy_buf,
+ entropy_retain);
+ mutex_unlock(&trng->lock);
+
+ /*
+ * Continue even of total_entropy_bits is zero - inject uninitialized
+ * buffer into TRNG for pure mixing in this case.
+ */
+
+ pr_debug("reseed TRNG from internal noise sources with %u bits "
+ "of entropy\n", total_entropy_bits);
+
+ ret = lrng_trng_inject((u8 *)&entropy_buf, sizeof(entropy_buf),
+ total_entropy_bits,
+ outbuf, outbuflen);
+
+ memzero_explicit(&entropy_buf, sizeof(entropy_buf));
+
+ if (ret > 0)
+ retrieved += ret;
+
+out:
+ /* Allow the seeding operation to be called again */
+ lrng_pool_unlock();
+
+ return (ret >= 0) ? retrieved : ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Obtain random data from TRNG with information theoretical entropy by
+ * triggering a reseed. The TRNG will only return as many random bytes as it
+ * was seeded with.
+ *
+ * @outbuf: buffer to store the random data in
+ * @outbuflen: length of outbuf
+ * @return: < 0 on error
+ * >= 0 the number of bytes that were obtained
+ */
+int lrng_trng_get(u8 *outbuf, u32 outbuflen)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!outbuf || !outbuflen)
+ return 0;
+
+ lrng_drngs_init_cc20();
+
+ if (lrng_pool_trylock())
+ return -EINPROGRESS;
+ ret = lrng_trng_seed(outbuf, outbuflen, lrng_trng_retain());
+ if (ret >= 0) {
+ pr_debug("read %d bytes of full entropy data from TRNG\n", ret);
+ } else {
+ /* This is no error, but we have not generated anything */
+ if (ret == -EINPROGRESS)
+ return 0;
+ pr_debug("reading data from TRNG failed: %d\n", ret);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_LRNG_DRNG_SWITCH
+int lrng_trng_switch(const struct lrng_crypto_cb *cb)
+{
+ int ret;
+ u8 seed[LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BYTES];
+ void *trng, *hash;
+
+ trng = cb->lrng_drng_alloc(LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BYTES);
+ if (IS_ERR(trng))
+ return PTR_ERR(trng);
+
+ hash = cb->lrng_hash_alloc(seed, sizeof(seed));
+ if (IS_ERR(hash)) {
+ pr_warn("could not allocate new LRNG pool hash (%ld)\n",
+ PTR_ERR(hash));
+ cb->lrng_drng_dealloc(trng);
+ return PTR_ERR(hash);
+ }
+
+ /* Update primary DRNG */
+ mutex_lock(&lrng_trng.lock);
+ /* pull from existing DRNG to seed new DRNG */
+ ret = lrng_trng.crypto_cb->lrng_drng_generate_helper_full(
+ lrng_trng.trng, seed, sizeof(seed));
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ lrng_trng_reset();
+ pr_warn("getting random data from TRNG failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * No change of the seed status as the old and new DRNG have
+ * same security strength.
+ */
+ ret = cb->lrng_drng_seed_helper(trng, seed, ret);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ lrng_trng_reset();
+ pr_warn("seeding of new TRNG failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ } else {
+ pr_debug("seeded new TRNG instance from old TRNG "
+ "instance\n");
+ }
+ }
+ memzero_explicit(seed, sizeof(seed));
+
+ if (!lrng_get_available())
+ lrng_trng_reset();
+ lrng_trng.crypto_cb->lrng_drng_dealloc(lrng_trng.trng);
+ lrng_trng.trng = trng;
+
+ lrng_trng.crypto_cb->lrng_hash_dealloc(lrng_trng.hash);
+ lrng_trng.hash = hash;
+
+ lrng_trng.crypto_cb = cb;
+
+ mutex_unlock(&lrng_trng.lock);
+
+ pr_info("TRNG allocated\n");
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_LRNG_DRNG_SWITCH */
--
2.23.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v26 11/12] LRNG - add SP800-90B compliant health tests
From: Stephan Müller @ 2019-11-23 20:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Arnd Bergmann
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, linux-crypto, LKML, linux-api,
Eric W. Biederman, Alexander E. Patrakov, Ahmed S. Darwish,
Theodore Y. Ts'o, Willy Tarreau, Matthew Garrett, Vito Caputo,
Andreas Dilger, Jan Kara, Ray Strode, William Jon McCann, zhangjs,
Andy Lutomirski, Florian Weimer, Lennart Poettering,
Nicolai Stange, "Peter, Matthias" <matth>
In-Reply-To: <2722222.P16TYeLAVu@positron.chronox.de>
Implement health tests for LRNG's slow noise sources as mandated by
SP-800-90B The file contains the following health tests:
- stuck test: The stuck test calculates the first, second and third
discrete derivative of the time stamp to be processed by the LFSR.
Only if all three values are non-zero, the received time delta is
considered to be non-stuck.
- SP800-90B Repetition Count Test (RCT): The LRNG uses an enhanced
version of the RCT specified in SP800-90B section 4.4.1. Instead of
counting identical back-to-back values, the input to the RCT is the
counting of the stuck values during the processing of received
interrupt events. The RCT is applied with alpha=2^-30 compliant to
the recommendation of FIPS 140-2 IG 9.8. During the counting operation,
the LRNG always calculates the RCT cut-off value of C. If that value
exceeds the allowed cut-off value, the LRNG will trigger the health
test failure discussed below. An error is logged to the kernel log
that such RCT failure occurred. This test is only applied and
enforced in FIPS mode, i.e. when the kernel compiled with
CONFIG_CONFIG_FIPS is started with fips=1.
- SP800-90B Adaptive Proportion Test (APT): The LRNG implements the
APT as defined in SP800-90B section 4.4.2. The applied significance
level again is alpha=2^-30 compliant to the recommendation of FIPS
140-2 IG 9.8.
The aforementioned health tests are applied to the first 1,024 time stamps
obtained from interrupt events. In case one error is identified for either
the RCT, or the APT, the collected entropy is invalidated and the
SP800-90B startup health test is restarted.
As long as the SP800-90B startup health test is not completed, all LRNG
random number output interfaces that may block will block and not generate
any data. This implies that only those potentially blocking interfaces are
defined to provide random numbers that are seeded with the interrupt noise
source being SP800-90B compliant. All other output interfaces will not be
affected by the SP800-90B startup test and thus are not considered
SP800-90B compliant.
At runtime, the SP800-90B APT and RCT are applied to each time stamp
generated for a received interrupt. When either the APT and RCT indicates
a noise source failure, the LRNG is reset to a state it has immediately
after boot:
- all entropy counters are set to zero
- the SP800-90B startup tests are re-performed which implies that
getrandom(2) would block again until new entropy was collected
To summarize, the following rules apply:
• SP800-90B compliant output interfaces
- /dev/random
- getrandom(2) system call
- get_random_bytes kernel-internal interface when being triggered by
the callback registered with add_random_ready_callback
• SP800-90B non-compliant output interfaces
- /dev/urandom
- get_random_bytes kernel-internal interface called directly
- randomize_page kernel-internal interface
- get_random_u32 and get_random_u64 kernel-internal interfaces
- get_random_u32_wait, get_random_u64_wait, get_random_int_wait, and
get_random_long_wait kernel-internal interfaces
If either the RCT, or the APT health test fails irrespective whether
during initialization or runtime, the following actions occur:
1. The entropy of the entire entropy pool is invalidated.
2. The primary and all secondary DRNGs are reset which imply that they
are treated as being not seeded and require a reseed during next
invocation.
3. The SP800-90B startup health test are initiated with all
implications of the startup tests. That implies that from that point
on, new events must be observed and its entropy must be inserted into
the entropy pool before random numbers are calculated from the
entropy pool.
Further details on the SP800-90B compliance and the availability of all
test tools required to perform all tests mandated by SP800-90B are
provided at [1].
The entire health testing code is compile-time configurable.
The patch provides a CONFIG_BROKEN configuration of the APT / RCT cutoff
values which have a high likelihood to trigger the health test failure.
The BROKEN APT cutoff is set to the exact mean of the expected value if
the time stamps are equally distributed (512 time stamps divided by 16
possible values due to using the 4 LSB of the time stamp). The BROKEN
RCT cutoff value is set to 1 which is likely to be triggered during
regular operation.
CC: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CC: "Alexander E. Patrakov" <patrakov@gmail.com>
CC: "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com>
CC: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CC: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
CC: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
CC: Vito Caputo <vcaputo@pengaru.com>
CC: Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca>
CC: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CC: Ray Strode <rstrode@redhat.com>
CC: William Jon McCann <mccann@jhu.edu>
CC: zhangjs <zachary@baishancloud.com>
CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
CC: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
CC: Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@0pointer.de>
CC: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Roman Drahtmueller <draht@schaltsekun.de>
Tested-by: Roman Drahtmüller <draht@schaltsekun.de>
Tested-by: Marcelo Henrique Cerri <marcelo.cerri@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
---
drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig | 56 +++++
drivers/char/lrng/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/char/lrng/lrng_health.c | 409 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 466 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 drivers/char/lrng/lrng_health.c
diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig b/drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig
index 122d67ee110e..e6ca3acc1e48 100644
--- a/drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig
@@ -113,4 +113,60 @@ config LRNG_TRNG_SUPPORT
With the TRNG support the /dev/random device will block
if insufficient entropy is available.
+config LRNG_HEALTH_TESTS
+ bool "Enable noise source online health tests"
+ help
+ The online health tests validate the noise source at
+ runtime for fatal errors. These tests include SP800-90B
+ compliant tests which are invoked if the system is booted
+ with fips=1. In case of fatal errors during active
+ SP800-90B tests, the issue is logged and the noise
+ data is discarded. These tests are required for full
+ compliance with SP800-90B.
+
+ If unsure, say Y.
+
+config LRNG_RCT_BROKEN
+ bool "SP800-90B RCT with dangerous low cutoff value"
+ depends on LRNG_HEALTH_TESTS
+ depends on BROKEN
+ default n
+ help
+ This option enables a dangerously low SP800-90B repetitive
+ count test (RCT) cutoff value which makes it very likely
+ that the RCT is triggered to raise a self test failure.
+
+ This option is ONLY intended for developers wanting to
+ test the effectiveness of the SP800-90B RCT health test.
+
+ If unsure, say N.
+
+config LRNG_APT_BROKEN
+ bool "SP800-90B APT with dangerous low cutoff value"
+ depends on LRNG_HEALTH_TESTS
+ depends on BROKEN
+ default n
+ help
+ This option enables a dangerously low SP800-90B adaptive
+ proportion test (APT) cutoff value which makes it very
+ likely that the RCT is triggered to raise a self test
+ failure.
+
+ This option is ONLY intended for developers wanting to
+ test the effectiveness of the SP800-90B APT health test.
+
+ If unsure, say N.
+
+# Default taken from SP800-90B sec 4.4.1 - significance level 2^-30
+config LRNG_RCT_CUTOFF
+ int
+ default 30 if !LRNG_RCT_BROKEN
+ default 1 if LRNG_RCT_BROKEN
+
+# Default taken from SP800-90B sec 4.4.2 - significance level 2^-30
+config LRNG_APT_CUTOFF
+ int
+ default 325 if !LRNG_APT_BROKEN
+ default 32 if LRNG_APT_BROKEN
+
endif # LRNG
diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile b/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile
index 1c72bc060bce..0713e9c0aa6e 100644
--- a/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile
@@ -15,3 +15,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_LRNG_DRBG) += lrng_drbg.o
obj-$(CONFIG_LRNG_KCAPI) += lrng_kcapi.o
obj-$(CONFIG_LRNG_JENT) += lrng_jent.o
obj-$(CONFIG_LRNG_TRNG_SUPPORT) += lrng_trng.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_LRNG_HEALTH_TESTS) += lrng_health.o
diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_health.c b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_health.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9ea34322e0ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_health.c
@@ -0,0 +1,409 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR BSD-2-Clause
+/*
+ * Linux Random Number Generator (LRNG) Health Testing
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2019, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/fips.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+
+#include "lrng_internal.h"
+
+/* Stuck Test */
+struct lrng_stuck_test {
+ u32 last_time; /* Stuck test: time of previous IRQ */
+ u32 last_delta; /* Stuck test: delta of previous IRQ */
+ u32 last_delta2; /* Stuck test: 2. time derivation of prev IRQ */
+};
+
+/* Repetition Count Test */
+struct lrng_rct {
+ atomic_t rct_count; /* Number of stuck values */
+};
+
+/* Adaptive Proportion Test */
+struct lrng_apt {
+ /* Data window size */
+#define LRNG_APT_WINDOW_SIZE 512
+ /* LSB of time stamp to process */
+#define LRNG_APT_LSB 16
+#define LRNG_APT_WORD_MASK (LRNG_APT_LSB - 1)
+ atomic_t apt_count; /* APT counter */
+ atomic_t apt_base; /* APT base reference */
+
+ atomic_t apt_trigger;
+ bool apt_base_set; /* Is APT base set? */
+};
+
+/* The health test code must operate lock-less */
+struct lrng_health {
+ struct lrng_rct rct;
+ struct lrng_apt apt;
+
+ bool health_test_enabled;
+
+ /* SP800-90B startup health tests */
+#define LRNG_SP80090B_STARTUP_SAMPLES 1024
+#define LRNG_SP80090B_STARTUP_BLOCKS ((LRNG_SP80090B_STARTUP_SAMPLES + \
+ LRNG_APT_WINDOW_SIZE - 1) / \
+ LRNG_APT_WINDOW_SIZE)
+ bool sp80090b_startup_done;
+ atomic_t sp80090b_startup_blocks;
+};
+
+static struct lrng_health lrng_health = {
+ .rct.rct_count = ATOMIC_INIT(0),
+
+ .apt.apt_count = ATOMIC_INIT(0),
+ .apt.apt_base = ATOMIC_INIT(-1),
+ .apt.apt_trigger = ATOMIC_INIT(LRNG_APT_WINDOW_SIZE),
+ .apt.apt_base_set = false,
+
+ .health_test_enabled = true,
+
+ .sp80090b_startup_blocks = ATOMIC_INIT(LRNG_SP80090B_STARTUP_BLOCKS),
+ .sp80090b_startup_done = false,
+};
+
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct lrng_stuck_test, lrng_stuck_test);
+
+static inline bool lrng_sp80090b_health_requested(void)
+{
+ /* Health tests are only requested in FIPS mode */
+ return fips_enabled;
+}
+
+static inline bool lrng_sp80090b_health_enabled(void)
+{
+ struct lrng_health *health = &lrng_health;
+
+ return lrng_sp80090b_health_requested() && health->health_test_enabled;
+}
+
+/***************************************************************************
+ * SP800-90B Compliance
+ *
+ * If the Linux-RNG is booted into FIPS mode, the following interfaces
+ * provide an SP800-90B compliant noise source:
+ *
+ * * /dev/random
+ * * getrandom(2)
+ * * get_random_bytes when using it in conjunction with
+ * add_random_ready_callback
+ *
+ * All other interfaces, including /dev/urandom or get_random_bytes without
+ * the add_random_ready_callback cannot claim to use an SP800-90B compliant
+ * noise source.
+ ***************************************************************************/
+
+/**
+ * Perform SP800-90B startup testing
+ */
+static inline void lrng_sp80090b_startup(struct lrng_health *health)
+{
+ if (!health->sp80090b_startup_done &&
+ atomic_dec_and_test(&health->sp80090b_startup_blocks)) {
+ health->sp80090b_startup_done = true;
+ pr_info("SP800-90B startup health tests completed\n");
+ lrng_init_ops(0);
+
+ /*
+ * Force a reseed of secondary DRNGs to ensure they are
+ * seeded with entropy that passed the SP800-90B health tests.
+ * As the primary DRNG always will reseed before generating
+ * random numbers, it does not need a reseed trigger.
+ */
+ lrng_sdrng_force_reseed();
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Handle failure of SP800-90B startup testing
+ */
+static inline void lrng_sp80090b_startup_failure(struct lrng_health *health)
+{
+ /* Reset of LRNG and its entropy - NOTE: we are in atomic context */
+ lrng_reset();
+
+ /*
+ * Reset the SP800-90B startup test.
+ *
+ * NOTE SP800-90B section 4.3 bullet 4 does not specify what
+ * exactly is to be done in case of failure! Thus, we do what
+ * makes sense, i.e. restarting the health test and thus gating
+ * the output function of /dev/random and getrandom(2).
+ */
+ atomic_set(&health->sp80090b_startup_blocks,
+ LRNG_SP80090B_STARTUP_BLOCKS);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Handle failure of SP800-90B runtime testing
+ */
+static inline void lrng_sp80090b_runtime_failure(struct lrng_health *health)
+{
+ lrng_sp80090b_startup_failure(health);
+ health->sp80090b_startup_done = false;
+}
+
+static inline void lrng_sp80090b_failure(struct lrng_health *health)
+{
+ if (health->sp80090b_startup_done) {
+ pr_err("SP800-90B runtime health test failure - invalidating "
+ "all existing entropy and initiate SP800-90B startup\n");
+ lrng_sp80090b_runtime_failure(health);
+ } else {
+ pr_err("SP800-90B startup test failure - resetting\n");
+ lrng_sp80090b_startup_failure(health);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Is the SP800-90B startup testing complete?
+ *
+ * This function is called by the LRNG to determine whether to unblock
+ * a certain user interface. Therefore, only the potentially blocking
+ * user interfaces are considered SP800-90B compliant.
+ */
+bool lrng_sp80090b_startup_complete(void)
+{
+ struct lrng_health *health = &lrng_health;
+
+ return (lrng_sp80090b_health_enabled()) ? health->sp80090b_startup_done:
+ true;
+}
+
+bool lrng_sp80090b_compliant(void)
+{
+ struct lrng_health *health = &lrng_health;
+
+ return lrng_sp80090b_health_enabled() && health->sp80090b_startup_done;
+}
+
+/***************************************************************************
+ * Adaptive Proportion Test
+ *
+ * This test complies with SP800-90B section 4.4.2.
+ ***************************************************************************/
+
+/**
+ * Reset the APT counter
+ *
+ * @health [in] Reference to health state
+ */
+static inline void lrng_apt_reset(struct lrng_health *health,
+ unsigned int time_masked)
+{
+ struct lrng_apt *apt = &health->apt;
+
+ pr_debug("APT value %d for base %d\n",
+ atomic_read(&apt->apt_count), atomic_read(&apt->apt_base));
+
+ /* Reset APT */
+ atomic_set(&apt->apt_count, 0);
+ atomic_set(&apt->apt_base, time_masked);
+}
+
+static inline void lrng_apt_restart(struct lrng_health *health)
+{
+ struct lrng_apt *apt = &health->apt;
+
+ atomic_set(&apt->apt_trigger, LRNG_APT_WINDOW_SIZE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Insert a new entropy event into APT
+ *
+ * This function does is void as it does not decide about the fate of a time
+ * stamp. An APT failure can only happen at the same time of a stuck test
+ * failure. Thus, the stuck failure will already decide how the time stamp
+ * is handled.
+ *
+ * @health [in] Reference to health state
+ * @now_time [in] Time stamp to process
+ */
+static inline void lrng_apt_insert(struct lrng_health *health,
+ unsigned int now_time)
+{
+ struct lrng_apt *apt = &health->apt;
+
+ if (!lrng_sp80090b_health_requested())
+ return;
+
+ now_time &= LRNG_APT_WORD_MASK;
+
+ /* Initialization of APT */
+ if (!apt->apt_base_set) {
+ atomic_set(&apt->apt_base, now_time);
+ apt->apt_base_set = true;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (now_time == (unsigned int)atomic_read(&apt->apt_base)) {
+ u32 apt_val = (u32)atomic_inc_return_relaxed(&apt->apt_count);
+
+ if (apt_val >= CONFIG_LRNG_APT_CUTOFF)
+ lrng_sp80090b_failure(health);
+ }
+
+ if (atomic_dec_and_test(&apt->apt_trigger)) {
+ lrng_apt_restart(health);
+ lrng_apt_reset(health, now_time);
+ lrng_sp80090b_startup(health);
+ }
+}
+
+/***************************************************************************
+ * Repetition Count Test
+ *
+ * The LRNG uses an enhanced version of the Repetition Count Test
+ * (RCT) specified in SP800-90B section 4.4.1. Instead of counting identical
+ * back-to-back values, the input to the RCT is the counting of the stuck
+ * values while filling the entropy pool.
+ *
+ * The RCT is applied with an alpha of 2^-30 compliant to FIPS 140-2 IG 9.8.
+ *
+ * During the counting operation, the LRNG always calculates the RCT
+ * cut-off value of C. If that value exceeds the allowed cut-off value,
+ * the LRNG will invalidate all entropy for the entropy pool which implies
+ * that no data can be extracted from the entropy pool unless new entropy
+ * is received.
+ ***************************************************************************/
+
+/**
+ * Hot code path - Insert data for Repetition Count Test
+ *
+ * @health: Reference to health information
+ * @stuck: Decision of stuck test
+ */
+static inline void lrng_rct(struct lrng_health *health, int stuck)
+{
+ struct lrng_rct *rct = &health->rct;
+
+ if (!lrng_sp80090b_health_requested())
+ return;
+
+ if (stuck) {
+ u32 rct_count = atomic_add_return_relaxed(1, &rct->rct_count);
+
+ pr_debug("RCT count: %u\n", rct_count);
+
+ /*
+ * The cutoff value is based on the following consideration:
+ * alpha = 2^-30 as recommended in FIPS 140-2 IG 9.8.
+ * In addition, we imply an entropy value H of 1 bit as this
+ * is the minimum entropy required to provide full entropy.
+ *
+ * Note, rct_count (which equals to value B in the
+ * pseudo code of SP800-90B section 4.4.1) starts with zero.
+ * Hence we need to subtract one from the cutoff value as
+ * calculated following SP800-90B.
+ */
+ if (rct_count >= CONFIG_LRNG_RCT_CUTOFF) {
+ atomic_set(&rct->rct_count, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * APT must start anew as we consider all previously
+ * recorded data to contain no entropy.
+ */
+ lrng_apt_restart(health);
+
+ lrng_sp80090b_failure(health);
+ }
+ } else {
+ atomic_set(&rct->rct_count, 0);
+ }
+}
+
+/***************************************************************************
+ * Stuck Test
+ *
+ * Checking the:
+ * 1st derivative of the event occurrence (time delta)
+ * 2nd derivative of the event occurrence (delta of time deltas)
+ * 3rd derivative of the event occurrence (delta of delta of time deltas)
+ *
+ * All values must always be non-zero. The stuck test is only valid disabled if
+ * high-resolution time stamps are identified after initialization.
+ ***************************************************************************/
+
+static inline u32 lrng_delta(u32 prev, u32 next)
+{
+ /*
+ * Note that this (unsigned) subtraction does yield the correct value
+ * in the wraparound-case, i.e. when next < prev.
+ */
+ return (next - prev);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Hot code path
+ *
+ * @health: Reference to health information
+ * @now: Event time
+ * @return: 0 event occurrence not stuck (good time stamp)
+ * != 0 event occurrence stuck (reject time stamp)
+ */
+static inline int lrng_irq_stuck(struct lrng_stuck_test *stuck, u32 now_time)
+{
+ u32 delta = lrng_delta(stuck->last_time, now_time);
+ u32 delta2 = lrng_delta(stuck->last_delta, delta);
+ u32 delta3 = lrng_delta(stuck->last_delta2, delta2);
+
+ stuck->last_time = now_time;
+ stuck->last_delta = delta;
+ stuck->last_delta2 = delta2;
+
+ if (!delta || !delta2 || !delta3)
+ return 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/***************************************************************************
+ * Health test interfaces
+ ***************************************************************************/
+
+/**
+ * Disable all health tests
+ */
+void lrng_health_disable(void)
+{
+ struct lrng_health *health = &lrng_health;
+
+ health->health_test_enabled = false;
+
+ if (lrng_sp80090b_health_requested())
+ pr_warn("SP800-90B compliance requested but the Linux RNG is "
+ "NOT SP800-90B compliant\n");
+}
+
+/**
+ * Hot code path - Perform health test on time stamp received from an event
+ *
+ * @now_time Time stap
+ */
+enum lrng_health_res lrng_health_test(u32 now_time)
+{
+ struct lrng_health *health = &lrng_health;
+ struct lrng_stuck_test *stuck_test = this_cpu_ptr(&lrng_stuck_test);
+ int stuck;
+
+ if (!health->health_test_enabled)
+ return lrng_health_pass;
+
+ lrng_apt_insert(health, now_time);
+
+ stuck = lrng_irq_stuck(stuck_test, now_time);
+ lrng_rct(health, stuck);
+ if (stuck) {
+ /* SP800-90B disallows using a failing health test time stamp */
+ return lrng_sp80090b_health_requested() ?
+ lrng_health_fail_drop : lrng_health_fail_use;
+ }
+
+ return lrng_health_pass;
+}
--
2.23.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v26 12/12] LRNG - add interface for gathering of raw entropy
From: Stephan Müller @ 2019-11-23 20:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Arnd Bergmann
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, linux-crypto, LKML, linux-api,
Eric W. Biederman, Alexander E. Patrakov, Ahmed S. Darwish,
Theodore Y. Ts'o, Willy Tarreau, Matthew Garrett, Vito Caputo,
Andreas Dilger, Jan Kara, Ray Strode, William Jon McCann, zhangjs,
Andy Lutomirski, Florian Weimer, Lennart Poettering,
Nicolai Stange, "Peter, Matthias" <matth>
In-Reply-To: <2722222.P16TYeLAVu@positron.chronox.de>
The test interface allows a privileged process to capture the raw
unconditioned noise that is collected by the LRNG for statistical
analysis. Such testing allows the analysis how much entropy
the interrupt noise source provides on a given platform.
Extracted noise data is not used to seed the LRNG. This
is a test interface and not appropriate for production systems.
Yet, the interface is considered to be sufficiently secured for
production systems.
Access to the data is given through the lrng_raw debugfs file. The
data buffer should be multiples of sizeof(u32) to fill the entire
buffer. Using the option lrng_testing.boot_test=1 the raw noise of
the first 1000 entropy events since boot can be sampled.
This test interface allows generating the data required for
analysis whether the LRNG is in compliance with SP800-90B
sections 3.1.3 and 3.1.4.
CC: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CC: "Alexander E. Patrakov" <patrakov@gmail.com>
CC: "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com>
CC: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CC: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
CC: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
CC: Vito Caputo <vcaputo@pengaru.com>
CC: Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca>
CC: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CC: Ray Strode <rstrode@redhat.com>
CC: William Jon McCann <mccann@jhu.edu>
CC: zhangjs <zachary@baishancloud.com>
CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
CC: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
CC: Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@0pointer.de>
CC: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Roman Drahtmueller <draht@schaltsekun.de>
Tested-by: Roman Drahtmüller <draht@schaltsekun.de>
Tested-by: Marcelo Henrique Cerri <marcelo.cerri@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
---
drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig | 16 ++
drivers/char/lrng/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/char/lrng/lrng_testing.c | 269 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 286 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 drivers/char/lrng/lrng_testing.c
diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig b/drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig
index e6ca3acc1e48..9335761cb2ba 100644
--- a/drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig
@@ -169,4 +169,20 @@ config LRNG_APT_CUTOFF
default 325 if !LRNG_APT_BROKEN
default 32 if LRNG_APT_BROKEN
+config LRNG_TESTING
+ bool "Enable entropy test interface to LRNG noise source"
+ depends on DEBUG_FS
+ help
+ The test interface allows a privileged process to capture
+ the raw unconditioned noise that is collected by the LRNG
+ for statistical analysis. Extracted noise data is not used
+ to seed the LRNG.
+
+ The raw noise data can be obtained using the lrng_raw
+ debugfs file. Using the option lrng_testing.boot_test=1
+ the raw noise of the first 1000 entropy events since boot
+ can be sampled.
+
+ If unsure, say N.
+
endif # LRNG
diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile b/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile
index 0713e9c0aa6e..c0b6cc4301fe 100644
--- a/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile
@@ -16,3 +16,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_LRNG_KCAPI) += lrng_kcapi.o
obj-$(CONFIG_LRNG_JENT) += lrng_jent.o
obj-$(CONFIG_LRNG_TRNG_SUPPORT) += lrng_trng.o
obj-$(CONFIG_LRNG_HEALTH_TESTS) += lrng_health.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_LRNG_TESTING) += lrng_testing.o
diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_testing.c b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_testing.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..718a24660773
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_testing.c
@@ -0,0 +1,269 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR BSD-2-Clause
+/*
+ * Linux Random Number Generator (LRNG) Raw entropy collection tool
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2019, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <linux/debugfs.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/workqueue.h>
+#include <asm/errno.h>
+
+#include "lrng_internal.h"
+
+#define LRNG_TESTING_RINGBUFFER_SIZE 1024
+#define LRNG_TESTING_RINGBUFFER_MASK (LRNG_TESTING_RINGBUFFER_SIZE - 1)
+
+static u32 lrng_testing_rb[LRNG_TESTING_RINGBUFFER_SIZE];
+static u32 lrng_rb_reader = 0;
+static u32 lrng_rb_writer = 0;
+static atomic_t lrng_testing_enabled = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
+
+static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(lrng_raw_read_wait);
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lrng_raw_lock);
+
+/*
+ * 0 ==> No boot test, gathering of runtime data allowed
+ * 1 ==> Boot test enabled and ready for collecting data, gathering runtime
+ * data is disabled
+ * 2 ==> Boot test completed and disabled, gathering of runtime data is
+ * disabled
+ */
+static u32 boot_test = 0;
+module_param(boot_test, uint, 0644);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(boot_test, "Enable gathering boot time entropy of the first"
+ " entropy events");
+
+static inline void lrng_raw_entropy_reset(void)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&lrng_raw_lock, flags);
+ lrng_rb_reader = 0;
+ lrng_rb_writer = 0;
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&lrng_raw_lock, flags);
+}
+
+static void lrng_raw_entropy_init(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * The boot time testing implies we have a running test. If the
+ * caller wants to clear it, he has to unset the boot_test flag
+ * at runtime via sysfs to enable regular runtime testing
+ */
+ if (boot_test)
+ return;
+
+ lrng_raw_entropy_reset();
+ atomic_set(&lrng_testing_enabled, 1);
+ pr_warn("Enabling raw entropy collection\n");
+}
+
+static void lrng_raw_entropy_fini(void)
+{
+ if (boot_test)
+ return;
+
+ atomic_set(&lrng_testing_enabled, 0);
+ lrng_raw_entropy_reset();
+ pr_warn("Disabling raw entropy collection\n");
+}
+
+bool lrng_raw_entropy_store(u32 value)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ if (!atomic_read(&lrng_testing_enabled) && (boot_test != 1))
+ return false;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&lrng_raw_lock, flags);
+
+ /*
+ * Disable entropy testing for boot time testing after ring buffer
+ * is filled.
+ */
+ if (boot_test) {
+ if (lrng_rb_writer > LRNG_TESTING_RINGBUFFER_SIZE) {
+ boot_test = 2;
+ pr_warn_once("Boot time entropy collection test "
+ "disabled\n");
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&lrng_raw_lock, flags);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (lrng_rb_writer == 1)
+ pr_warn("Boot time entropy collection test enabled\n");
+ }
+
+ lrng_testing_rb[lrng_rb_writer & LRNG_TESTING_RINGBUFFER_MASK] = value;
+ lrng_rb_writer++;
+
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&lrng_raw_lock, flags);
+
+ if (wq_has_sleeper(&lrng_raw_read_wait))
+ wake_up_interruptible(&lrng_raw_read_wait);
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static inline bool lrng_raw_have_data(void)
+{
+ return ((lrng_rb_writer & LRNG_TESTING_RINGBUFFER_MASK) !=
+ (lrng_rb_reader & LRNG_TESTING_RINGBUFFER_MASK));
+}
+
+static int lrng_raw_entropy_reader(u8 *outbuf, u32 outbuflen)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+ int collected_data = 0;
+
+ lrng_raw_entropy_init();
+
+ while (outbuflen) {
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&lrng_raw_lock, flags);
+
+ /* We have no data or reached the writer. */
+ if (!lrng_rb_writer || (lrng_rb_writer == lrng_rb_reader)) {
+
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&lrng_raw_lock, flags);
+
+ /*
+ * Now we gathered all boot data, enable regular data
+ * collection.
+ */
+ if (boot_test) {
+ boot_test = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ wait_event_interruptible(lrng_raw_read_wait,
+ lrng_raw_have_data());
+ if (signal_pending(current)) {
+ collected_data = -ERESTARTSYS;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* We copy out word-wise */
+ if (outbuflen < sizeof(u32))
+ goto out;
+
+ memcpy(outbuf, &lrng_testing_rb[lrng_rb_reader], sizeof(u32));
+ lrng_rb_reader++;
+
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&lrng_raw_lock, flags);
+
+ outbuf += sizeof(u32);
+ outbuflen -= sizeof(u32);
+ collected_data += sizeof(u32);
+ }
+
+out:
+ lrng_raw_entropy_fini();
+ return collected_data;
+}
+
+/**************************************************************************
+ * Debugfs interface
+ **************************************************************************/
+static int lrng_raw_extract_user(char __user *buf, size_t nbytes)
+{
+ u8 *tmp, *tmp_aligned;
+ int ret = 0, large_request = (nbytes > 256);
+
+ /*
+ * The intention of this interface is for collecting at least
+ * 1000 samples due to the SP800-90B requirements. So, we make no
+ * effort in avoiding allocating more memory that actually needed
+ * by the user. Hence, we allocate sufficient memory to always hold
+ * that amount of data.
+ */
+ tmp = kmalloc(LRNG_TESTING_RINGBUFFER_SIZE + sizeof(u32), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tmp)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ tmp_aligned = PTR_ALIGN(tmp, sizeof(u32));
+
+ while (nbytes) {
+ int i;
+
+ if (large_request && need_resched()) {
+ if (signal_pending(current)) {
+ if (ret == 0)
+ ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
+ break;
+ }
+ schedule();
+ }
+
+ i = min_t(int, nbytes, LRNG_TESTING_RINGBUFFER_SIZE);
+ i = lrng_raw_entropy_reader(tmp_aligned, i);
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ if (i < 0)
+ ret = i;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (copy_to_user(buf, tmp_aligned, i)) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ nbytes -= i;
+ buf += i;
+ ret += i;
+ }
+
+ kzfree(tmp);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* DebugFS operations and definition of the debugfs files */
+static ssize_t lrng_raw_read(struct file *file, char __user *to,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ loff_t pos = *ppos;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!count)
+ return 0;
+
+ ret = lrng_raw_extract_user(to, count);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ count -= ret;
+ *ppos = pos + count;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static struct file_operations lrng_raw_name_fops = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .read = lrng_raw_read,
+};
+
+static int __init lrng_raw_init(void)
+{
+ struct dentry *lrng_raw_debugfs_root;
+
+ lrng_raw_debugfs_root = debugfs_create_dir(KBUILD_MODNAME, NULL);
+ debugfs_create_file_unsafe("lrng_raw", 0400, lrng_raw_debugfs_root,
+ NULL, &lrng_raw_name_fops);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+module_init(lrng_raw_init);
--
2.23.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [PATCH v24 01/12] Linux Random Number Generator
From: Sandy Harris @ 2019-11-24 4:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stephan Müller
Cc: Arnd Bergmann, Greg Kroah-Hartman, Linux Crypto Mailing List,
LKML, linux-api, Eric W. Biederman, Alexander E. Patrakov,
Ahmed S. Darwish, Theodore Y. Ts'o, Willy Tarreau,
Matthew Garrett, Vito Caputo, Andreas Dilger, Jan Kara,
Ray Strode, William Jon McCann, zhangjs, Andy Lutomirski,
Florian Weimer, Lennart Poettering
In-Reply-To: <2369119.jSEA3qhmGI@positron.chronox.de>
Stephan Müller <smueller@chronox.de> wrote:
> In an effort to provide a flexible implementation for a random number
> generator that also ...
As usual, some of your proposals make considerable sense to me &
others do not, at least on first reading. I may have more comments
after reflecting some.
Meanwhile, a couple of things jump out at me:
> (a) When an interrupt occurs, the high-resolution time stamp is mixed
> into the LFSR. ...
>
> (b) HID event data like the key stroke or the mouse coordinates are
> mixed into the LFSR. ...
>
> (c) Device drivers may provide data that is mixed into the LFSR. ...
Why into the LFSR instead of into the entropy pool?
> The LRNG allows the TRNG and secondary DRNG mechanism to be changed
> at runtime.
Why? This strikes me as pointless complication.
> * high performance of interrupt handling code: The LRNG impact on the
> interrupt handling has been reduced to a minimum. On one example
> system, the LRNG interrupt handling code executes within an average
> of 65 cycles whereas the existing /dev/random on the same device
> takes about 97 cycles when measuring the execution time of
> add_interrupt_randomness().
Assuming you do this without sacrificing the input mixing, this
would be worth submitting as a separate patch. Saving cycles
on every interrupt definitely looks worth doing.
> * lockless LFSR to collect raw entropy
This too.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v24 01/12] Linux Random Number Generator
From: Stephan Mueller @ 2019-11-24 9:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sandy Harris
Cc: Arnd Bergmann, Greg Kroah-Hartman, Linux Crypto Mailing List,
LKML, linux-api, Eric W. Biederman, Alexander E. Patrakov,
Ahmed S. Darwish, Theodore Y. Ts'o, Willy Tarreau,
Matthew Garrett, Vito Caputo, Andreas Dilger, Jan Kara,
Ray Strode, William Jon McCann, zhangjs, Andy Lutomirski,
Florian Weimer, Lennart Poettering
In-Reply-To: <CACXcFmkBQAZd4bSfQvqeCsoTjMr0-uSjKciD6y9EkMN3c9ppJw@mail.gmail.com>
Am Sonntag, 24. November 2019, 05:51:19 CET schrieb Sandy Harris:
Hi Sandy,
> Stephan Müller <smueller@chronox.de> wrote:
> > In an effort to provide a flexible implementation for a random number
> > generator that also ...
>
> As usual, some of your proposals make considerable sense to me &
> others do not, at least on first reading. I may have more comments
> after reflecting some.
>
> Meanwhile, a couple of things jump out at me:
> > (a) When an interrupt occurs, the high-resolution time stamp is mixed
> >
> > into the LFSR. ...
> >
> > (b) HID event data like the key stroke or the mouse coordinates are
> >
> > mixed into the LFSR. ...
> >
> > (c) Device drivers may provide data that is mixed into the LFSR. ...
>
> Why into the LFSR instead of into the entropy pool?
The LFSR is the state transitioning function of the entropy pool. Thus, when
handing data to the LFSR, it is "mixed" into the entropy pool. Thus, the LRNG
should perform the action you would expect, i.e. mixing the data into the
entropy pool.
>
> > The LRNG allows the TRNG and secondary DRNG mechanism to be changed
> > at runtime.
>
> Why? This strikes me as pointless complication.
The reason for this is the construction definition of the German AIS 31.
The TRNG is considered to operate as an NTG.1 in the terms of AIS 31. The
secondary DRNG(s) act as a DRG.3 in terms of AIS 31.
AIS 31 requires that DRGs (including a DRG.3) must be seeded from either an
NTG.1 (i.e. the TRNG) or a PTG (a physical noise source which we do not have
in the kernel).
This implies that the TRNG (NTG.1) seeds the secondary DRNG (DRG.3) and thus
would be compliant to AIS 31.
Since this construction method does not violate other construction methods,
such as the recommendations in SP800-90C, the LRNG architecture can be claimed
to be compliant with multiple different construction methods and requirements
where the output of either the TRNG or the secondary DRNGs always provide
random data from a compliant RNG.
Note, this construction is only applied if the TRNG is selected and compiled.
If the TRNG is not present (i.e. not compiled based on the Linux kernel
compilation configuration), the secondary DRNGs seed directly from the entropy
pool. Using this flexibility, the LRNG is intended to be able to serve
different use cases and requirements.
>
> > * high performance of interrupt handling code: The LRNG impact on the
> > interrupt handling has been reduced to a minimum. On one example
> > system, the LRNG interrupt handling code executes within an average
> > of 65 cycles whereas the existing /dev/random on the same device
> > takes about 97 cycles when measuring the execution time of
> > add_interrupt_randomness().
>
> Assuming you do this without sacrificing the input mixing, this
> would be worth submitting as a separate patch. Saving cycles
> on every interrupt definitely looks worth doing.
>
> > * lockless LFSR to collect raw entropy
>
> This too.
For both comments, the issue is that patches should always provide code that
compiles. The issue is that this logic cannot be extracted into a separate
patch without sacrificing the requirement to make it compile.
Though, the code you refer to is extracted into its own C file which allows an
independent assessment: please see lrng_sw_noise.c whose purpose is to only
provide the high-performance interrupt handling code. The lockless LFSR is
provided with the lrng_pool.c with the function lrng_pool_lfsr_u32.
PS: For those two functions and the ChaCha20 DRNG I have another patch in the
pipeline that will add power-on self tests which are automatically executed
during boot. Considering that these three functions are essential to the
maintenance of entropy, adding the self test for those should provide
additional assurance to users that the code runs properly.
PPS: If you want to study the operations of both, the high-performance
interrupt collection and the lockless LFSR, there is user space test code that
provides the implementation as a user space application: please see the test
code in [1] and use the code in:
- lfsr_demonstration.c: Full operational LFSR to generate arbitrary amounts of
data from arbitrary seed data.
- lfsr_testvector_generation.c: LFSR code that I used to generate self-test
vectors for the pending patch
- time_storage.c: Test code for the high-performance interrupt handling code
In addition the essential ChaCha20 DRNG is available as a user space DRNG for
study at [2].
[1] https://www.chronox.de/lrng.html
[2] https://www.chronox.de/chacha20_drng.html
Thank you very much for your considerations.
Ciao
Stephan
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v26 01/12] Linux Random Number Generator
From: kbuild test robot @ 2019-11-24 22:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stephan Müller
Cc: kbuild-all, Arnd Bergmann, Greg Kroah-Hartman, linux-crypto, LKML,
linux-api, Eric W. Biederman, Alexander E. Patrakov,
Ahmed S. Darwish, Theodore Y. Ts'o, Willy Tarreau,
Matthew Garrett, Vito Caputo, Andreas Dilger, Jan Kara,
Ray Strode, William Jon McCann, zhangjs, Andy Lutomirski,
Florian Weimer, Lennart Poettering, Ni
In-Reply-To: <4092523.WvKr7FP7fE@positron.chronox.de>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2717 bytes --]
Hi "Stephan,
Thank you for the patch! Yet something to improve:
[auto build test ERROR on char-misc/char-misc-testing]
[also build test ERROR on v5.4-rc8 next-20191122]
[if your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, please drop us a note to help
improve the system. BTW, we also suggest to use '--base' option to specify the
base tree in git format-patch, please see https://stackoverflow.com/a/37406982]
url: https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Stephan-M-ller/dev-random-a-new-approach-with-full-SP800-90B/20191125-042152
base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc.git b78cda795ac83333293f1bfa3165572a47e550c2
config: sh-allmodconfig (attached as .config)
compiler: sh4-linux-gcc (GCC) 7.4.0
reproduce:
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross
chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross
# save the attached .config to linux build tree
GCC_VERSION=7.4.0 make.cross ARCH=sh
If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
All error/warnings (new ones prefixed by >>):
In file included from include/linux/printk.h:6:0,
from include/linux/kernel.h:15,
from include/asm-generic/bug.h:19,
from arch/sh/include/asm/bug.h:112,
from include/linux/bug.h:5,
from include/linux/mmdebug.h:5,
from include/linux/percpu.h:5,
from include/asm-generic/irq_regs.h:11,
from ./arch/sh/include/generated/asm/irq_regs.h:1,
from drivers/char/lrng/lrng_pool.c:10:
>> drivers/char/lrng/lrng_pool.c:216:15: error: initialization from incompatible pointer type [-Werror=incompatible-pointer-types]
core_initcall(lrng_init_time_source);
^
include/linux/init.h:197:50: note: in definition of macro '___define_initcall'
__attribute__((__section__(#__sec ".init"))) = fn;
^~
include/linux/init.h:218:28: note: in expansion of macro '__define_initcall'
#define core_initcall(fn) __define_initcall(fn, 1)
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> drivers/char/lrng/lrng_pool.c:216:1: note: in expansion of macro 'core_initcall'
core_initcall(lrng_init_time_source);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~
cc1: some warnings being treated as errors
vim +216 drivers/char/lrng/lrng_pool.c
215
> 216 core_initcall(lrng_init_time_source);
217
---
0-DAY kernel test infrastructure Open Source Technology Center
https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/kbuild-all@lists.01.org Intel Corporation
[-- Attachment #2: .config.gz --]
[-- Type: application/gzip, Size: 52266 bytes --]
^ permalink raw reply
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