* Re: [PATCHv6 bpf-next 1/9] x86/shstk: Make return uprobe work with shadow stack
From: Jiri Olsa @ 2024-05-21 16:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Oleg Nesterov
Cc: Steven Rostedt, Masami Hiramatsu, Alexei Starovoitov,
Daniel Borkmann, Andrii Nakryiko, linux-kernel,
linux-trace-kernel, linux-api, linux-man, x86, bpf, Song Liu,
Yonghong Song, John Fastabend, Peter Zijlstra, Thomas Gleixner,
Borislav Petkov (AMD), Ingo Molnar, Andy Lutomirski,
Edgecombe, Rick P, Deepak Gupta
In-Reply-To: <20240521142221.GA19434@redhat.com>
On Tue, May 21, 2024 at 04:22:21PM +0200, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
> On 05/21, Jiri Olsa wrote:
> >
> > Currently the application with enabled shadow stack will crash
> > if it sets up return uprobe. The reason is the uretprobe kernel
> > code changes the user space task's stack, but does not update
> > shadow stack accordingly.
> >
> > Adding new functions to update values on shadow stack and using
> > them in uprobe code to keep shadow stack in sync with uretprobe
> > changes to user stack.
>
> I don't think my ack has any value in this area but looks good to me.
>
> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
>
>
> > Fixes: 8b1c23543436 ("x86/shstk: Add return uprobe support")
>
> Hmm... Was this commit ever applied?
should have been:
488af8ea7131 x86/shstk: Wire in shadow stack interface
will send new version
thanks,
jirka
>
> Oleg.
>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCHv6 bpf-next 1/9] x86/shstk: Make return uprobe work with shadow stack
From: Oleg Nesterov @ 2024-05-21 14:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jiri Olsa
Cc: Steven Rostedt, Masami Hiramatsu, Alexei Starovoitov,
Daniel Borkmann, Andrii Nakryiko, linux-kernel,
linux-trace-kernel, linux-api, linux-man, x86, bpf, Song Liu,
Yonghong Song, John Fastabend, Peter Zijlstra, Thomas Gleixner,
Borislav Petkov (AMD), Ingo Molnar, Andy Lutomirski,
Edgecombe, Rick P, Deepak Gupta
In-Reply-To: <20240521104825.1060966-2-jolsa@kernel.org>
On 05/21, Jiri Olsa wrote:
>
> Currently the application with enabled shadow stack will crash
> if it sets up return uprobe. The reason is the uretprobe kernel
> code changes the user space task's stack, but does not update
> shadow stack accordingly.
>
> Adding new functions to update values on shadow stack and using
> them in uprobe code to keep shadow stack in sync with uretprobe
> changes to user stack.
I don't think my ack has any value in this area but looks good to me.
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
> Fixes: 8b1c23543436 ("x86/shstk: Add return uprobe support")
Hmm... Was this commit ever applied?
Oleg.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCHv6 9/9] man2: Add uretprobe syscall page
From: Jiri Olsa @ 2024-05-21 11:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Alejandro Colomar
Cc: Steven Rostedt, Masami Hiramatsu, Oleg Nesterov,
Alexei Starovoitov, Daniel Borkmann, Andrii Nakryiko,
linux-kernel, linux-trace-kernel, linux-api, linux-man, x86, bpf,
Song Liu, Yonghong Song, John Fastabend, Peter Zijlstra,
Thomas Gleixner, Borislav Petkov (AMD), Ingo Molnar,
Andy Lutomirski, Edgecombe, Rick P, Deepak Gupta
In-Reply-To: <j6qxudmvwccpqnle4evabxbswdygmx35bgqwhemuzsjs5iuydv@fk2iumwucifx>
On Tue, May 21, 2024 at 01:36:25PM +0200, Alejandro Colomar wrote:
> Hi Jiri,
>
> On Tue, May 21, 2024 at 12:48:25PM GMT, Jiri Olsa wrote:
> > Adding man page for new uretprobe syscall.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
> > ---
> > man2/uretprobe.2 | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+)
> > create mode 100644 man2/uretprobe.2
> >
> > diff --git a/man2/uretprobe.2 b/man2/uretprobe.2
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..690fe3b1a44f
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/man2/uretprobe.2
> > @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
> > +.\" Copyright (C) 2024, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
> > +.\"
> > +.\" SPDX-License-Identifier: Linux-man-pages-copyleft
> > +.\"
> > +.TH uretprobe 2 (date) "Linux man-pages (unreleased)"
> > +.SH NAME
> > +uretprobe \- execute pending return uprobes
> > +.SH SYNOPSIS
> > +.nf
> > +.B int uretprobe(void)
> > +.fi
>
> What header file provides this system call?
there's no header, it's used/called only by user space trampoline
provided by kernel, it's not expected to be called by user
>
> > +.SH DESCRIPTION
> > +The
> > +.BR uretprobe ()
> > +syscall is an alternative to breakpoint instructions for
> > +triggering return uprobe consumers.
> > +.P
> > +Calls to
> > +.BR uretprobe ()
> > +suscall are only made from the user-space trampoline provided by the kernel.
>
> s/suscall/system call/
ugh leftover sry
>
> > +Calls from any other place result in a
> > +.BR SIGILL .
>
> Maybe add an ERRORS section?
>
> > +
>
> We don't use blank lines; it causes a groff(1) warning, and other
> problems. Instead, use '.P'.
>
> > +.SH RETURN VALUE
> > +The
> > +.BR uretprobe ()
> > +syscall return value is architecture-specific.
> > +
>
> .P
>
> > +.SH VERSIONS
> > +This syscall is not specified in POSIX,
>
> Redundant with "STANDARDS: None.".
>
> > +and details of its behavior vary across systems.
>
> Keep this.
ok
>
> > +.SH STANDARDS
> > +None.
> > +.SH HISTORY
> > +TBD
> > +.SH NOTES
> > +The
> > +.BR uretprobe ()
> > +syscall was initially introduced for the x86_64 architecture where it was shown
> > +to be faster than breakpoint traps. It might be extended to other architectures.
>
> Please use semantic newlines.
>
> $ MANWIDTH=72 man man-pages | sed -n '/Use semantic newlines/,/^$/p'
> Use semantic newlines
> In the source of a manual page, new sentences should be started on
> new lines, long sentences should be split into lines at clause
> breaks (commas, semicolons, colons, and so on), and long clauses
> should be split at phrase boundaries. This convention, sometimes
> known as "semantic newlines", makes it easier to see the effect of
> patches, which often operate at the level of individual sentences,
> clauses, or phrases.
ok
thanks,
jirka
>
> > +.P
> > +The
> > +.BR uretprobe ()
> > +syscall exists only to allow the invocation of return uprobe consumers.
>
> s/syscall/system call/
>
> > +It should
> > +.B never
> > +be called directly.
> > +Details of the arguments (if any) passed to
> > +.BR uretprobe ()
> > +and the return value are architecture-specific.
> > --
> > 2.44.0
>
> Have a lovely day!
> Alex
>
> --
> <https://www.alejandro-colomar.es/>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCHv6 9/9] man2: Add uretprobe syscall page
From: Alejandro Colomar @ 2024-05-21 11:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jiri Olsa
Cc: Steven Rostedt, Masami Hiramatsu, Oleg Nesterov,
Alexei Starovoitov, Daniel Borkmann, Andrii Nakryiko,
linux-kernel, linux-trace-kernel, linux-api, linux-man, x86, bpf,
Song Liu, Yonghong Song, John Fastabend, Peter Zijlstra,
Thomas Gleixner, Borislav Petkov (AMD), Ingo Molnar,
Andy Lutomirski, Edgecombe, Rick P, Deepak Gupta
In-Reply-To: <20240521104825.1060966-10-jolsa@kernel.org>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2912 bytes --]
Hi Jiri,
On Tue, May 21, 2024 at 12:48:25PM GMT, Jiri Olsa wrote:
> Adding man page for new uretprobe syscall.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
> ---
> man2/uretprobe.2 | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 man2/uretprobe.2
>
> diff --git a/man2/uretprobe.2 b/man2/uretprobe.2
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..690fe3b1a44f
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/man2/uretprobe.2
> @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
> +.\" Copyright (C) 2024, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
> +.\"
> +.\" SPDX-License-Identifier: Linux-man-pages-copyleft
> +.\"
> +.TH uretprobe 2 (date) "Linux man-pages (unreleased)"
> +.SH NAME
> +uretprobe \- execute pending return uprobes
> +.SH SYNOPSIS
> +.nf
> +.B int uretprobe(void)
> +.fi
What header file provides this system call?
> +.SH DESCRIPTION
> +The
> +.BR uretprobe ()
> +syscall is an alternative to breakpoint instructions for
> +triggering return uprobe consumers.
> +.P
> +Calls to
> +.BR uretprobe ()
> +suscall are only made from the user-space trampoline provided by the kernel.
s/suscall/system call/
> +Calls from any other place result in a
> +.BR SIGILL .
Maybe add an ERRORS section?
> +
We don't use blank lines; it causes a groff(1) warning, and other
problems. Instead, use '.P'.
> +.SH RETURN VALUE
> +The
> +.BR uretprobe ()
> +syscall return value is architecture-specific.
> +
.P
> +.SH VERSIONS
> +This syscall is not specified in POSIX,
Redundant with "STANDARDS: None.".
> +and details of its behavior vary across systems.
Keep this.
> +.SH STANDARDS
> +None.
> +.SH HISTORY
> +TBD
> +.SH NOTES
> +The
> +.BR uretprobe ()
> +syscall was initially introduced for the x86_64 architecture where it was shown
> +to be faster than breakpoint traps. It might be extended to other architectures.
Please use semantic newlines.
$ MANWIDTH=72 man man-pages | sed -n '/Use semantic newlines/,/^$/p'
Use semantic newlines
In the source of a manual page, new sentences should be started on
new lines, long sentences should be split into lines at clause
breaks (commas, semicolons, colons, and so on), and long clauses
should be split at phrase boundaries. This convention, sometimes
known as "semantic newlines", makes it easier to see the effect of
patches, which often operate at the level of individual sentences,
clauses, or phrases.
> +.P
> +The
> +.BR uretprobe ()
> +syscall exists only to allow the invocation of return uprobe consumers.
s/syscall/system call/
> +It should
> +.B never
> +be called directly.
> +Details of the arguments (if any) passed to
> +.BR uretprobe ()
> +and the return value are architecture-specific.
> --
> 2.44.0
Have a lovely day!
Alex
--
<https://www.alejandro-colomar.es/>
[-- Attachment #2: signature.asc --]
[-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 833 bytes --]
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH v15 0/5] implement getrandom() in vDSO
From: Jason A. Donenfeld @ 2024-05-21 11:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, patches, tglx
Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld, linux-crypto, linux-api, x86,
Greg Kroah-Hartman, Adhemerval Zanella Netto, Carlos O'Donell,
Florian Weimer, Arnd Bergmann, Jann Horn, Christian Brauner
Changes v14->v15:
----------------
This is back after a bit of a hiatus. In the last attempt to do this in
the beginning of 2023, I think we reached consensus on a few things --
the use case, the vDSO implementation and semantics, its integration
with libc, the test code and documentation, and so forth. It was
basically "ready to go". Almost. But there was a lingering issue that
bogged this down, which is that it demanded some new mm semantics that
weren't very popular.
In particular, the series from last year made use of the x86 instruction
decoder to just skip over faulting instructions. I still think this is
nifty, but it's not actually essential for the semantics needed, and I
can understand why this was by far the largest objection. So all of that
is dropped, which simplifies quite a bit.
In another avenue of the mm discussion, Andy had mentioned using
_install_special_mapping() instead of the VM_DROPPABLE work, and I spent
a long while looking into this, and attempted several times to code up a
working implementation that used that. But the semantics really just
weren't possible without adding hooks to lots of other core code, and
duplicating a lot of code that really ought not to be. So I've kept the
VM_DROPPABLE patch here, but because the x86 instruction decoding stuff
has been removed, that patch is actually a lot smaller and simpler and I
don't think should be too controversial. In terms of actual C code, it
only adds around 8 lines, and is compact enough that you can just grep
for VM_DROPPABLE to see the whole thing.
The original cover letter is produced below. I'm eager to finally get
this patchset moving, and sorry for the delay in producing the v+1 from
before.
Assuming this goes well, the plan would be to take this through my
random.git tree for 6.11. And if the mm part looks fine, I'll get this
cooking in linux-next ASAP.
Thanks ahead of time for taking a look at it.
--------------
Two statements:
1) Userspace wants faster cryptographically secure random numbers of
arbitrary size, big or small.
2) Userspace is currently unable to safely roll its own RNG with the
same security profile as getrandom().
Statement (1) has been debated for years, with arguments ranging from
"we need faster cryptographically secure card shuffling!" to "the only
things that actually need good randomness are keys, which are few and
far between" to "actually, TLS CBC nonces are frequent" and so on. I
don't intend to wade into that debate substantially, except to note that
recently glibc added arc4random(), whose goal is to return a
cryptographically secure uint32_t, and there are real user reports of it
being too slow. So here we are.
Statement (2) is more interesting. The kernel is the nexus of all
entropic inputs that influence the RNG. It is in the best position, and
probably the only position, to decide anything at all about the current
state of the RNG and of its entropy. One of the things it uniquely knows
about is when reseeding is necessary.
For example, when a virtual machine is forked, restored, or duplicated,
it's imparative that the RNG doesn't generate the same outputs. For this
reason, there's a small protocol between hypervisors and the kernel that
indicates this has happened, alongside some ID, which the RNG uses to
immediately reseed, so as not to return the same numbers. Were userspace
to expand a getrandom() seed from time T1 for the next hour, and at some
point T2 < hour, the virtual machine forked, userspace would continue to
provide the same numbers to two (or more) different virtual machines,
resulting in potential cryptographic catastrophe. Something similar
happens on resuming from hibernation (or even suspend), with various
compromise scenarios there in mind.
There's a more general reason why userspace rolling its own RNG from a
getrandom() seed is fraught. There's a lot of attention paid to this
particular Linuxism we have of the RNG being initialized and thus
non-blocking or uninitialized and thus blocking until it is initialized.
These are our Two Big States that many hold to be the holy
differentiating factor between safe and not safe, between
cryptographically secure and garbage. The fact is, however, that the
distinction between these two states is a hand-wavy wishy-washy inexact
approximation. Outside of a few exceptional cases (e.g. a HW RNG is
available), we actually don't really ever know with any rigor at all
when the RNG is safe and ready (nor when it's compromised). We do the
best we can to "estimate" it, but entropy estimation is fundamentally
impossible in the general case. So really, we're just doing guess work,
and hoping it's good and conservative enough. Let's then assume that
there's always some potential error involved in this differentiator.
In fact, under the surface, the RNG is engineered around a different
principal, and that is trying to *use* new entropic inputs regularly and
at the right specific moments in time. For example, close to boot time,
the RNG reseeds itself more often than later. At certain events, like VM
fork, the RNG reseeds itself immediately. The various heuristics for
when the RNG will use new entropy and how often is really a core aspect
of what the RNG has some potential to do decently enough (and something
that will probably continue to improve in the future from random.c's
present set of algorithms). So in your mind, put away the metal
attachment to the Two Big States, which represent an approximation with
a potential margin of error. Instead keep in mind that the RNG's primary
operating heuristic is how often and exactly when it's going to reseed.
So, if userspace takes a seed from getrandom() at point T1, and uses it
for the next hour (or N megabytes or some other meaningless metric),
during that time, potential errors in the Two Big States approximation
are amplified. During that time potential reseeds are being lost,
forgotten, not reflected in the output stream. That's not good.
The simplest statement you could make is that userspace RNGs that expand
a getrandom() seed at some point T1 are nearly always *worse*, in some
way, than just calling getrandom() every time a random number is
desired.
For those reasons, after some discussion on libc-alpha, glibc's
arc4random() now just calls getrandom() on each invocation. That's
trivially safe, and gives us latitude to then make the safe thing faster
without becoming unsafe at our leasure. Card shuffling isn't
particularly fast, however.
How do we rectify this? By putting a safe implementation of getrandom()
in the vDSO, which has access to whatever information a
particular iteration of random.c is using to make its decisions. I use
that careful language of "particular iteration of random.c", because the
set of things that a vDSO getrandom() implementation might need for making
decisions as good as the kernel's will likely change over time. This
isn't just a matter of exporting certain *data* to userspace. We're not
going to commit to a "data API" where the various heuristics used are
exposed, locking in how the kernel works for decades to come, and then
leave it to various userspaces to roll something on top and shoot
themselves in the foot and have all sorts of complexity disasters.
Rather, vDSO getrandom() is supposed to be the *same exact algorithm*
that runs in the kernel, except it's been hoisted into userspace as
much as possible. And so vDSO getrandom() and kernel getrandom() will
always mirror each other hermetically.
API-wise, the vDSO gains this function:
ssize_t vgetrandom(void *buffer, size_t len, unsigned int flags, void *opaque_state);
The return value and the first 3 arguments are the same as ordinary
getrandom(), while the last argument is a pointer to some state
allocated with vgetrandom_alloc(), explained below. Were all four
arguments passed to the getrandom syscall, nothing different would
happen, and the functions would have the exact same behavior.
Then, we introduce a new syscall:
void *vgetrandom_alloc(unsigned int *num, unsigned int *size_per_each,
unsigned long addr, unsigned int flags);
This takes a hinted number of opaque states in `num`, and returns a
pointer to an array of opaque states, the number actually allocated back
in `num`, and the size in bytes of each one in `size_per_each`, enabling
a libc to slice up the returned array into a state per each thread. (The
`flags` and `addr` arguments, as well as the `*size_per_each` input
value, are reserved for the future and are forced to be zero for now.)
Libc is expected to allocate a chunk of these on first use, and then
dole them out to threads as they're created, allocating more when
needed. The returned address of the first state may be passed to
munmap(2) with a length of `num * size_per_each`, in order to deallocate
the memory.
We very intentionally do *not* leave state allocation up to the caller
of vgetrandom, but provide vgetrandom_alloc for that allocation. There
are too many weird things that can go wrong, and it's important that
vDSO does not provide too generic of a mechanism. It's not going to
store its state in just any old memory address. It'll do it only in ones
it allocates.
Right now this means it uses a new mm flag called VM_DROPPABLE, along
with VM_WIPEONFORK. In the future maybe there will be other interesting
page flags or anti-heartbleed measures, or other platform-specific
kernel-specific things that can be set from the syscall. Again, it's
important that the kernel has a say in how this works rather than
agreeing to operate on any old address; memory isn't neutral.
The interesting meat of the implementation is in lib/vdso/getrandom.c,
as generic C code, and it aims to mainly follow random.c's buffered fast
key erasure logic. Before the RNG is initialized, it falls back to the
syscall. Right now it uses a simple generation counter to make its decisions
on reseeding (though this could be made more extensive over time).
The actual place that has the most work to do is in all of the other
files. Most of the vDSO shared page infrastructure is centered around
gettimeofday, and so the main structs are all in arrays for different
timestamp types, and attached to time namespaces, and so forth. I've
done the best I could to add onto this in an unintrusive way.
In my test results, performance is pretty stellar (around 15x for uint32_t
generation), and it seems to be working. There's an extended example in the
second commit of this series, showing how the syscall and the vDSO function
are meant to be used together.
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Adhemerval Zanella Netto <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org>
Cc: Carlos O'Donell <carlos@redhat.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Jason A. Donenfeld (5):
mm: add VM_DROPPABLE for designating always lazily freeable mappings
random: add vgetrandom_alloc() syscall
arch: allocate vgetrandom_alloc() syscall number
random: introduce generic vDSO getrandom() implementation
x86: vdso: Wire up getrandom() vDSO implementation
MAINTAINERS | 2 +
arch/alpha/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
arch/arm/tools/syscall.tbl | 1 +
arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h | 2 +-
arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h | 2 +
arch/m68k/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
arch/microblaze/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl | 1 +
arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl | 1 +
arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl | 1 +
arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
arch/sh/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 +
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 +
arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile | 3 +-
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso.lds.S | 2 +
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom-chacha.S | 178 +++++++++++
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom.c | 17 ++
arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/getrandom.h | 55 ++++
arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/vsyscall.h | 2 +
arch/x86/include/asm/vvar.h | 16 +
arch/xtensa/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
drivers/char/random.c | 143 +++++++++
fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 3 +
include/linux/mm.h | 8 +
include/linux/syscalls.h | 3 +
include/trace/events/mmflags.h | 7 +
include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 5 +-
include/vdso/datapage.h | 12 +
include/vdso/getrandom.h | 44 +++
include/vdso/types.h | 35 +++
kernel/sys_ni.c | 3 +
lib/vdso/Kconfig | 6 +
lib/vdso/getrandom.c | 226 ++++++++++++++
mm/Kconfig | 3 +
mm/memory.c | 4 +
mm/mempolicy.c | 3 +
mm/mprotect.c | 2 +-
mm/rmap.c | 5 +-
tools/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 5 +-
.../arch/mips/entry/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl | 1 +
.../arch/powerpc/entry/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
.../perf/arch/s390/entry/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
.../arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 +
tools/testing/selftests/vDSO/.gitignore | 2 +
tools/testing/selftests/vDSO/Makefile | 11 +
.../testing/selftests/vDSO/vdso_test_chacha.c | 43 +++
.../selftests/vDSO/vdso_test_getrandom.c | 283 ++++++++++++++++++
52 files changed, 1148 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom-chacha.S
create mode 100644 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom.c
create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/getrandom.h
create mode 100644 include/vdso/getrandom.h
create mode 100644 include/vdso/types.h
create mode 100644 lib/vdso/getrandom.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vDSO/vdso_test_chacha.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vDSO/vdso_test_getrandom.c
--
2.44.0
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCHv6 9/9] man2: Add uretprobe syscall page
From: Jiri Olsa @ 2024-05-21 10:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Steven Rostedt, Masami Hiramatsu, Oleg Nesterov,
Alexei Starovoitov, Daniel Borkmann, Andrii Nakryiko
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-trace-kernel, linux-api, linux-man, x86, bpf,
Song Liu, Yonghong Song, John Fastabend, Peter Zijlstra,
Thomas Gleixner, Borislav Petkov (AMD), Ingo Molnar,
Andy Lutomirski, Edgecombe, Rick P, Deepak Gupta
In-Reply-To: <20240521104825.1060966-1-jolsa@kernel.org>
Adding man page for new uretprobe syscall.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
---
man2/uretprobe.2 | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 50 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 man2/uretprobe.2
diff --git a/man2/uretprobe.2 b/man2/uretprobe.2
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..690fe3b1a44f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/man2/uretprobe.2
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+.\" Copyright (C) 2024, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
+.\"
+.\" SPDX-License-Identifier: Linux-man-pages-copyleft
+.\"
+.TH uretprobe 2 (date) "Linux man-pages (unreleased)"
+.SH NAME
+uretprobe \- execute pending return uprobes
+.SH SYNOPSIS
+.nf
+.B int uretprobe(void)
+.fi
+.SH DESCRIPTION
+The
+.BR uretprobe ()
+syscall is an alternative to breakpoint instructions for
+triggering return uprobe consumers.
+.P
+Calls to
+.BR uretprobe ()
+suscall are only made from the user-space trampoline provided by the kernel.
+Calls from any other place result in a
+.BR SIGILL .
+
+.SH RETURN VALUE
+The
+.BR uretprobe ()
+syscall return value is architecture-specific.
+
+.SH VERSIONS
+This syscall is not specified in POSIX,
+and details of its behavior vary across systems.
+.SH STANDARDS
+None.
+.SH HISTORY
+TBD
+.SH NOTES
+The
+.BR uretprobe ()
+syscall was initially introduced for the x86_64 architecture where it was shown
+to be faster than breakpoint traps. It might be extended to other architectures.
+.P
+The
+.BR uretprobe ()
+syscall exists only to allow the invocation of return uprobe consumers.
+It should
+.B never
+be called directly.
+Details of the arguments (if any) passed to
+.BR uretprobe ()
+and the return value are architecture-specific.
--
2.44.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCHv6 bpf-next 8/9] selftests/bpf: Add uretprobe shadow stack test
From: Jiri Olsa @ 2024-05-21 10:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Steven Rostedt, Masami Hiramatsu, Oleg Nesterov,
Alexei Starovoitov, Daniel Borkmann, Andrii Nakryiko
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-trace-kernel, linux-api, linux-man, x86, bpf,
Song Liu, Yonghong Song, John Fastabend, Peter Zijlstra,
Thomas Gleixner, Borislav Petkov (AMD), Ingo Molnar,
Andy Lutomirski, Edgecombe, Rick P, Deepak Gupta
In-Reply-To: <20240521104825.1060966-1-jolsa@kernel.org>
Adding uretprobe shadow stack test that runs all existing
uretprobe tests with shadow stack enabled if it's available.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
---
.../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/uprobe_syscall.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 60 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/uprobe_syscall.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/uprobe_syscall.c
index 3ef324c2db50..fda456401284 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/uprobe_syscall.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/uprobe_syscall.c
@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@
#include <linux/compiler.h>
#include <linux/stringify.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/syscall.h>
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <asm/prctl.h>
#include "uprobe_syscall.skel.h"
#include "uprobe_syscall_executed.skel.h"
@@ -297,6 +300,56 @@ static void test_uretprobe_syscall_call(void)
close(go[1]);
close(go[0]);
}
+
+/*
+ * Borrowed from tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_shadow_stack.c.
+ *
+ * For use in inline enablement of shadow stack.
+ *
+ * The program can't return from the point where shadow stack gets enabled
+ * because there will be no address on the shadow stack. So it can't use
+ * syscall() for enablement, since it is a function.
+ *
+ * Based on code from nolibc.h. Keep a copy here because this can't pull
+ * in all of nolibc.h.
+ */
+#define ARCH_PRCTL(arg1, arg2) \
+({ \
+ long _ret; \
+ register long _num asm("eax") = __NR_arch_prctl; \
+ register long _arg1 asm("rdi") = (long)(arg1); \
+ register long _arg2 asm("rsi") = (long)(arg2); \
+ \
+ asm volatile ( \
+ "syscall\n" \
+ : "=a"(_ret) \
+ : "r"(_arg1), "r"(_arg2), \
+ "0"(_num) \
+ : "rcx", "r11", "memory", "cc" \
+ ); \
+ _ret; \
+})
+
+#ifndef ARCH_SHSTK_ENABLE
+#define ARCH_SHSTK_ENABLE 0x5001
+#define ARCH_SHSTK_DISABLE 0x5002
+#define ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK (1ULL << 0)
+#endif
+
+static void test_uretprobe_shadow_stack(void)
+{
+ if (ARCH_PRCTL(ARCH_SHSTK_ENABLE, ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK)) {
+ test__skip();
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Run all of the uretprobe tests. */
+ test_uretprobe_regs_equal();
+ test_uretprobe_regs_change();
+ test_uretprobe_syscall_call();
+
+ ARCH_PRCTL(ARCH_SHSTK_DISABLE, ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK);
+}
#else
static void test_uretprobe_regs_equal(void)
{
@@ -312,6 +365,11 @@ static void test_uretprobe_syscall_call(void)
{
test__skip();
}
+
+static void test_uretprobe_shadow_stack(void)
+{
+ test__skip();
+}
#endif
void test_uprobe_syscall(void)
@@ -322,4 +380,6 @@ void test_uprobe_syscall(void)
test_uretprobe_regs_change();
if (test__start_subtest("uretprobe_syscall_call"))
test_uretprobe_syscall_call();
+ if (test__start_subtest("uretprobe_shadow_stack"))
+ test_uretprobe_shadow_stack();
}
--
2.45.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCHv6 bpf-next 7/9] selftests/bpf: Add uretprobe syscall call from user space test
From: Jiri Olsa @ 2024-05-21 10:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Steven Rostedt, Masami Hiramatsu, Oleg Nesterov,
Alexei Starovoitov, Daniel Borkmann, Andrii Nakryiko
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-trace-kernel, linux-api, linux-man, x86, bpf,
Song Liu, Yonghong Song, John Fastabend, Peter Zijlstra,
Thomas Gleixner, Borislav Petkov (AMD), Ingo Molnar,
Andy Lutomirski, Edgecombe, Rick P, Deepak Gupta
In-Reply-To: <20240521104825.1060966-1-jolsa@kernel.org>
Adding test to verify that when called from outside of the
trampoline provided by kernel, the uretprobe syscall will cause
calling process to receive SIGILL signal and the attached bpf
program is not executed.
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
---
.../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/uprobe_syscall.c | 95 +++++++++++++++++++
.../bpf/progs/uprobe_syscall_executed.c | 17 ++++
2 files changed, 112 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/uprobe_syscall_executed.c
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/uprobe_syscall.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/uprobe_syscall.c
index 1a50cd35205d..3ef324c2db50 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/uprobe_syscall.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/uprobe_syscall.c
@@ -7,7 +7,10 @@
#include <unistd.h>
#include <asm/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/compiler.h>
+#include <linux/stringify.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
#include "uprobe_syscall.skel.h"
+#include "uprobe_syscall_executed.skel.h"
__naked unsigned long uretprobe_regs_trigger(void)
{
@@ -209,6 +212,91 @@ static void test_uretprobe_regs_change(void)
}
}
+#ifndef __NR_uretprobe
+#define __NR_uretprobe 462
+#endif
+
+__naked unsigned long uretprobe_syscall_call_1(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * Pretend we are uretprobe trampoline to trigger the return
+ * probe invocation in order to verify we get SIGILL.
+ */
+ asm volatile (
+ "pushq %rax\n"
+ "pushq %rcx\n"
+ "pushq %r11\n"
+ "movq $" __stringify(__NR_uretprobe) ", %rax\n"
+ "syscall\n"
+ "popq %r11\n"
+ "popq %rcx\n"
+ "retq\n"
+ );
+}
+
+__naked unsigned long uretprobe_syscall_call(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "call uretprobe_syscall_call_1\n"
+ "retq\n"
+ );
+}
+
+static void test_uretprobe_syscall_call(void)
+{
+ LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_uprobe_multi_opts, opts,
+ .retprobe = true,
+ );
+ struct uprobe_syscall_executed *skel;
+ int pid, status, err, go[2], c;
+
+ if (ASSERT_OK(pipe(go), "pipe"))
+ return;
+
+ skel = uprobe_syscall_executed__open_and_load();
+ if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "uprobe_syscall_executed__open_and_load"))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ pid = fork();
+ if (!ASSERT_GE(pid, 0, "fork"))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ /* child */
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ close(go[1]);
+
+ /* wait for parent's kick */
+ err = read(go[0], &c, 1);
+ if (err != 1)
+ exit(-1);
+
+ uretprobe_syscall_call();
+ _exit(0);
+ }
+
+ skel->links.test = bpf_program__attach_uprobe_multi(skel->progs.test, pid,
+ "/proc/self/exe",
+ "uretprobe_syscall_call", &opts);
+ if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel->links.test, "bpf_program__attach_uprobe_multi"))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ /* kick the child */
+ write(go[1], &c, 1);
+ err = waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(err, pid, "waitpid");
+
+ /* verify the child got killed with SIGILL */
+ ASSERT_EQ(WIFSIGNALED(status), 1, "WIFSIGNALED");
+ ASSERT_EQ(WTERMSIG(status), SIGILL, "WTERMSIG");
+
+ /* verify the uretprobe program wasn't called */
+ ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->executed, 0, "executed");
+
+cleanup:
+ uprobe_syscall_executed__destroy(skel);
+ close(go[1]);
+ close(go[0]);
+}
#else
static void test_uretprobe_regs_equal(void)
{
@@ -219,6 +307,11 @@ static void test_uretprobe_regs_change(void)
{
test__skip();
}
+
+static void test_uretprobe_syscall_call(void)
+{
+ test__skip();
+}
#endif
void test_uprobe_syscall(void)
@@ -227,4 +320,6 @@ void test_uprobe_syscall(void)
test_uretprobe_regs_equal();
if (test__start_subtest("uretprobe_regs_change"))
test_uretprobe_regs_change();
+ if (test__start_subtest("uretprobe_syscall_call"))
+ test_uretprobe_syscall_call();
}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/uprobe_syscall_executed.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/uprobe_syscall_executed.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..0d7f1a7db2e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/uprobe_syscall_executed.c
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include "vmlinux.h"
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+struct pt_regs regs;
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
+
+int executed = 0;
+
+SEC("uretprobe.multi")
+int test(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ executed = 1;
+ return 0;
+}
--
2.45.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCHv6 bpf-next 6/9] selftests/bpf: Add uretprobe syscall test for regs changes
From: Jiri Olsa @ 2024-05-21 10:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Steven Rostedt, Masami Hiramatsu, Oleg Nesterov,
Alexei Starovoitov, Daniel Borkmann, Andrii Nakryiko
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-trace-kernel, linux-api, linux-man, x86, bpf,
Song Liu, Yonghong Song, John Fastabend, Peter Zijlstra,
Thomas Gleixner, Borislav Petkov (AMD), Ingo Molnar,
Andy Lutomirski, Edgecombe, Rick P, Deepak Gupta
In-Reply-To: <20240521104825.1060966-1-jolsa@kernel.org>
Adding test that creates uprobe consumer on uretprobe which changes some
of the registers. Making sure the changed registers are propagated to the
user space when the ureptobe syscall trampoline is used on x86_64.
To be able to do this, adding support to bpf_testmod to create uprobe via
new attribute file:
/sys/kernel/bpf_testmod_uprobe
This file is expecting file offset and creates related uprobe on current
process exe file and removes existing uprobe if offset is 0. The can be
only single uprobe at any time.
The uprobe has specific consumer that changes registers used in ureprobe
syscall trampoline and which are later checked in the test.
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
---
.../selftests/bpf/bpf_testmod/bpf_testmod.c | 123 +++++++++++++++++-
.../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/uprobe_syscall.c | 67 ++++++++++
2 files changed, 189 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_testmod/bpf_testmod.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_testmod/bpf_testmod.c
index 2a18bd320e92..b0132a342bb5 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_testmod/bpf_testmod.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_testmod/bpf_testmod.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
#include <linux/in6.h>
#include <linux/un.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
#include "bpf_testmod.h"
#include "bpf_testmod_kfunc.h"
@@ -358,6 +359,119 @@ static struct bin_attribute bin_attr_bpf_testmod_file __ro_after_init = {
.write = bpf_testmod_test_write,
};
+/* bpf_testmod_uprobe sysfs attribute is so far enabled for x86_64 only,
+ * please see test_uretprobe_regs_change test
+ */
+#ifdef __x86_64__
+
+static int
+uprobe_ret_handler(struct uprobe_consumer *self, unsigned long func,
+ struct pt_regs *regs)
+
+{
+ regs->ax = 0x12345678deadbeef;
+ regs->cx = 0x87654321feebdaed;
+ regs->r11 = (u64) -1;
+ return true;
+}
+
+struct testmod_uprobe {
+ struct path path;
+ loff_t offset;
+ struct uprobe_consumer consumer;
+};
+
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(testmod_uprobe_mutex);
+
+static struct testmod_uprobe uprobe = {
+ .consumer.ret_handler = uprobe_ret_handler,
+};
+
+static int testmod_register_uprobe(loff_t offset)
+{
+ int err = -EBUSY;
+
+ if (uprobe.offset)
+ return -EBUSY;
+
+ mutex_lock(&testmod_uprobe_mutex);
+
+ if (uprobe.offset)
+ goto out;
+
+ err = kern_path("/proc/self/exe", LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &uprobe.path);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ err = uprobe_register_refctr(d_real_inode(uprobe.path.dentry),
+ offset, 0, &uprobe.consumer);
+ if (err)
+ path_put(&uprobe.path);
+ else
+ uprobe.offset = offset;
+
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&testmod_uprobe_mutex);
+ return err;
+}
+
+static void testmod_unregister_uprobe(void)
+{
+ mutex_lock(&testmod_uprobe_mutex);
+
+ if (uprobe.offset) {
+ uprobe_unregister(d_real_inode(uprobe.path.dentry),
+ uprobe.offset, &uprobe.consumer);
+ uprobe.offset = 0;
+ }
+
+ mutex_unlock(&testmod_uprobe_mutex);
+}
+
+static ssize_t
+bpf_testmod_uprobe_write(struct file *file, struct kobject *kobj,
+ struct bin_attribute *bin_attr,
+ char *buf, loff_t off, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned long offset = 0;
+ int err = 0;
+
+ if (kstrtoul(buf, 0, &offset))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (offset)
+ err = testmod_register_uprobe(offset);
+ else
+ testmod_unregister_uprobe();
+
+ return err ?: strlen(buf);
+}
+
+static struct bin_attribute bin_attr_bpf_testmod_uprobe_file __ro_after_init = {
+ .attr = { .name = "bpf_testmod_uprobe", .mode = 0666, },
+ .write = bpf_testmod_uprobe_write,
+};
+
+static int register_bpf_testmod_uprobe(void)
+{
+ return sysfs_create_bin_file(kernel_kobj, &bin_attr_bpf_testmod_uprobe_file);
+}
+
+static void unregister_bpf_testmod_uprobe(void)
+{
+ testmod_unregister_uprobe();
+ sysfs_remove_bin_file(kernel_kobj, &bin_attr_bpf_testmod_uprobe_file);
+}
+
+#else
+static int register_bpf_testmod_uprobe(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void unregister_bpf_testmod_uprobe(void) { }
+#endif
+
BTF_KFUNCS_START(bpf_testmod_common_kfunc_ids)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_testmod_seq_new, KF_ITER_NEW)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_testmod_seq_next, KF_ITER_NEXT | KF_RET_NULL)
@@ -912,7 +1026,13 @@ static int bpf_testmod_init(void)
return -EINVAL;
sock = NULL;
mutex_init(&sock_lock);
- return sysfs_create_bin_file(kernel_kobj, &bin_attr_bpf_testmod_file);
+ ret = sysfs_create_bin_file(kernel_kobj, &bin_attr_bpf_testmod_file);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ ret = register_bpf_testmod_uprobe();
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ return 0;
}
static void bpf_testmod_exit(void)
@@ -927,6 +1047,7 @@ static void bpf_testmod_exit(void)
bpf_kfunc_close_sock();
sysfs_remove_bin_file(kernel_kobj, &bin_attr_bpf_testmod_file);
+ unregister_bpf_testmod_uprobe();
}
module_init(bpf_testmod_init);
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/uprobe_syscall.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/uprobe_syscall.c
index 311ac19d8992..1a50cd35205d 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/uprobe_syscall.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/uprobe_syscall.c
@@ -149,15 +149,82 @@ static void test_uretprobe_regs_equal(void)
cleanup:
uprobe_syscall__destroy(skel);
}
+
+#define BPF_TESTMOD_UPROBE_TEST_FILE "/sys/kernel/bpf_testmod_uprobe"
+
+static int write_bpf_testmod_uprobe(unsigned long offset)
+{
+ size_t n, ret;
+ char buf[30];
+ int fd;
+
+ n = sprintf(buf, "%lu", offset);
+
+ fd = open(BPF_TESTMOD_UPROBE_TEST_FILE, O_WRONLY);
+ if (fd < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ ret = write(fd, buf, n);
+ close(fd);
+ return ret != n ? (int) ret : 0;
+}
+
+static void test_uretprobe_regs_change(void)
+{
+ struct pt_regs before = {}, after = {};
+ unsigned long *pb = (unsigned long *) &before;
+ unsigned long *pa = (unsigned long *) &after;
+ unsigned long cnt = sizeof(before)/sizeof(*pb);
+ unsigned int i, err, offset;
+
+ offset = get_uprobe_offset(uretprobe_regs_trigger);
+
+ err = write_bpf_testmod_uprobe(offset);
+ if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "register_uprobe"))
+ return;
+
+ uretprobe_regs(&before, &after);
+
+ err = write_bpf_testmod_uprobe(0);
+ if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "unregister_uprobe"))
+ return;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++) {
+ unsigned int offset = i * sizeof(unsigned long);
+
+ switch (offset) {
+ case offsetof(struct pt_regs, rax):
+ ASSERT_EQ(pa[i], 0x12345678deadbeef, "rax");
+ break;
+ case offsetof(struct pt_regs, rcx):
+ ASSERT_EQ(pa[i], 0x87654321feebdaed, "rcx");
+ break;
+ case offsetof(struct pt_regs, r11):
+ ASSERT_EQ(pa[i], (__u64) -1, "r11");
+ break;
+ default:
+ if (!ASSERT_EQ(pa[i], pb[i], "register before-after value check"))
+ fprintf(stdout, "failed register offset %u\n", offset);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
#else
static void test_uretprobe_regs_equal(void)
{
test__skip();
}
+
+static void test_uretprobe_regs_change(void)
+{
+ test__skip();
+}
#endif
void test_uprobe_syscall(void)
{
if (test__start_subtest("uretprobe_regs_equal"))
test_uretprobe_regs_equal();
+ if (test__start_subtest("uretprobe_regs_change"))
+ test_uretprobe_regs_change();
}
--
2.45.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCHv6 bpf-next 5/9] selftests/bpf: Add uretprobe syscall test for regs integrity
From: Jiri Olsa @ 2024-05-21 10:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Steven Rostedt, Masami Hiramatsu, Oleg Nesterov,
Alexei Starovoitov, Daniel Borkmann, Andrii Nakryiko
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-trace-kernel, linux-api, linux-man, x86, bpf,
Song Liu, Yonghong Song, John Fastabend, Peter Zijlstra,
Thomas Gleixner, Borislav Petkov (AMD), Ingo Molnar,
Andy Lutomirski, Edgecombe, Rick P, Deepak Gupta
In-Reply-To: <20240521104825.1060966-1-jolsa@kernel.org>
Add uretprobe syscall test that compares register values before
and after the uretprobe is hit. It also compares the register
values seen from attached bpf program.
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
---
tools/include/linux/compiler.h | 4 +
.../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/uprobe_syscall.c | 163 ++++++++++++++++++
.../selftests/bpf/progs/uprobe_syscall.c | 15 ++
3 files changed, 182 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/uprobe_syscall.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/uprobe_syscall.c
diff --git a/tools/include/linux/compiler.h b/tools/include/linux/compiler.h
index 8a63a9913495..6f7f22ac9da5 100644
--- a/tools/include/linux/compiler.h
+++ b/tools/include/linux/compiler.h
@@ -62,6 +62,10 @@
#define __nocf_check __attribute__((nocf_check))
#endif
+#ifndef __naked
+#define __naked __attribute__((__naked__))
+#endif
+
/* Are two types/vars the same type (ignoring qualifiers)? */
#ifndef __same_type
# define __same_type(a, b) __builtin_types_compatible_p(typeof(a), typeof(b))
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/uprobe_syscall.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/uprobe_syscall.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..311ac19d8992
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/uprobe_syscall.c
@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <test_progs.h>
+
+#ifdef __x86_64__
+
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <asm/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/compiler.h>
+#include "uprobe_syscall.skel.h"
+
+__naked unsigned long uretprobe_regs_trigger(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "movq $0xdeadbeef, %rax\n"
+ "ret\n"
+ );
+}
+
+__naked void uretprobe_regs(struct pt_regs *before, struct pt_regs *after)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "movq %r15, 0(%rdi)\n"
+ "movq %r14, 8(%rdi)\n"
+ "movq %r13, 16(%rdi)\n"
+ "movq %r12, 24(%rdi)\n"
+ "movq %rbp, 32(%rdi)\n"
+ "movq %rbx, 40(%rdi)\n"
+ "movq %r11, 48(%rdi)\n"
+ "movq %r10, 56(%rdi)\n"
+ "movq %r9, 64(%rdi)\n"
+ "movq %r8, 72(%rdi)\n"
+ "movq %rax, 80(%rdi)\n"
+ "movq %rcx, 88(%rdi)\n"
+ "movq %rdx, 96(%rdi)\n"
+ "movq %rsi, 104(%rdi)\n"
+ "movq %rdi, 112(%rdi)\n"
+ "movq $0, 120(%rdi)\n" /* orig_rax */
+ "movq $0, 128(%rdi)\n" /* rip */
+ "movq $0, 136(%rdi)\n" /* cs */
+ "pushf\n"
+ "pop %rax\n"
+ "movq %rax, 144(%rdi)\n" /* eflags */
+ "movq %rsp, 152(%rdi)\n" /* rsp */
+ "movq $0, 160(%rdi)\n" /* ss */
+
+ /* save 2nd argument */
+ "pushq %rsi\n"
+ "call uretprobe_regs_trigger\n"
+
+ /* save return value and load 2nd argument pointer to rax */
+ "pushq %rax\n"
+ "movq 8(%rsp), %rax\n"
+
+ "movq %r15, 0(%rax)\n"
+ "movq %r14, 8(%rax)\n"
+ "movq %r13, 16(%rax)\n"
+ "movq %r12, 24(%rax)\n"
+ "movq %rbp, 32(%rax)\n"
+ "movq %rbx, 40(%rax)\n"
+ "movq %r11, 48(%rax)\n"
+ "movq %r10, 56(%rax)\n"
+ "movq %r9, 64(%rax)\n"
+ "movq %r8, 72(%rax)\n"
+ "movq %rcx, 88(%rax)\n"
+ "movq %rdx, 96(%rax)\n"
+ "movq %rsi, 104(%rax)\n"
+ "movq %rdi, 112(%rax)\n"
+ "movq $0, 120(%rax)\n" /* orig_rax */
+ "movq $0, 128(%rax)\n" /* rip */
+ "movq $0, 136(%rax)\n" /* cs */
+
+ /* restore return value and 2nd argument */
+ "pop %rax\n"
+ "pop %rsi\n"
+
+ "movq %rax, 80(%rsi)\n"
+
+ "pushf\n"
+ "pop %rax\n"
+
+ "movq %rax, 144(%rsi)\n" /* eflags */
+ "movq %rsp, 152(%rsi)\n" /* rsp */
+ "movq $0, 160(%rsi)\n" /* ss */
+ "ret\n"
+);
+}
+
+static void test_uretprobe_regs_equal(void)
+{
+ struct uprobe_syscall *skel = NULL;
+ struct pt_regs before = {}, after = {};
+ unsigned long *pb = (unsigned long *) &before;
+ unsigned long *pa = (unsigned long *) &after;
+ unsigned long *pp;
+ unsigned int i, cnt;
+ int err;
+
+ skel = uprobe_syscall__open_and_load();
+ if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "uprobe_syscall__open_and_load"))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ err = uprobe_syscall__attach(skel);
+ if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "uprobe_syscall__attach"))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ uretprobe_regs(&before, &after);
+
+ pp = (unsigned long *) &skel->bss->regs;
+ cnt = sizeof(before)/sizeof(*pb);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++) {
+ unsigned int offset = i * sizeof(unsigned long);
+
+ /*
+ * Check register before and after uretprobe_regs_trigger call
+ * that triggers the uretprobe.
+ */
+ switch (offset) {
+ case offsetof(struct pt_regs, rax):
+ ASSERT_EQ(pa[i], 0xdeadbeef, "return value");
+ break;
+ default:
+ if (!ASSERT_EQ(pb[i], pa[i], "register before-after value check"))
+ fprintf(stdout, "failed register offset %u\n", offset);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check register seen from bpf program and register after
+ * uretprobe_regs_trigger call
+ */
+ switch (offset) {
+ /*
+ * These values will be different (not set in uretprobe_regs),
+ * we don't care.
+ */
+ case offsetof(struct pt_regs, orig_rax):
+ case offsetof(struct pt_regs, rip):
+ case offsetof(struct pt_regs, cs):
+ case offsetof(struct pt_regs, rsp):
+ case offsetof(struct pt_regs, ss):
+ break;
+ default:
+ if (!ASSERT_EQ(pp[i], pa[i], "register prog-after value check"))
+ fprintf(stdout, "failed register offset %u\n", offset);
+ }
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+ uprobe_syscall__destroy(skel);
+}
+#else
+static void test_uretprobe_regs_equal(void)
+{
+ test__skip();
+}
+#endif
+
+void test_uprobe_syscall(void)
+{
+ if (test__start_subtest("uretprobe_regs_equal"))
+ test_uretprobe_regs_equal();
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/uprobe_syscall.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/uprobe_syscall.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8a4fa6c7ef59
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/uprobe_syscall.c
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include "vmlinux.h"
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+struct pt_regs regs;
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
+
+SEC("uretprobe//proc/self/exe:uretprobe_regs_trigger")
+int uretprobe(struct pt_regs *ctx)
+{
+ __builtin_memcpy(®s, ctx, sizeof(regs));
+ return 0;
+}
--
2.45.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCHv6 bpf-next 4/9] selftests/x86: Add return uprobe shadow stack test
From: Jiri Olsa @ 2024-05-21 10:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Steven Rostedt, Masami Hiramatsu, Oleg Nesterov,
Alexei Starovoitov, Daniel Borkmann, Andrii Nakryiko
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-trace-kernel, linux-api, linux-man, x86, bpf,
Song Liu, Yonghong Song, John Fastabend, Peter Zijlstra,
Thomas Gleixner, Borislav Petkov (AMD), Ingo Molnar,
Andy Lutomirski, Edgecombe, Rick P, Deepak Gupta
In-Reply-To: <20240521104825.1060966-1-jolsa@kernel.org>
Adding return uprobe test for shadow stack and making sure it's
working properly. Borrowed some of the code from bpf selftests.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
---
.../testing/selftests/x86/test_shadow_stack.c | 145 ++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 145 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_shadow_stack.c b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_shadow_stack.c
index 757e6527f67e..e3501b7e2ecc 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_shadow_stack.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_shadow_stack.c
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
#include <sys/ptrace.h>
#include <sys/signal.h>
#include <linux/elf.h>
+#include <linux/perf_event.h>
/*
* Define the ABI defines if needed, so people can run the tests
@@ -681,6 +682,144 @@ int test_32bit(void)
return !segv_triggered;
}
+static int parse_uint_from_file(const char *file, const char *fmt)
+{
+ int err, ret;
+ FILE *f;
+
+ f = fopen(file, "re");
+ if (!f) {
+ err = -errno;
+ printf("failed to open '%s': %d\n", file, err);
+ return err;
+ }
+ err = fscanf(f, fmt, &ret);
+ if (err != 1) {
+ err = err == EOF ? -EIO : -errno;
+ printf("failed to parse '%s': %d\n", file, err);
+ fclose(f);
+ return err;
+ }
+ fclose(f);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int determine_uprobe_perf_type(void)
+{
+ const char *file = "/sys/bus/event_source/devices/uprobe/type";
+
+ return parse_uint_from_file(file, "%d\n");
+}
+
+static int determine_uprobe_retprobe_bit(void)
+{
+ const char *file = "/sys/bus/event_source/devices/uprobe/format/retprobe";
+
+ return parse_uint_from_file(file, "config:%d\n");
+}
+
+static ssize_t get_uprobe_offset(const void *addr)
+{
+ size_t start, end, base;
+ char buf[256];
+ bool found = false;
+ FILE *f;
+
+ f = fopen("/proc/self/maps", "r");
+ if (!f)
+ return -errno;
+
+ while (fscanf(f, "%zx-%zx %s %zx %*[^\n]\n", &start, &end, buf, &base) == 4) {
+ if (buf[2] == 'x' && (uintptr_t)addr >= start && (uintptr_t)addr < end) {
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ fclose(f);
+
+ if (!found)
+ return -ESRCH;
+
+ return (uintptr_t)addr - start + base;
+}
+
+static __attribute__((noinline)) void uretprobe_trigger(void)
+{
+ asm volatile ("");
+}
+
+/*
+ * This test setups return uprobe, which is sensitive to shadow stack
+ * (crashes without extra fix). After executing the uretprobe we fail
+ * the test if we receive SIGSEGV, no crash means we're good.
+ *
+ * Helper functions above borrowed from bpf selftests.
+ */
+static int test_uretprobe(void)
+{
+ const size_t attr_sz = sizeof(struct perf_event_attr);
+ const char *file = "/proc/self/exe";
+ int bit, fd = 0, type, err = 1;
+ struct perf_event_attr attr;
+ struct sigaction sa = {};
+ ssize_t offset;
+
+ type = determine_uprobe_perf_type();
+ if (type < 0) {
+ if (type == -ENOENT)
+ printf("[SKIP]\tUretprobe test, uprobes are not available\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ offset = get_uprobe_offset(uretprobe_trigger);
+ if (offset < 0)
+ return 1;
+
+ bit = determine_uprobe_retprobe_bit();
+ if (bit < 0)
+ return 1;
+
+ sa.sa_sigaction = segv_gp_handler;
+ sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
+ if (sigaction(SIGSEGV, &sa, NULL))
+ return 1;
+
+ /* Setup return uprobe through perf event interface. */
+ memset(&attr, 0, attr_sz);
+ attr.size = attr_sz;
+ attr.type = type;
+ attr.config = 1 << bit;
+ attr.config1 = (__u64) (unsigned long) file;
+ attr.config2 = offset;
+
+ fd = syscall(__NR_perf_event_open, &attr, 0 /* pid */, -1 /* cpu */,
+ -1 /* group_fd */, PERF_FLAG_FD_CLOEXEC);
+ if (fd < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (sigsetjmp(jmp_buffer, 1))
+ goto out;
+
+ ARCH_PRCTL(ARCH_SHSTK_ENABLE, ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK);
+
+ /*
+ * This either segfaults and goes through sigsetjmp above
+ * or succeeds and we're good.
+ */
+ uretprobe_trigger();
+
+ printf("[OK]\tUretprobe test\n");
+ err = 0;
+
+out:
+ ARCH_PRCTL(ARCH_SHSTK_DISABLE, ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK);
+ signal(SIGSEGV, SIG_DFL);
+ if (fd)
+ close(fd);
+ return err;
+}
+
void segv_handler_ptrace(int signum, siginfo_t *si, void *uc)
{
/* The SSP adjustment caused a segfault. */
@@ -867,6 +1006,12 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
goto out;
}
+ if (test_uretprobe()) {
+ ret = 1;
+ printf("[FAIL]\turetprobe test\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
return ret;
out:
--
2.45.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCHv6 bpf-next 3/9] uprobe: Add uretprobe syscall to speed up return probe
From: Jiri Olsa @ 2024-05-21 10:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Steven Rostedt, Masami Hiramatsu, Oleg Nesterov,
Alexei Starovoitov, Daniel Borkmann, Andrii Nakryiko
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-trace-kernel, linux-api, linux-man, x86, bpf,
Song Liu, Yonghong Song, John Fastabend, Peter Zijlstra,
Thomas Gleixner, Borislav Petkov (AMD), Ingo Molnar,
Andy Lutomirski, Edgecombe, Rick P, Deepak Gupta
In-Reply-To: <20240521104825.1060966-1-jolsa@kernel.org>
Adding uretprobe syscall instead of trap to speed up return probe.
At the moment the uretprobe setup/path is:
- install entry uprobe
- when the uprobe is hit, it overwrites probed function's return address
on stack with address of the trampoline that contains breakpoint
instruction
- the breakpoint trap code handles the uretprobe consumers execution and
jumps back to original return address
This patch replaces the above trampoline's breakpoint instruction with new
ureprobe syscall call. This syscall does exactly the same job as the trap
with some more extra work:
- syscall trampoline must save original value for rax/r11/rcx registers
on stack - rax is set to syscall number and r11/rcx are changed and
used by syscall instruction
- the syscall code reads the original values of those registers and
restore those values in task's pt_regs area
- only caller from trampoline exposed in '[uprobes]' is allowed,
the process will receive SIGILL signal otherwise
Even with some extra work, using the uretprobes syscall shows speed
improvement (compared to using standard breakpoint):
On Intel (11th Gen Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-1165G7 @ 2.80GHz)
current:
uretprobe-nop : 1.498 ± 0.000M/s
uretprobe-push : 1.448 ± 0.001M/s
uretprobe-ret : 0.816 ± 0.001M/s
with the fix:
uretprobe-nop : 1.969 ± 0.002M/s < 31% speed up
uretprobe-push : 1.910 ± 0.000M/s < 31% speed up
uretprobe-ret : 0.934 ± 0.000M/s < 14% speed up
On Amd (AMD Ryzen 7 5700U)
current:
uretprobe-nop : 0.778 ± 0.001M/s
uretprobe-push : 0.744 ± 0.001M/s
uretprobe-ret : 0.540 ± 0.001M/s
with the fix:
uretprobe-nop : 0.860 ± 0.001M/s < 10% speed up
uretprobe-push : 0.818 ± 0.001M/s < 10% speed up
uretprobe-ret : 0.578 ± 0.000M/s < 7% speed up
The performance test spawns a thread that runs loop which triggers
uprobe with attached bpf program that increments the counter that
gets printed in results above.
The uprobe (and uretprobe) kind is determined by which instruction
is being patched with breakpoint instruction. That's also important
for uretprobes, because uprobe is installed for each uretprobe.
The performance test is part of bpf selftests:
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/run_bench_uprobes.sh
Note at the moment uretprobe syscall is supported only for native
64-bit process, compat process still uses standard breakpoint.
Note that when shadow stack is enabled the uretprobe syscall returns
via iret, which is slower than return via sysret, but won't cause the
shadow stack violation.
Suggested-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h | 2 +
arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c | 5 ++
arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c | 117 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/uprobes.h | 3 +
kernel/events/uprobes.c | 24 ++++---
5 files changed, 144 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h
index 896909f306e3..4cb77e004615 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p);
int setup_signal_shadow_stack(struct ksignal *ksig);
int restore_signal_shadow_stack(void);
int shstk_update_last_frame(unsigned long val);
+bool shstk_is_enabled(void);
#else
static inline long shstk_prctl(struct task_struct *task, int option,
unsigned long arg2) { return -EINVAL; }
@@ -33,6 +34,7 @@ static inline void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p) {}
static inline int setup_signal_shadow_stack(struct ksignal *ksig) { return 0; }
static inline int restore_signal_shadow_stack(void) { return 0; }
static inline int shstk_update_last_frame(unsigned long val) { return 0; }
+static inline bool shstk_is_enabled(void) { return false; }
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK */
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
index 9797d4cdb78a..059685612362 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
@@ -588,3 +588,8 @@ int shstk_update_last_frame(unsigned long val)
ssp = get_user_shstk_addr();
return write_user_shstk_64((u64 __user *)ssp, (u64)val);
}
+
+bool shstk_is_enabled(void)
+{
+ return features_enabled(ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK);
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c b/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c
index 6402fb3089d2..5a952c5ea66b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/uprobes.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/kdebug.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
@@ -308,6 +309,122 @@ static int uprobe_init_insn(struct arch_uprobe *auprobe, struct insn *insn, bool
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+
+asm (
+ ".pushsection .rodata\n"
+ ".global uretprobe_trampoline_entry\n"
+ "uretprobe_trampoline_entry:\n"
+ "pushq %rax\n"
+ "pushq %rcx\n"
+ "pushq %r11\n"
+ "movq $" __stringify(__NR_uretprobe) ", %rax\n"
+ "syscall\n"
+ ".global uretprobe_syscall_check\n"
+ "uretprobe_syscall_check:\n"
+ "popq %r11\n"
+ "popq %rcx\n"
+
+ /* The uretprobe syscall replaces stored %rax value with final
+ * return address, so we don't restore %rax in here and just
+ * call ret.
+ */
+ "retq\n"
+ ".global uretprobe_trampoline_end\n"
+ "uretprobe_trampoline_end:\n"
+ ".popsection\n"
+);
+
+extern u8 uretprobe_trampoline_entry[];
+extern u8 uretprobe_trampoline_end[];
+extern u8 uretprobe_syscall_check[];
+
+void *arch_uprobe_trampoline(unsigned long *psize)
+{
+ static uprobe_opcode_t insn = UPROBE_SWBP_INSN;
+ struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(current);
+
+ /*
+ * At the moment the uretprobe syscall trampoline is supported
+ * only for native 64-bit process, the compat process still uses
+ * standard breakpoint.
+ */
+ if (user_64bit_mode(regs)) {
+ *psize = uretprobe_trampoline_end - uretprobe_trampoline_entry;
+ return uretprobe_trampoline_entry;
+ }
+
+ *psize = UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE;
+ return &insn;
+}
+
+static unsigned long trampoline_check_ip(void)
+{
+ unsigned long tramp = uprobe_get_trampoline_vaddr();
+
+ return tramp + (uretprobe_syscall_check - uretprobe_trampoline_entry);
+}
+
+SYSCALL_DEFINE0(uretprobe)
+{
+ struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(current);
+ unsigned long err, ip, sp, r11_cx_ax[3];
+
+ if (regs->ip != trampoline_check_ip())
+ goto sigill;
+
+ err = copy_from_user(r11_cx_ax, (void __user *)regs->sp, sizeof(r11_cx_ax));
+ if (err)
+ goto sigill;
+
+ /* expose the "right" values of r11/cx/ax/sp to uprobe_consumer/s */
+ regs->r11 = r11_cx_ax[0];
+ regs->cx = r11_cx_ax[1];
+ regs->ax = r11_cx_ax[2];
+ regs->sp += sizeof(r11_cx_ax);
+ regs->orig_ax = -1;
+
+ ip = regs->ip;
+ sp = regs->sp;
+
+ uprobe_handle_trampoline(regs);
+
+ /*
+ * Some of the uprobe consumers has changed sp, we can do nothing,
+ * just return via iret.
+ * .. or shadow stack is enabled, in which case we need to skip
+ * return through the user space stack address.
+ */
+ if (regs->sp != sp || shstk_is_enabled())
+ return regs->ax;
+ regs->sp -= sizeof(r11_cx_ax);
+
+ /* for the case uprobe_consumer has changed r11/cx */
+ r11_cx_ax[0] = regs->r11;
+ r11_cx_ax[1] = regs->cx;
+
+ /*
+ * ax register is passed through as return value, so we can use
+ * its space on stack for ip value and jump to it through the
+ * trampoline's ret instruction
+ */
+ r11_cx_ax[2] = regs->ip;
+ regs->ip = ip;
+
+ err = copy_to_user((void __user *)regs->sp, r11_cx_ax, sizeof(r11_cx_ax));
+ if (err)
+ goto sigill;
+
+ /* ensure sysret, see do_syscall_64() */
+ regs->r11 = regs->flags;
+ regs->cx = regs->ip;
+
+ return regs->ax;
+
+sigill:
+ force_sig(SIGILL);
+ return -1;
+}
+
/*
* If arch_uprobe->insn doesn't use rip-relative addressing, return
* immediately. Otherwise, rewrite the instruction so that it accesses
diff --git a/include/linux/uprobes.h b/include/linux/uprobes.h
index f46e0ca0169c..b503fafb7fb3 100644
--- a/include/linux/uprobes.h
+++ b/include/linux/uprobes.h
@@ -138,6 +138,9 @@ extern bool arch_uretprobe_is_alive(struct return_instance *ret, enum rp_check c
extern bool arch_uprobe_ignore(struct arch_uprobe *aup, struct pt_regs *regs);
extern void arch_uprobe_copy_ixol(struct page *page, unsigned long vaddr,
void *src, unsigned long len);
+extern void uprobe_handle_trampoline(struct pt_regs *regs);
+extern void *arch_uprobe_trampoline(unsigned long *psize);
+extern unsigned long uprobe_get_trampoline_vaddr(void);
#else /* !CONFIG_UPROBES */
struct uprobes_state {
};
diff --git a/kernel/events/uprobes.c b/kernel/events/uprobes.c
index 2c83ba776fc7..2816e65729ac 100644
--- a/kernel/events/uprobes.c
+++ b/kernel/events/uprobes.c
@@ -1474,11 +1474,20 @@ static int xol_add_vma(struct mm_struct *mm, struct xol_area *area)
return ret;
}
+void * __weak arch_uprobe_trampoline(unsigned long *psize)
+{
+ static uprobe_opcode_t insn = UPROBE_SWBP_INSN;
+
+ *psize = UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE;
+ return &insn;
+}
+
static struct xol_area *__create_xol_area(unsigned long vaddr)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
- uprobe_opcode_t insn = UPROBE_SWBP_INSN;
+ unsigned long insns_size;
struct xol_area *area;
+ void *insns;
area = kmalloc(sizeof(*area), GFP_KERNEL);
if (unlikely(!area))
@@ -1502,7 +1511,8 @@ static struct xol_area *__create_xol_area(unsigned long vaddr)
/* Reserve the 1st slot for get_trampoline_vaddr() */
set_bit(0, area->bitmap);
atomic_set(&area->slot_count, 1);
- arch_uprobe_copy_ixol(area->pages[0], 0, &insn, UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE);
+ insns = arch_uprobe_trampoline(&insns_size);
+ arch_uprobe_copy_ixol(area->pages[0], 0, insns, insns_size);
if (!xol_add_vma(mm, area))
return area;
@@ -1827,7 +1837,7 @@ void uprobe_copy_process(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long flags)
*
* Returns -1 in case the xol_area is not allocated.
*/
-static unsigned long get_trampoline_vaddr(void)
+unsigned long uprobe_get_trampoline_vaddr(void)
{
struct xol_area *area;
unsigned long trampoline_vaddr = -1;
@@ -1878,7 +1888,7 @@ static void prepare_uretprobe(struct uprobe *uprobe, struct pt_regs *regs)
if (!ri)
return;
- trampoline_vaddr = get_trampoline_vaddr();
+ trampoline_vaddr = uprobe_get_trampoline_vaddr();
orig_ret_vaddr = arch_uretprobe_hijack_return_addr(trampoline_vaddr, regs);
if (orig_ret_vaddr == -1)
goto fail;
@@ -2123,7 +2133,7 @@ static struct return_instance *find_next_ret_chain(struct return_instance *ri)
return ri;
}
-static void handle_trampoline(struct pt_regs *regs)
+void uprobe_handle_trampoline(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct uprobe_task *utask;
struct return_instance *ri, *next;
@@ -2187,8 +2197,8 @@ static void handle_swbp(struct pt_regs *regs)
int is_swbp;
bp_vaddr = uprobe_get_swbp_addr(regs);
- if (bp_vaddr == get_trampoline_vaddr())
- return handle_trampoline(regs);
+ if (bp_vaddr == uprobe_get_trampoline_vaddr())
+ return uprobe_handle_trampoline(regs);
uprobe = find_active_uprobe(bp_vaddr, &is_swbp);
if (!uprobe) {
--
2.45.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCHv6 bpf-next 2/9] uprobe: Wire up uretprobe system call
From: Jiri Olsa @ 2024-05-21 10:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Steven Rostedt, Masami Hiramatsu, Oleg Nesterov,
Alexei Starovoitov, Daniel Borkmann, Andrii Nakryiko
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-trace-kernel, linux-api, linux-man, x86, bpf,
Song Liu, Yonghong Song, John Fastabend, Peter Zijlstra,
Thomas Gleixner, Borislav Petkov (AMD), Ingo Molnar,
Andy Lutomirski, Edgecombe, Rick P, Deepak Gupta
In-Reply-To: <20240521104825.1060966-1-jolsa@kernel.org>
Wiring up uretprobe system call, which comes in following changes.
We need to do the wiring before, because the uretprobe implementation
needs the syscall number.
Note at the moment uretprobe syscall is supported only for native
64-bit process.
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
---
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 +
include/linux/syscalls.h | 2 ++
include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 5 ++++-
kernel/sys_ni.c | 2 ++
4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
index cc78226ffc35..47dfea0a827c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
@@ -383,6 +383,7 @@
459 common lsm_get_self_attr sys_lsm_get_self_attr
460 common lsm_set_self_attr sys_lsm_set_self_attr
461 common lsm_list_modules sys_lsm_list_modules
+462 64 uretprobe sys_uretprobe
#
# Due to a historical design error, certain syscalls are numbered differently
diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h
index e619ac10cd23..5318e0e76799 100644
--- a/include/linux/syscalls.h
+++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h
@@ -972,6 +972,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_lsm_list_modules(u64 *ids, u32 *size, u32 flags);
/* x86 */
asmlinkage long sys_ioperm(unsigned long from, unsigned long num, int on);
+asmlinkage long sys_uretprobe(void);
+
/* pciconfig: alpha, arm, arm64, ia64, sparc */
asmlinkage long sys_pciconfig_read(unsigned long bus, unsigned long dfn,
unsigned long off, unsigned long len,
diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h
index 75f00965ab15..8a747cd1d735 100644
--- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h
+++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h
@@ -842,8 +842,11 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_lsm_set_self_attr, sys_lsm_set_self_attr)
#define __NR_lsm_list_modules 461
__SYSCALL(__NR_lsm_list_modules, sys_lsm_list_modules)
+#define __NR_uretprobe 462
+__SYSCALL(__NR_uretprobe, sys_uretprobe)
+
#undef __NR_syscalls
-#define __NR_syscalls 462
+#define __NR_syscalls 463
/*
* 32 bit systems traditionally used different
diff --git a/kernel/sys_ni.c b/kernel/sys_ni.c
index faad00cce269..be6195e0d078 100644
--- a/kernel/sys_ni.c
+++ b/kernel/sys_ni.c
@@ -391,3 +391,5 @@ COND_SYSCALL(setuid16);
/* restartable sequence */
COND_SYSCALL(rseq);
+
+COND_SYSCALL(uretprobe);
--
2.45.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCHv6 bpf-next 1/9] x86/shstk: Make return uprobe work with shadow stack
From: Jiri Olsa @ 2024-05-21 10:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Steven Rostedt, Masami Hiramatsu, Oleg Nesterov,
Alexei Starovoitov, Daniel Borkmann, Andrii Nakryiko
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-trace-kernel, linux-api, linux-man, x86, bpf,
Song Liu, Yonghong Song, John Fastabend, Peter Zijlstra,
Thomas Gleixner, Borislav Petkov (AMD), Ingo Molnar,
Andy Lutomirski, Edgecombe, Rick P, Deepak Gupta
In-Reply-To: <20240521104825.1060966-1-jolsa@kernel.org>
Currently the application with enabled shadow stack will crash
if it sets up return uprobe. The reason is the uretprobe kernel
code changes the user space task's stack, but does not update
shadow stack accordingly.
Adding new functions to update values on shadow stack and using
them in uprobe code to keep shadow stack in sync with uretprobe
changes to user stack.
Fixes: 8b1c23543436 ("x86/shstk: Add return uprobe support")
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c | 11 +++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c | 7 ++++++-
3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h
index 42fee8959df7..896909f306e3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ unsigned long shstk_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clon
void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p);
int setup_signal_shadow_stack(struct ksignal *ksig);
int restore_signal_shadow_stack(void);
+int shstk_update_last_frame(unsigned long val);
#else
static inline long shstk_prctl(struct task_struct *task, int option,
unsigned long arg2) { return -EINVAL; }
@@ -31,6 +32,7 @@ static inline unsigned long shstk_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *p,
static inline void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p) {}
static inline int setup_signal_shadow_stack(struct ksignal *ksig) { return 0; }
static inline int restore_signal_shadow_stack(void) { return 0; }
+static inline int shstk_update_last_frame(unsigned long val) { return 0; }
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK */
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
index 6f1e9883f074..9797d4cdb78a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
@@ -577,3 +577,14 @@ long shstk_prctl(struct task_struct *task, int option, unsigned long arg2)
return wrss_control(true);
return -EINVAL;
}
+
+int shstk_update_last_frame(unsigned long val)
+{
+ unsigned long ssp;
+
+ if (!features_enabled(ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK))
+ return 0;
+
+ ssp = get_user_shstk_addr();
+ return write_user_shstk_64((u64 __user *)ssp, (u64)val);
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c b/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c
index 6c07f6daaa22..6402fb3089d2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c
@@ -1076,8 +1076,13 @@ arch_uretprobe_hijack_return_addr(unsigned long trampoline_vaddr, struct pt_regs
return orig_ret_vaddr;
nleft = copy_to_user((void __user *)regs->sp, &trampoline_vaddr, rasize);
- if (likely(!nleft))
+ if (likely(!nleft)) {
+ if (shstk_update_last_frame(trampoline_vaddr)) {
+ force_sig(SIGSEGV);
+ return -1;
+ }
return orig_ret_vaddr;
+ }
if (nleft != rasize) {
pr_err("return address clobbered: pid=%d, %%sp=%#lx, %%ip=%#lx\n",
--
2.45.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCHv6 bpf-next 0/9] uprobe: uretprobe speed up
From: Jiri Olsa @ 2024-05-21 10:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Steven Rostedt, Masami Hiramatsu, Oleg Nesterov,
Alexei Starovoitov, Daniel Borkmann, Andrii Nakryiko
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-trace-kernel, linux-api, linux-man, x86, bpf,
Song Liu, Yonghong Song, John Fastabend, Peter Zijlstra,
Thomas Gleixner, Borislav Petkov (AMD), Ingo Molnar,
Andy Lutomirski, Edgecombe, Rick P, Deepak Gupta
hi,
as part of the effort on speeding up the uprobes [0] coming with
return uprobe optimization by using syscall instead of the trap
on the uretprobe trampoline.
The speed up depends on instruction type that uprobe is installed
and depends on specific HW type, please check patch 1 for details.
Patches 1-8 are based on bpf-next/master, but patch 2 and 3 are
apply-able on linux-trace.git tree probes/for-next branch.
Patch 9 is based on man-pages master.
v6 changes:
- separate shadow stack fix for current uretprobe in patch 1
- skip shadow stack test when uprobe is not compiled int [Masami]
- fix retprobe with the shadow stack, using iret return when
shadow stack is detected
- I kept the acks on patch 3, because the shadow stack change is
minimal and the original code is almost untouched
- added shadow stack bpf selftest
- rebased man page
Also available at:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jolsa/perf.git
uretprobe_syscall
thanks,
jirka
Notes to check list items in Documentation/process/adding-syscalls.rst:
- System Call Alternatives
New syscall seems like the best way in here, because we need
just to quickly enter kernel with no extra arguments processing,
which we'd need to do if we decided to use another syscall.
- Designing the API: Planning for Extension
The uretprobe syscall is very specific and most likely won't be
extended in the future.
At the moment it does not take any arguments and even if it does
in future, it's allowed to be called only from trampoline prepared
by kernel, so there'll be no broken user.
- Designing the API: Other Considerations
N/A because uretprobe syscall does not return reference to kernel
object.
- Proposing the API
Wiring up of the uretprobe system call is in separate change,
selftests and man page changes are part of the patchset.
- Generic System Call Implementation
There's no CONFIG option for the new functionality because it
keeps the same behaviour from the user POV.
- x86 System Call Implementation
It's 64-bit syscall only.
- Compatibility System Calls (Generic)
N/A uretprobe syscall has no arguments and is not supported
for compat processes.
- Compatibility System Calls (x86)
N/A uretprobe syscall is not supported for compat processes.
- System Calls Returning Elsewhere
N/A.
- Other Details
N/A.
- Testing
Adding new bpf selftests and ran ltp on top of this change.
- Man Page
Attached.
- Do not call System Calls in the Kernel
N/A.
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/ZeCXHKJ--iYYbmLj@krava/
---
Jiri Olsa (8):
x86/shstk: Make return uprobe work with shadow stack
uprobe: Wire up uretprobe system call
uprobe: Add uretprobe syscall to speed up return probe
selftests/x86: Add return uprobe shadow stack test
selftests/bpf: Add uretprobe syscall test for regs integrity
selftests/bpf: Add uretprobe syscall test for regs changes
selftests/bpf: Add uretprobe syscall call from user space test
selftests/bpf: Add uretprobe shadow stack test
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h | 4 +
arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c | 16 ++++
arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c | 124 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
include/linux/syscalls.h | 2 +
include/linux/uprobes.h | 3 +
include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 5 +-
kernel/events/uprobes.c | 24 ++++--
kernel/sys_ni.c | 2 +
tools/include/linux/compiler.h | 4 +
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_testmod/bpf_testmod.c | 123 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/uprobe_syscall.c | 385 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/uprobe_syscall.c | 15 ++++
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/uprobe_syscall_executed.c | 17 ++++
tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_shadow_stack.c | 145 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
15 files changed, 860 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/uprobe_syscall.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/uprobe_syscall.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/uprobe_syscall_executed.c
Jiri Olsa (1):
man2: Add uretprobe syscall page
man/man2/uretprobe.2 | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 50 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 man/man2/uretprobe.2
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCHv5 bpf-next 6/8] x86/shstk: Add return uprobe support
From: Jiri Olsa @ 2024-05-21 10:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Edgecombe, Rick P
Cc: olsajiri@gmail.com, oleg@redhat.com, songliubraving@fb.com,
luto@kernel.org, mhiramat@kernel.org, andrii@kernel.org,
debug@rivosinc.com, john.fastabend@gmail.com,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
mingo@redhat.com, rostedt@goodmis.org, ast@kernel.org,
tglx@linutronix.de, linux-man@vger.kernel.org, yhs@fb.com,
daniel@iogearbox.net, peterz@infradead.org,
linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org, bp@alien8.de,
bpf@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org
In-Reply-To: <81afa4ccc661a1598b659958164c7a73cf211d21.camel@intel.com>
On Tue, May 21, 2024 at 01:31:53AM +0000, Edgecombe, Rick P wrote:
> On Mon, 2024-05-20 at 00:18 +0200, Jiri Olsa wrote:
> > anyway I think we can fix that in another way by using the optimized
> > trampoline,
> > but returning to the user space through iret when shadow stack is detected
> > (as I did in the first version, before you adjusted it to the sysret path).
> >
> > we need to update the return address on stack only when returning through the
> > trampoline, but we can jump to original return address directly from syscall
> > through iret.. which is slower, but with shadow stack we don't care
> >
> > basically the only change is adding the shstk_is_enabled check to the
> > following condition in SYSCALL_DEFINE0(uretprobe):
> >
> > if (regs->sp != sp || shstk_is_enabled())
> > return regs->ax;
>
> On the surface it sounds reasonable. Thanks.
>
> And then I guess if tradeoffs are seen differently in the future, and we want to
> enable the fast path for shadow stack we can go with your other solution. So
> this just simply fixes things functionally without much code.
yes, if we want to enable the fast path for shadow stack in future
we'll need to remove that shstk_is_enabled and push extra frame on
shadow stack
jirka
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCHv5 bpf-next 6/8] x86/shstk: Add return uprobe support
From: Edgecombe, Rick P @ 2024-05-21 1:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: olsajiri@gmail.com, oleg@redhat.com
Cc: songliubraving@fb.com, luto@kernel.org, mhiramat@kernel.org,
andrii@kernel.org, debug@rivosinc.com, john.fastabend@gmail.com,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
mingo@redhat.com, rostedt@goodmis.org, ast@kernel.org,
tglx@linutronix.de, linux-man@vger.kernel.org, yhs@fb.com,
daniel@iogearbox.net, peterz@infradead.org,
linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org, bp@alien8.de,
bpf@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org
In-Reply-To: <Zkp6mT2xag29dLTR@krava>
On Mon, 2024-05-20 at 00:18 +0200, Jiri Olsa wrote:
> anyway I think we can fix that in another way by using the optimized
> trampoline,
> but returning to the user space through iret when shadow stack is detected
> (as I did in the first version, before you adjusted it to the sysret path).
>
> we need to update the return address on stack only when returning through the
> trampoline, but we can jump to original return address directly from syscall
> through iret.. which is slower, but with shadow stack we don't care
>
> basically the only change is adding the shstk_is_enabled check to the
> following condition in SYSCALL_DEFINE0(uretprobe):
>
> if (regs->sp != sp || shstk_is_enabled())
> return regs->ax;
On the surface it sounds reasonable. Thanks.
And then I guess if tradeoffs are seen differently in the future, and we want to
enable the fast path for shadow stack we can go with your other solution. So
this just simply fixes things functionally without much code.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCHv5 bpf-next 6/8] x86/shstk: Add return uprobe support
From: Jiri Olsa @ 2024-05-19 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Oleg Nesterov
Cc: Edgecombe, Rick P, olsajiri@gmail.com, songliubraving@fb.com,
luto@kernel.org, mhiramat@kernel.org, andrii@kernel.org,
debug@rivosinc.com, john.fastabend@gmail.com,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
mingo@redhat.com, rostedt@goodmis.org, ast@kernel.org,
tglx@linutronix.de, linux-man@vger.kernel.org, yhs@fb.com,
daniel@iogearbox.net, peterz@infradead.org,
linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org, bp@alien8.de,
bpf@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org
In-Reply-To: <20240515154202.GE6821@redhat.com>
On Wed, May 15, 2024 at 05:42:03PM +0200, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
> On 05/15, Edgecombe, Rick P wrote:
> >
> > On Wed, 2024-05-15 at 13:35 +0200, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
> > >
> > > > I'm ok with not using optimized uretprobe when shadow stack is detected
> > > > as enabled and we go with current uretprobe in that case
> > >
> > > But how can we detect it? Again, suppose userspace does
> >
> > the rdssp instruction returns the value of the shadow stack pointer. On non-
> > shadow stack it is a nop. So you could check if the SSP is non-zero to find if
> > shadow stack is enabled.
>
> But again, the ret-probed function can enable it before it returns? And we
> need to check if it is enabled on the function entry if we want to avoid
> sys_uretprobe() in this case.
yea, that's another complexity
> Although I don't understand why we want to
> avoid it.
AFAIU the problem is that by using uretprobe syscall we make the kernel to
push data on shadow stack [1], which adds another way to modify shadow stack
as pointed out by Rick in here [2]:
> Shadow stack allows for modification to the shadow stack only through a few
> limited ways (call, ret, etc). The kernel has the ability to write through
> shadow stack protections (for example when pushing and popping signal frames),
> but the ways in which it does this are limited in order to try to prevent
> providing extra capabilities to attackers wanting to craft their own shadow
> stacks.
anyway I think we can fix that in another way by using the optimized trampoline,
but returning to the user space through iret when shadow stack is detected
(as I did in the first version, before you adjusted it to the sysret path).
we need to update the return address on stack only when returning through the
trampoline, but we can jump to original return address directly from syscall
through iret.. which is slower, but with shadow stack we don't care
basically the only change is adding the shstk_is_enabled check to the
following condition in SYSCALL_DEFINE0(uretprobe):
if (regs->sp != sp || shstk_is_enabled())
return regs->ax;
I'm testing patch below and it looks good so far, I'll add test code to run
existing tests on top of shadow stack as well (when detected).
I'll send new version with that
jirka
---
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h
index 896909f306e3..4cb77e004615 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p);
int setup_signal_shadow_stack(struct ksignal *ksig);
int restore_signal_shadow_stack(void);
int shstk_update_last_frame(unsigned long val);
+bool shstk_is_enabled(void);
#else
static inline long shstk_prctl(struct task_struct *task, int option,
unsigned long arg2) { return -EINVAL; }
@@ -33,6 +34,7 @@ static inline void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p) {}
static inline int setup_signal_shadow_stack(struct ksignal *ksig) { return 0; }
static inline int restore_signal_shadow_stack(void) { return 0; }
static inline int shstk_update_last_frame(unsigned long val) { return 0; }
+static inline bool shstk_is_enabled(void) { return false; }
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK */
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
index 9797d4cdb78a..059685612362 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
@@ -588,3 +588,8 @@ int shstk_update_last_frame(unsigned long val)
ssp = get_user_shstk_addr();
return write_user_shstk_64((u64 __user *)ssp, (u64)val);
}
+
+bool shstk_is_enabled(void)
+{
+ return features_enabled(ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK);
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c b/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c
index 6402fb3089d2..5a952c5ea66b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/uprobes.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/kdebug.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
@@ -308,6 +309,122 @@ static int uprobe_init_insn(struct arch_uprobe *auprobe, struct insn *insn, bool
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+
+asm (
+ ".pushsection .rodata\n"
+ ".global uretprobe_trampoline_entry\n"
+ "uretprobe_trampoline_entry:\n"
+ "pushq %rax\n"
+ "pushq %rcx\n"
+ "pushq %r11\n"
+ "movq $" __stringify(__NR_uretprobe) ", %rax\n"
+ "syscall\n"
+ ".global uretprobe_syscall_check\n"
+ "uretprobe_syscall_check:\n"
+ "popq %r11\n"
+ "popq %rcx\n"
+
+ /* The uretprobe syscall replaces stored %rax value with final
+ * return address, so we don't restore %rax in here and just
+ * call ret.
+ */
+ "retq\n"
+ ".global uretprobe_trampoline_end\n"
+ "uretprobe_trampoline_end:\n"
+ ".popsection\n"
+);
+
+extern u8 uretprobe_trampoline_entry[];
+extern u8 uretprobe_trampoline_end[];
+extern u8 uretprobe_syscall_check[];
+
+void *arch_uprobe_trampoline(unsigned long *psize)
+{
+ static uprobe_opcode_t insn = UPROBE_SWBP_INSN;
+ struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(current);
+
+ /*
+ * At the moment the uretprobe syscall trampoline is supported
+ * only for native 64-bit process, the compat process still uses
+ * standard breakpoint.
+ */
+ if (user_64bit_mode(regs)) {
+ *psize = uretprobe_trampoline_end - uretprobe_trampoline_entry;
+ return uretprobe_trampoline_entry;
+ }
+
+ *psize = UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE;
+ return &insn;
+}
+
+static unsigned long trampoline_check_ip(void)
+{
+ unsigned long tramp = uprobe_get_trampoline_vaddr();
+
+ return tramp + (uretprobe_syscall_check - uretprobe_trampoline_entry);
+}
+
+SYSCALL_DEFINE0(uretprobe)
+{
+ struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(current);
+ unsigned long err, ip, sp, r11_cx_ax[3];
+
+ if (regs->ip != trampoline_check_ip())
+ goto sigill;
+
+ err = copy_from_user(r11_cx_ax, (void __user *)regs->sp, sizeof(r11_cx_ax));
+ if (err)
+ goto sigill;
+
+ /* expose the "right" values of r11/cx/ax/sp to uprobe_consumer/s */
+ regs->r11 = r11_cx_ax[0];
+ regs->cx = r11_cx_ax[1];
+ regs->ax = r11_cx_ax[2];
+ regs->sp += sizeof(r11_cx_ax);
+ regs->orig_ax = -1;
+
+ ip = regs->ip;
+ sp = regs->sp;
+
+ uprobe_handle_trampoline(regs);
+
+ /*
+ * Some of the uprobe consumers has changed sp, we can do nothing,
+ * just return via iret.
+ * .. or shadow stack is enabled, in which case we need to skip
+ * return through the user space stack address.
+ */
+ if (regs->sp != sp || shstk_is_enabled())
+ return regs->ax;
+ regs->sp -= sizeof(r11_cx_ax);
+
+ /* for the case uprobe_consumer has changed r11/cx */
+ r11_cx_ax[0] = regs->r11;
+ r11_cx_ax[1] = regs->cx;
+
+ /*
+ * ax register is passed through as return value, so we can use
+ * its space on stack for ip value and jump to it through the
+ * trampoline's ret instruction
+ */
+ r11_cx_ax[2] = regs->ip;
+ regs->ip = ip;
+
+ err = copy_to_user((void __user *)regs->sp, r11_cx_ax, sizeof(r11_cx_ax));
+ if (err)
+ goto sigill;
+
+ /* ensure sysret, see do_syscall_64() */
+ regs->r11 = regs->flags;
+ regs->cx = regs->ip;
+
+ return regs->ax;
+
+sigill:
+ force_sig(SIGILL);
+ return -1;
+}
+
/*
* If arch_uprobe->insn doesn't use rip-relative addressing, return
* immediately. Otherwise, rewrite the instruction so that it accesses
diff --git a/include/linux/uprobes.h b/include/linux/uprobes.h
index f46e0ca0169c..b503fafb7fb3 100644
--- a/include/linux/uprobes.h
+++ b/include/linux/uprobes.h
@@ -138,6 +138,9 @@ extern bool arch_uretprobe_is_alive(struct return_instance *ret, enum rp_check c
extern bool arch_uprobe_ignore(struct arch_uprobe *aup, struct pt_regs *regs);
extern void arch_uprobe_copy_ixol(struct page *page, unsigned long vaddr,
void *src, unsigned long len);
+extern void uprobe_handle_trampoline(struct pt_regs *regs);
+extern void *arch_uprobe_trampoline(unsigned long *psize);
+extern unsigned long uprobe_get_trampoline_vaddr(void);
#else /* !CONFIG_UPROBES */
struct uprobes_state {
};
diff --git a/kernel/events/uprobes.c b/kernel/events/uprobes.c
index 2c83ba776fc7..2816e65729ac 100644
--- a/kernel/events/uprobes.c
+++ b/kernel/events/uprobes.c
@@ -1474,11 +1474,20 @@ static int xol_add_vma(struct mm_struct *mm, struct xol_area *area)
return ret;
}
+void * __weak arch_uprobe_trampoline(unsigned long *psize)
+{
+ static uprobe_opcode_t insn = UPROBE_SWBP_INSN;
+
+ *psize = UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE;
+ return &insn;
+}
+
static struct xol_area *__create_xol_area(unsigned long vaddr)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
- uprobe_opcode_t insn = UPROBE_SWBP_INSN;
+ unsigned long insns_size;
struct xol_area *area;
+ void *insns;
area = kmalloc(sizeof(*area), GFP_KERNEL);
if (unlikely(!area))
@@ -1502,7 +1511,8 @@ static struct xol_area *__create_xol_area(unsigned long vaddr)
/* Reserve the 1st slot for get_trampoline_vaddr() */
set_bit(0, area->bitmap);
atomic_set(&area->slot_count, 1);
- arch_uprobe_copy_ixol(area->pages[0], 0, &insn, UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE);
+ insns = arch_uprobe_trampoline(&insns_size);
+ arch_uprobe_copy_ixol(area->pages[0], 0, insns, insns_size);
if (!xol_add_vma(mm, area))
return area;
@@ -1827,7 +1837,7 @@ void uprobe_copy_process(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long flags)
*
* Returns -1 in case the xol_area is not allocated.
*/
-static unsigned long get_trampoline_vaddr(void)
+unsigned long uprobe_get_trampoline_vaddr(void)
{
struct xol_area *area;
unsigned long trampoline_vaddr = -1;
@@ -1878,7 +1888,7 @@ static void prepare_uretprobe(struct uprobe *uprobe, struct pt_regs *regs)
if (!ri)
return;
- trampoline_vaddr = get_trampoline_vaddr();
+ trampoline_vaddr = uprobe_get_trampoline_vaddr();
orig_ret_vaddr = arch_uretprobe_hijack_return_addr(trampoline_vaddr, regs);
if (orig_ret_vaddr == -1)
goto fail;
@@ -2123,7 +2133,7 @@ static struct return_instance *find_next_ret_chain(struct return_instance *ri)
return ri;
}
-static void handle_trampoline(struct pt_regs *regs)
+void uprobe_handle_trampoline(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct uprobe_task *utask;
struct return_instance *ri, *next;
@@ -2187,8 +2197,8 @@ static void handle_swbp(struct pt_regs *regs)
int is_swbp;
bp_vaddr = uprobe_get_swbp_addr(regs);
- if (bp_vaddr == get_trampoline_vaddr())
- return handle_trampoline(regs);
+ if (bp_vaddr == uprobe_get_trampoline_vaddr())
+ return uprobe_handle_trampoline(regs);
uprobe = find_active_uprobe(bp_vaddr, &is_swbp);
if (!uprobe) {
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v5 03/28] ntsync: Introduce NTSYNC_IOC_CREATE_MUTEX.
From: Elizabeth Figura @ 2024-05-19 20:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Arnd Bergmann, Greg Kroah-Hartman, Jonathan Corbet, Shuah Khan
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-api, wine-devel, André Almeida,
Wolfram Sang, Arkadiusz Hiler, Peter Zijlstra, Andy Lutomirski,
linux-doc, linux-kselftest, Randy Dunlap, Ingo Molnar,
Will Deacon, Waiman Long, Boqun Feng, Elizabeth Figura
In-Reply-To: <20240519202454.1192826-1-zfigura@codeweavers.com>
This corresponds to the NT syscall NtCreateMutant().
An NT mutex is recursive, with a 32-bit recursion counter. When acquired via
NtWaitForMultipleObjects(), the recursion counter is incremented by one. The OS
records the thread which acquired it.
The OS records the thread which acquired it. However, in order to keep this
driver self-contained, the owning thread ID is managed by user-space, and passed
as a parameter to all relevant ioctls.
The initial owner and recursion count, if any, are specified when the mutex is
created.
Signed-off-by: Elizabeth Figura <zfigura@codeweavers.com>
---
drivers/misc/ntsync.c | 77 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
include/uapi/linux/ntsync.h | 10 ++++-
2 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/misc/ntsync.c b/drivers/misc/ntsync.c
index a2f2dfadc3ee..cfe802c79d7d 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/ntsync.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/ntsync.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
enum ntsync_type {
NTSYNC_TYPE_SEM,
+ NTSYNC_TYPE_MUTEX,
};
/*
@@ -55,6 +56,10 @@ struct ntsync_obj {
__u32 count;
__u32 max;
} sem;
+ struct {
+ __u32 count;
+ pid_t owner;
+ } mutex;
} u;
/*
@@ -92,6 +97,7 @@ struct ntsync_q_entry {
struct ntsync_q {
struct task_struct *task;
+ __u32 owner;
/*
* Protected via atomic_try_cmpxchg(). Only the thread that wins the
@@ -214,13 +220,17 @@ static void ntsync_unlock_obj(struct ntsync_device *dev, struct ntsync_obj *obj,
((lockdep_is_held(&(obj)->dev->wait_all_lock) != LOCK_STATE_NOT_HELD) && \
(obj)->dev_locked))
-static bool is_signaled(struct ntsync_obj *obj)
+static bool is_signaled(struct ntsync_obj *obj, __u32 owner)
{
ntsync_assert_held(obj);
switch (obj->type) {
case NTSYNC_TYPE_SEM:
return !!obj->u.sem.count;
+ case NTSYNC_TYPE_MUTEX:
+ if (obj->u.mutex.owner && obj->u.mutex.owner != owner)
+ return false;
+ return obj->u.mutex.count < UINT_MAX;
}
WARN(1, "bad object type %#x\n", obj->type);
@@ -250,7 +260,7 @@ static void try_wake_all(struct ntsync_device *dev, struct ntsync_q *q,
}
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
- if (!is_signaled(q->entries[i].obj)) {
+ if (!is_signaled(q->entries[i].obj, q->owner)) {
can_wake = false;
break;
}
@@ -264,6 +274,10 @@ static void try_wake_all(struct ntsync_device *dev, struct ntsync_q *q,
case NTSYNC_TYPE_SEM:
obj->u.sem.count--;
break;
+ case NTSYNC_TYPE_MUTEX:
+ obj->u.mutex.count++;
+ obj->u.mutex.owner = q->owner;
+ break;
}
}
wake_up_process(q->task);
@@ -307,6 +321,30 @@ static void try_wake_any_sem(struct ntsync_obj *sem)
}
}
+static void try_wake_any_mutex(struct ntsync_obj *mutex)
+{
+ struct ntsync_q_entry *entry;
+
+ ntsync_assert_held(mutex);
+ lockdep_assert(mutex->type == NTSYNC_TYPE_MUTEX);
+
+ list_for_each_entry(entry, &mutex->any_waiters, node) {
+ struct ntsync_q *q = entry->q;
+ int signaled = -1;
+
+ if (mutex->u.mutex.count == UINT_MAX)
+ break;
+ if (mutex->u.mutex.owner && mutex->u.mutex.owner != q->owner)
+ continue;
+
+ if (atomic_try_cmpxchg(&q->signaled, &signaled, entry->index)) {
+ mutex->u.mutex.count++;
+ mutex->u.mutex.owner = q->owner;
+ wake_up_process(q->task);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
/*
* Actually change the semaphore state, returning -EOVERFLOW if it is made
* invalid.
@@ -455,6 +493,33 @@ static int ntsync_create_sem(struct ntsync_device *dev, void __user *argp)
return put_user(fd, &user_args->sem);
}
+static int ntsync_create_mutex(struct ntsync_device *dev, void __user *argp)
+{
+ struct ntsync_mutex_args __user *user_args = argp;
+ struct ntsync_mutex_args args;
+ struct ntsync_obj *mutex;
+ int fd;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&args, argp, sizeof(args)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if (!args.owner != !args.count)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ mutex = ntsync_alloc_obj(dev, NTSYNC_TYPE_MUTEX);
+ if (!mutex)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ mutex->u.mutex.count = args.count;
+ mutex->u.mutex.owner = args.owner;
+ fd = ntsync_obj_get_fd(mutex);
+ if (fd < 0) {
+ kfree(mutex);
+ return fd;
+ }
+
+ return put_user(fd, &user_args->mutex);
+}
+
static struct ntsync_obj *get_obj(struct ntsync_device *dev, int fd)
{
struct file *file = fget(fd);
@@ -524,7 +589,7 @@ static int setup_wait(struct ntsync_device *dev,
struct ntsync_q *q;
__u32 i, j;
- if (args->pad[0] || args->pad[1] || args->pad[2] || (args->flags & ~NTSYNC_WAIT_REALTIME))
+ if (args->pad[0] || args->pad[1] || (args->flags & ~NTSYNC_WAIT_REALTIME))
return -EINVAL;
if (args->count > NTSYNC_MAX_WAIT_COUNT)
@@ -538,6 +603,7 @@ static int setup_wait(struct ntsync_device *dev,
if (!q)
return -ENOMEM;
q->task = current;
+ q->owner = args->owner;
atomic_set(&q->signaled, -1);
q->all = all;
q->count = count;
@@ -580,6 +646,9 @@ static void try_wake_any_obj(struct ntsync_obj *obj)
case NTSYNC_TYPE_SEM:
try_wake_any_sem(obj);
break;
+ case NTSYNC_TYPE_MUTEX:
+ try_wake_any_mutex(obj);
+ break;
}
}
@@ -769,6 +838,8 @@ static long ntsync_char_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
void __user *argp = (void __user *)parm;
switch (cmd) {
+ case NTSYNC_IOC_CREATE_MUTEX:
+ return ntsync_create_mutex(dev, argp);
case NTSYNC_IOC_CREATE_SEM:
return ntsync_create_sem(dev, argp);
case NTSYNC_IOC_WAIT_ALL:
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/ntsync.h b/include/uapi/linux/ntsync.h
index addf187b1573..d5e5a2fbcb4d 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/ntsync.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/ntsync.h
@@ -16,6 +16,12 @@ struct ntsync_sem_args {
__u32 max;
};
+struct ntsync_mutex_args {
+ __u32 mutex;
+ __u32 owner;
+ __u32 count;
+};
+
#define NTSYNC_WAIT_REALTIME 0x1
struct ntsync_wait_args {
@@ -24,7 +30,8 @@ struct ntsync_wait_args {
__u32 count;
__u32 index;
__u32 flags;
- __u32 pad[3];
+ __u32 owner;
+ __u32 pad[2];
};
#define NTSYNC_MAX_WAIT_COUNT 64
@@ -32,6 +39,7 @@ struct ntsync_wait_args {
#define NTSYNC_IOC_CREATE_SEM _IOWR('N', 0x80, struct ntsync_sem_args)
#define NTSYNC_IOC_WAIT_ANY _IOWR('N', 0x82, struct ntsync_wait_args)
#define NTSYNC_IOC_WAIT_ALL _IOWR('N', 0x83, struct ntsync_wait_args)
+#define NTSYNC_IOC_CREATE_MUTEX _IOWR('N', 0x84, struct ntsync_sem_args)
#define NTSYNC_IOC_SEM_POST _IOWR('N', 0x81, __u32)
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v5 25/28] selftests: ntsync: Add a stress test for contended waits.
From: Elizabeth Figura @ 2024-05-19 20:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Arnd Bergmann, Greg Kroah-Hartman, Jonathan Corbet, Shuah Khan
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-api, wine-devel, André Almeida,
Wolfram Sang, Arkadiusz Hiler, Peter Zijlstra, Andy Lutomirski,
linux-doc, linux-kselftest, Randy Dunlap, Ingo Molnar,
Will Deacon, Waiman Long, Boqun Feng, Elizabeth Figura
In-Reply-To: <20240519202454.1192826-1-zfigura@codeweavers.com>
Test a more realistic usage pattern, and one with heavy contention, in order to
actually exercise ntsync's internal synchronization.
This test has several threads in a tight loop acquiring a mutex, modifying some
shared data, and then releasing the mutex. At the end we check if the data is
consistent.
Signed-off-by: Elizabeth Figura <zfigura@codeweavers.com>
---
.../testing/selftests/drivers/ntsync/ntsync.c | 74 +++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 74 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/ntsync/ntsync.c b/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/ntsync/ntsync.c
index 968874d7e325..5fa2c9a0768c 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/ntsync/ntsync.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/ntsync/ntsync.c
@@ -1330,4 +1330,78 @@ TEST(alert_all)
close(fd);
}
+#define STRESS_LOOPS 10000
+#define STRESS_THREADS 4
+
+static unsigned int stress_counter;
+static int stress_device, stress_start_event, stress_mutex;
+
+static void *stress_thread(void *arg)
+{
+ struct ntsync_wait_args wait_args = {0};
+ __u32 index, count, i;
+ int ret;
+
+ wait_args.timeout = UINT64_MAX;
+ wait_args.count = 1;
+ wait_args.objs = (uintptr_t)&stress_start_event;
+ wait_args.owner = gettid();
+ wait_args.index = 0xdeadbeef;
+
+ ioctl(stress_device, NTSYNC_IOC_WAIT_ANY, &wait_args);
+
+ wait_args.objs = (uintptr_t)&stress_mutex;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < STRESS_LOOPS; ++i) {
+ ioctl(stress_device, NTSYNC_IOC_WAIT_ANY, &wait_args);
+
+ ++stress_counter;
+
+ unlock_mutex(stress_mutex, wait_args.owner, &count);
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+TEST(stress_wait)
+{
+ struct ntsync_event_args event_args;
+ struct ntsync_mutex_args mutex_args;
+ pthread_t threads[STRESS_THREADS];
+ __u32 signaled, i;
+ int ret;
+
+ stress_device = open("/dev/ntsync", O_CLOEXEC | O_RDONLY);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, stress_device);
+
+ mutex_args.owner = 0;
+ mutex_args.count = 0;
+ ret = ioctl(stress_device, NTSYNC_IOC_CREATE_MUTEX, &mutex_args);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+ stress_mutex = mutex_args.mutex;
+
+ event_args.manual = 1;
+ event_args.signaled = 0;
+ ret = ioctl(stress_device, NTSYNC_IOC_CREATE_EVENT, &event_args);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+ stress_start_event = event_args.event;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < STRESS_THREADS; ++i)
+ pthread_create(&threads[i], NULL, stress_thread, NULL);
+
+ ret = ioctl(stress_start_event, NTSYNC_IOC_EVENT_SET, &signaled);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < STRESS_THREADS; ++i) {
+ ret = pthread_join(threads[i], NULL);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(STRESS_LOOPS * STRESS_THREADS, stress_counter);
+
+ close(stress_start_event);
+ close(stress_mutex);
+ close(stress_device);
+}
+
TEST_HARNESS_MAIN
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v5 05/28] ntsync: Introduce NTSYNC_IOC_MUTEX_KILL.
From: Elizabeth Figura @ 2024-05-19 20:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Arnd Bergmann, Greg Kroah-Hartman, Jonathan Corbet, Shuah Khan
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-api, wine-devel, André Almeida,
Wolfram Sang, Arkadiusz Hiler, Peter Zijlstra, Andy Lutomirski,
linux-doc, linux-kselftest, Randy Dunlap, Ingo Molnar,
Will Deacon, Waiman Long, Boqun Feng, Elizabeth Figura
In-Reply-To: <20240519202454.1192826-1-zfigura@codeweavers.com>
This does not correspond to any NT syscall. Rather, when a thread dies, it
should be called by the NT emulator for each mutex, with the TID of the dying
thread.
NT mutexes are robust (in the pthread sense). When an NT thread dies, any
mutexes it owned are immediately released. Acquisition of those mutexes by other
threads will return a special value indicating that the mutex was abandoned,
like EOWNERDEAD returned from pthread_mutex_lock(), and EOWNERDEAD is indeed
used here for that purpose.
Signed-off-by: Elizabeth Figura <zfigura@codeweavers.com>
---
drivers/misc/ntsync.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
include/uapi/linux/ntsync.h | 1 +
2 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/misc/ntsync.c b/drivers/misc/ntsync.c
index f00af9b15164..5aaf9dad76b6 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/ntsync.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/ntsync.c
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ struct ntsync_obj {
struct {
__u32 count;
pid_t owner;
+ bool ownerdead;
} mutex;
} u;
@@ -107,6 +108,7 @@ struct ntsync_q {
atomic_t signaled;
bool all;
+ bool ownerdead;
__u32 count;
struct ntsync_q_entry entries[];
};
@@ -275,6 +277,9 @@ static void try_wake_all(struct ntsync_device *dev, struct ntsync_q *q,
obj->u.sem.count--;
break;
case NTSYNC_TYPE_MUTEX:
+ if (obj->u.mutex.ownerdead)
+ q->ownerdead = true;
+ obj->u.mutex.ownerdead = false;
obj->u.mutex.count++;
obj->u.mutex.owner = q->owner;
break;
@@ -338,6 +343,9 @@ static void try_wake_any_mutex(struct ntsync_obj *mutex)
continue;
if (atomic_try_cmpxchg(&q->signaled, &signaled, entry->index)) {
+ if (mutex->u.mutex.ownerdead)
+ q->ownerdead = true;
+ mutex->u.mutex.ownerdead = false;
mutex->u.mutex.count++;
mutex->u.mutex.owner = q->owner;
wake_up_process(q->task);
@@ -447,6 +455,52 @@ static int ntsync_mutex_unlock(struct ntsync_obj *mutex, void __user *argp)
return ret;
}
+/*
+ * Actually change the mutex state to mark its owner as dead,
+ * returning -EPERM if not the owner.
+ */
+static int kill_mutex_state(struct ntsync_obj *mutex, __u32 owner)
+{
+ ntsync_assert_held(mutex);
+
+ if (mutex->u.mutex.owner != owner)
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ mutex->u.mutex.ownerdead = true;
+ mutex->u.mutex.owner = 0;
+ mutex->u.mutex.count = 0;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int ntsync_mutex_kill(struct ntsync_obj *mutex, void __user *argp)
+{
+ struct ntsync_device *dev = mutex->dev;
+ __u32 owner;
+ bool all;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (get_user(owner, (__u32 __user *)argp))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ if (!owner)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (mutex->type != NTSYNC_TYPE_MUTEX)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ all = ntsync_lock_obj(dev, mutex);
+
+ ret = kill_mutex_state(mutex, owner);
+ if (!ret) {
+ if (all)
+ try_wake_all_obj(dev, mutex);
+ try_wake_any_mutex(mutex);
+ }
+
+ ntsync_unlock_obj(dev, mutex, all);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
static int ntsync_obj_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct ntsync_obj *obj = file->private_data;
@@ -468,6 +522,8 @@ static long ntsync_obj_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
return ntsync_sem_post(obj, argp);
case NTSYNC_IOC_MUTEX_UNLOCK:
return ntsync_mutex_unlock(obj, argp);
+ case NTSYNC_IOC_MUTEX_KILL:
+ return ntsync_mutex_kill(obj, argp);
default:
return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
}
@@ -659,6 +715,7 @@ static int setup_wait(struct ntsync_device *dev,
q->owner = args->owner;
atomic_set(&q->signaled, -1);
q->all = all;
+ q->ownerdead = false;
q->count = count;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
@@ -767,7 +824,7 @@ static int ntsync_wait_any(struct ntsync_device *dev, void __user *argp)
struct ntsync_wait_args __user *user_args = argp;
/* even if we caught a signal, we need to communicate success */
- ret = 0;
+ ret = q->ownerdead ? -EOWNERDEAD : 0;
if (put_user(signaled, &user_args->index))
ret = -EFAULT;
@@ -848,7 +905,7 @@ static int ntsync_wait_all(struct ntsync_device *dev, void __user *argp)
struct ntsync_wait_args __user *user_args = argp;
/* even if we caught a signal, we need to communicate success */
- ret = 0;
+ ret = q->ownerdead ? -EOWNERDEAD : 0;
if (put_user(signaled, &user_args->index))
ret = -EFAULT;
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/ntsync.h b/include/uapi/linux/ntsync.h
index a633db34f284..d7996180c1d2 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/ntsync.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/ntsync.h
@@ -43,5 +43,6 @@ struct ntsync_wait_args {
#define NTSYNC_IOC_SEM_POST _IOWR('N', 0x81, __u32)
#define NTSYNC_IOC_MUTEX_UNLOCK _IOWR('N', 0x85, struct ntsync_mutex_args)
+#define NTSYNC_IOC_MUTEX_KILL _IOW ('N', 0x86, __u32)
#endif
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v5 23/28] selftests: ntsync: Add tests for alertable waits.
From: Elizabeth Figura @ 2024-05-19 20:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Arnd Bergmann, Greg Kroah-Hartman, Jonathan Corbet, Shuah Khan
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-api, wine-devel, André Almeida,
Wolfram Sang, Arkadiusz Hiler, Peter Zijlstra, Andy Lutomirski,
linux-doc, linux-kselftest, Randy Dunlap, Ingo Molnar,
Will Deacon, Waiman Long, Boqun Feng, Elizabeth Figura
In-Reply-To: <20240519202454.1192826-1-zfigura@codeweavers.com>
Test the "alert" functionality of NTSYNC_IOC_WAIT_ALL and NTSYNC_IOC_WAIT_ANY,
when a wait is woken with an alert and when it is woken by an object.
Signed-off-by: Elizabeth Figura <zfigura@codeweavers.com>
---
.../testing/selftests/drivers/ntsync/ntsync.c | 179 +++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 176 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/ntsync/ntsync.c b/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/ntsync/ntsync.c
index 5d17eff6a370..5465a16d38b3 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/ntsync/ntsync.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/ntsync/ntsync.c
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ static int read_event_state(int event, __u32 *signaled, __u32 *manual)
})
static int wait_objs(int fd, unsigned long request, __u32 count,
- const int *objs, __u32 owner, __u32 *index)
+ const int *objs, __u32 owner, int alert, __u32 *index)
{
struct ntsync_wait_args args = {0};
struct timespec timeout;
@@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ static int wait_objs(int fd, unsigned long request, __u32 count,
args.objs = (uintptr_t)objs;
args.owner = owner;
args.index = 0xdeadbeef;
+ args.alert = alert;
ret = ioctl(fd, request, &args);
*index = args.index;
return ret;
@@ -115,12 +116,26 @@ static int wait_objs(int fd, unsigned long request, __u32 count,
static int wait_any(int fd, __u32 count, const int *objs, __u32 owner, __u32 *index)
{
- return wait_objs(fd, NTSYNC_IOC_WAIT_ANY, count, objs, owner, index);
+ return wait_objs(fd, NTSYNC_IOC_WAIT_ANY, count, objs, owner, 0, index);
}
static int wait_all(int fd, __u32 count, const int *objs, __u32 owner, __u32 *index)
{
- return wait_objs(fd, NTSYNC_IOC_WAIT_ALL, count, objs, owner, index);
+ return wait_objs(fd, NTSYNC_IOC_WAIT_ALL, count, objs, owner, 0, index);
+}
+
+static int wait_any_alert(int fd, __u32 count, const int *objs,
+ __u32 owner, int alert, __u32 *index)
+{
+ return wait_objs(fd, NTSYNC_IOC_WAIT_ANY,
+ count, objs, owner, alert, index);
+}
+
+static int wait_all_alert(int fd, __u32 count, const int *objs,
+ __u32 owner, int alert, __u32 *index)
+{
+ return wait_objs(fd, NTSYNC_IOC_WAIT_ALL,
+ count, objs, owner, alert, index);
}
TEST(semaphore_state)
@@ -1095,4 +1110,162 @@ TEST(wake_all)
close(fd);
}
+TEST(alert_any)
+{
+ struct ntsync_event_args event_args = {0};
+ struct ntsync_sem_args sem_args = {0};
+ __u32 index, count, signaled;
+ int objs[2], fd, ret;
+
+ fd = open("/dev/ntsync", O_CLOEXEC | O_RDONLY);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, fd);
+
+ sem_args.count = 0;
+ sem_args.max = 2;
+ sem_args.sem = 0xdeadbeef;
+ ret = ioctl(fd, NTSYNC_IOC_CREATE_SEM, &sem_args);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+ EXPECT_NE(0xdeadbeef, sem_args.sem);
+ objs[0] = sem_args.sem;
+
+ sem_args.count = 1;
+ sem_args.max = 2;
+ sem_args.sem = 0xdeadbeef;
+ ret = ioctl(fd, NTSYNC_IOC_CREATE_SEM, &sem_args);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+ EXPECT_NE(0xdeadbeef, sem_args.sem);
+ objs[1] = sem_args.sem;
+
+ event_args.manual = true;
+ event_args.signaled = true;
+ ret = ioctl(fd, NTSYNC_IOC_CREATE_EVENT, &event_args);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = wait_any_alert(fd, 0, NULL, 123, event_args.event, &index);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, index);
+
+ ret = ioctl(event_args.event, NTSYNC_IOC_EVENT_RESET, &signaled);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = wait_any_alert(fd, 0, NULL, 123, event_args.event, &index);
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ETIMEDOUT, errno);
+
+ ret = ioctl(event_args.event, NTSYNC_IOC_EVENT_SET, &signaled);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = wait_any_alert(fd, 2, objs, 123, event_args.event, &index);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, index);
+
+ ret = wait_any_alert(fd, 2, objs, 123, event_args.event, &index);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(2, index);
+
+ close(event_args.event);
+
+ /* test with an auto-reset event */
+
+ event_args.manual = false;
+ event_args.signaled = true;
+ ret = ioctl(fd, NTSYNC_IOC_CREATE_EVENT, &event_args);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ count = 1;
+ ret = post_sem(objs[0], &count);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = wait_any_alert(fd, 2, objs, 123, event_args.event, &index);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, index);
+
+ ret = wait_any_alert(fd, 2, objs, 123, event_args.event, &index);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(2, index);
+
+ ret = wait_any_alert(fd, 2, objs, 123, event_args.event, &index);
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ETIMEDOUT, errno);
+
+ close(event_args.event);
+
+ close(objs[0]);
+ close(objs[1]);
+
+ close(fd);
+}
+
+TEST(alert_all)
+{
+ struct ntsync_event_args event_args = {0};
+ struct ntsync_sem_args sem_args = {0};
+ __u32 index, count, signaled;
+ int objs[2], fd, ret;
+
+ fd = open("/dev/ntsync", O_CLOEXEC | O_RDONLY);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, fd);
+
+ sem_args.count = 2;
+ sem_args.max = 2;
+ sem_args.sem = 0xdeadbeef;
+ ret = ioctl(fd, NTSYNC_IOC_CREATE_SEM, &sem_args);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+ EXPECT_NE(0xdeadbeef, sem_args.sem);
+ objs[0] = sem_args.sem;
+
+ sem_args.count = 1;
+ sem_args.max = 2;
+ sem_args.sem = 0xdeadbeef;
+ ret = ioctl(fd, NTSYNC_IOC_CREATE_SEM, &sem_args);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+ EXPECT_NE(0xdeadbeef, sem_args.sem);
+ objs[1] = sem_args.sem;
+
+ event_args.manual = true;
+ event_args.signaled = true;
+ ret = ioctl(fd, NTSYNC_IOC_CREATE_EVENT, &event_args);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = wait_all_alert(fd, 2, objs, 123, event_args.event, &index);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, index);
+
+ ret = wait_all_alert(fd, 2, objs, 123, event_args.event, &index);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(2, index);
+
+ close(event_args.event);
+
+ /* test with an auto-reset event */
+
+ event_args.manual = false;
+ event_args.signaled = true;
+ ret = ioctl(fd, NTSYNC_IOC_CREATE_EVENT, &event_args);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ count = 2;
+ ret = post_sem(objs[1], &count);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = wait_all_alert(fd, 2, objs, 123, event_args.event, &index);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, index);
+
+ ret = wait_all_alert(fd, 2, objs, 123, event_args.event, &index);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(2, index);
+
+ ret = wait_all_alert(fd, 2, objs, 123, event_args.event, &index);
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ETIMEDOUT, errno);
+
+ close(event_args.event);
+
+ close(objs[0]);
+ close(objs[1]);
+
+ close(fd);
+}
+
TEST_HARNESS_MAIN
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v5 24/28] selftests: ntsync: Add some tests for wakeup signaling via alerts.
From: Elizabeth Figura @ 2024-05-19 20:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Arnd Bergmann, Greg Kroah-Hartman, Jonathan Corbet, Shuah Khan
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-api, wine-devel, André Almeida,
Wolfram Sang, Arkadiusz Hiler, Peter Zijlstra, Andy Lutomirski,
linux-doc, linux-kselftest, Randy Dunlap, Ingo Molnar,
Will Deacon, Waiman Long, Boqun Feng, Elizabeth Figura
In-Reply-To: <20240519202454.1192826-1-zfigura@codeweavers.com>
Expand the alert tests to cover alerting a thread mid-wait, to test that the
relevant scheduling logic works correctly.
Signed-off-by: Elizabeth Figura <zfigura@codeweavers.com>
---
.../testing/selftests/drivers/ntsync/ntsync.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 62 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/ntsync/ntsync.c b/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/ntsync/ntsync.c
index 5465a16d38b3..968874d7e325 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/ntsync/ntsync.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/ntsync/ntsync.c
@@ -1113,9 +1113,12 @@ TEST(wake_all)
TEST(alert_any)
{
struct ntsync_event_args event_args = {0};
+ struct ntsync_wait_args wait_args = {0};
struct ntsync_sem_args sem_args = {0};
__u32 index, count, signaled;
+ struct wait_args thread_args;
int objs[2], fd, ret;
+ pthread_t thread;
fd = open("/dev/ntsync", O_CLOEXEC | O_RDONLY);
ASSERT_LE(0, fd);
@@ -1163,6 +1166,34 @@ TEST(alert_any)
EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
EXPECT_EQ(2, index);
+ /* test wakeup via alert */
+
+ ret = ioctl(event_args.event, NTSYNC_IOC_EVENT_RESET, &signaled);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ wait_args.timeout = get_abs_timeout(1000);
+ wait_args.objs = (uintptr_t)objs;
+ wait_args.count = 2;
+ wait_args.owner = 123;
+ wait_args.index = 0xdeadbeef;
+ wait_args.alert = event_args.event;
+ thread_args.fd = fd;
+ thread_args.args = &wait_args;
+ thread_args.request = NTSYNC_IOC_WAIT_ANY;
+ ret = pthread_create(&thread, NULL, wait_thread, &thread_args);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = wait_for_thread(thread, 100);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ETIMEDOUT, ret);
+
+ ret = ioctl(event_args.event, NTSYNC_IOC_EVENT_SET, &signaled);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = wait_for_thread(thread, 100);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, thread_args.ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(2, wait_args.index);
+
close(event_args.event);
/* test with an auto-reset event */
@@ -1199,9 +1230,12 @@ TEST(alert_any)
TEST(alert_all)
{
struct ntsync_event_args event_args = {0};
+ struct ntsync_wait_args wait_args = {0};
struct ntsync_sem_args sem_args = {0};
+ struct wait_args thread_args;
__u32 index, count, signaled;
int objs[2], fd, ret;
+ pthread_t thread;
fd = open("/dev/ntsync", O_CLOEXEC | O_RDONLY);
ASSERT_LE(0, fd);
@@ -1235,6 +1269,34 @@ TEST(alert_all)
EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
EXPECT_EQ(2, index);
+ /* test wakeup via alert */
+
+ ret = ioctl(event_args.event, NTSYNC_IOC_EVENT_RESET, &signaled);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ wait_args.timeout = get_abs_timeout(1000);
+ wait_args.objs = (uintptr_t)objs;
+ wait_args.count = 2;
+ wait_args.owner = 123;
+ wait_args.index = 0xdeadbeef;
+ wait_args.alert = event_args.event;
+ thread_args.fd = fd;
+ thread_args.args = &wait_args;
+ thread_args.request = NTSYNC_IOC_WAIT_ALL;
+ ret = pthread_create(&thread, NULL, wait_thread, &thread_args);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = wait_for_thread(thread, 100);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ETIMEDOUT, ret);
+
+ ret = ioctl(event_args.event, NTSYNC_IOC_EVENT_SET, &signaled);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = wait_for_thread(thread, 100);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, thread_args.ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(2, wait_args.index);
+
close(event_args.event);
/* test with an auto-reset event */
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v5 22/28] selftests: ntsync: Add some tests for wakeup signaling with events.
From: Elizabeth Figura @ 2024-05-19 20:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Arnd Bergmann, Greg Kroah-Hartman, Jonathan Corbet, Shuah Khan
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-api, wine-devel, André Almeida,
Wolfram Sang, Arkadiusz Hiler, Peter Zijlstra, Andy Lutomirski,
linux-doc, linux-kselftest, Randy Dunlap, Ingo Molnar,
Will Deacon, Waiman Long, Boqun Feng, Elizabeth Figura
In-Reply-To: <20240519202454.1192826-1-zfigura@codeweavers.com>
Expand the contended wait tests, which previously only covered events and
semaphores, to cover events as well.
Signed-off-by: Elizabeth Figura <zfigura@codeweavers.com>
---
.../testing/selftests/drivers/ntsync/ntsync.c | 151 +++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 147 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/ntsync/ntsync.c b/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/ntsync/ntsync.c
index 12ccb4ec28e4..5d17eff6a370 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/ntsync/ntsync.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/ntsync/ntsync.c
@@ -622,6 +622,7 @@ TEST(test_wait_any)
TEST(test_wait_all)
{
+ struct ntsync_event_args event_args = {0};
struct ntsync_mutex_args mutex_args = {0};
struct ntsync_sem_args sem_args = {0};
__u32 owner, index, count;
@@ -644,6 +645,11 @@ TEST(test_wait_all)
EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
EXPECT_NE(0xdeadbeef, mutex_args.mutex);
+ event_args.manual = true;
+ event_args.signaled = true;
+ ret = ioctl(fd, NTSYNC_IOC_CREATE_EVENT, &event_args);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+
objs[0] = sem_args.sem;
objs[1] = mutex_args.mutex;
@@ -692,6 +698,14 @@ TEST(test_wait_all)
check_sem_state(sem_args.sem, 1, 3);
check_mutex_state(mutex_args.mutex, 1, 123);
+ objs[0] = sem_args.sem;
+ objs[1] = event_args.event;
+ ret = wait_all(fd, 2, objs, 123, &index);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, index);
+ check_sem_state(sem_args.sem, 0, 3);
+ check_event_state(event_args.event, 1, 1);
+
/* test waiting on the same object twice */
objs[0] = objs[1] = sem_args.sem;
ret = wait_all(fd, 2, objs, 123, &index);
@@ -700,6 +714,7 @@ TEST(test_wait_all)
close(sem_args.sem);
close(mutex_args.mutex);
+ close(event_args.event);
close(fd);
}
@@ -746,12 +761,13 @@ static int wait_for_thread(pthread_t thread, unsigned int ms)
TEST(wake_any)
{
+ struct ntsync_event_args event_args = {0};
struct ntsync_mutex_args mutex_args = {0};
struct ntsync_wait_args wait_args = {0};
struct ntsync_sem_args sem_args = {0};
struct wait_args thread_args;
+ __u32 count, index, signaled;
int objs[2], fd, ret;
- __u32 count, index;
pthread_t thread;
fd = open("/dev/ntsync", O_CLOEXEC | O_RDONLY);
@@ -833,10 +849,101 @@ TEST(wake_any)
EXPECT_EQ(0, thread_args.ret);
EXPECT_EQ(1, wait_args.index);
+ /* test waking events */
+
+ event_args.manual = false;
+ event_args.signaled = false;
+ ret = ioctl(fd, NTSYNC_IOC_CREATE_EVENT, &event_args);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ objs[1] = event_args.event;
+ wait_args.timeout = get_abs_timeout(1000);
+ ret = pthread_create(&thread, NULL, wait_thread, &thread_args);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = wait_for_thread(thread, 100);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ETIMEDOUT, ret);
+
+ ret = ioctl(event_args.event, NTSYNC_IOC_EVENT_SET, &signaled);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, signaled);
+ check_event_state(event_args.event, 0, 0);
+
+ ret = wait_for_thread(thread, 100);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, thread_args.ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, wait_args.index);
+
+ wait_args.timeout = get_abs_timeout(1000);
+ ret = pthread_create(&thread, NULL, wait_thread, &thread_args);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = wait_for_thread(thread, 100);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ETIMEDOUT, ret);
+
+ ret = ioctl(event_args.event, NTSYNC_IOC_EVENT_PULSE, &signaled);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, signaled);
+ check_event_state(event_args.event, 0, 0);
+
+ ret = wait_for_thread(thread, 100);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, thread_args.ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, wait_args.index);
+
+ close(event_args.event);
+
+ event_args.manual = true;
+ event_args.signaled = false;
+ ret = ioctl(fd, NTSYNC_IOC_CREATE_EVENT, &event_args);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ objs[1] = event_args.event;
+ wait_args.timeout = get_abs_timeout(1000);
+ ret = pthread_create(&thread, NULL, wait_thread, &thread_args);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = wait_for_thread(thread, 100);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ETIMEDOUT, ret);
+
+ ret = ioctl(event_args.event, NTSYNC_IOC_EVENT_SET, &signaled);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, signaled);
+ check_event_state(event_args.event, 1, 1);
+
+ ret = wait_for_thread(thread, 100);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, thread_args.ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, wait_args.index);
+
+ ret = ioctl(event_args.event, NTSYNC_IOC_EVENT_RESET, &signaled);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, signaled);
+
+ wait_args.timeout = get_abs_timeout(1000);
+ ret = pthread_create(&thread, NULL, wait_thread, &thread_args);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = wait_for_thread(thread, 100);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ETIMEDOUT, ret);
+
+ ret = ioctl(event_args.event, NTSYNC_IOC_EVENT_PULSE, &signaled);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, signaled);
+ check_event_state(event_args.event, 0, 1);
+
+ ret = wait_for_thread(thread, 100);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, thread_args.ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, wait_args.index);
+
+ close(event_args.event);
+
/* delete an object while it's being waited on */
wait_args.timeout = get_abs_timeout(200);
wait_args.owner = 123;
+ objs[1] = mutex_args.mutex;
ret = pthread_create(&thread, NULL, wait_thread, &thread_args);
EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
@@ -856,12 +963,14 @@ TEST(wake_any)
TEST(wake_all)
{
+ struct ntsync_event_args manual_event_args = {0};
+ struct ntsync_event_args auto_event_args = {0};
struct ntsync_mutex_args mutex_args = {0};
struct ntsync_wait_args wait_args = {0};
struct ntsync_sem_args sem_args = {0};
struct wait_args thread_args;
- int objs[2], fd, ret;
- __u32 count, index;
+ __u32 count, index, signaled;
+ int objs[4], fd, ret;
pthread_t thread;
fd = open("/dev/ntsync", O_CLOEXEC | O_RDONLY);
@@ -881,12 +990,24 @@ TEST(wake_all)
EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
EXPECT_NE(0xdeadbeef, mutex_args.mutex);
+ manual_event_args.manual = true;
+ manual_event_args.signaled = true;
+ ret = ioctl(fd, NTSYNC_IOC_CREATE_EVENT, &manual_event_args);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ auto_event_args.manual = false;
+ auto_event_args.signaled = true;
+ ret = ioctl(fd, NTSYNC_IOC_CREATE_EVENT, &auto_event_args);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+
objs[0] = sem_args.sem;
objs[1] = mutex_args.mutex;
+ objs[2] = manual_event_args.event;
+ objs[3] = auto_event_args.event;
wait_args.timeout = get_abs_timeout(1000);
wait_args.objs = (uintptr_t)objs;
- wait_args.count = 2;
+ wait_args.count = 4;
wait_args.owner = 456;
thread_args.fd = fd;
thread_args.args = &wait_args;
@@ -920,12 +1041,32 @@ TEST(wake_all)
check_mutex_state(mutex_args.mutex, 0, 0);
+ ret = ioctl(manual_event_args.event, NTSYNC_IOC_EVENT_RESET, &signaled);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, signaled);
+
count = 2;
ret = post_sem(sem_args.sem, &count);
EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
EXPECT_EQ(0, count);
+ check_sem_state(sem_args.sem, 2, 3);
+
+ ret = ioctl(auto_event_args.event, NTSYNC_IOC_EVENT_RESET, &signaled);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, signaled);
+
+ ret = ioctl(manual_event_args.event, NTSYNC_IOC_EVENT_SET, &signaled);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, signaled);
+
+ ret = ioctl(auto_event_args.event, NTSYNC_IOC_EVENT_SET, &signaled);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, signaled);
+
check_sem_state(sem_args.sem, 1, 3);
check_mutex_state(mutex_args.mutex, 1, 456);
+ check_event_state(manual_event_args.event, 1, 1);
+ check_event_state(auto_event_args.event, 0, 0);
ret = wait_for_thread(thread, 100);
EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
@@ -943,6 +1084,8 @@ TEST(wake_all)
close(sem_args.sem);
close(mutex_args.mutex);
+ close(manual_event_args.event);
+ close(auto_event_args.event);
ret = wait_for_thread(thread, 200);
EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v5 21/28] selftests: ntsync: Add some tests for auto-reset event state.
From: Elizabeth Figura @ 2024-05-19 20:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Arnd Bergmann, Greg Kroah-Hartman, Jonathan Corbet, Shuah Khan
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-api, wine-devel, André Almeida,
Wolfram Sang, Arkadiusz Hiler, Peter Zijlstra, Andy Lutomirski,
linux-doc, linux-kselftest, Randy Dunlap, Ingo Molnar,
Will Deacon, Waiman Long, Boqun Feng, Elizabeth Figura
In-Reply-To: <20240519202454.1192826-1-zfigura@codeweavers.com>
Test event-specific ioctls NTSYNC_IOC_EVENT_SET, NTSYNC_IOC_EVENT_RESET,
NTSYNC_IOC_EVENT_PULSE, NTSYNC_IOC_EVENT_READ for auto-reset events, and
waiting on auto-reset events.
Signed-off-by: Elizabeth Figura <zfigura@codeweavers.com>
---
.../testing/selftests/drivers/ntsync/ntsync.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 59 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/ntsync/ntsync.c b/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/ntsync/ntsync.c
index b6481c2b85cc..12ccb4ec28e4 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/ntsync/ntsync.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/ntsync/ntsync.c
@@ -442,6 +442,65 @@ TEST(manual_event_state)
close(fd);
}
+TEST(auto_event_state)
+{
+ struct ntsync_event_args event_args;
+ __u32 index, signaled;
+ int fd, event, ret;
+
+ fd = open("/dev/ntsync", O_CLOEXEC | O_RDONLY);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, fd);
+
+ event_args.manual = 0;
+ event_args.signaled = 1;
+ event_args.event = 0xdeadbeef;
+ ret = ioctl(fd, NTSYNC_IOC_CREATE_EVENT, &event_args);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+ EXPECT_NE(0xdeadbeef, event_args.event);
+ event = event_args.event;
+
+ check_event_state(event, 1, 0);
+
+ signaled = 0xdeadbeef;
+ ret = ioctl(event, NTSYNC_IOC_EVENT_SET, &signaled);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, signaled);
+ check_event_state(event, 1, 0);
+
+ ret = wait_any(fd, 1, &event, 123, &index);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, index);
+ check_event_state(event, 0, 0);
+
+ signaled = 0xdeadbeef;
+ ret = ioctl(event, NTSYNC_IOC_EVENT_RESET, &signaled);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, signaled);
+ check_event_state(event, 0, 0);
+
+ ret = wait_any(fd, 1, &event, 123, &index);
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ETIMEDOUT, errno);
+
+ ret = ioctl(event, NTSYNC_IOC_EVENT_SET, &signaled);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, signaled);
+
+ ret = ioctl(event, NTSYNC_IOC_EVENT_PULSE, &signaled);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, signaled);
+ check_event_state(event, 0, 0);
+
+ ret = ioctl(event, NTSYNC_IOC_EVENT_PULSE, &signaled);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, signaled);
+ check_event_state(event, 0, 0);
+
+ close(event);
+
+ close(fd);
+}
+
TEST(test_wait_any)
{
int objs[NTSYNC_MAX_WAIT_COUNT + 1], fd, ret;
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related
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