From: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
x86@kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de, davem@davemloft.net,
hpa@zytor.com, mingo@redhat.com, oleg@redhat.com,
peterz@infradead.org, rdunlap@xenotime.net,
mcgrathr@chromium.org, tglx@linutronix.de, luto@mit.edu,
eparis@redhat.com, serge.hallyn@canonical.com, djm@mindrot.org,
scarybeasts@gmail.com, indan@nul.nu, pmoore@redhat.com,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, corbet@lwn.net,
eric.dumazet@gmail.com, markus@chromium.org,
keescook@chromium.org, Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Subject: [PATCH v9 5/8] seccomp: Add SECCOMP_RET_TRAP
Date: Thu, 16 Feb 2012 15:11:45 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1329426706-26562-1-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CABqD9hZSLqn+=jr6sWwp_eJ5WsuGpH2Khoc_7aRmYt+1ZaEGoA@mail.gmail.com>
Adds a new return value to seccomp filters that triggers a SIGILL to be
delivered with the new ILL_SECCOMP si_code.
This allows in-process system call emulation, including just specifying
an errno or cleanly dumping core, rather than just dying. It also
avoids interfering with normal debugger operation (injecting SIGTRAPs).
v9: - changes to SIGILL (markus@chromium.org)
v8: - clean up based on changes to dependent patches
v7: - introduction
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
---
arch/Kconfig | 8 ++++----
include/asm-generic/siginfo.h | 3 ++-
include/linux/seccomp.h | 1 +
kernel/seccomp.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig
index 3f3052b..a01c151 100644
--- a/arch/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/Kconfig
@@ -203,10 +203,10 @@ config HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
bool
help
This symbol should be selected by an architecure if it provides
- asm/syscall.h, specifically syscall_get_arguments() and
- syscall_set_return_value(). Additionally, its system call
- entry path must respect a return value of -1 from
- __secure_computing_int() and/or secure_computing().
+ asm/syscall.h, specifically syscall_get_arguments(),
+ syscall_set_return_value(), and syscall_rollback().
+ Additionally, its system call entry path must respect a return
+ value of -1 from __secure_computing_int() and/or secure_computing().
config SECCOMP_FILTER
def_bool y
diff --git a/include/asm-generic/siginfo.h b/include/asm-generic/siginfo.h
index 0dd4e87..e565662 100644
--- a/include/asm-generic/siginfo.h
+++ b/include/asm-generic/siginfo.h
@@ -166,7 +166,8 @@ typedef struct siginfo {
#define ILL_PRVREG (__SI_FAULT|6) /* privileged register */
#define ILL_COPROC (__SI_FAULT|7) /* coprocessor error */
#define ILL_BADSTK (__SI_FAULT|8) /* internal stack error */
-#define NSIGILL 8
+#define ILL_SECCOMP (__SI_FAULT|9) /* illegal syscall via seccomp */
+#define NSIGILL 9
/*
* SIGFPE si_codes
diff --git a/include/linux/seccomp.h b/include/linux/seccomp.h
index 879ece2..1be562f 100644
--- a/include/linux/seccomp.h
+++ b/include/linux/seccomp.h
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
* selects the least permissive choice.
*/
#define SECCOMP_RET_KILL 0x00000000U /* kill the task immediately */
+#define SECCOMP_RET_TRAP 0x00020000U /* disallow and send sigtrap */
#define SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO 0x00030000U /* returns an errno */
#define SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW 0x7fff0000U /* allow */
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index 55d000d..a7b6510 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -290,6 +290,21 @@ void copy_seccomp(struct seccomp *child,
child->mode = prev->mode;
child->filter = get_seccomp_filter(prev->filter);
}
+
+/**
+ * seccomp_send_sigill - signals the task to allow in-process syscall emulation
+ *
+ * Forces a SIGILL with si_code of ILL_SECCOMP.
+ */
+static void seccomp_send_sigill(void)
+{
+ struct siginfo info;
+ memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
+ info.si_signo = SIGILL;
+ info.si_code = ILL_SECCOMP;
+ info.si_addr = (void __user *)KSTK_EIP(current);
+ force_sig_info(SIGILL, &info, current);
+}
#endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */
/*
@@ -343,6 +358,11 @@ int __secure_computing_int(int this_syscall)
-(action & SECCOMP_RET_DATA),
0);
return -1;
+ case SECCOMP_RET_TRAP:
+ /* Show the handler the original registers. */
+ syscall_rollback(current, task_pt_regs(current));
+ seccomp_send_sigill();
+ return -1;
case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW:
return 0;
case SECCOMP_RET_KILL:
--
1.7.5.4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2012-02-16 21:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 91+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-02-16 20:02 [PATCH v8 1/8] sk_run_filter: add support for custom load_pointer Will Drewry
2012-02-16 20:02 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-16 20:02 ` [PATCH v8 2/8] seccomp: kill the seccomp_t typedef Will Drewry
2012-02-16 20:02 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-20 2:55 ` James Morris
2012-02-16 20:02 ` [PATCH v8 3/8] seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF Will Drewry
2012-02-16 20:02 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-16 20:06 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-16 20:25 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-16 21:17 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-16 21:28 ` Markus Gutschke
2012-02-16 21:34 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-16 21:51 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-16 22:06 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-16 23:00 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-17 0:23 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-02-17 0:43 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-17 0:43 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-17 0:50 ` Eric Paris
2012-02-17 2:24 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-17 2:24 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-17 3:53 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-17 4:12 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-17 4:12 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-17 4:26 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-17 4:26 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-17 4:32 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-17 4:32 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-17 4:40 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-17 4:40 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-16 21:31 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-16 21:31 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-17 0:48 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-17 0:48 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-17 0:51 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-02-17 1:10 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-17 1:25 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-17 1:33 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-17 1:33 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-17 2:00 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-17 2:00 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-17 2:16 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-02-17 2:22 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-17 2:22 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-17 3:27 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-17 4:09 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-17 4:51 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-17 2:44 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-17 2:44 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-17 3:38 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-02-16 20:02 ` [PATCH v8 4/8] seccomp: add SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO Will Drewry
2012-02-16 20:02 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-16 20:02 ` [PATCH v8 5/8] seccomp: Add SECCOMP_RET_TRAP Will Drewry
2012-02-16 20:02 ` Will Drewry
[not found] ` <CAE6n16mCrJC=Sre+PT1H_VfSjW0MGyi0xtEcdcRvGMvvwXWzmA@mail.gmail.com>
2012-02-16 20:28 ` Markus Gutschke
2012-02-16 20:28 ` Markus Gutschke
2012-02-16 21:23 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-16 21:23 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-16 20:42 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-16 20:42 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-16 21:11 ` Will Drewry [this message]
2012-02-16 21:11 ` [PATCH v9 " Will Drewry
2012-02-16 21:11 ` [PATCH v9 8/8] Documentation: prctl/seccomp_filter Will Drewry
2012-02-16 21:28 ` [PATCH v8 5/8] seccomp: Add SECCOMP_RET_TRAP H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-16 21:28 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-16 21:33 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-16 21:33 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-16 20:02 ` [PATCH v8 6/8] ptrace,seccomp: Add PTRACE_SECCOMP support Will Drewry
2012-02-16 20:02 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-17 5:08 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-17 5:08 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-17 16:23 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-17 16:23 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-17 22:55 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-17 22:55 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-21 17:31 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-21 17:31 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-16 20:02 ` [PATCH v8 7/8] x86: Enable HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER Will Drewry
2012-02-16 20:02 ` [PATCH v8 8/8] Documentation: prctl/seccomp_filter Will Drewry
2012-02-16 20:02 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-16 20:08 ` [PATCH v8 1/8] sk_run_filter: add support for custom load_pointer Will Drewry
2012-02-16 20:08 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-17 1:54 ` Joe Perches
2012-02-17 2:22 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-17 2:22 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-17 3:04 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-17 3:04 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-17 4:13 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-17 4:13 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-17 5:05 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-17 5:05 ` Indan Zupancic
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