From: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
To: Indan Zupancic <indan@nul.nu>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de,
davem@davemloft.net, hpa@zytor.com, mingo@redhat.com,
oleg@redhat.com, peterz@infradead.org, rdunlap@xenotime.net,
mcgrathr@chromium.org, tglx@linutronix.de, luto@mit.edu,
eparis@redhat.com, serge.hallyn@canonical.com, djm@mindrot.org,
scarybeasts@gmail.com, pmoore@redhat.com,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, corbet@lwn.net,
eric.dumazet@gmail.com, markus@chromium.org,
keescook@chromium.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 05/11] seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF
Date: Wed, 22 Feb 2012 14:23:46 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1329920626.3258.174.camel@deadeye> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <38d58caa17befe422065efe5dc451a34.squirrel@webmail.greenhost.nl>
On Wed, 2012-02-22 at 09:19 +0100, Indan Zupancic wrote:
[...]
> Alternative approach: Tell the arch at filter install time and only run the
> filters with the same arch as the current system call. If no filters are run,
> deny the systemcall.
>
> Advantages:
>
> - Filters don't have to check the arch every syscall entry.
>
> - Secure by default. Filters don't have to do anything arch specific to
> be secure, no surprises possible.
>
> - If a new arch comes into existence, there is no chance of old filters
> becoming buggy and insecure. This is especially true for archs that
> had only one mode, but added another one later on: Old filters had no
> need to check the mode at all.
[...]
What about when there are multiple layers of restrictions? So long as
any one layer covers the new architecture, there is no default-deny even
though the other layers might not cover it.
I would have thought the way to make sure the architecture is always
checked is to pack it together with the syscall number.
Ben.
--
Ben Hutchings, Staff Engineer, Solarflare
Not speaking for my employer; that's the marketing department's job.
They asked us to note that Solarflare product names are trademarked.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2012-02-22 14:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 98+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-02-21 17:30 [PATCH v10 01/11] sk_run_filter: add support for custom load_pointer Will Drewry
2012-02-21 17:30 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-21 17:30 ` [PATCH v10 02/11] seccomp: kill the seccomp_t typedef Will Drewry
2012-02-21 17:30 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-21 17:30 ` [PATCH v10 03/11] asm/syscall.h: add syscall_get_arch Will Drewry
2012-02-21 17:30 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-21 18:46 ` Roland McGrath
2012-02-21 18:46 ` Roland McGrath
2012-02-21 18:57 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-21 18:57 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-21 19:01 ` [PATCH v11 " Will Drewry
2012-02-21 19:01 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-21 17:30 ` [PATCH v10 04/11] arch/x86: add syscall_get_arch to syscall.h Will Drewry
2012-02-21 17:30 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-21 17:30 ` [PATCH v10 05/11] seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF Will Drewry
2012-02-21 17:30 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-22 6:32 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-22 6:32 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-22 19:48 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-22 19:48 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-22 8:19 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-22 8:19 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-22 14:23 ` Ben Hutchings [this message]
2012-02-22 19:47 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-22 19:47 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-22 23:46 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-22 23:46 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-22 23:51 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-02-22 23:51 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-02-23 0:08 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-23 1:07 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-23 1:07 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-22 23:03 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-22 19:47 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-22 19:47 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-22 19:53 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-22 19:53 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-22 20:01 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-22 20:01 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-23 0:25 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-21 17:30 ` [PATCH v10 06/11] seccomp: add SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO Will Drewry
2012-02-21 17:30 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-21 22:41 ` Kees Cook
2012-02-21 22:41 ` Kees Cook
2012-02-21 22:48 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-21 17:30 ` [PATCH v10 07/11] signal, x86: add SIGSYS info and make it synchronous Will Drewry
2012-02-21 17:30 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-22 8:34 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-22 8:34 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-22 19:48 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-22 19:48 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-22 23:38 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-02-22 23:38 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-02-22 23:53 ` Kees Cook
2012-02-22 23:53 ` Kees Cook
2012-02-23 0:05 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-23 0:05 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-23 0:08 ` Kees Cook
2012-02-23 0:08 ` Kees Cook
2012-02-23 0:29 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-23 0:29 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-23 0:50 ` Roland McGrath
2012-02-23 1:06 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-23 1:06 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-23 17:38 ` Roland McGrath
2012-02-23 17:38 ` Roland McGrath
2012-02-23 19:26 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-23 19:26 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-23 22:15 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-23 22:15 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-23 22:33 ` Markus Gutschke
2012-02-23 22:33 ` Markus Gutschke
2012-02-23 22:36 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-23 22:36 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-27 12:32 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-27 12:32 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-27 16:21 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-27 16:21 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-23 22:34 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-02-23 16:44 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-23 16:44 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-23 0:11 ` Roland McGrath
2012-02-23 0:11 ` Roland McGrath
2012-02-21 17:30 ` [PATCH v10 08/11] seccomp: Add SECCOMP_RET_TRAP Will Drewry
2012-02-21 17:30 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-21 17:30 ` [PATCH v10 09/11] ptrace,seccomp: Add PTRACE_SECCOMP support Will Drewry
2012-02-21 17:30 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-22 12:22 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-22 12:22 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-22 19:47 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-22 19:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-02-21 17:30 ` [PATCH v10 10/11] x86: Enable HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER Will Drewry
2012-02-21 17:30 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-21 17:30 ` [PATCH v10 11/11] Documentation: prctl/seccomp_filter Will Drewry
2012-02-21 17:30 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-21 23:12 ` Kees Cook
2012-02-21 23:12 ` Kees Cook
2012-02-22 3:41 ` Will Drewry
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