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From: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	x86@kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de, davem@davemloft.net,
	hpa@zytor.com, mingo@redhat.com, oleg@redhat.com,
	peterz@infradead.org, rdunlap@xenotime.net,
	mcgrathr@chromium.org, tglx@linutronix.de, luto@mit.edu,
	eparis@redhat.com, serge.hallyn@canonical.com, djm@mindrot.org,
	scarybeasts@gmail.com, indan@nul.nu, pmoore@redhat.com,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, corbet@lwn.net,
	eric.dumazet@gmail.com, markus@chromium.org,
	coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com, keescook@chromium.org,
	Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Subject: [PATCH v12 11/13] x86: Enable HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
Date: Wed, 29 Feb 2012 17:53:38 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1330559620-23543-11-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1330559620-23543-1-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org>

Enable support for seccomp filter on x86:
- asm/tracehook.h exists
- syscall_get_arguments() works
- syscall_rollback() works
- ptrace_report_syscall() works
- secure_computing() return value is honored (see below)

This also adds support for honoring the return
value from secure_computing().

SECCOMP_RET_TRACE and SECCOMP_RET_TRAP may result in seccomp needing to
skip a system call without killing the process.  This is done by
returning a non-zero (-1) value from secure_computing.  This change
makes x86 respect that return value.

To ensure that minimal kernel code is exposed, a non-zero return value
results in an immediate return to user space (with an invalid syscall
number).

Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig         |    1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c |    7 ++++++-
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index f50b52a..fe35491 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ config X86
 	select CLKEVT_I8253
 	select ARCH_HAVE_NMI_SAFE_CMPXCHG
 	select GENERIC_IOMAP
+	select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
 
 config INSTRUCTION_DECODER
 	def_bool (KPROBES || PERF_EVENTS || UPROBES)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
index 78f05e4..cdce22c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -1381,7 +1381,11 @@ long syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 		regs->flags |= X86_EFLAGS_TF;
 
 	/* do the secure computing check first */
-	secure_computing(regs->orig_ax);
+	if (secure_computing(regs->orig_ax)) {
+		/* seccomp failures shouldn't expose any additional code. */
+		ret = -1L;
+		goto out;
+	}
 
 	if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_EMU)))
 		ret = -1L;
@@ -1406,6 +1410,7 @@ long syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 				    regs->dx, regs->r10);
 #endif
 
+out:
 	return ret ?: regs->orig_ax;
 }
 
-- 
1.7.5.4

  parent reply	other threads:[~2012-02-29 23:53 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 73+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2012-02-29 23:53 [PATCH v12 01/13] sk_run_filter: add support for custom load_pointer Will Drewry
2012-02-29 23:53 ` Will Drewry
2012-02-29 23:53 ` [PATCH v12 02/13] net/compat.c,linux/filter.h: share compat_sock_fprog Will Drewry
2012-02-29 23:53   ` Will Drewry
2012-02-29 23:53 ` [PATCH v12 03/13] seccomp: kill the seccomp_t typedef Will Drewry
2012-02-29 23:53   ` Will Drewry
2012-02-29 23:53 ` [PATCH v12 04/13] asm/syscall.h: add syscall_get_arch Will Drewry
2012-02-29 23:53   ` Will Drewry
2012-02-29 23:53 ` [PATCH v12 05/13] arch/x86: add syscall_get_arch to syscall.h Will Drewry
2012-02-29 23:53   ` Will Drewry
2012-02-29 23:53 ` [PATCH v12 06/13] seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF Will Drewry
2012-02-29 23:53   ` Will Drewry
2012-03-02  5:45   ` Indan Zupancic
2012-03-02  5:45     ` Indan Zupancic
2012-03-02  5:52     ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-03-02  5:52       ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-03-02  6:43       ` Indan Zupancic
2012-03-02  6:43         ` Indan Zupancic
2012-03-02  6:55         ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-03-02  6:55           ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-03-02  8:12           ` Indan Zupancic
2012-03-02  8:12             ` Indan Zupancic
2012-03-02 18:44     ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-03-02 18:44       ` Will Drewry
2012-02-29 23:53 ` [PATCH v12 07/13] seccomp: add SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO Will Drewry
2012-02-29 23:53   ` Will Drewry
2012-03-02 18:24   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2012-03-02 18:24     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2012-03-05 21:03     ` Will Drewry
2012-03-05 21:03       ` Will Drewry
2012-03-05 21:13       ` Serge Hallyn
2012-03-05 21:13         ` Serge Hallyn
2012-02-29 23:53 ` [PATCH v12 08/13] signal, x86: add SIGSYS info and make it synchronous Will Drewry
2012-02-29 23:53   ` Will Drewry
2012-02-29 23:53 ` [PATCH v12 09/13] seccomp: Add SECCOMP_RET_TRAP Will Drewry
2012-02-29 23:53   ` Will Drewry
2012-02-29 23:53 ` [PATCH v12 10/13] ptrace,seccomp: Add PTRACE_SECCOMP support Will Drewry
2012-02-29 23:53   ` Will Drewry
2012-02-29 23:53 ` Will Drewry [this message]
2012-02-29 23:53   ` [PATCH v12 11/13] x86: Enable HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER Will Drewry
2012-02-29 23:53 ` [PATCH v12 12/13] Documentation: prctl/seccomp_filter Will Drewry
2012-02-29 23:53   ` Will Drewry
2012-02-29 23:53 ` [PATCH v12 13/13] seccomp: remove duplicated failure logging Will Drewry
2012-02-29 23:53   ` Will Drewry
2012-03-01 23:37 ` [PATCH v12 01/13] sk_run_filter: add support for custom load_pointer Kees Cook
2012-03-01 23:37   ` Kees Cook
2012-03-02  0:05   ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-03-02  0:05     ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-03-02  0:22   ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-03-02  0:47   ` Stephen Rothwell
2012-03-02  0:47     ` Stephen Rothwell
2012-03-02  0:57     ` Kees Cook
2012-03-02  1:19       ` Andrew Morton
2012-03-02  1:19         ` Andrew Morton
2012-03-02  2:39         ` Will Drewry
2012-03-02  2:39           ` Will Drewry
2012-03-02  4:04         ` Indan Zupancic
2012-03-02  4:04           ` Indan Zupancic
2012-03-02  5:03           ` Stephen Rothwell
2012-03-02  5:03             ` Stephen Rothwell
2012-03-02  5:26           ` Kees Cook
2012-03-02  5:26             ` Kees Cook
2012-03-02  1:48       ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-03-02  3:10       ` Stephen Rothwell
2012-03-02  3:41         ` Will Drewry
2012-03-02  3:41           ` Will Drewry
2012-03-02  3:57           ` Stephen Rothwell
2012-03-02  3:57             ` Stephen Rothwell
2012-03-02  0:47   ` Eric Dumazet
2012-03-02 10:40 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-03-02 10:40   ` Indan Zupancic
2012-03-02 18:47   ` Will Drewry
2012-03-02 18:47     ` Will Drewry

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