From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mips@linux-mips.org,
Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
x86@kernel.org, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>,
Julien Tinnes <jln@chromium.org>,
"Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Subject: [PATCH v9 10/11] seccomp: allow mode setting across threads
Date: Fri, 27 Jun 2014 16:22:59 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1403911380-27787-11-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1403911380-27787-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
This changes the mode setting helper to allow threads to change the
seccomp mode from another thread. We must maintain barriers to keep
TIF_SECCOMP synchronized with the rest of the seccomp state.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
kernel/seccomp.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index e1ff2c193190..7bbcb9ed16df 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -207,12 +207,18 @@ static inline bool seccomp_check_mode(unsigned long seccomp_mode)
return true;
}
-static inline void seccomp_assign_mode(unsigned long seccomp_mode)
+static inline void seccomp_assign_mode(struct task_struct *task,
+ unsigned long seccomp_mode)
{
- BUG_ON(!spin_is_locked(¤t->sighand->siglock));
+ BUG_ON(!spin_is_locked(&task->sighand->siglock));
- current->seccomp.mode = seccomp_mode;
- set_tsk_thread_flag(current, TIF_SECCOMP);
+ task->seccomp.mode = seccomp_mode;
+ /*
+ * Make sure TIF_SECCOMP cannot be set before the mode (and
+ * filter) is set.
+ */
+ smp_mb__before_atomic();
+ set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SECCOMP);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
@@ -433,12 +439,17 @@ static int mode1_syscalls_32[] = {
int __secure_computing(int this_syscall)
{
- int mode = current->seccomp.mode;
int exit_sig = 0;
int *syscall;
u32 ret;
- switch (mode) {
+ /*
+ * Make sure that any changes to mode from another thread have
+ * been seen after TIF_SECCOMP was seen.
+ */
+ rmb();
+
+ switch (current->seccomp.mode) {
case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT:
syscall = mode1_syscalls;
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
@@ -543,7 +554,7 @@ static long seccomp_set_mode_strict(void)
#ifdef TIF_NOTSC
disable_TSC();
#endif
- seccomp_assign_mode(seccomp_mode);
+ seccomp_assign_mode(current, seccomp_mode);
ret = 0;
out:
@@ -593,7 +604,7 @@ static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags,
/* Do not free the successfully attached filter. */
prepared = NULL;
- seccomp_assign_mode(seccomp_mode);
+ seccomp_assign_mode(current, seccomp_mode);
out:
spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
seccomp_filter_free(prepared);
--
1.7.9.5
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
"Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>,
Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>, Julien Tinnes <jln@chromium.org>,
David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mips@linux-mips.org,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v9 10/11] seccomp: allow mode setting across threads
Date: Fri, 27 Jun 2014 16:22:59 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1403911380-27787-11-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
Message-ID: <20140627232259.gfRn-0TJul_M1Nogegqt7SMamXN7A65kMD3vzSRCLMM@z> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1403911380-27787-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
This changes the mode setting helper to allow threads to change the
seccomp mode from another thread. We must maintain barriers to keep
TIF_SECCOMP synchronized with the rest of the seccomp state.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
kernel/seccomp.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index e1ff2c193190..7bbcb9ed16df 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -207,12 +207,18 @@ static inline bool seccomp_check_mode(unsigned long seccomp_mode)
return true;
}
-static inline void seccomp_assign_mode(unsigned long seccomp_mode)
+static inline void seccomp_assign_mode(struct task_struct *task,
+ unsigned long seccomp_mode)
{
- BUG_ON(!spin_is_locked(¤t->sighand->siglock));
+ BUG_ON(!spin_is_locked(&task->sighand->siglock));
- current->seccomp.mode = seccomp_mode;
- set_tsk_thread_flag(current, TIF_SECCOMP);
+ task->seccomp.mode = seccomp_mode;
+ /*
+ * Make sure TIF_SECCOMP cannot be set before the mode (and
+ * filter) is set.
+ */
+ smp_mb__before_atomic();
+ set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SECCOMP);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
@@ -433,12 +439,17 @@ static int mode1_syscalls_32[] = {
int __secure_computing(int this_syscall)
{
- int mode = current->seccomp.mode;
int exit_sig = 0;
int *syscall;
u32 ret;
- switch (mode) {
+ /*
+ * Make sure that any changes to mode from another thread have
+ * been seen after TIF_SECCOMP was seen.
+ */
+ rmb();
+
+ switch (current->seccomp.mode) {
case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT:
syscall = mode1_syscalls;
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
@@ -543,7 +554,7 @@ static long seccomp_set_mode_strict(void)
#ifdef TIF_NOTSC
disable_TSC();
#endif
- seccomp_assign_mode(seccomp_mode);
+ seccomp_assign_mode(current, seccomp_mode);
ret = 0;
out:
@@ -593,7 +604,7 @@ static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags,
/* Do not free the successfully attached filter. */
prepared = NULL;
- seccomp_assign_mode(seccomp_mode);
+ seccomp_assign_mode(current, seccomp_mode);
out:
spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
seccomp_filter_free(prepared);
--
1.7.9.5
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-06-27 23:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-06-27 23:22 [PATCH v9 0/11] seccomp: add thread sync ability Kees Cook
2014-06-27 23:22 ` Kees Cook
2014-06-27 23:22 ` [PATCH v9 01/11] seccomp: create internal mode-setting function Kees Cook
2014-06-27 23:22 ` Kees Cook
2014-06-27 23:22 ` [PATCH v9 02/11] seccomp: extract check/assign mode helpers Kees Cook
2014-06-27 23:22 ` Kees Cook
2014-06-27 23:22 ` [PATCH v9 03/11] seccomp: split mode setting routines Kees Cook
2014-06-27 23:22 ` Kees Cook
2014-06-27 23:22 ` [PATCH v9 04/11] seccomp: add "seccomp" syscall Kees Cook
2014-06-27 23:22 ` Kees Cook
2014-06-27 23:22 ` [PATCH v9 05/11] ARM: add seccomp syscall Kees Cook
2014-06-27 23:22 ` Kees Cook
2014-06-27 23:22 ` [PATCH v9 06/11] MIPS: " Kees Cook
2014-06-27 23:22 ` Kees Cook
2014-06-27 23:22 ` [PATCH v9 07/11] sched: move no_new_privs into new atomic flags Kees Cook
2014-06-27 23:22 ` Kees Cook
2014-06-27 23:22 ` [PATCH v9 08/11] seccomp: split filter prep from check and apply Kees Cook
2014-06-27 23:22 ` Kees Cook
2014-06-27 23:22 ` [PATCH v9 09/11] seccomp: introduce writer locking Kees Cook
2014-06-27 23:22 ` Kees Cook
2014-07-09 18:42 ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-07-09 18:42 ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-07-09 18:55 ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-07-09 18:55 ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-07-10 9:25 ` Kees Cook
2014-07-10 15:24 ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-07-10 15:24 ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-07-10 16:54 ` Kees Cook
2014-07-10 16:54 ` Kees Cook
2014-07-10 17:35 ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-07-10 17:35 ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-07-09 18:59 ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-07-09 18:59 ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-27 23:22 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2014-06-27 23:22 ` [PATCH v9 10/11] seccomp: allow mode setting across threads Kees Cook
2014-06-27 23:23 ` [PATCH v9 11/11] seccomp: implement SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC Kees Cook
2014-06-27 23:23 ` Kees Cook
2014-07-09 18:05 ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-07-09 18:05 ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-07-10 9:17 ` Kees Cook
2014-07-10 9:17 ` Kees Cook
2014-07-10 15:08 ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-07-10 15:08 ` Oleg Nesterov
[not found] ` <20140710150832.GA20861-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2014-07-10 16:03 ` Kees Cook
2014-07-10 16:03 ` Kees Cook
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