From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mips@linux-mips.org, Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>, Julien Tinnes <jln@chromium.org>, "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>, David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Subject: [PATCH v11 10/11] seccomp: allow mode setting across threads Date: Wed, 16 Jul 2014 14:50:41 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <1405547442-26641-11-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw) In-Reply-To: <1405547442-26641-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> This changes the mode setting helper to allow threads to change the seccomp mode from another thread. We must maintain barriers to keep TIF_SECCOMP synchronized with the rest of the seccomp state. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> --- kernel/seccomp.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c index d5543e787e4e..9065d2c79c56 100644 --- a/kernel/seccomp.c +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c @@ -173,21 +173,24 @@ static int seccomp_check_filter(struct sock_filter *filter, unsigned int flen) */ static u32 seccomp_run_filters(int syscall) { - struct seccomp_filter *f; + struct seccomp_filter *f = ACCESS_ONCE(current->seccomp.filter); struct seccomp_data sd; u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW; /* Ensure unexpected behavior doesn't result in failing open. */ - if (WARN_ON(current->seccomp.filter == NULL)) + if (unlikely(WARN_ON(f == NULL))) return SECCOMP_RET_KILL; + /* Make sure cross-thread synced filter points somewhere sane. */ + smp_read_barrier_depends(); + populate_seccomp_data(&sd); /* * All filters in the list are evaluated and the lowest BPF return * value always takes priority (ignoring the DATA). */ - for (f = current->seccomp.filter; f; f = f->prev) { + for (; f; f = f->prev) { u32 cur_ret = SK_RUN_FILTER(f->prog, (void *)&sd); if ((cur_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION) < (ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION)) @@ -207,12 +210,18 @@ static inline bool seccomp_may_assign_mode(unsigned long seccomp_mode) return true; } -static inline void seccomp_assign_mode(unsigned long seccomp_mode) +static inline void seccomp_assign_mode(struct task_struct *task, + unsigned long seccomp_mode) { - BUG_ON(!spin_is_locked(¤t->sighand->siglock)); + BUG_ON(!spin_is_locked(&task->sighand->siglock)); - current->seccomp.mode = seccomp_mode; - set_tsk_thread_flag(current, TIF_SECCOMP); + task->seccomp.mode = seccomp_mode; + /* + * Make sure TIF_SECCOMP cannot be set before the mode (and + * filter) is set. + */ + smp_mb__before_atomic(); + set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SECCOMP); } #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER @@ -435,12 +444,17 @@ static int mode1_syscalls_32[] = { int __secure_computing(int this_syscall) { - int mode = current->seccomp.mode; int exit_sig = 0; int *syscall; u32 ret; - switch (mode) { + /* + * Make sure that any changes to mode from another thread have + * been seen after TIF_SECCOMP was seen. + */ + rmb(); + + switch (current->seccomp.mode) { case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT: syscall = mode1_syscalls; #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT @@ -545,7 +559,7 @@ static long seccomp_set_mode_strict(void) #ifdef TIF_NOTSC disable_TSC(); #endif - seccomp_assign_mode(seccomp_mode); + seccomp_assign_mode(current, seccomp_mode); ret = 0; out: @@ -595,7 +609,7 @@ static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags, /* Do not free the successfully attached filter. */ prepared = NULL; - seccomp_assign_mode(seccomp_mode); + seccomp_assign_mode(current, seccomp_mode); out: spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); seccomp_filter_free(prepared); -- 1.7.9.5
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>, "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>, Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>, Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>, Julien Tinnes <jln@chromium.org>, David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mips@linux-mips.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v11 10/11] seccomp: allow mode setting across threads Date: Wed, 16 Jul 2014 14:50:41 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <1405547442-26641-11-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw) Message-ID: <20140716215041.cZCAlcCfhI_5yUWGYDWAKcY0e2BmPu8KChcsM82-d7Q@z> (raw) In-Reply-To: <1405547442-26641-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> This changes the mode setting helper to allow threads to change the seccomp mode from another thread. We must maintain barriers to keep TIF_SECCOMP synchronized with the rest of the seccomp state. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> --- kernel/seccomp.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c index d5543e787e4e..9065d2c79c56 100644 --- a/kernel/seccomp.c +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c @@ -173,21 +173,24 @@ static int seccomp_check_filter(struct sock_filter *filter, unsigned int flen) */ static u32 seccomp_run_filters(int syscall) { - struct seccomp_filter *f; + struct seccomp_filter *f = ACCESS_ONCE(current->seccomp.filter); struct seccomp_data sd; u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW; /* Ensure unexpected behavior doesn't result in failing open. */ - if (WARN_ON(current->seccomp.filter == NULL)) + if (unlikely(WARN_ON(f == NULL))) return SECCOMP_RET_KILL; + /* Make sure cross-thread synced filter points somewhere sane. */ + smp_read_barrier_depends(); + populate_seccomp_data(&sd); /* * All filters in the list are evaluated and the lowest BPF return * value always takes priority (ignoring the DATA). */ - for (f = current->seccomp.filter; f; f = f->prev) { + for (; f; f = f->prev) { u32 cur_ret = SK_RUN_FILTER(f->prog, (void *)&sd); if ((cur_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION) < (ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION)) @@ -207,12 +210,18 @@ static inline bool seccomp_may_assign_mode(unsigned long seccomp_mode) return true; } -static inline void seccomp_assign_mode(unsigned long seccomp_mode) +static inline void seccomp_assign_mode(struct task_struct *task, + unsigned long seccomp_mode) { - BUG_ON(!spin_is_locked(¤t->sighand->siglock)); + BUG_ON(!spin_is_locked(&task->sighand->siglock)); - current->seccomp.mode = seccomp_mode; - set_tsk_thread_flag(current, TIF_SECCOMP); + task->seccomp.mode = seccomp_mode; + /* + * Make sure TIF_SECCOMP cannot be set before the mode (and + * filter) is set. + */ + smp_mb__before_atomic(); + set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SECCOMP); } #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER @@ -435,12 +444,17 @@ static int mode1_syscalls_32[] = { int __secure_computing(int this_syscall) { - int mode = current->seccomp.mode; int exit_sig = 0; int *syscall; u32 ret; - switch (mode) { + /* + * Make sure that any changes to mode from another thread have + * been seen after TIF_SECCOMP was seen. + */ + rmb(); + + switch (current->seccomp.mode) { case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT: syscall = mode1_syscalls; #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT @@ -545,7 +559,7 @@ static long seccomp_set_mode_strict(void) #ifdef TIF_NOTSC disable_TSC(); #endif - seccomp_assign_mode(seccomp_mode); + seccomp_assign_mode(current, seccomp_mode); ret = 0; out: @@ -595,7 +609,7 @@ static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags, /* Do not free the successfully attached filter. */ prepared = NULL; - seccomp_assign_mode(seccomp_mode); + seccomp_assign_mode(current, seccomp_mode); out: spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); seccomp_filter_free(prepared); -- 1.7.9.5
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-07-16 21:50 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2014-07-16 21:50 [PATCH v11 0/11] seccomp: add thread sync ability Kees Cook 2014-07-16 21:50 ` [PATCH v11 01/11] seccomp: create internal mode-setting function Kees Cook 2014-07-16 21:50 ` Kees Cook 2014-07-16 21:50 ` [PATCH v11 03/11] seccomp: split mode setting routines Kees Cook 2014-07-16 21:50 ` Kees Cook 2014-07-16 21:50 ` [PATCH v11 04/11] seccomp: add "seccomp" syscall Kees Cook 2014-07-16 21:50 ` Kees Cook 2014-07-16 21:50 ` [PATCH v11 05/11] ARM: add seccomp syscall Kees Cook 2014-07-16 21:50 ` Kees Cook 2014-07-16 21:50 ` [PATCH v11 06/11] MIPS: " Kees Cook 2014-07-16 21:50 ` Kees Cook 2014-07-16 21:50 ` [PATCH v11 07/11] sched: move no_new_privs into new atomic flags Kees Cook [not found] ` <1405547442-26641-1-git-send-email-keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org> 2014-07-16 21:50 ` [PATCH v11 02/11] seccomp: extract check/assign mode helpers Kees Cook 2014-07-16 21:50 ` Kees Cook 2014-07-16 21:50 ` [PATCH v11 08/11] seccomp: split filter prep from check and apply Kees Cook 2014-07-16 21:50 ` Kees Cook 2014-07-16 21:50 ` [PATCH v11 09/11] seccomp: introduce writer locking Kees Cook 2014-07-16 21:50 ` Kees Cook 2014-07-16 21:50 ` Kees Cook [this message] 2014-07-16 21:50 ` [PATCH v11 10/11] seccomp: allow mode setting across threads Kees Cook 2014-07-16 21:50 ` [PATCH v11 11/11] seccomp: implement SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC Kees Cook 2014-07-17 15:04 ` David Drysdale 2014-07-17 15:04 ` David Drysdale [not found] ` <CAHse=S_32tmusk4ceY4U6GbNpX4PkX12iPPDZFVZ7qgv-RAooA-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org> 2014-07-17 15:45 ` Kees Cook 2014-07-17 15:45 ` Kees Cook [not found] ` <CAGXu5j+dFZdnnK8f-HRrUs2vLeyhWyHh_AY-OynDcp-Ye+dy7Q-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org> 2014-07-17 17:52 ` Kees Cook 2014-07-17 17:52 ` Kees Cook
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