linux-arch.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mips@linux-mips.org,
	Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	x86@kernel.org, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>,
	Julien Tinnes <jln@chromium.org>,
	"Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Subject: [PATCH v11 03/11] seccomp: split mode setting routines
Date: Wed, 16 Jul 2014 14:50:34 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1405547442-26641-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1405547442-26641-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>

Separates the two mode setting paths to make things more readable with
fewer #ifdefs within function bodies.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
---
 kernel/seccomp.c |   71 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
 1 file changed, 48 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index 9df7def86c3b..05cac2c2eca1 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -489,48 +489,66 @@ long prctl_get_seccomp(void)
 }
 
 /**
- * seccomp_set_mode: internal function for setting seccomp mode
- * @seccomp_mode: requested mode to use
- * @filter: optional struct sock_fprog for use with SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER
- *
- * This function may be called repeatedly with a @seccomp_mode of
- * SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER to install additional filters.  Every filter
- * successfully installed will be evaluated (in reverse order) for each system
- * call the task makes.
+ * seccomp_set_mode_strict: internal function for setting strict seccomp
  *
  * Once current->seccomp.mode is non-zero, it may not be changed.
  *
  * Returns 0 on success or -EINVAL on failure.
  */
-static long seccomp_set_mode(unsigned long seccomp_mode, char __user *filter)
+static long seccomp_set_mode_strict(void)
 {
+	const unsigned long seccomp_mode = SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT;
 	long ret = -EINVAL;
 
 	if (!seccomp_may_assign_mode(seccomp_mode))
 		goto out;
 
-	switch (seccomp_mode) {
-	case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT:
-		ret = 0;
 #ifdef TIF_NOTSC
-		disable_TSC();
+	disable_TSC();
 #endif
-		break;
+	seccomp_assign_mode(seccomp_mode);
+	ret = 0;
+
+out:
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
-	case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER:
-		ret = seccomp_attach_user_filter(filter);
-		if (ret)
-			goto out;
-		break;
-#endif
-	default:
+/**
+ * seccomp_set_mode_filter: internal function for setting seccomp filter
+ * @filter: struct sock_fprog containing filter
+ *
+ * This function may be called repeatedly to install additional filters.
+ * Every filter successfully installed will be evaluated (in reverse order)
+ * for each system call the task makes.
+ *
+ * Once current->seccomp.mode is non-zero, it may not be changed.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or -EINVAL on failure.
+ */
+static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(char __user *filter)
+{
+	const unsigned long seccomp_mode = SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER;
+	long ret = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!seccomp_may_assign_mode(seccomp_mode))
+		goto out;
+
+	ret = seccomp_attach_user_filter(filter);
+	if (ret)
 		goto out;
-	}
 
 	seccomp_assign_mode(seccomp_mode);
 out:
 	return ret;
 }
+#else
+static inline long seccomp_set_mode_filter(char __user *filter)
+{
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+#endif
 
 /**
  * prctl_set_seccomp: configures current->seccomp.mode
@@ -541,5 +559,12 @@ out:
  */
 long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long seccomp_mode, char __user *filter)
 {
-	return seccomp_set_mode(seccomp_mode, filter);
+	switch (seccomp_mode) {
+	case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT:
+		return seccomp_set_mode_strict();
+	case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER:
+		return seccomp_set_mode_filter(filter);
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
 }
-- 
1.7.9.5

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>,
	Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>, Julien Tinnes <jln@chromium.org>,
	David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mips@linux-mips.org,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v11 03/11] seccomp: split mode setting routines
Date: Wed, 16 Jul 2014 14:50:34 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1405547442-26641-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
Message-ID: <20140716215034.IDxZGYKVj8p8VeF8gixVJ1XbliPIgxAgF1bh9JASEdA@z> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1405547442-26641-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>

Separates the two mode setting paths to make things more readable with
fewer #ifdefs within function bodies.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
---
 kernel/seccomp.c |   71 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
 1 file changed, 48 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index 9df7def86c3b..05cac2c2eca1 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -489,48 +489,66 @@ long prctl_get_seccomp(void)
 }
 
 /**
- * seccomp_set_mode: internal function for setting seccomp mode
- * @seccomp_mode: requested mode to use
- * @filter: optional struct sock_fprog for use with SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER
- *
- * This function may be called repeatedly with a @seccomp_mode of
- * SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER to install additional filters.  Every filter
- * successfully installed will be evaluated (in reverse order) for each system
- * call the task makes.
+ * seccomp_set_mode_strict: internal function for setting strict seccomp
  *
  * Once current->seccomp.mode is non-zero, it may not be changed.
  *
  * Returns 0 on success or -EINVAL on failure.
  */
-static long seccomp_set_mode(unsigned long seccomp_mode, char __user *filter)
+static long seccomp_set_mode_strict(void)
 {
+	const unsigned long seccomp_mode = SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT;
 	long ret = -EINVAL;
 
 	if (!seccomp_may_assign_mode(seccomp_mode))
 		goto out;
 
-	switch (seccomp_mode) {
-	case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT:
-		ret = 0;
 #ifdef TIF_NOTSC
-		disable_TSC();
+	disable_TSC();
 #endif
-		break;
+	seccomp_assign_mode(seccomp_mode);
+	ret = 0;
+
+out:
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
-	case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER:
-		ret = seccomp_attach_user_filter(filter);
-		if (ret)
-			goto out;
-		break;
-#endif
-	default:
+/**
+ * seccomp_set_mode_filter: internal function for setting seccomp filter
+ * @filter: struct sock_fprog containing filter
+ *
+ * This function may be called repeatedly to install additional filters.
+ * Every filter successfully installed will be evaluated (in reverse order)
+ * for each system call the task makes.
+ *
+ * Once current->seccomp.mode is non-zero, it may not be changed.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or -EINVAL on failure.
+ */
+static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(char __user *filter)
+{
+	const unsigned long seccomp_mode = SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER;
+	long ret = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!seccomp_may_assign_mode(seccomp_mode))
+		goto out;
+
+	ret = seccomp_attach_user_filter(filter);
+	if (ret)
 		goto out;
-	}
 
 	seccomp_assign_mode(seccomp_mode);
 out:
 	return ret;
 }
+#else
+static inline long seccomp_set_mode_filter(char __user *filter)
+{
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+#endif
 
 /**
  * prctl_set_seccomp: configures current->seccomp.mode
@@ -541,5 +559,12 @@ out:
  */
 long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long seccomp_mode, char __user *filter)
 {
-	return seccomp_set_mode(seccomp_mode, filter);
+	switch (seccomp_mode) {
+	case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT:
+		return seccomp_set_mode_strict();
+	case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER:
+		return seccomp_set_mode_filter(filter);
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
 }
-- 
1.7.9.5


  parent reply	other threads:[~2014-07-16 21:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-07-16 21:50 [PATCH v11 0/11] seccomp: add thread sync ability Kees Cook
2014-07-16 21:50 ` [PATCH v11 01/11] seccomp: create internal mode-setting function Kees Cook
2014-07-16 21:50   ` Kees Cook
2014-07-16 21:50 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2014-07-16 21:50   ` [PATCH v11 03/11] seccomp: split mode setting routines Kees Cook
2014-07-16 21:50 ` [PATCH v11 04/11] seccomp: add "seccomp" syscall Kees Cook
2014-07-16 21:50   ` Kees Cook
2014-07-16 21:50 ` [PATCH v11 05/11] ARM: add seccomp syscall Kees Cook
2014-07-16 21:50   ` Kees Cook
2014-07-16 21:50 ` [PATCH v11 06/11] MIPS: " Kees Cook
2014-07-16 21:50   ` Kees Cook
2014-07-16 21:50 ` [PATCH v11 07/11] sched: move no_new_privs into new atomic flags Kees Cook
     [not found] ` <1405547442-26641-1-git-send-email-keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org>
2014-07-16 21:50   ` [PATCH v11 02/11] seccomp: extract check/assign mode helpers Kees Cook
2014-07-16 21:50     ` Kees Cook
2014-07-16 21:50   ` [PATCH v11 08/11] seccomp: split filter prep from check and apply Kees Cook
2014-07-16 21:50     ` Kees Cook
2014-07-16 21:50   ` [PATCH v11 09/11] seccomp: introduce writer locking Kees Cook
2014-07-16 21:50     ` Kees Cook
2014-07-16 21:50 ` [PATCH v11 10/11] seccomp: allow mode setting across threads Kees Cook
2014-07-16 21:50   ` Kees Cook
2014-07-16 21:50 ` [PATCH v11 11/11] seccomp: implement SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC Kees Cook
2014-07-17 15:04   ` David Drysdale
2014-07-17 15:04     ` David Drysdale
     [not found]     ` <CAHse=S_32tmusk4ceY4U6GbNpX4PkX12iPPDZFVZ7qgv-RAooA-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2014-07-17 15:45       ` Kees Cook
2014-07-17 15:45         ` Kees Cook
     [not found]         ` <CAGXu5j+dFZdnnK8f-HRrUs2vLeyhWyHh_AY-OynDcp-Ye+dy7Q-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2014-07-17 17:52           ` Kees Cook
2014-07-17 17:52             ` Kees Cook

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=1405547442-26641-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org \
    --to=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=ast@plumgrid.com \
    --cc=dborkman@redhat.com \
    --cc=drysdale@google.com \
    --cc=jln@chromium.org \
    --cc=jmorris@namei.org \
    --cc=linux-api@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-arch@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mips@linux-mips.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=luto@amacapital.net \
    --cc=mtk.manpages@gmail.com \
    --cc=oleg@redhat.com \
    --cc=wad@chromium.org \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).