From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
x86@kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] x86: introduce post-init read-only memory
Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2015 13:38:33 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1448401114-24650-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1448401114-24650-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
One of the easiest ways to protect the kernel from attack is to reduce
the internal attack surface exposed when a "write" flaw is available. By
making as much of the kernel read-only as possible, we reduce the
attack surface.
Many things are written to only during __init, and never changed
again. These cannot be made "const" since the compiler will do the wrong
thing (we do actually need to write to them). Instead, move these items
into a memory region that will be made read-only during mark_rodata_ro()
which happens after all kernel __init code has finished.
This introduces __read_only as a way to mark such memory, and adds some
documentation about the existing __read_mostly marking.
Based on work by PaX Team and Brad Spengler.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cache.h | 1 +
include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h | 1 +
include/linux/cache.h | 15 +++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 17 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cache.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cache.h
index 48f99f15452e..982b21c5eb1f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cache.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cache.h
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
#define L1_CACHE_BYTES (1 << L1_CACHE_SHIFT)
#define __read_mostly __attribute__((__section__(".data..read_mostly")))
+#define __read_only __attribute__((__section__(".data..read_only")))
#define INTERNODE_CACHE_SHIFT CONFIG_X86_INTERNODE_CACHE_SHIFT
#define INTERNODE_CACHE_BYTES (1 << INTERNODE_CACHE_SHIFT)
diff --git a/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h b/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h
index c4bd0e2c173c..998a09d7731c 100644
--- a/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h
+++ b/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h
@@ -256,6 +256,7 @@
.rodata : AT(ADDR(.rodata) - LOAD_OFFSET) { \
VMLINUX_SYMBOL(__start_rodata) = .; \
*(.rodata) *(.rodata.*) \
+ *(.data..read_only) /* Read only after init */ \
*(__vermagic) /* Kernel version magic */ \
. = ALIGN(8); \
VMLINUX_SYMBOL(__start___tracepoints_ptrs) = .; \
diff --git a/include/linux/cache.h b/include/linux/cache.h
index 17e7e82d2aa7..b2967e711a75 100644
--- a/include/linux/cache.h
+++ b/include/linux/cache.h
@@ -12,10 +12,25 @@
#define SMP_CACHE_BYTES L1_CACHE_BYTES
#endif
+/*
+ * __read_mostly is used to keep rarely changing variables out of frequently
+ * updated cachelines. If an architecture doesn't support it, ignore the
+ * hint.
+ */
#ifndef __read_mostly
#define __read_mostly
#endif
+/*
+ * __read_only is used to mark things that are read-only after init (i.e.
+ * after mark_rodata_ro() has been called). These are effectively read-only,
+ * but may get written to during init, so can't live in .rodata (via "const").
+ * Hint to __read_mostly if the architecture hasn't wired this up.
+ */
+#ifndef __read_only
+#define __read_only __read_mostly
+#endif
+
#ifndef ____cacheline_aligned
#define ____cacheline_aligned __attribute__((__aligned__(SMP_CACHE_BYTES)))
#endif
--
1.9.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-11-24 21:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 67+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-11-24 21:38 [PATCH 0/2] introduce post-init read-only memory Kees Cook
2015-11-24 21:38 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-24 21:38 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2015-11-24 21:38 ` [PATCH 1/2] x86: " Kees Cook
2015-11-25 0:34 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-25 0:34 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-25 0:44 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-25 0:54 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman
2015-11-25 15:03 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-25 23:05 ` Michael Ellerman
2015-11-25 23:32 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-25 23:32 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2015-11-24 21:38 ` [PATCH 2/2] x86, vdso: mark vDSO read-only after init Kees Cook
2015-11-24 21:38 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-25 9:13 ` [PATCH 0/2] introduce post-init read-only memory Mathias Krause
2015-11-25 9:13 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mathias Krause
2015-11-25 10:06 ` Clemens Ladisch
2015-11-25 10:06 ` Clemens Ladisch
2015-11-25 11:14 ` PaX Team
2015-11-25 11:14 ` [kernel-hardening] " PaX Team
2015-11-25 11:05 ` PaX Team
2015-11-25 11:05 ` [kernel-hardening] " PaX Team
2015-11-26 8:54 ` Ingo Molnar
2015-11-26 9:57 ` PaX Team
2015-11-26 9:57 ` [kernel-hardening] " PaX Team
2015-11-26 10:42 ` Ingo Molnar
2015-11-26 12:14 ` PaX Team
2015-11-26 12:14 ` [kernel-hardening] " PaX Team
2015-11-27 8:05 ` Ingo Molnar
2015-11-27 8:05 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2015-11-27 15:29 ` PaX Team
2015-11-27 15:29 ` [kernel-hardening] " PaX Team
2015-11-27 16:30 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-29 8:08 ` Ingo Molnar
2015-11-29 8:08 ` Ingo Molnar
2015-11-29 11:15 ` PaX Team
2015-11-29 11:15 ` [kernel-hardening] " PaX Team
2015-11-29 15:39 ` Ingo Molnar
2015-11-29 18:05 ` Mathias Krause
2015-11-29 18:05 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mathias Krause
2015-11-30 8:01 ` Ingo Molnar
2015-11-30 8:01 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2015-11-26 16:11 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-26 16:11 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-27 7:59 ` Ingo Molnar
2015-11-27 7:59 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2015-11-27 18:00 ` Linus Torvalds
2015-11-27 18:03 ` Linus Torvalds
2015-11-27 18:03 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2015-11-27 20:03 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-27 20:03 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2015-11-27 20:09 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-29 8:05 ` Ingo Molnar
2015-11-29 8:05 ` Ingo Molnar
2015-11-30 21:14 ` H. Peter Anvin
2015-11-30 21:14 ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2015-11-30 21:33 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-30 21:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-30 21:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-30 21:43 ` H. Peter Anvin
2015-11-30 21:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2015-11-25 17:26 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-25 17:26 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2015-11-25 17:31 ` H. Peter Anvin
2015-11-25 17:31 ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2015-11-25 18:54 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-25 19:06 ` H. Peter Anvin
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