[PATCH v3 0/8] introduce post-init read-only memory

[PATCH v3 0/8] introduce post-init read-only memory

[Kees Cook]

One of the easiest ways to protect the kernel from attack is to reduce
the internal attack surface exposed when a "write" flaw is available. By
making as much of the kernel read-only as possible, we reduce the
attack surface.

Many things are written to only during __init, and never changed
again. These cannot be made "const" since the compiler will do the wrong
thing (we do actually need to write to them). Instead, move these items
into a memory region that will be made read-only during mark_rodata_ro()
which happens after all kernel __init code has finished.

This introduces __ro_after_init as a way to mark such memory, and uses
it on the x86 vDSO to kill an extant kernel exploitation method. Also
adds a new kernel parameter to help debug future use and adds an lkdtm
test to check the results.

-Kees

v3:
- conslidated mark_rodata_ro()
- make CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA always enabled on x86, mingo
- enhanced strtobool and potential callers to use "on"/"off"
- use strtobool for rodata= param, gregkh
v2:
- renamed __read_only to __ro_after_init

[PATCH v3 0/8] introduce post-init read-only memory

[Kees Cook]

One of the easiest ways to protect the kernel from attack is to reduce
the internal attack surface exposed when a "write" flaw is available. By
making as much of the kernel read-only as possible, we reduce the
attack surface.

Many things are written to only during __init, and never changed
again. These cannot be made "const" since the compiler will do the wrong
thing (we do actually need to write to them). Instead, move these items
into a memory region that will be made read-only during mark_rodata_ro()
which happens after all kernel __init code has finished.

This introduces __ro_after_init as a way to mark such memory, and uses
it on the x86 vDSO to kill an extant kernel exploitation method. Also
adds a new kernel parameter to help debug future use and adds an lkdtm
test to check the results.

-Kees

v3:
- conslidated mark_rodata_ro()
- make CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA always enabled on x86, mingo
- enhanced strtobool and potential callers to use "on"/"off"
- use strtobool for rodata= param, gregkh
v2:
- renamed __read_only to __ro_after_init

[PATCH v3 1/8] asm-generic: consolidate mark_rodata_ro()

[Kees Cook]

Instead of defining mark_rodata_ro() in each architecture, consolidate it.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org>
---
 arch/arm/include/asm/cacheflush.h    | 1 -
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h  | 4 ----
 arch/parisc/include/asm/cacheflush.h | 4 ----
 arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h    | 1 -
 include/asm-generic/cacheflush.h     | 4 ++++
 5 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/cacheflush.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/cacheflush.h
index d5525bfc7e3e..9156fc303afd 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/cacheflush.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/cacheflush.h
@@ -491,7 +491,6 @@ static inline int set_memory_nx(unsigned long addr, int numpages) { return 0; }
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
-void mark_rodata_ro(void);
 void set_kernel_text_rw(void);
 void set_kernel_text_ro(void);
 #else
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h
index 54efedaf331f..ca3b7841e1c6 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h
@@ -155,8 +155,4 @@ int set_memory_rw(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
 int set_memory_x(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
 int set_memory_nx(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
-void mark_rodata_ro(void);
-#endif
-
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/parisc/include/asm/cacheflush.h b/arch/parisc/include/asm/cacheflush.h
index 845272ce9cc5..7bd69bd43a01 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/include/asm/cacheflush.h
+++ b/arch/parisc/include/asm/cacheflush.h
@@ -121,10 +121,6 @@ flush_anon_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct page *page, unsigned long vma
 	}
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
-void mark_rodata_ro(void);
-#endif
-
 #include <asm/kmap_types.h>
 
 #define ARCH_HAS_KMAP
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h
index e63aa38e85fb..c8cff75c5b21 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h
@@ -92,7 +92,6 @@ void clflush_cache_range(void *addr, unsigned int size);
 #define mmio_flush_range(addr, size) clflush_cache_range(addr, size)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
-void mark_rodata_ro(void);
 extern const int rodata_test_data;
 extern int kernel_set_to_readonly;
 void set_kernel_text_rw(void);
diff --git a/include/asm-generic/cacheflush.h b/include/asm-generic/cacheflush.h
index 87bc536ccde3..1225497ce3bf 100644
--- a/include/asm-generic/cacheflush.h
+++ b/include/asm-generic/cacheflush.h
@@ -31,4 +31,8 @@
 #define copy_from_user_page(vma, page, vaddr, dst, src, len) \
 	memcpy(dst, src, len)
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
+void mark_rodata_ro(void);
+#endif
+
 #endif /* __ASM_CACHEFLUSH_H */
-- 
1.9.1

[PATCH v3 1/8] asm-generic: consolidate mark_rodata_ro()

[Kees Cook]

Instead of defining mark_rodata_ro() in each architecture, consolidate it.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org>
---
 arch/arm/include/asm/cacheflush.h    | 1 -
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h  | 4 ----
 arch/parisc/include/asm/cacheflush.h | 4 ----
 arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h    | 1 -
 include/asm-generic/cacheflush.h     | 4 ++++
 5 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/cacheflush.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/cacheflush.h
index d5525bfc7e3e..9156fc303afd 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/cacheflush.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/cacheflush.h
@@ -491,7 +491,6 @@ static inline int set_memory_nx(unsigned long addr, int numpages) { return 0; }
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
-void mark_rodata_ro(void);
 void set_kernel_text_rw(void);
 void set_kernel_text_ro(void);
 #else
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h
index 54efedaf331f..ca3b7841e1c6 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h
@@ -155,8 +155,4 @@ int set_memory_rw(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
 int set_memory_x(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
 int set_memory_nx(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
-void mark_rodata_ro(void);
-#endif
-
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/parisc/include/asm/cacheflush.h b/arch/parisc/include/asm/cacheflush.h
index 845272ce9cc5..7bd69bd43a01 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/include/asm/cacheflush.h
+++ b/arch/parisc/include/asm/cacheflush.h
@@ -121,10 +121,6 @@ flush_anon_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct page *page, unsigned long vma
 	}
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
-void mark_rodata_ro(void);
-#endif
-
 #include <asm/kmap_types.h>
 
 #define ARCH_HAS_KMAP
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h
index e63aa38e85fb..c8cff75c5b21 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h
@@ -92,7 +92,6 @@ void clflush_cache_range(void *addr, unsigned int size);
 #define mmio_flush_range(addr, size) clflush_cache_range(addr, size)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
-void mark_rodata_ro(void);
 extern const int rodata_test_data;
 extern int kernel_set_to_readonly;
 void set_kernel_text_rw(void);
diff --git a/include/asm-generic/cacheflush.h b/include/asm-generic/cacheflush.h
index 87bc536ccde3..1225497ce3bf 100644
--- a/include/asm-generic/cacheflush.h
+++ b/include/asm-generic/cacheflush.h
@@ -31,4 +31,8 @@
 #define copy_from_user_page(vma, page, vaddr, dst, src, len) \
 	memcpy(dst, src, len)
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
+void mark_rodata_ro(void);
+#endif
+
 #endif /* __ASM_CACHEFLUSH_H */
-- 
1.9.1

[PATCH v3 2/8] lib: add "on" and "off" to strtobool

[Kees Cook]

Several places in the kernel expect to use "on" and "off" for their
boolean signifiers, so add them to strtobool.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
---
 lib/string.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/lib/string.c b/lib/string.c
index 0323c0d5629a..d7550432f91c 100644
--- a/lib/string.c
+++ b/lib/string.c
@@ -635,12 +635,16 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysfs_streq);
  * @s: input string
  * @res: result
  *
- * This routine returns 0 iff the first character is one of 'Yy1Nn0'.
+ * This routine returns 0 iff the first character is one of 'Yy1Nn0', or
+ * 'Oo' when the second character is one of 'fFnN' (for "on" and "off").
  * Otherwise it will return -EINVAL.  Value pointed to by res is
  * updated upon finding a match.
  */
 int strtobool(const char *s, bool *res)
 {
+	if (!s)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	switch (s[0]) {
 	case 'y':
 	case 'Y':
@@ -652,6 +656,21 @@ int strtobool(const char *s, bool *res)
 	case '0':
 		*res = false;
 		break;
+	case 'o':
+	case 'O':
+		switch (s[1]) {
+		case 'n':
+		case 'N':
+			*res = true;
+			break;
+		case 'f':
+		case 'F':
+			*res = false;
+			break;
+		default:
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		break;
 	default:
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
-- 
1.9.1

[PATCH v3 2/8] lib: add "on" and "off" to strtobool

[Kees Cook]

Several places in the kernel expect to use "on" and "off" for their
boolean signifiers, so add them to strtobool.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
---
 lib/string.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/lib/string.c b/lib/string.c
index 0323c0d5629a..d7550432f91c 100644
--- a/lib/string.c
+++ b/lib/string.c
@@ -635,12 +635,16 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysfs_streq);
  * @s: input string
  * @res: result
  *
- * This routine returns 0 iff the first character is one of 'Yy1Nn0'.
+ * This routine returns 0 iff the first character is one of 'Yy1Nn0', or
+ * 'Oo' when the second character is one of 'fFnN' (for "on" and "off").
  * Otherwise it will return -EINVAL.  Value pointed to by res is
  * updated upon finding a match.
  */
 int strtobool(const char *s, bool *res)
 {
+	if (!s)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	switch (s[0]) {
 	case 'y':
 	case 'Y':
@@ -652,6 +656,21 @@ int strtobool(const char *s, bool *res)
 	case '0':
 		*res = false;
 		break;
+	case 'o':
+	case 'O':
+		switch (s[1]) {
+		case 'n':
+		case 'N':
+			*res = true;
+			break;
+		case 'f':
+		case 'F':
+			*res = false;
+			break;
+		default:
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		break;
 	default:
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
-- 
1.9.1

Re: [PATCH v3 2/8] lib: add "on" and "off" to strtobool

[Andy Shevchenko]

On Wed, Dec 9, 2015 at 11:43 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> Several places in the kernel expect to use "on" and "off" for their
> boolean signifiers, so add them to strtobool.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
> ---
>  lib/string.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++-
>  1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/lib/string.c b/lib/string.c
> index 0323c0d5629a..d7550432f91c 100644
> --- a/lib/string.c
> +++ b/lib/string.c
> @@ -635,12 +635,16 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysfs_streq);
>   * @s: input string
>   * @res: result
>   *
> - * This routine returns 0 iff the first character is one of 'Yy1Nn0'.
> + * This routine returns 0 iff the first character is one of 'Yy1Nn0', or
> + * 'Oo' when the second character is one of 'fFnN' (for "on" and "off").

Maybe

…or [Oo][FfNn] for "off" and "on"…


>   * Otherwise it will return -EINVAL.  Value pointed to by res is
>   * updated upon finding a match.
>   */
>  int strtobool(const char *s, bool *res)
>  {

> +       if (!s)
> +               return -EINVAL;
> +

This change I think is better to do separately. Do we have even need for it?

>         switch (s[0]) {
>         case 'y':
>         case 'Y':
> @@ -652,6 +656,21 @@ int strtobool(const char *s, bool *res)
>         case '0':
>                 *res = false;
>                 break;
> +       case 'o':
> +       case 'O':
> +               switch (s[1]) {
> +               case 'n':
> +               case 'N':
> +                       *res = true;
> +                       break;
> +               case 'f':
> +               case 'F':
> +                       *res = false;
> +                       break;


> +               default:
> +                       return -EINVAL;
> +               }
> +               break;
>         default:
>                 return -EINVAL;

Maybe in both cases
default:
 break;
}
…
}
return -EINVAL;

-- 
With Best Regards,
Andy Shevchenko

Re: [PATCH v3 2/8] lib: add "on" and "off" to strtobool

[Kees Cook]

On Fri, Dec 11, 2015 at 9:00 AM, Andy Shevchenko
<andy.shevchenko@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 9, 2015 at 11:43 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>> Several places in the kernel expect to use "on" and "off" for their
>> boolean signifiers, so add them to strtobool.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
>> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
>> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
>> ---
>>  lib/string.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++-
>>  1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/lib/string.c b/lib/string.c
>> index 0323c0d5629a..d7550432f91c 100644
>> --- a/lib/string.c
>> +++ b/lib/string.c
>> @@ -635,12 +635,16 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysfs_streq);
>>   * @s: input string
>>   * @res: result
>>   *
>> - * This routine returns 0 iff the first character is one of 'Yy1Nn0'.
>> + * This routine returns 0 iff the first character is one of 'Yy1Nn0', or
>> + * 'Oo' when the second character is one of 'fFnN' (for "on" and "off").
>
> Maybe
>
> …or [Oo][FfNn] for "off" and "on"…

Sure! That's more readable.

>>   * Otherwise it will return -EINVAL.  Value pointed to by res is
>>   * updated upon finding a match.
>>   */
>>  int strtobool(const char *s, bool *res)
>>  {
>
>> +       if (!s)
>> +               return -EINVAL;
>> +
>
> This change I think is better to do separately. Do we have even need for it?

I'm happy to separate it, sure. I added it here because several of the
__setup and param callers do a check for !NULL input, and it made this
cleaner. Also it seems sensible to do this check anyway.

>>         switch (s[0]) {
>>         case 'y':
>>         case 'Y':
>> @@ -652,6 +656,21 @@ int strtobool(const char *s, bool *res)
>>         case '0':
>>                 *res = false;
>>                 break;
>> +       case 'o':
>> +       case 'O':
>> +               switch (s[1]) {
>> +               case 'n':
>> +               case 'N':
>> +                       *res = true;
>> +                       break;
>> +               case 'f':
>> +               case 'F':
>> +                       *res = false;
>> +                       break;
>
>
>> +               default:
>> +                       return -EINVAL;
>> +               }
>> +               break;
>>         default:
>>                 return -EINVAL;
>
> Maybe in both cases
> default:
>  break;
> }
> …
> }
> return -EINVAL;

I went back and forth on this. To switch to the fall-back being EINVAL
meant I had to change all the other "breaks" into "return 0", and it
just looked ugly to me. If that is preferred, though, I'm happy to do
it.

Thanks!

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security

Re: [PATCH v3 2/8] lib: add "on" and "off" to strtobool

[Andy Shevchenko]

On Fri, Dec 11, 2015 at 8:50 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 11, 2015 at 9:00 AM, Andy Shevchenko
> <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com> wrote:
>> On Wed, Dec 9, 2015 at 11:43 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>>> Several places in the kernel expect to use "on" and "off" for their
>>> boolean signifiers, so add them to strtobool.

>>> +       if (!s)
>>> +               return -EINVAL;
>>> +
>>
>> This change I think is better to do separately. Do we have even need for it?
>
> I'm happy to separate it, sure. I added it here because several of the
> __setup and param callers do a check for !NULL input, and it made this
> cleaner. Also it seems sensible to do this check anyway.

OK.

>>> +               default:
>>> +                       return -EINVAL;
>>> +               }
>>> +               break;
>>>         default:
>>>                 return -EINVAL;
>>
>> Maybe in both cases
>> default:
>>  break;
>> }
>> …
>> }
>> return -EINVAL;
>
> I went back and forth on this. To switch to the fall-back being EINVAL
> meant I had to change all the other "breaks" into "return 0", and it
> just looked ugly to me. If that is preferred, though, I'm happy to do
> it.

I have no strong feelings about that, I prefer whatever looks neater.

-- 
With Best Regards,
Andy Shevchenko

[PATCH v3 3/8] param: convert some "on"/"off" users to strtobool

[Kees Cook]

This changes several users of manual "on"/"off" parsing to use strtobool.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 arch/powerpc/kernel/rtasd.c                  | 10 +++-------
 arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/hotplug-cpu.c | 11 +++--------
 arch/s390/kernel/time.c                      |  8 ++------
 arch/s390/kernel/topology.c                  |  8 +++-----
 arch/x86/kernel/aperture_64.c                | 13 +++----------
 kernel/time/hrtimer.c                        | 11 +++--------
 kernel/time/tick-sched.c                     | 11 +++--------
 7 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtasd.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtasd.c
index 5a2c049c1c61..984e67e91ba3 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtasd.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtasd.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
 #include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <linux/workqueue.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/io.h>
@@ -49,7 +50,7 @@ static unsigned int rtas_error_log_buffer_max;
 static unsigned int event_scan;
 static unsigned int rtas_event_scan_rate;
 
-static int full_rtas_msgs = 0;
+static bool full_rtas_msgs;
 
 /* Stop logging to nvram after first fatal error */
 static int logging_enabled; /* Until we initialize everything,
@@ -592,11 +593,6 @@ __setup("surveillance=", surveillance_setup);
 
 static int __init rtasmsgs_setup(char *str)
 {
-	if (strcmp(str, "on") == 0)
-		full_rtas_msgs = 1;
-	else if (strcmp(str, "off") == 0)
-		full_rtas_msgs = 0;
-
-	return 1;
+	return strtobool(str, &full_rtas_msgs);
 }
 __setup("rtasmsgs=", rtasmsgs_setup);
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/hotplug-cpu.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/hotplug-cpu.c
index 62475440fd45..ffed89818d39 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/hotplug-cpu.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/hotplug-cpu.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 #include <linux/sched.h>	/* for idle_task_exit */
 #include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <linux/of.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
 #include <asm/prom.h>
 #include <asm/rtas.h>
 #include <asm/firmware.h>
@@ -43,20 +44,14 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(enum cpu_state_vals, current_state) = CPU_STATE_OFFLINE;
 
 static enum cpu_state_vals default_offline_state = CPU_STATE_OFFLINE;
 
-static int cede_offline_enabled __read_mostly = 1;
+static bool cede_offline_enabled __read_mostly = true;
 
 /*
  * Enable/disable cede_offline when available.
  */
 static int __init setup_cede_offline(char *str)
 {
-	if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
-		cede_offline_enabled = 0;
-	else if (!strcmp(str, "on"))
-		cede_offline_enabled = 1;
-	else
-		return 0;
-	return 1;
+	return strtobool(str, &cede_offline_enabled);
 }
 
 __setup("cede_offline=", setup_cede_offline);
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/time.c b/arch/s390/kernel/time.c
index 99f84ac31307..afc7fc9684ba 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/time.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/time.c
@@ -1433,7 +1433,7 @@ device_initcall(etr_init_sysfs);
 /*
  * Server Time Protocol (STP) code.
  */
-static int stp_online;
+static bool stp_online;
 static struct stp_sstpi stp_info;
 static void *stp_page;
 
@@ -1444,11 +1444,7 @@ static struct timer_list stp_timer;
 
 static int __init early_parse_stp(char *p)
 {
-	if (strncmp(p, "off", 3) == 0)
-		stp_online = 0;
-	else if (strncmp(p, "on", 2) == 0)
-		stp_online = 1;
-	return 0;
+	return strtobool(p, &stp_online);
 }
 early_param("stp", early_parse_stp);
 
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/topology.c b/arch/s390/kernel/topology.c
index 40b8102fdadb..10e388216307 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/topology.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/topology.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #include <linux/delay.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <linux/smp.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
@@ -37,7 +38,7 @@ static void set_topology_timer(void);
 static void topology_work_fn(struct work_struct *work);
 static struct sysinfo_15_1_x *tl_info;
 
-static int topology_enabled = 1;
+static bool topology_enabled = true;
 static DECLARE_WORK(topology_work, topology_work_fn);
 
 /*
@@ -444,10 +445,7 @@ static const struct cpumask *cpu_book_mask(int cpu)
 
 static int __init early_parse_topology(char *p)
 {
-	if (strncmp(p, "off", 3))
-		return 0;
-	topology_enabled = 0;
-	return 0;
+	return strtobool(p, &topology_enabled);
 }
 early_param("topology", early_parse_topology);
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/aperture_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/aperture_64.c
index 6e85f713641d..6608b00a516a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/aperture_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/aperture_64.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #include <linux/pci_ids.h>
 #include <linux/pci.h>
 #include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/suspend.h>
 #include <asm/e820.h>
 #include <asm/io.h>
@@ -227,19 +228,11 @@ static u32 __init search_agp_bridge(u32 *order, int *valid_agp)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int gart_fix_e820 __initdata = 1;
+static bool gart_fix_e820 __initdata = true;
 
 static int __init parse_gart_mem(char *p)
 {
-	if (!p)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	if (!strncmp(p, "off", 3))
-		gart_fix_e820 = 0;
-	else if (!strncmp(p, "on", 2))
-		gart_fix_e820 = 1;
-
-	return 0;
+	return strtobool(p, &gart_fix_e820);
 }
 early_param("gart_fix_e820", parse_gart_mem);
 
diff --git a/kernel/time/hrtimer.c b/kernel/time/hrtimer.c
index 435b8850dd80..40d82fe4d2a5 100644
--- a/kernel/time/hrtimer.c
+++ b/kernel/time/hrtimer.c
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
 #include <linux/kallsyms.h>
 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/tick.h>
 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
@@ -515,7 +516,7 @@ static inline ktime_t hrtimer_update_base(struct hrtimer_cpu_base *base)
 /*
  * High resolution timer enabled ?
  */
-static int hrtimer_hres_enabled __read_mostly  = 1;
+static bool hrtimer_hres_enabled __read_mostly  = true;
 unsigned int hrtimer_resolution __read_mostly = LOW_RES_NSEC;
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hrtimer_resolution);
 
@@ -524,13 +525,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hrtimer_resolution);
  */
 static int __init setup_hrtimer_hres(char *str)
 {
-	if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
-		hrtimer_hres_enabled = 0;
-	else if (!strcmp(str, "on"))
-		hrtimer_hres_enabled = 1;
-	else
-		return 0;
-	return 1;
+	return strtobool(str, &hrtimer_hres_enabled);
 }
 
 __setup("highres=", setup_hrtimer_hres);
diff --git a/kernel/time/tick-sched.c b/kernel/time/tick-sched.c
index 7c7ec4515983..dad2b3bec58b 100644
--- a/kernel/time/tick-sched.c
+++ b/kernel/time/tick-sched.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <linux/percpu.h>
 #include <linux/profile.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/irq_work.h>
 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
@@ -387,20 +388,14 @@ void __init tick_nohz_init(void)
 /*
  * NO HZ enabled ?
  */
-static int tick_nohz_enabled __read_mostly  = 1;
+static bool tick_nohz_enabled __read_mostly  = true;
 unsigned long tick_nohz_active  __read_mostly;
 /*
  * Enable / Disable tickless mode
  */
 static int __init setup_tick_nohz(char *str)
 {
-	if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
-		tick_nohz_enabled = 0;
-	else if (!strcmp(str, "on"))
-		tick_nohz_enabled = 1;
-	else
-		return 0;
-	return 1;
+	return strtobool(str, &tick_nohz_enabled);
 }
 
 __setup("nohz=", setup_tick_nohz);
-- 
1.9.1

[PATCH v3 3/8] param: convert some "on"/"off" users to strtobool

[Kees Cook]

This changes several users of manual "on"/"off" parsing to use strtobool.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 arch/powerpc/kernel/rtasd.c                  | 10 +++-------
 arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/hotplug-cpu.c | 11 +++--------
 arch/s390/kernel/time.c                      |  8 ++------
 arch/s390/kernel/topology.c                  |  8 +++-----
 arch/x86/kernel/aperture_64.c                | 13 +++----------
 kernel/time/hrtimer.c                        | 11 +++--------
 kernel/time/tick-sched.c                     | 11 +++--------
 7 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtasd.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtasd.c
index 5a2c049c1c61..984e67e91ba3 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtasd.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtasd.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
 #include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <linux/workqueue.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/io.h>
@@ -49,7 +50,7 @@ static unsigned int rtas_error_log_buffer_max;
 static unsigned int event_scan;
 static unsigned int rtas_event_scan_rate;
 
-static int full_rtas_msgs = 0;
+static bool full_rtas_msgs;
 
 /* Stop logging to nvram after first fatal error */
 static int logging_enabled; /* Until we initialize everything,
@@ -592,11 +593,6 @@ __setup("surveillance=", surveillance_setup);
 
 static int __init rtasmsgs_setup(char *str)
 {
-	if (strcmp(str, "on") == 0)
-		full_rtas_msgs = 1;
-	else if (strcmp(str, "off") == 0)
-		full_rtas_msgs = 0;
-
-	return 1;
+	return strtobool(str, &full_rtas_msgs);
 }
 __setup("rtasmsgs=", rtasmsgs_setup);
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/hotplug-cpu.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/hotplug-cpu.c
index 62475440fd45..ffed89818d39 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/hotplug-cpu.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/hotplug-cpu.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 #include <linux/sched.h>	/* for idle_task_exit */
 #include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <linux/of.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
 #include <asm/prom.h>
 #include <asm/rtas.h>
 #include <asm/firmware.h>
@@ -43,20 +44,14 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(enum cpu_state_vals, current_state) = CPU_STATE_OFFLINE;
 
 static enum cpu_state_vals default_offline_state = CPU_STATE_OFFLINE;
 
-static int cede_offline_enabled __read_mostly = 1;
+static bool cede_offline_enabled __read_mostly = true;
 
 /*
  * Enable/disable cede_offline when available.
  */
 static int __init setup_cede_offline(char *str)
 {
-	if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
-		cede_offline_enabled = 0;
-	else if (!strcmp(str, "on"))
-		cede_offline_enabled = 1;
-	else
-		return 0;
-	return 1;
+	return strtobool(str, &cede_offline_enabled);
 }
 
 __setup("cede_offline=", setup_cede_offline);
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/time.c b/arch/s390/kernel/time.c
index 99f84ac31307..afc7fc9684ba 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/time.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/time.c
@@ -1433,7 +1433,7 @@ device_initcall(etr_init_sysfs);
 /*
  * Server Time Protocol (STP) code.
  */
-static int stp_online;
+static bool stp_online;
 static struct stp_sstpi stp_info;
 static void *stp_page;
 
@@ -1444,11 +1444,7 @@ static struct timer_list stp_timer;
 
 static int __init early_parse_stp(char *p)
 {
-	if (strncmp(p, "off", 3) == 0)
-		stp_online = 0;
-	else if (strncmp(p, "on", 2) == 0)
-		stp_online = 1;
-	return 0;
+	return strtobool(p, &stp_online);
 }
 early_param("stp", early_parse_stp);
 
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/topology.c b/arch/s390/kernel/topology.c
index 40b8102fdadb..10e388216307 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/topology.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/topology.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #include <linux/delay.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <linux/smp.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
@@ -37,7 +38,7 @@ static void set_topology_timer(void);
 static void topology_work_fn(struct work_struct *work);
 static struct sysinfo_15_1_x *tl_info;
 
-static int topology_enabled = 1;
+static bool topology_enabled = true;
 static DECLARE_WORK(topology_work, topology_work_fn);
 
 /*
@@ -444,10 +445,7 @@ static const struct cpumask *cpu_book_mask(int cpu)
 
 static int __init early_parse_topology(char *p)
 {
-	if (strncmp(p, "off", 3))
-		return 0;
-	topology_enabled = 0;
-	return 0;
+	return strtobool(p, &topology_enabled);
 }
 early_param("topology", early_parse_topology);
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/aperture_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/aperture_64.c
index 6e85f713641d..6608b00a516a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/aperture_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/aperture_64.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #include <linux/pci_ids.h>
 #include <linux/pci.h>
 #include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/suspend.h>
 #include <asm/e820.h>
 #include <asm/io.h>
@@ -227,19 +228,11 @@ static u32 __init search_agp_bridge(u32 *order, int *valid_agp)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int gart_fix_e820 __initdata = 1;
+static bool gart_fix_e820 __initdata = true;
 
 static int __init parse_gart_mem(char *p)
 {
-	if (!p)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	if (!strncmp(p, "off", 3))
-		gart_fix_e820 = 0;
-	else if (!strncmp(p, "on", 2))
-		gart_fix_e820 = 1;
-
-	return 0;
+	return strtobool(p, &gart_fix_e820);
 }
 early_param("gart_fix_e820", parse_gart_mem);
 
diff --git a/kernel/time/hrtimer.c b/kernel/time/hrtimer.c
index 435b8850dd80..40d82fe4d2a5 100644
--- a/kernel/time/hrtimer.c
+++ b/kernel/time/hrtimer.c
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
 #include <linux/kallsyms.h>
 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/tick.h>
 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
@@ -515,7 +516,7 @@ static inline ktime_t hrtimer_update_base(struct hrtimer_cpu_base *base)
 /*
  * High resolution timer enabled ?
  */
-static int hrtimer_hres_enabled __read_mostly  = 1;
+static bool hrtimer_hres_enabled __read_mostly  = true;
 unsigned int hrtimer_resolution __read_mostly = LOW_RES_NSEC;
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hrtimer_resolution);
 
@@ -524,13 +525,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hrtimer_resolution);
  */
 static int __init setup_hrtimer_hres(char *str)
 {
-	if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
-		hrtimer_hres_enabled = 0;
-	else if (!strcmp(str, "on"))
-		hrtimer_hres_enabled = 1;
-	else
-		return 0;
-	return 1;
+	return strtobool(str, &hrtimer_hres_enabled);
 }
 
 __setup("highres=", setup_hrtimer_hres);
diff --git a/kernel/time/tick-sched.c b/kernel/time/tick-sched.c
index 7c7ec4515983..dad2b3bec58b 100644
--- a/kernel/time/tick-sched.c
+++ b/kernel/time/tick-sched.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <linux/percpu.h>
 #include <linux/profile.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/irq_work.h>
 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
@@ -387,20 +388,14 @@ void __init tick_nohz_init(void)
 /*
  * NO HZ enabled ?
  */
-static int tick_nohz_enabled __read_mostly  = 1;
+static bool tick_nohz_enabled __read_mostly  = true;
 unsigned long tick_nohz_active  __read_mostly;
 /*
  * Enable / Disable tickless mode
  */
 static int __init setup_tick_nohz(char *str)
 {
-	if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
-		tick_nohz_enabled = 0;
-	else if (!strcmp(str, "on"))
-		tick_nohz_enabled = 1;
-	else
-		return 0;
-	return 1;
+	return strtobool(str, &tick_nohz_enabled);
 }
 
 __setup("nohz=", setup_tick_nohz);
-- 
1.9.1

[PATCH v3 4/8] init: create cmdline param to disable readonly

[Kees Cook]

It may be useful to debug writes to the readonly sections of memory,
so provide a cmdline "rodata=off" to allow for this. This can be
expanded in the future to support "log" and "write" modes, but that
will need to be architecture-specific.

Suggested-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt |  4 ++++
 init/main.c                         | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++----
 kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_bp.c           |  4 +---
 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
index 742f69d18fc8..21cf76dbba90 100644
--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -3409,6 +3409,10 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
 
 	ro		[KNL] Mount root device read-only on boot
 
+	rodata=		[KNL]
+		on	Mark read-only kernel memory as read-only (default).
+		off	Leave read-only kernel memory writable for debugging.
+
 	root=		[KNL] Root filesystem
 			See name_to_dev_t comment in init/do_mounts.c.
 
diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
index 9e64d7097f1a..fbafa271531c 100644
--- a/init/main.c
+++ b/init/main.c
@@ -93,9 +93,6 @@ static int kernel_init(void *);
 extern void init_IRQ(void);
 extern void fork_init(void);
 extern void radix_tree_init(void);
-#ifndef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
-static inline void mark_rodata_ro(void) { }
-#endif
 
 /*
  * Debug helper: via this flag we know that we are in 'early bootup code'
@@ -929,6 +926,28 @@ static int try_to_run_init_process(const char *init_filename)
 
 static noinline void __init kernel_init_freeable(void);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
+static bool rodata_enabled = true;
+static int __init set_debug_rodata(char *str)
+{
+	return strtobool(str, &rodata_enabled);
+}
+__setup("rodata=", set_debug_rodata);
+
+static void mark_readonly(void)
+{
+	if (rodata_enabled)
+		mark_rodata_ro();
+	else
+		pr_info("Kernel memory protection disabled.\n");
+}
+#else
+static inline void mark_readonly(void)
+{
+	pr_warn("This architecture does not have kernel memory protection.\n");
+}
+#endif
+
 static int __ref kernel_init(void *unused)
 {
 	int ret;
@@ -937,7 +956,7 @@ static int __ref kernel_init(void *unused)
 	/* need to finish all async __init code before freeing the memory */
 	async_synchronize_full();
 	free_initmem();
-	mark_rodata_ro();
+	mark_readonly();
 	system_state = SYSTEM_RUNNING;
 	numa_default_policy();
 
diff --git a/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_bp.c b/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_bp.c
index e1dbf4a2c69e..90ff129c88a2 100644
--- a/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_bp.c
+++ b/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_bp.c
@@ -153,13 +153,11 @@ static int _kdb_bp_install(struct pt_regs *regs, kdb_bp_t *bp)
 	} else {
 		kdb_printf("%s: failed to set breakpoint at 0x%lx\n",
 			   __func__, bp->bp_addr);
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
 		if (!bp->bp_type) {
 			kdb_printf("Software breakpoints are unavailable.\n"
-				   "  Change the kernel CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA=n\n"
+				   "  Boot the kernel with rodata=off\n"
 				   "  OR use hw breaks: help bph\n");
 		}
-#endif
 		return 1;
 	}
 	return 0;
-- 
1.9.1

[PATCH v3 4/8] init: create cmdline param to disable readonly

[Kees Cook]

It may be useful to debug writes to the readonly sections of memory,
so provide a cmdline "rodata=off" to allow for this. This can be
expanded in the future to support "log" and "write" modes, but that
will need to be architecture-specific.

Suggested-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt |  4 ++++
 init/main.c                         | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++----
 kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_bp.c           |  4 +---
 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
index 742f69d18fc8..21cf76dbba90 100644
--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -3409,6 +3409,10 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
 
 	ro		[KNL] Mount root device read-only on boot
 
+	rodata=		[KNL]
+		on	Mark read-only kernel memory as read-only (default).
+		off	Leave read-only kernel memory writable for debugging.
+
 	root=		[KNL] Root filesystem
 			See name_to_dev_t comment in init/do_mounts.c.
 
diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
index 9e64d7097f1a..fbafa271531c 100644
--- a/init/main.c
+++ b/init/main.c
@@ -93,9 +93,6 @@ static int kernel_init(void *);
 extern void init_IRQ(void);
 extern void fork_init(void);
 extern void radix_tree_init(void);
-#ifndef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
-static inline void mark_rodata_ro(void) { }
-#endif
 
 /*
  * Debug helper: via this flag we know that we are in 'early bootup code'
@@ -929,6 +926,28 @@ static int try_to_run_init_process(const char *init_filename)
 
 static noinline void __init kernel_init_freeable(void);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
+static bool rodata_enabled = true;
+static int __init set_debug_rodata(char *str)
+{
+	return strtobool(str, &rodata_enabled);
+}
+__setup("rodata=", set_debug_rodata);
+
+static void mark_readonly(void)
+{
+	if (rodata_enabled)
+		mark_rodata_ro();
+	else
+		pr_info("Kernel memory protection disabled.\n");
+}
+#else
+static inline void mark_readonly(void)
+{
+	pr_warn("This architecture does not have kernel memory protection.\n");
+}
+#endif
+
 static int __ref kernel_init(void *unused)
 {
 	int ret;
@@ -937,7 +956,7 @@ static int __ref kernel_init(void *unused)
 	/* need to finish all async __init code before freeing the memory */
 	async_synchronize_full();
 	free_initmem();
-	mark_rodata_ro();
+	mark_readonly();
 	system_state = SYSTEM_RUNNING;
 	numa_default_policy();
 
diff --git a/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_bp.c b/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_bp.c
index e1dbf4a2c69e..90ff129c88a2 100644
--- a/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_bp.c
+++ b/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_bp.c
@@ -153,13 +153,11 @@ static int _kdb_bp_install(struct pt_regs *regs, kdb_bp_t *bp)
 	} else {
 		kdb_printf("%s: failed to set breakpoint at 0x%lx\n",
 			   __func__, bp->bp_addr);
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
 		if (!bp->bp_type) {
 			kdb_printf("Software breakpoints are unavailable.\n"
-				   "  Change the kernel CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA=n\n"
+				   "  Boot the kernel with rodata=off\n"
 				   "  OR use hw breaks: help bph\n");
 		}
-#endif
 		return 1;
 	}
 	return 0;
-- 
1.9.1

[PATCH v3 5/8] x86: make CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA non-optional

[Kees Cook]

This removes the CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA option and makes it always enabled.

Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                  |  3 +++
 arch/x86/Kconfig.debug            | 18 +++---------------
 arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h |  5 -----
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_para.h   |  7 -------
 arch/x86/include/asm/sections.h   |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c          |  6 +++---
 arch/x86/kernel/kgdb.c            |  8 ++------
 arch/x86/kernel/test_nx.c         |  2 --
 arch/x86/kernel/test_rodata.c     |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S     | 25 +++++++++++--------------
 arch/x86/mm/init_32.c             |  3 ---
 arch/x86/mm/init_64.c             |  3 ---
 arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c            |  2 +-
 13 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 61 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index db3622f22b61..f7c69436accc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -289,6 +289,9 @@ config ARCH_SUPPORTS_UPROBES
 config FIX_EARLYCON_MEM
 	def_bool y
 
+config DEBUG_RODATA
+	def_bool y
+
 config PGTABLE_LEVELS
 	int
 	default 4 if X86_64
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug b/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug
index 137dfa96aa14..1f6c306a9a00 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug
@@ -91,28 +91,16 @@ config EFI_PGT_DUMP
 	  issues with the mapping of the EFI runtime regions into that
 	  table.
 
-config DEBUG_RODATA
-	bool "Write protect kernel read-only data structures"
-	default y
-	depends on DEBUG_KERNEL
-	---help---
-	  Mark the kernel read-only data as write-protected in the pagetables,
-	  in order to catch accidental (and incorrect) writes to such const
-	  data. This is recommended so that we can catch kernel bugs sooner.
-	  If in doubt, say "Y".
-
 config DEBUG_RODATA_TEST
-	bool "Testcase for the DEBUG_RODATA feature"
-	depends on DEBUG_RODATA
+	bool "Testcase for the marking rodata read-only"
 	default y
 	---help---
-	  This option enables a testcase for the DEBUG_RODATA
-	  feature as well as for the change_page_attr() infrastructure.
+	  This option enables a testcase for the setting rodata read-only
+	  as well as for the change_page_attr() infrastructure.
 	  If in doubt, say "N"
 
 config DEBUG_WX
 	bool "Warn on W+X mappings at boot"
-	depends on DEBUG_RODATA
 	select X86_PTDUMP_CORE
 	---help---
 	  Generate a warning if any W+X mappings are found at boot.
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h
index c8cff75c5b21..61518cf79437 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h
@@ -91,15 +91,10 @@ void clflush_cache_range(void *addr, unsigned int size);
 
 #define mmio_flush_range(addr, size) clflush_cache_range(addr, size)
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
 extern const int rodata_test_data;
 extern int kernel_set_to_readonly;
 void set_kernel_text_rw(void);
 void set_kernel_text_ro(void);
-#else
-static inline void set_kernel_text_rw(void) { }
-static inline void set_kernel_text_ro(void) { }
-#endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA_TEST
 int rodata_test(void);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_para.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_para.h
index c1adf33fdd0d..bc62e7cbf1b1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_para.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_para.h
@@ -17,15 +17,8 @@ static inline bool kvm_check_and_clear_guest_paused(void)
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_KVM_GUEST */
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
 #define KVM_HYPERCALL \
         ALTERNATIVE(".byte 0x0f,0x01,0xc1", ".byte 0x0f,0x01,0xd9", X86_FEATURE_VMMCALL)
-#else
-/* On AMD processors, vmcall will generate a trap that we will
- * then rewrite to the appropriate instruction.
- */
-#define KVM_HYPERCALL ".byte 0x0f,0x01,0xc1"
-#endif
 
 /* For KVM hypercalls, a three-byte sequence of either the vmcall or the vmmcall
  * instruction.  The hypervisor may replace it with something else but only the
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sections.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sections.h
index 0a5242428659..13b6cdd0af57 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sections.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sections.h
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
 extern char __brk_base[], __brk_limit[];
 extern struct exception_table_entry __stop___ex_table[];
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) && defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA)
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64)
 extern char __end_rodata_hpage_align[];
 #endif
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
index 311bcf338f07..eb6bd34582c6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
@@ -81,9 +81,9 @@ within(unsigned long addr, unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
 static unsigned long text_ip_addr(unsigned long ip)
 {
 	/*
-	 * On x86_64, kernel text mappings are mapped read-only with
-	 * CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA. So we use the kernel identity mapping instead
-	 * of the kernel text mapping to modify the kernel text.
+	 * On x86_64, kernel text mappings are mapped read-only, so we use
+	 * the kernel identity mapping instead of the kernel text mapping
+	 * to modify the kernel text.
 	 *
 	 * For 32bit kernels, these mappings are same and we can use
 	 * kernel identity mapping to modify code.
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kgdb.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kgdb.c
index 44256a62702b..ed15cd486d06 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kgdb.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kgdb.c
@@ -750,9 +750,7 @@ void kgdb_arch_set_pc(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long ip)
 int kgdb_arch_set_breakpoint(struct kgdb_bkpt *bpt)
 {
 	int err;
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
 	char opc[BREAK_INSTR_SIZE];
-#endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA */
 
 	bpt->type = BP_BREAKPOINT;
 	err = probe_kernel_read(bpt->saved_instr, (char *)bpt->bpt_addr,
@@ -761,7 +759,6 @@ int kgdb_arch_set_breakpoint(struct kgdb_bkpt *bpt)
 		return err;
 	err = probe_kernel_write((char *)bpt->bpt_addr,
 				 arch_kgdb_ops.gdb_bpt_instr, BREAK_INSTR_SIZE);
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
 	if (!err)
 		return err;
 	/*
@@ -778,13 +775,12 @@ int kgdb_arch_set_breakpoint(struct kgdb_bkpt *bpt)
 	if (memcmp(opc, arch_kgdb_ops.gdb_bpt_instr, BREAK_INSTR_SIZE))
 		return -EINVAL;
 	bpt->type = BP_POKE_BREAKPOINT;
-#endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA */
+
 	return err;
 }
 
 int kgdb_arch_remove_breakpoint(struct kgdb_bkpt *bpt)
 {
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
 	int err;
 	char opc[BREAK_INSTR_SIZE];
 
@@ -801,8 +797,8 @@ int kgdb_arch_remove_breakpoint(struct kgdb_bkpt *bpt)
 	if (err || memcmp(opc, bpt->saved_instr, BREAK_INSTR_SIZE))
 		goto knl_write;
 	return err;
+
 knl_write:
-#endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA */
 	return probe_kernel_write((char *)bpt->bpt_addr,
 				  (char *)bpt->saved_instr, BREAK_INSTR_SIZE);
 }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/test_nx.c b/arch/x86/kernel/test_nx.c
index 3f92ce07e525..27538f183c3b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/test_nx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/test_nx.c
@@ -142,7 +142,6 @@ static int test_NX(void)
 	 * by the error message
 	 */
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
 	/* Test 3: Check if the .rodata section is executable */
 	if (rodata_test_data != 0xC3) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "test_nx: .rodata marker has invalid value\n");
@@ -151,7 +150,6 @@ static int test_NX(void)
 		printk(KERN_ERR "test_nx: .rodata section is executable\n");
 		ret = -ENODEV;
 	}
-#endif
 
 #if 0
 	/* Test 4: Check if the .data section of a module is executable */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/test_rodata.c b/arch/x86/kernel/test_rodata.c
index 5ecbfe5099da..cb4a01b41e27 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/test_rodata.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/test_rodata.c
@@ -76,5 +76,5 @@ int rodata_test(void)
 }
 
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
-MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Testcase for the DEBUG_RODATA infrastructure");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Testcase for marking rodata as read-only");
 MODULE_AUTHOR("Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>");
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
index 74e4bf11f562..fe133b710bef 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
@@ -41,29 +41,28 @@ ENTRY(phys_startup_64)
 jiffies_64 = jiffies;
 #endif
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) && defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA)
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64)
 /*
- * On 64-bit, align RODATA to 2MB so that even with CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
- * we retain large page mappings for boundaries spanning kernel text, rodata
- * and data sections.
+ * On 64-bit, align RODATA to 2MB so we retain large page mappings for
+ * boundaries spanning kernel text, rodata and data sections.
  *
  * However, kernel identity mappings will have different RWX permissions
  * to the pages mapping to text and to the pages padding (which are freed) the
  * text section. Hence kernel identity mappings will be broken to smaller
  * pages. For 64-bit, kernel text and kernel identity mappings are different,
- * so we can enable protection checks that come with CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA,
- * as well as retain 2MB large page mappings for kernel text.
+ * so we can enable protection checks as well as retain 2MB large page
+ * mappings for kernel text.
  */
-#define X64_ALIGN_DEBUG_RODATA_BEGIN	. = ALIGN(HPAGE_SIZE);
+#define X64_ALIGN_RODATA_BEGIN	. = ALIGN(HPAGE_SIZE);
 
-#define X64_ALIGN_DEBUG_RODATA_END				\
+#define X64_ALIGN_RODATA_END					\
 		. = ALIGN(HPAGE_SIZE);				\
 		__end_rodata_hpage_align = .;
 
 #else
 
-#define X64_ALIGN_DEBUG_RODATA_BEGIN
-#define X64_ALIGN_DEBUG_RODATA_END
+#define X64_ALIGN_RODATA_BEGIN
+#define X64_ALIGN_RODATA_END
 
 #endif
 
@@ -112,13 +111,11 @@ SECTIONS
 
 	EXCEPTION_TABLE(16) :text = 0x9090
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA)
 	/* .text should occupy whole number of pages */
 	. = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
-#endif
-	X64_ALIGN_DEBUG_RODATA_BEGIN
+	X64_ALIGN_RODATA_BEGIN
 	RO_DATA(PAGE_SIZE)
-	X64_ALIGN_DEBUG_RODATA_END
+	X64_ALIGN_RODATA_END
 
 	/* Data */
 	.data : AT(ADDR(.data) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c
index cb4ef3de61f9..2ebfbaf61142 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c
@@ -871,7 +871,6 @@ static noinline int do_test_wp_bit(void)
 	return flag;
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
 const int rodata_test_data = 0xC3;
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rodata_test_data);
 
@@ -960,5 +959,3 @@ void mark_rodata_ro(void)
 	if (__supported_pte_mask & _PAGE_NX)
 		debug_checkwx();
 }
-#endif
-
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
index ec081fe0ce2c..e08d141844ee 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
@@ -1062,7 +1062,6 @@ void __init mem_init(void)
 	mem_init_print_info(NULL);
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
 const int rodata_test_data = 0xC3;
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rodata_test_data);
 
@@ -1154,8 +1153,6 @@ void mark_rodata_ro(void)
 	debug_checkwx();
 }
 
-#endif
-
 int kern_addr_valid(unsigned long addr)
 {
 	unsigned long above = ((long)addr) >> __VIRTUAL_MASK_SHIFT;
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
index a3137a4feed1..8d77c7f7a614 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ static inline pgprot_t static_protections(pgprot_t prot, unsigned long address,
 		   __pa_symbol(__end_rodata) >> PAGE_SHIFT))
 		pgprot_val(forbidden) |= _PAGE_RW;
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) && defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA)
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64)
 	/*
 	 * Once the kernel maps the text as RO (kernel_set_to_readonly is set),
 	 * kernel text mappings for the large page aligned text, rodata sections
-- 
1.9.1

[PATCH v3 5/8] x86: make CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA non-optional

[Kees Cook]

This removes the CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA option and makes it always enabled.

Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                  |  3 +++
 arch/x86/Kconfig.debug            | 18 +++---------------
 arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h |  5 -----
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_para.h   |  7 -------
 arch/x86/include/asm/sections.h   |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c          |  6 +++---
 arch/x86/kernel/kgdb.c            |  8 ++------
 arch/x86/kernel/test_nx.c         |  2 --
 arch/x86/kernel/test_rodata.c     |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S     | 25 +++++++++++--------------
 arch/x86/mm/init_32.c             |  3 ---
 arch/x86/mm/init_64.c             |  3 ---
 arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c            |  2 +-
 13 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 61 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index db3622f22b61..f7c69436accc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -289,6 +289,9 @@ config ARCH_SUPPORTS_UPROBES
 config FIX_EARLYCON_MEM
 	def_bool y
 
+config DEBUG_RODATA
+	def_bool y
+
 config PGTABLE_LEVELS
 	int
 	default 4 if X86_64
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug b/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug
index 137dfa96aa14..1f6c306a9a00 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug
@@ -91,28 +91,16 @@ config EFI_PGT_DUMP
 	  issues with the mapping of the EFI runtime regions into that
 	  table.
 
-config DEBUG_RODATA
-	bool "Write protect kernel read-only data structures"
-	default y
-	depends on DEBUG_KERNEL
-	---help---
-	  Mark the kernel read-only data as write-protected in the pagetables,
-	  in order to catch accidental (and incorrect) writes to such const
-	  data. This is recommended so that we can catch kernel bugs sooner.
-	  If in doubt, say "Y".
-
 config DEBUG_RODATA_TEST
-	bool "Testcase for the DEBUG_RODATA feature"
-	depends on DEBUG_RODATA
+	bool "Testcase for the marking rodata read-only"
 	default y
 	---help---
-	  This option enables a testcase for the DEBUG_RODATA
-	  feature as well as for the change_page_attr() infrastructure.
+	  This option enables a testcase for the setting rodata read-only
+	  as well as for the change_page_attr() infrastructure.
 	  If in doubt, say "N"
 
 config DEBUG_WX
 	bool "Warn on W+X mappings at boot"
-	depends on DEBUG_RODATA
 	select X86_PTDUMP_CORE
 	---help---
 	  Generate a warning if any W+X mappings are found at boot.
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h
index c8cff75c5b21..61518cf79437 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h
@@ -91,15 +91,10 @@ void clflush_cache_range(void *addr, unsigned int size);
 
 #define mmio_flush_range(addr, size) clflush_cache_range(addr, size)
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
 extern const int rodata_test_data;
 extern int kernel_set_to_readonly;
 void set_kernel_text_rw(void);
 void set_kernel_text_ro(void);
-#else
-static inline void set_kernel_text_rw(void) { }
-static inline void set_kernel_text_ro(void) { }
-#endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA_TEST
 int rodata_test(void);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_para.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_para.h
index c1adf33fdd0d..bc62e7cbf1b1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_para.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_para.h
@@ -17,15 +17,8 @@ static inline bool kvm_check_and_clear_guest_paused(void)
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_KVM_GUEST */
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
 #define KVM_HYPERCALL \
         ALTERNATIVE(".byte 0x0f,0x01,0xc1", ".byte 0x0f,0x01,0xd9", X86_FEATURE_VMMCALL)
-#else
-/* On AMD processors, vmcall will generate a trap that we will
- * then rewrite to the appropriate instruction.
- */
-#define KVM_HYPERCALL ".byte 0x0f,0x01,0xc1"
-#endif
 
 /* For KVM hypercalls, a three-byte sequence of either the vmcall or the vmmcall
  * instruction.  The hypervisor may replace it with something else but only the
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sections.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sections.h
index 0a5242428659..13b6cdd0af57 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sections.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sections.h
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
 extern char __brk_base[], __brk_limit[];
 extern struct exception_table_entry __stop___ex_table[];
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) && defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA)
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64)
 extern char __end_rodata_hpage_align[];
 #endif
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
index 311bcf338f07..eb6bd34582c6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
@@ -81,9 +81,9 @@ within(unsigned long addr, unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
 static unsigned long text_ip_addr(unsigned long ip)
 {
 	/*
-	 * On x86_64, kernel text mappings are mapped read-only with
-	 * CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA. So we use the kernel identity mapping instead
-	 * of the kernel text mapping to modify the kernel text.
+	 * On x86_64, kernel text mappings are mapped read-only, so we use
+	 * the kernel identity mapping instead of the kernel text mapping
+	 * to modify the kernel text.
 	 *
 	 * For 32bit kernels, these mappings are same and we can use
 	 * kernel identity mapping to modify code.
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kgdb.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kgdb.c
index 44256a62702b..ed15cd486d06 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kgdb.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kgdb.c
@@ -750,9 +750,7 @@ void kgdb_arch_set_pc(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long ip)
 int kgdb_arch_set_breakpoint(struct kgdb_bkpt *bpt)
 {
 	int err;
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
 	char opc[BREAK_INSTR_SIZE];
-#endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA */
 
 	bpt->type = BP_BREAKPOINT;
 	err = probe_kernel_read(bpt->saved_instr, (char *)bpt->bpt_addr,
@@ -761,7 +759,6 @@ int kgdb_arch_set_breakpoint(struct kgdb_bkpt *bpt)
 		return err;
 	err = probe_kernel_write((char *)bpt->bpt_addr,
 				 arch_kgdb_ops.gdb_bpt_instr, BREAK_INSTR_SIZE);
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
 	if (!err)
 		return err;
 	/*
@@ -778,13 +775,12 @@ int kgdb_arch_set_breakpoint(struct kgdb_bkpt *bpt)
 	if (memcmp(opc, arch_kgdb_ops.gdb_bpt_instr, BREAK_INSTR_SIZE))
 		return -EINVAL;
 	bpt->type = BP_POKE_BREAKPOINT;
-#endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA */
+
 	return err;
 }
 
 int kgdb_arch_remove_breakpoint(struct kgdb_bkpt *bpt)
 {
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
 	int err;
 	char opc[BREAK_INSTR_SIZE];
 
@@ -801,8 +797,8 @@ int kgdb_arch_remove_breakpoint(struct kgdb_bkpt *bpt)
 	if (err || memcmp(opc, bpt->saved_instr, BREAK_INSTR_SIZE))
 		goto knl_write;
 	return err;
+
 knl_write:
-#endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA */
 	return probe_kernel_write((char *)bpt->bpt_addr,
 				  (char *)bpt->saved_instr, BREAK_INSTR_SIZE);
 }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/test_nx.c b/arch/x86/kernel/test_nx.c
index 3f92ce07e525..27538f183c3b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/test_nx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/test_nx.c
@@ -142,7 +142,6 @@ static int test_NX(void)
 	 * by the error message
 	 */
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
 	/* Test 3: Check if the .rodata section is executable */
 	if (rodata_test_data != 0xC3) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "test_nx: .rodata marker has invalid value\n");
@@ -151,7 +150,6 @@ static int test_NX(void)
 		printk(KERN_ERR "test_nx: .rodata section is executable\n");
 		ret = -ENODEV;
 	}
-#endif
 
 #if 0
 	/* Test 4: Check if the .data section of a module is executable */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/test_rodata.c b/arch/x86/kernel/test_rodata.c
index 5ecbfe5099da..cb4a01b41e27 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/test_rodata.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/test_rodata.c
@@ -76,5 +76,5 @@ int rodata_test(void)
 }
 
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
-MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Testcase for the DEBUG_RODATA infrastructure");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Testcase for marking rodata as read-only");
 MODULE_AUTHOR("Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>");
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
index 74e4bf11f562..fe133b710bef 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
@@ -41,29 +41,28 @@ ENTRY(phys_startup_64)
 jiffies_64 = jiffies;
 #endif
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) && defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA)
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64)
 /*
- * On 64-bit, align RODATA to 2MB so that even with CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
- * we retain large page mappings for boundaries spanning kernel text, rodata
- * and data sections.
+ * On 64-bit, align RODATA to 2MB so we retain large page mappings for
+ * boundaries spanning kernel text, rodata and data sections.
  *
  * However, kernel identity mappings will have different RWX permissions
  * to the pages mapping to text and to the pages padding (which are freed) the
  * text section. Hence kernel identity mappings will be broken to smaller
  * pages. For 64-bit, kernel text and kernel identity mappings are different,
- * so we can enable protection checks that come with CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA,
- * as well as retain 2MB large page mappings for kernel text.
+ * so we can enable protection checks as well as retain 2MB large page
+ * mappings for kernel text.
  */
-#define X64_ALIGN_DEBUG_RODATA_BEGIN	. = ALIGN(HPAGE_SIZE);
+#define X64_ALIGN_RODATA_BEGIN	. = ALIGN(HPAGE_SIZE);
 
-#define X64_ALIGN_DEBUG_RODATA_END				\
+#define X64_ALIGN_RODATA_END					\
 		. = ALIGN(HPAGE_SIZE);				\
 		__end_rodata_hpage_align = .;
 
 #else
 
-#define X64_ALIGN_DEBUG_RODATA_BEGIN
-#define X64_ALIGN_DEBUG_RODATA_END
+#define X64_ALIGN_RODATA_BEGIN
+#define X64_ALIGN_RODATA_END
 
 #endif
 
@@ -112,13 +111,11 @@ SECTIONS
 
 	EXCEPTION_TABLE(16) :text = 0x9090
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA)
 	/* .text should occupy whole number of pages */
 	. = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
-#endif
-	X64_ALIGN_DEBUG_RODATA_BEGIN
+	X64_ALIGN_RODATA_BEGIN
 	RO_DATA(PAGE_SIZE)
-	X64_ALIGN_DEBUG_RODATA_END
+	X64_ALIGN_RODATA_END
 
 	/* Data */
 	.data : AT(ADDR(.data) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c
index cb4ef3de61f9..2ebfbaf61142 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c
@@ -871,7 +871,6 @@ static noinline int do_test_wp_bit(void)
 	return flag;
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
 const int rodata_test_data = 0xC3;
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rodata_test_data);
 
@@ -960,5 +959,3 @@ void mark_rodata_ro(void)
 	if (__supported_pte_mask & _PAGE_NX)
 		debug_checkwx();
 }
-#endif
-
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
index ec081fe0ce2c..e08d141844ee 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
@@ -1062,7 +1062,6 @@ void __init mem_init(void)
 	mem_init_print_info(NULL);
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
 const int rodata_test_data = 0xC3;
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rodata_test_data);
 
@@ -1154,8 +1153,6 @@ void mark_rodata_ro(void)
 	debug_checkwx();
 }
 
-#endif
-
 int kern_addr_valid(unsigned long addr)
 {
 	unsigned long above = ((long)addr) >> __VIRTUAL_MASK_SHIFT;
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
index a3137a4feed1..8d77c7f7a614 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ static inline pgprot_t static_protections(pgprot_t prot, unsigned long address,
 		   __pa_symbol(__end_rodata) >> PAGE_SHIFT))
 		pgprot_val(forbidden) |= _PAGE_RW;
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) && defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA)
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64)
 	/*
 	 * Once the kernel maps the text as RO (kernel_set_to_readonly is set),
 	 * kernel text mappings for the large page aligned text, rodata sections
-- 
1.9.1

[PATCH v3 6/8] introduce post-init read-only memory

[Kees Cook]

One of the easiest ways to protect the kernel from attack is to reduce
the internal attack surface exposed when a "write" flaw is available. By
making as much of the kernel read-only as possible, we reduce the
attack surface.

Many things are written to only during __init, and never changed
again. These cannot be made "const" since the compiler will do the wrong
thing (we do actually need to write to them). Instead, move these items
into a memory region that will be made read-only during mark_rodata_ro()
which happens after all kernel __init code has finished.

This introduces __ro_after_init as a way to mark such memory, and adds
some documentation about the existing __read_mostly marking.

Based on work by PaX Team and Brad Spengler.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 arch/parisc/include/asm/cache.h   |  3 +++
 include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h |  1 +
 include/linux/cache.h             | 14 ++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/parisc/include/asm/cache.h b/arch/parisc/include/asm/cache.h
index 3d0e17bcc8e9..df0f52bd18b4 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/include/asm/cache.h
+++ b/arch/parisc/include/asm/cache.h
@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@
 
 #define __read_mostly __attribute__((__section__(".data..read_mostly")))
 
+/* Read-only memory is marked before mark_rodata_ro() is called. */
+#define __ro_after_init	__read_mostly
+
 void parisc_cache_init(void);	/* initializes cache-flushing */
 void disable_sr_hashing_asm(int); /* low level support for above */
 void disable_sr_hashing(void);   /* turns off space register hashing */
diff --git a/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h b/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h
index c4bd0e2c173c..772c784ba763 100644
--- a/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h
+++ b/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h
@@ -256,6 +256,7 @@
 	.rodata           : AT(ADDR(.rodata) - LOAD_OFFSET) {		\
 		VMLINUX_SYMBOL(__start_rodata) = .;			\
 		*(.rodata) *(.rodata.*)					\
+		*(.data..ro_after_init)	/* Read only after init */	\
 		*(__vermagic)		/* Kernel version magic */	\
 		. = ALIGN(8);						\
 		VMLINUX_SYMBOL(__start___tracepoints_ptrs) = .;		\
diff --git a/include/linux/cache.h b/include/linux/cache.h
index 17e7e82d2aa7..1be04f8c563a 100644
--- a/include/linux/cache.h
+++ b/include/linux/cache.h
@@ -12,10 +12,24 @@
 #define SMP_CACHE_BYTES L1_CACHE_BYTES
 #endif
 
+/*
+ * __read_mostly is used to keep rarely changing variables out of frequently
+ * updated cachelines. If an architecture doesn't support it, ignore the
+ * hint.
+ */
 #ifndef __read_mostly
 #define __read_mostly
 #endif
 
+/*
+ * __ro_after_init is used to mark things that are read-only after init (i.e.
+ * after mark_rodata_ro() has been called). These are effectively read-only,
+ * but may get written to during init, so can't live in .rodata (via "const").
+ */
+#ifndef __ro_after_init
+#define __ro_after_init __attribute__((__section__(".data..ro_after_init")))
+#endif
+
 #ifndef ____cacheline_aligned
 #define ____cacheline_aligned __attribute__((__aligned__(SMP_CACHE_BYTES)))
 #endif
-- 
1.9.1

[PATCH v3 6/8] introduce post-init read-only memory

[Kees Cook]

One of the easiest ways to protect the kernel from attack is to reduce
the internal attack surface exposed when a "write" flaw is available. By
making as much of the kernel read-only as possible, we reduce the
attack surface.

Many things are written to only during __init, and never changed
again. These cannot be made "const" since the compiler will do the wrong
thing (we do actually need to write to them). Instead, move these items
into a memory region that will be made read-only during mark_rodata_ro()
which happens after all kernel __init code has finished.

This introduces __ro_after_init as a way to mark such memory, and adds
some documentation about the existing __read_mostly marking.

Based on work by PaX Team and Brad Spengler.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 arch/parisc/include/asm/cache.h   |  3 +++
 include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h |  1 +
 include/linux/cache.h             | 14 ++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/parisc/include/asm/cache.h b/arch/parisc/include/asm/cache.h
index 3d0e17bcc8e9..df0f52bd18b4 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/include/asm/cache.h
+++ b/arch/parisc/include/asm/cache.h
@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@
 
 #define __read_mostly __attribute__((__section__(".data..read_mostly")))
 
+/* Read-only memory is marked before mark_rodata_ro() is called. */
+#define __ro_after_init	__read_mostly
+
 void parisc_cache_init(void);	/* initializes cache-flushing */
 void disable_sr_hashing_asm(int); /* low level support for above */
 void disable_sr_hashing(void);   /* turns off space register hashing */
diff --git a/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h b/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h
index c4bd0e2c173c..772c784ba763 100644
--- a/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h
+++ b/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h
@@ -256,6 +256,7 @@
 	.rodata           : AT(ADDR(.rodata) - LOAD_OFFSET) {		\
 		VMLINUX_SYMBOL(__start_rodata) = .;			\
 		*(.rodata) *(.rodata.*)					\
+		*(.data..ro_after_init)	/* Read only after init */	\
 		*(__vermagic)		/* Kernel version magic */	\
 		. = ALIGN(8);						\
 		VMLINUX_SYMBOL(__start___tracepoints_ptrs) = .;		\
diff --git a/include/linux/cache.h b/include/linux/cache.h
index 17e7e82d2aa7..1be04f8c563a 100644
--- a/include/linux/cache.h
+++ b/include/linux/cache.h
@@ -12,10 +12,24 @@
 #define SMP_CACHE_BYTES L1_CACHE_BYTES
 #endif
 
+/*
+ * __read_mostly is used to keep rarely changing variables out of frequently
+ * updated cachelines. If an architecture doesn't support it, ignore the
+ * hint.
+ */
 #ifndef __read_mostly
 #define __read_mostly
 #endif
 
+/*
+ * __ro_after_init is used to mark things that are read-only after init (i.e.
+ * after mark_rodata_ro() has been called). These are effectively read-only,
+ * but may get written to during init, so can't live in .rodata (via "const").
+ */
+#ifndef __ro_after_init
+#define __ro_after_init __attribute__((__section__(".data..ro_after_init")))
+#endif
+
 #ifndef ____cacheline_aligned
 #define ____cacheline_aligned __attribute__((__aligned__(SMP_CACHE_BYTES)))
 #endif
-- 
1.9.1

[PATCH v3 7/8] lkdtm: verify that __ro_after_init works correctly

[Kees Cook]

The new __ro_after_init section should be writable before init, but
not after. Validate that it gets updated at init and can't be written
to afterwards.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 drivers/misc/lkdtm.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm.c b/drivers/misc/lkdtm.c
index 11fdadc68e53..2a6eaf1122b4 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm.c
@@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ enum ctype {
 	CT_EXEC_USERSPACE,
 	CT_ACCESS_USERSPACE,
 	CT_WRITE_RO,
+	CT_WRITE_RO_AFTER_INIT,
 	CT_WRITE_KERN,
 };
 
@@ -140,6 +141,7 @@ static char* cp_type[] = {
 	"EXEC_USERSPACE",
 	"ACCESS_USERSPACE",
 	"WRITE_RO",
+	"WRITE_RO_AFTER_INIT",
 	"WRITE_KERN",
 };
 
@@ -162,6 +164,7 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lock_me_up);
 static u8 data_area[EXEC_SIZE];
 
 static const unsigned long rodata = 0xAA55AA55;
+static unsigned long ro_after_init __ro_after_init = 0x55AA5500;
 
 module_param(recur_count, int, 0644);
 MODULE_PARM_DESC(recur_count, " Recursion level for the stack overflow test");
@@ -503,11 +506,28 @@ static void lkdtm_do_action(enum ctype which)
 		break;
 	}
 	case CT_WRITE_RO: {
-		unsigned long *ptr;
+		/* Explicitly cast away "const" for the test. */
+		unsigned long *ptr = (unsigned long *)&rodata;
 
-		ptr = (unsigned long *)&rodata;
+		pr_info("attempting bad rodata write at %p\n", ptr);
+		*ptr ^= 0xabcd1234;
 
-		pr_info("attempting bad write at %p\n", ptr);
+		break;
+	}
+	case CT_WRITE_RO_AFTER_INIT: {
+		unsigned long *ptr = &ro_after_init;
+
+		/*
+		 * Verify we were written to during init. Since an Oops
+		 * is considered a "success", a failure is to just skip the
+		 * real test.
+		 */
+		if ((*ptr & 0xAA) != 0xAA) {
+			pr_info("%p was NOT written during init!?\n", ptr);
+			break;
+		}
+
+		pr_info("attempting bad ro_after_init write at %p\n", ptr);
 		*ptr ^= 0xabcd1234;
 
 		break;
@@ -817,6 +837,9 @@ static int __init lkdtm_module_init(void)
 	int n_debugfs_entries = 1; /* Assume only the direct entry */
 	int i;
 
+	/* Make sure we can write to __ro_after_init values during __init */
+	ro_after_init |= 0xAA;
+
 	/* Register debugfs interface */
 	lkdtm_debugfs_root = debugfs_create_dir("provoke-crash", NULL);
 	if (!lkdtm_debugfs_root) {
-- 
1.9.1

[PATCH v3 7/8] lkdtm: verify that __ro_after_init works correctly

[Kees Cook]

The new __ro_after_init section should be writable before init, but
not after. Validate that it gets updated at init and can't be written
to afterwards.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 drivers/misc/lkdtm.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm.c b/drivers/misc/lkdtm.c
index 11fdadc68e53..2a6eaf1122b4 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm.c
@@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ enum ctype {
 	CT_EXEC_USERSPACE,
 	CT_ACCESS_USERSPACE,
 	CT_WRITE_RO,
+	CT_WRITE_RO_AFTER_INIT,
 	CT_WRITE_KERN,
 };
 
@@ -140,6 +141,7 @@ static char* cp_type[] = {
 	"EXEC_USERSPACE",
 	"ACCESS_USERSPACE",
 	"WRITE_RO",
+	"WRITE_RO_AFTER_INIT",
 	"WRITE_KERN",
 };
 
@@ -162,6 +164,7 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lock_me_up);
 static u8 data_area[EXEC_SIZE];
 
 static const unsigned long rodata = 0xAA55AA55;
+static unsigned long ro_after_init __ro_after_init = 0x55AA5500;
 
 module_param(recur_count, int, 0644);
 MODULE_PARM_DESC(recur_count, " Recursion level for the stack overflow test");
@@ -503,11 +506,28 @@ static void lkdtm_do_action(enum ctype which)
 		break;
 	}
 	case CT_WRITE_RO: {
-		unsigned long *ptr;
+		/* Explicitly cast away "const" for the test. */
+		unsigned long *ptr = (unsigned long *)&rodata;
 
-		ptr = (unsigned long *)&rodata;
+		pr_info("attempting bad rodata write at %p\n", ptr);
+		*ptr ^= 0xabcd1234;
 
-		pr_info("attempting bad write at %p\n", ptr);
+		break;
+	}
+	case CT_WRITE_RO_AFTER_INIT: {
+		unsigned long *ptr = &ro_after_init;
+
+		/*
+		 * Verify we were written to during init. Since an Oops
+		 * is considered a "success", a failure is to just skip the
+		 * real test.
+		 */
+		if ((*ptr & 0xAA) != 0xAA) {
+			pr_info("%p was NOT written during init!?\n", ptr);
+			break;
+		}
+
+		pr_info("attempting bad ro_after_init write at %p\n", ptr);
 		*ptr ^= 0xabcd1234;
 
 		break;
@@ -817,6 +837,9 @@ static int __init lkdtm_module_init(void)
 	int n_debugfs_entries = 1; /* Assume only the direct entry */
 	int i;
 
+	/* Make sure we can write to __ro_after_init values during __init */
+	ro_after_init |= 0xAA;
+
 	/* Register debugfs interface */
 	lkdtm_debugfs_root = debugfs_create_dir("provoke-crash", NULL);
 	if (!lkdtm_debugfs_root) {
-- 
1.9.1

[PATCH v3 8/8] x86, vdso: mark vDSO read-only after init

[Kees Cook]

The vDSO does not need to be writable after __init, so mark it as
__ro_after_init. The result kills the exploit method of writing to the
vDSO from kernel space resulting in userspace executing the modified code,
as shown here to bypass SMEP restrictions: http://itszn.com/blog/?p=21

The memory map (with added vDSO address reporting) shows the vDSO moving
into read-only memory:

Before:
[    0.143067] vDSO @ ffffffff82004000
[    0.143551] vDSO @ ffffffff82006000
---[ High Kernel Mapping ]---
0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffff81000000      16M                         pmd
0xffffffff81000000-0xffffffff81800000       8M   ro     PSE     GLB x  pmd
0xffffffff81800000-0xffffffff819f3000    1996K   ro             GLB x  pte
0xffffffff819f3000-0xffffffff81a00000      52K   ro                 NX pte
0xffffffff81a00000-0xffffffff81e00000       4M   ro     PSE     GLB NX pmd
0xffffffff81e00000-0xffffffff81e05000      20K   ro             GLB NX pte
0xffffffff81e05000-0xffffffff82000000    2028K   ro                 NX pte
0xffffffff82000000-0xffffffff8214f000    1340K   RW             GLB NX pte
0xffffffff8214f000-0xffffffff82281000    1224K   RW                 NX pte
0xffffffff82281000-0xffffffff82400000    1532K   RW             GLB NX pte
0xffffffff82400000-0xffffffff83200000      14M   RW     PSE     GLB NX pmd
0xffffffff83200000-0xffffffffc0000000     974M                         pmd

After:
[    0.145062] vDSO @ ffffffff81da1000
[    0.146057] vDSO @ ffffffff81da4000
---[ High Kernel Mapping ]---
0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffff81000000      16M                         pmd
0xffffffff81000000-0xffffffff81800000       8M   ro     PSE     GLB x  pmd
0xffffffff81800000-0xffffffff819f3000    1996K   ro             GLB x  pte
0xffffffff819f3000-0xffffffff81a00000      52K   ro                 NX pte
0xffffffff81a00000-0xffffffff81e00000       4M   ro     PSE     GLB NX pmd
0xffffffff81e00000-0xffffffff81e0b000      44K   ro             GLB NX pte
0xffffffff81e0b000-0xffffffff82000000    2004K   ro                 NX pte
0xffffffff82000000-0xffffffff8214c000    1328K   RW             GLB NX pte
0xffffffff8214c000-0xffffffff8227e000    1224K   RW                 NX pte
0xffffffff8227e000-0xffffffff82400000    1544K   RW             GLB NX pte
0xffffffff82400000-0xffffffff83200000      14M   RW     PSE     GLB NX pmd
0xffffffff83200000-0xffffffffc0000000     974M                         pmd

Based on work by PaX Team and Brad Spengler.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso2c.h | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso2c.h b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso2c.h
index 0224987556ce..eb93a3137ed2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso2c.h
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso2c.h
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ static void BITSFUNC(go)(void *raw_addr, size_t raw_len,
 	fprintf(outfile, "#include <asm/vdso.h>\n");
 	fprintf(outfile, "\n");
 	fprintf(outfile,
-		"static unsigned char raw_data[%lu] __page_aligned_data = {",
+		"static unsigned char raw_data[%lu] __ro_after_init __aligned(PAGE_SIZE) = {",
 		mapping_size);
 	for (j = 0; j < stripped_len; j++) {
 		if (j % 10 == 0)
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ static void BITSFUNC(go)(void *raw_addr, size_t raw_len,
 	}
 	fprintf(outfile, "\n};\n\n");
 
-	fprintf(outfile, "static struct page *pages[%lu];\n\n",
+	fprintf(outfile, "static struct page *pages[%lu] __ro_after_init;\n\n",
 		mapping_size / 4096);
 
 	fprintf(outfile, "const struct vdso_image %s = {\n", name);
-- 
1.9.1

[PATCH v3 8/8] x86, vdso: mark vDSO read-only after init

[Kees Cook]

The vDSO does not need to be writable after __init, so mark it as
__ro_after_init. The result kills the exploit method of writing to the
vDSO from kernel space resulting in userspace executing the modified code,
as shown here to bypass SMEP restrictions: http://itszn.com/blog/?p=21

The memory map (with added vDSO address reporting) shows the vDSO moving
into read-only memory:

Before:
[    0.143067] vDSO @ ffffffff82004000
[    0.143551] vDSO @ ffffffff82006000
---[ High Kernel Mapping ]---
0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffff81000000      16M                         pmd
0xffffffff81000000-0xffffffff81800000       8M   ro     PSE     GLB x  pmd
0xffffffff81800000-0xffffffff819f3000    1996K   ro             GLB x  pte
0xffffffff819f3000-0xffffffff81a00000      52K   ro                 NX pte
0xffffffff81a00000-0xffffffff81e00000       4M   ro     PSE     GLB NX pmd
0xffffffff81e00000-0xffffffff81e05000      20K   ro             GLB NX pte
0xffffffff81e05000-0xffffffff82000000    2028K   ro                 NX pte
0xffffffff82000000-0xffffffff8214f000    1340K   RW             GLB NX pte
0xffffffff8214f000-0xffffffff82281000    1224K   RW                 NX pte
0xffffffff82281000-0xffffffff82400000    1532K   RW             GLB NX pte
0xffffffff82400000-0xffffffff83200000      14M   RW     PSE     GLB NX pmd
0xffffffff83200000-0xffffffffc0000000     974M                         pmd

After:
[    0.145062] vDSO @ ffffffff81da1000
[    0.146057] vDSO @ ffffffff81da4000
---[ High Kernel Mapping ]---
0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffff81000000      16M                         pmd
0xffffffff81000000-0xffffffff81800000       8M   ro     PSE     GLB x  pmd
0xffffffff81800000-0xffffffff819f3000    1996K   ro             GLB x  pte
0xffffffff819f3000-0xffffffff81a00000      52K   ro                 NX pte
0xffffffff81a00000-0xffffffff81e00000       4M   ro     PSE     GLB NX pmd
0xffffffff81e00000-0xffffffff81e0b000      44K   ro             GLB NX pte
0xffffffff81e0b000-0xffffffff82000000    2004K   ro                 NX pte
0xffffffff82000000-0xffffffff8214c000    1328K   RW             GLB NX pte
0xffffffff8214c000-0xffffffff8227e000    1224K   RW                 NX pte
0xffffffff8227e000-0xffffffff82400000    1544K   RW             GLB NX pte
0xffffffff82400000-0xffffffff83200000      14M   RW     PSE     GLB NX pmd
0xffffffff83200000-0xffffffffc0000000     974M                         pmd

Based on work by PaX Team and Brad Spengler.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso2c.h | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso2c.h b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso2c.h
index 0224987556ce..eb93a3137ed2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso2c.h
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso2c.h
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ static void BITSFUNC(go)(void *raw_addr, size_t raw_len,
 	fprintf(outfile, "#include <asm/vdso.h>\n");
 	fprintf(outfile, "\n");
 	fprintf(outfile,
-		"static unsigned char raw_data[%lu] __page_aligned_data = {",
+		"static unsigned char raw_data[%lu] __ro_after_init __aligned(PAGE_SIZE) = {",
 		mapping_size);
 	for (j = 0; j < stripped_len; j++) {
 		if (j % 10 == 0)
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ static void BITSFUNC(go)(void *raw_addr, size_t raw_len,
 	}
 	fprintf(outfile, "\n};\n\n");
 
-	fprintf(outfile, "static struct page *pages[%lu];\n\n",
+	fprintf(outfile, "static struct page *pages[%lu] __ro_after_init;\n\n",
 		mapping_size / 4096);
 
 	fprintf(outfile, "const struct vdso_image %s = {\n", name);
-- 
1.9.1

Re: [PATCH v3 8/8] x86, vdso: mark vDSO read-only after init

[Andy Lutomirski]

On Wed, Dec 9, 2015 at 1:43 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> The vDSO does not need to be writable after __init, so mark it as
> __ro_after_init. The result kills the exploit method of writing to the
> vDSO from kernel space resulting in userspace executing the modified code,
> as shown here to bypass SMEP restrictions: http://itszn.com/blog/?p=21
>
> The memory map (with added vDSO address reporting) shows the vDSO moving
> into read-only memory:
>
> Before:
> [    0.143067] vDSO @ ffffffff82004000
> [    0.143551] vDSO @ ffffffff82006000
> ---[ High Kernel Mapping ]---
> 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffff81000000      16M                         pmd
> 0xffffffff81000000-0xffffffff81800000       8M   ro     PSE     GLB x  pmd
> 0xffffffff81800000-0xffffffff819f3000    1996K   ro             GLB x  pte
> 0xffffffff819f3000-0xffffffff81a00000      52K   ro                 NX pte
> 0xffffffff81a00000-0xffffffff81e00000       4M   ro     PSE     GLB NX pmd
> 0xffffffff81e00000-0xffffffff81e05000      20K   ro             GLB NX pte
> 0xffffffff81e05000-0xffffffff82000000    2028K   ro                 NX pte
> 0xffffffff82000000-0xffffffff8214f000    1340K   RW             GLB NX pte
> 0xffffffff8214f000-0xffffffff82281000    1224K   RW                 NX pte
> 0xffffffff82281000-0xffffffff82400000    1532K   RW             GLB NX pte
> 0xffffffff82400000-0xffffffff83200000      14M   RW     PSE     GLB NX pmd
> 0xffffffff83200000-0xffffffffc0000000     974M                         pmd
>
> After:
> [    0.145062] vDSO @ ffffffff81da1000
> [    0.146057] vDSO @ ffffffff81da4000
> ---[ High Kernel Mapping ]---
> 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffff81000000      16M                         pmd
> 0xffffffff81000000-0xffffffff81800000       8M   ro     PSE     GLB x  pmd
> 0xffffffff81800000-0xffffffff819f3000    1996K   ro             GLB x  pte
> 0xffffffff819f3000-0xffffffff81a00000      52K   ro                 NX pte
> 0xffffffff81a00000-0xffffffff81e00000       4M   ro     PSE     GLB NX pmd
> 0xffffffff81e00000-0xffffffff81e0b000      44K   ro             GLB NX pte
> 0xffffffff81e0b000-0xffffffff82000000    2004K   ro                 NX pte
> 0xffffffff82000000-0xffffffff8214c000    1328K   RW             GLB NX pte
> 0xffffffff8214c000-0xffffffff8227e000    1224K   RW                 NX pte
> 0xffffffff8227e000-0xffffffff82400000    1544K   RW             GLB NX pte
> 0xffffffff82400000-0xffffffff83200000      14M   RW     PSE     GLB NX pmd
> 0xffffffff83200000-0xffffffffc0000000     974M                         pmd
>
> Based on work by PaX Team and Brad Spengler.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>

--Andy

Re: [PATCH v3 8/8] x86, vdso: mark vDSO read-only after init

[Andy Lutomirski]

On Wed, Dec 9, 2015 at 1:43 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> The vDSO does not need to be writable after __init, so mark it as
> __ro_after_init. The result kills the exploit method of writing to the
> vDSO from kernel space resulting in userspace executing the modified code,
> as shown here to bypass SMEP restrictions: http://itszn.com/blog/?p=21
>
> The memory map (with added vDSO address reporting) shows the vDSO moving
> into read-only memory:
>
> Before:
> [    0.143067] vDSO @ ffffffff82004000
> [    0.143551] vDSO @ ffffffff82006000
> ---[ High Kernel Mapping ]---
> 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffff81000000      16M                         pmd
> 0xffffffff81000000-0xffffffff81800000       8M   ro     PSE     GLB x  pmd
> 0xffffffff81800000-0xffffffff819f3000    1996K   ro             GLB x  pte
> 0xffffffff819f3000-0xffffffff81a00000      52K   ro                 NX pte
> 0xffffffff81a00000-0xffffffff81e00000       4M   ro     PSE     GLB NX pmd
> 0xffffffff81e00000-0xffffffff81e05000      20K   ro             GLB NX pte
> 0xffffffff81e05000-0xffffffff82000000    2028K   ro                 NX pte
> 0xffffffff82000000-0xffffffff8214f000    1340K   RW             GLB NX pte
> 0xffffffff8214f000-0xffffffff82281000    1224K   RW                 NX pte
> 0xffffffff82281000-0xffffffff82400000    1532K   RW             GLB NX pte
> 0xffffffff82400000-0xffffffff83200000      14M   RW     PSE     GLB NX pmd
> 0xffffffff83200000-0xffffffffc0000000     974M                         pmd
>
> After:
> [    0.145062] vDSO @ ffffffff81da1000
> [    0.146057] vDSO @ ffffffff81da4000
> ---[ High Kernel Mapping ]---
> 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffff81000000      16M                         pmd
> 0xffffffff81000000-0xffffffff81800000       8M   ro     PSE     GLB x  pmd
> 0xffffffff81800000-0xffffffff819f3000    1996K   ro             GLB x  pte
> 0xffffffff819f3000-0xffffffff81a00000      52K   ro                 NX pte
> 0xffffffff81a00000-0xffffffff81e00000       4M   ro     PSE     GLB NX pmd
> 0xffffffff81e00000-0xffffffff81e0b000      44K   ro             GLB NX pte
> 0xffffffff81e0b000-0xffffffff82000000    2004K   ro                 NX pte
> 0xffffffff82000000-0xffffffff8214c000    1328K   RW             GLB NX pte
> 0xffffffff8214c000-0xffffffff8227e000    1224K   RW                 NX pte
> 0xffffffff8227e000-0xffffffff82400000    1544K   RW             GLB NX pte
> 0xffffffff82400000-0xffffffff83200000      14M   RW     PSE     GLB NX pmd
> 0xffffffff83200000-0xffffffffc0000000     974M                         pmd
>
> Based on work by PaX Team and Brad Spengler.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>

--Andy

Re: [PATCH v3 8/8] x86, vdso: mark vDSO read-only after init

[Andy Lutomirski]

On Wed, Dec 9, 2015 at 3:13 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 9, 2015 at 1:43 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>> The vDSO does not need to be writable after __init, so mark it as
>> __ro_after_init. The result kills the exploit method of writing to the
>> vDSO from kernel space resulting in userspace executing the modified code,
>> as shown here to bypass SMEP restrictions: http://itszn.com/blog/?p=21
>>
>> The memory map (with added vDSO address reporting) shows the vDSO moving
>> into read-only memory:
>>
>> Before:
>> [    0.143067] vDSO @ ffffffff82004000
>> [    0.143551] vDSO @ ffffffff82006000
>> ---[ High Kernel Mapping ]---
>> 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffff81000000      16M                         pmd
>> 0xffffffff81000000-0xffffffff81800000       8M   ro     PSE     GLB x  pmd
>> 0xffffffff81800000-0xffffffff819f3000    1996K   ro             GLB x  pte
>> 0xffffffff819f3000-0xffffffff81a00000      52K   ro                 NX pte
>> 0xffffffff81a00000-0xffffffff81e00000       4M   ro     PSE     GLB NX pmd
>> 0xffffffff81e00000-0xffffffff81e05000      20K   ro             GLB NX pte
>> 0xffffffff81e05000-0xffffffff82000000    2028K   ro                 NX pte
>> 0xffffffff82000000-0xffffffff8214f000    1340K   RW             GLB NX pte
>> 0xffffffff8214f000-0xffffffff82281000    1224K   RW                 NX pte
>> 0xffffffff82281000-0xffffffff82400000    1532K   RW             GLB NX pte
>> 0xffffffff82400000-0xffffffff83200000      14M   RW     PSE     GLB NX pmd
>> 0xffffffff83200000-0xffffffffc0000000     974M                         pmd
>>
>> After:
>> [    0.145062] vDSO @ ffffffff81da1000
>> [    0.146057] vDSO @ ffffffff81da4000
>> ---[ High Kernel Mapping ]---
>> 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffff81000000      16M                         pmd
>> 0xffffffff81000000-0xffffffff81800000       8M   ro     PSE     GLB x  pmd
>> 0xffffffff81800000-0xffffffff819f3000    1996K   ro             GLB x  pte
>> 0xffffffff819f3000-0xffffffff81a00000      52K   ro                 NX pte
>> 0xffffffff81a00000-0xffffffff81e00000       4M   ro     PSE     GLB NX pmd
>> 0xffffffff81e00000-0xffffffff81e0b000      44K   ro             GLB NX pte
>> 0xffffffff81e0b000-0xffffffff82000000    2004K   ro                 NX pte
>> 0xffffffff82000000-0xffffffff8214c000    1328K   RW             GLB NX pte
>> 0xffffffff8214c000-0xffffffff8227e000    1224K   RW                 NX pte
>> 0xffffffff8227e000-0xffffffff82400000    1544K   RW             GLB NX pte
>> 0xffffffff82400000-0xffffffff83200000      14M   RW     PSE     GLB NX pmd
>> 0xffffffff83200000-0xffffffffc0000000     974M                         pmd
>>
>> Based on work by PaX Team and Brad Spengler.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
>
> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
>

FWIW, this has a minor conflict with some stuff in my queue.  I
wouldn't worry about it for now.

--Andy