From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>, PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>, Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>, Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>, Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>, Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>, Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>, Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>, "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>, x86@kernel.org, Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>, Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>, David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>, Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>, Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Subject: [PATCH v2 11/11] mm: SLUB hardened usercopy support Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2016 14:56:04 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <1468446964-22213-12-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw) In-Reply-To: <1468446964-22213-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> Under CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY, this adds object size checking to the SLUB allocator to catch any copies that may span objects. Includes a redzone handling fix from Michael Ellerman. Based on code from PaX and grsecurity. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> --- init/Kconfig | 1 + mm/slub.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+) diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig index 798c2020ee7c..1c4711819dfd 100644 --- a/init/Kconfig +++ b/init/Kconfig @@ -1765,6 +1765,7 @@ config SLAB config SLUB bool "SLUB (Unqueued Allocator)" + select HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR help SLUB is a slab allocator that minimizes cache line usage instead of managing queues of cached objects (SLAB approach). diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c index 825ff4505336..7dee3d9a5843 100644 --- a/mm/slub.c +++ b/mm/slub.c @@ -3614,6 +3614,42 @@ void *__kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kmalloc_node); #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY +/* + * Rejects objects that are incorrectly sized. + * + * Returns NULL if check passes, otherwise const char * to name of cache + * to indicate an error. + */ +const char *__check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, + struct page *page) +{ + struct kmem_cache *s; + unsigned long offset; + size_t object_size; + + /* Find object and usable object size. */ + s = page->slab_cache; + object_size = slab_ksize(s); + + /* Find offset within object. */ + offset = (ptr - page_address(page)) % s->size; + + /* Adjust for redzone and reject if within the redzone. */ + if (kmem_cache_debug(s) && s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) { + if (offset < s->red_left_pad) + return s->name; + offset -= s->red_left_pad; + } + + /* Allow address range falling entirely within object size. */ + if (offset <= object_size && n <= object_size - offset) + return NULL; + + return s->name; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY */ + static size_t __ksize(const void *object) { struct page *page; -- 2.7.4 -- To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM, see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ . Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>, PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>, Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>, Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>, Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>, Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>, Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>, Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>, "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>, x86@kernel.org, Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>, Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>, David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>, Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>, Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>, Vitaly Wool <vitalywool@gmail.com>, Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>, Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, sparclinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Subject: [PATCH v2 11/11] mm: SLUB hardened usercopy support Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2016 14:56:04 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <1468446964-22213-12-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw) Message-ID: <20160713215604.wB9_Wb0Xzcgxh0BIG5-yp7D9U8n9Lof4Amwg0XSQpOE@z> (raw) In-Reply-To: <1468446964-22213-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> Under CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY, this adds object size checking to the SLUB allocator to catch any copies that may span objects. Includes a redzone handling fix from Michael Ellerman. Based on code from PaX and grsecurity. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> --- init/Kconfig | 1 + mm/slub.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+) diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig index 798c2020ee7c..1c4711819dfd 100644 --- a/init/Kconfig +++ b/init/Kconfig @@ -1765,6 +1765,7 @@ config SLAB config SLUB bool "SLUB (Unqueued Allocator)" + select HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR help SLUB is a slab allocator that minimizes cache line usage instead of managing queues of cached objects (SLAB approach). diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c index 825ff4505336..7dee3d9a5843 100644 --- a/mm/slub.c +++ b/mm/slub.c @@ -3614,6 +3614,42 @@ void *__kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kmalloc_node); #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY +/* + * Rejects objects that are incorrectly sized. + * + * Returns NULL if check passes, otherwise const char * to name of cache + * to indicate an error. + */ +const char *__check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, + struct page *page) +{ + struct kmem_cache *s; + unsigned long offset; + size_t object_size; + + /* Find object and usable object size. */ + s = page->slab_cache; + object_size = slab_ksize(s); + + /* Find offset within object. */ + offset = (ptr - page_address(page)) % s->size; + + /* Adjust for redzone and reject if within the redzone. */ + if (kmem_cache_debug(s) && s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) { + if (offset < s->red_left_pad) + return s->name; + offset -= s->red_left_pad; + } + + /* Allow address range falling entirely within object size. */ + if (offset <= object_size && n <= object_size - offset) + return NULL; + + return s->name; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY */ + static size_t __ksize(const void *object) { struct page *page; -- 2.7.4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-07-13 21:56 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 66+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2016-07-13 21:55 [PATCH v2 0/11] mm: Hardened usercopy Kees Cook 2016-07-13 21:55 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-13 21:55 ` [PATCH v2 01/11] mm: Implement stack frame object validation Kees Cook 2016-07-13 21:55 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-13 22:01 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-07-13 22:01 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-07-13 22:04 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-13 22:04 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-14 5:48 ` Josh Poimboeuf 2016-07-14 5:48 ` Josh Poimboeuf 2016-07-14 18:10 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-14 18:10 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-14 19:23 ` Josh Poimboeuf 2016-07-14 19:23 ` Josh Poimboeuf 2016-07-14 21:38 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-14 21:38 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-13 21:55 ` [PATCH v2 02/11] mm: Hardened usercopy Kees Cook 2016-07-13 21:55 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-14 23:20 ` Balbir Singh 2016-07-14 23:20 ` Balbir Singh 2016-07-15 1:04 ` Rik van Riel 2016-07-15 1:04 ` Rik van Riel 2016-07-15 1:41 ` Balbir Singh 2016-07-15 1:41 ` Balbir Singh 2016-07-15 4:05 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-15 4:05 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-15 4:53 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-15 4:53 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-15 12:55 ` Balbir Singh 2016-07-15 12:55 ` Balbir Singh 2016-07-15 4:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-15 4:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-15 19:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Daniel Micay 2016-07-15 19:00 ` Daniel Micay 2016-07-15 19:14 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-15 19:14 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-15 19:19 ` Daniel Micay 2016-07-15 19:19 ` Daniel Micay 2016-07-15 19:23 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-15 19:23 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-13 21:55 ` [PATCH v2 03/11] x86/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy Kees Cook 2016-07-13 21:55 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-13 21:55 ` [PATCH v2 04/11] ARM: uaccess: " Kees Cook 2016-07-13 21:55 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-13 21:55 ` [PATCH v2 05/11] arm64/uaccess: " Kees Cook 2016-07-13 21:55 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-13 21:55 ` [PATCH v2 06/11] ia64/uaccess: " Kees Cook 2016-07-13 21:55 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-13 21:56 ` [PATCH v2 07/11] powerpc/uaccess: " Kees Cook 2016-07-13 21:56 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-13 21:56 ` [PATCH v2 08/11] sparc/uaccess: " Kees Cook 2016-07-13 21:56 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-13 21:56 ` [PATCH v2 09/11] s390/uaccess: " Kees Cook 2016-07-13 21:56 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-13 21:56 ` [PATCH v2 10/11] mm: SLAB hardened usercopy support Kees Cook 2016-07-13 21:56 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-13 21:56 ` Kees Cook [this message] 2016-07-13 21:56 ` [PATCH v2 11/11] mm: SLUB " Kees Cook 2016-07-14 10:07 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman 2016-07-14 10:07 ` Michael Ellerman 2016-07-14 10:07 ` Michael Ellerman 2016-07-14 10:07 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman 2016-07-15 2:05 ` Balbir Singh 2016-07-15 2:05 ` Balbir Singh 2016-07-15 4:29 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-15 4:29 ` Kees Cook
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