From: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com> To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Okamoto Takayuki <tokamoto@jp.fujitsu.com>, libc-alpha@sourceware.org, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>, Szabolcs Nagy <szabolcs.nagy@arm.com>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>, kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu Subject: [PATCH v5 03/30] arm64: signal: Verify extra data is user-readable in sys_rt_sigreturn Date: Tue, 31 Oct 2017 15:50:55 +0000 [thread overview] Message-ID: <1509465082-30427-4-git-send-email-Dave.Martin@arm.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <1509465082-30427-1-git-send-email-Dave.Martin@arm.com> Currently sys_rt_sigreturn() verifies that the base sigframe is readable, but no similar check is performed on the extra data to which an extra_context record points. This matters because the extra data will be read with the unprotected user accessors. However, this is not a problem at present because the extra data base address is required to be exactly at the end of the base sigframe. So, there would need to be a non-user-readable kernel address within about 59K (SIGFRAME_MAXSZ - sizeof(struct rt_sigframe)) of some address for which access_ok(VERIFY_READ) returns true, in order for sigreturn to be able to read kernel memory that should be inaccessible to the user task. This is currently impossible due to the untranslatable address hole between the TTBR0 and TTBR1 address ranges. Disappearance of the hole between the TTBR0 and TTBR1 mapping ranges would require the VA size for TTBR0 and TTBR1 to grow to at least 55 bits, and either the disabling of tagged pointers for userspace or enabling of tagged pointers for kernel space; none of which is currently envisaged. Even so, it is wrong to use the unprotected user accessors without an accompanying access_ok() check. To avoid the potential for future surprises, this patch does an explicit access_ok() check on the extra data space when parsing an extra_context record. Fixes: 33f082614c34 ("arm64: signal: Allow expansion of the signal frame") Signed-off-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com> --- arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c index 0bdc96c..4716729 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c @@ -343,6 +343,10 @@ static int parse_user_sigframe(struct user_ctxs *user, */ offset = 0; limit = extra_size; + + if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, base, limit)) + goto invalid; + continue; default: -- 2.1.4
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com> To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: "Catalin Marinas" <catalin.marinas@arm.com>, "Will Deacon" <will.deacon@arm.com>, "Ard Biesheuvel" <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>, "Alex Bennée" <alex.bennee@linaro.org>, "Szabolcs Nagy" <szabolcs.nagy@arm.com>, "Okamoto Takayuki" <tokamoto@jp.fujitsu.com>, kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu, libc-alpha@sourceware.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v5 03/30] arm64: signal: Verify extra data is user-readable in sys_rt_sigreturn Date: Tue, 31 Oct 2017 15:50:55 +0000 [thread overview] Message-ID: <1509465082-30427-4-git-send-email-Dave.Martin@arm.com> (raw) Message-ID: <20171031155055.gKDye_J1Nyb4QBs3MzRStqH7LgZsM-ex1X-RNk3bw28@z> (raw) In-Reply-To: <1509465082-30427-1-git-send-email-Dave.Martin@arm.com> Currently sys_rt_sigreturn() verifies that the base sigframe is readable, but no similar check is performed on the extra data to which an extra_context record points. This matters because the extra data will be read with the unprotected user accessors. However, this is not a problem at present because the extra data base address is required to be exactly at the end of the base sigframe. So, there would need to be a non-user-readable kernel address within about 59K (SIGFRAME_MAXSZ - sizeof(struct rt_sigframe)) of some address for which access_ok(VERIFY_READ) returns true, in order for sigreturn to be able to read kernel memory that should be inaccessible to the user task. This is currently impossible due to the untranslatable address hole between the TTBR0 and TTBR1 address ranges. Disappearance of the hole between the TTBR0 and TTBR1 mapping ranges would require the VA size for TTBR0 and TTBR1 to grow to at least 55 bits, and either the disabling of tagged pointers for userspace or enabling of tagged pointers for kernel space; none of which is currently envisaged. Even so, it is wrong to use the unprotected user accessors without an accompanying access_ok() check. To avoid the potential for future surprises, this patch does an explicit access_ok() check on the extra data space when parsing an extra_context record. Fixes: 33f082614c34 ("arm64: signal: Allow expansion of the signal frame") Signed-off-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com> --- arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c index 0bdc96c..4716729 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c @@ -343,6 +343,10 @@ static int parse_user_sigframe(struct user_ctxs *user, */ offset = 0; limit = extra_size; + + if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, base, limit)) + goto invalid; + continue; default: -- 2.1.4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-10-31 15:50 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 106+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2017-10-31 15:50 [PATCH v5 00/30] ARM Scalable Vector Extension (SVE) Dave Martin 2017-10-31 15:50 ` Dave Martin 2017-10-31 15:50 ` [PATCH v5 01/30] regset: Add support for dynamically sized regsets Dave Martin 2017-11-01 11:42 ` Catalin Marinas 2017-11-01 13:16 ` Dave Martin 2017-11-01 13:16 ` Dave Martin 2017-11-08 11:50 ` Alex Bennée 2017-11-08 11:50 ` Alex Bennée 2017-10-31 15:50 ` [PATCH v5 02/30] arm64: fpsimd: Correctly annotate exception helpers called from asm Dave Martin 2017-10-31 15:50 ` Dave Martin 2017-11-01 11:42 ` Catalin Marinas 2017-10-31 15:50 ` Dave Martin [this message] 2017-10-31 15:50 ` [PATCH v5 03/30] arm64: signal: Verify extra data is user-readable in sys_rt_sigreturn Dave Martin 2017-11-01 11:43 ` Catalin Marinas 2017-10-31 15:50 ` [PATCH v5 04/30] arm64: KVM: Hide unsupported AArch64 CPU features from guests Dave Martin 2017-11-01 4:47 ` Christoffer Dall 2017-11-01 10:26 ` Dave Martin 2017-11-02 8:15 ` Christoffer Dall 2017-11-02 9:20 ` Dave Martin 2017-11-02 11:01 ` Dave Martin 2017-11-02 19:18 ` Christoffer Dall 2017-10-31 15:50 ` [PATCH v5 05/30] arm64: efi: Add missing Kconfig dependency on KERNEL_MODE_NEON Dave Martin 2017-10-31 15:50 ` Dave Martin 2017-10-31 15:50 ` [PATCH v5 06/30] arm64: Port deprecated instruction emulation to new sysctl interface Dave Martin 2017-10-31 15:50 ` [PATCH v5 07/30] arm64: fpsimd: Simplify uses of {set,clear}_ti_thread_flag() Dave Martin 2017-10-31 15:51 ` [PATCH v5 08/30] arm64/sve: System register and exception syndrome definitions Dave Martin 2017-10-31 15:51 ` [PATCH v5 09/30] arm64/sve: Low-level SVE architectural state manipulation functions Dave Martin 2017-10-31 15:51 ` [PATCH v5 10/30] arm64/sve: Kconfig update and conditional compilation support Dave Martin 2017-10-31 15:51 ` [PATCH v5 11/30] arm64/sve: Signal frame and context structure definition Dave Martin 2017-11-08 16:34 ` Alex Bennée 2017-11-08 16:34 ` Alex Bennée 2017-10-31 15:51 ` [PATCH v5 12/30] arm64/sve: Low-level CPU setup Dave Martin 2017-11-08 16:37 ` Alex Bennée 2017-11-08 16:37 ` Alex Bennée 2017-10-31 15:51 ` [PATCH v5 13/30] arm64/sve: Core task context handling Dave Martin 2017-10-31 15:51 ` Dave Martin 2017-11-09 17:16 ` Alex Bennée 2017-11-09 17:16 ` Alex Bennée 2017-11-09 17:56 ` Dave Martin 2017-11-09 18:06 ` Alex Bennée 2017-11-09 18:06 ` Alex Bennée 2017-10-31 15:51 ` [PATCH v5 14/30] arm64/sve: Support vector length resetting for new processes Dave Martin 2017-10-31 15:51 ` [PATCH v5 15/30] arm64/sve: Signal handling support Dave Martin 2017-10-31 15:51 ` Dave Martin 2017-11-01 14:33 ` Catalin Marinas 2017-11-07 13:22 ` Alex Bennée 2017-11-07 13:22 ` Alex Bennée 2017-11-08 16:11 ` Dave Martin 2017-12-06 19:56 ` Kees Cook 2017-12-07 10:49 ` Will Deacon 2017-12-07 12:03 ` Dave Martin 2017-12-07 18:50 ` Kees Cook 2017-12-11 14:07 ` Will Deacon 2017-12-11 19:23 ` Kees Cook 2017-12-12 10:40 ` Will Deacon 2017-12-12 11:11 ` Dave Martin 2017-12-12 19:36 ` Kees Cook 2017-12-12 19:36 ` Kees Cook 2017-10-31 15:51 ` [PATCH v5 16/30] arm64/sve: Backend logic for setting the vector length Dave Martin 2017-10-31 15:51 ` Dave Martin 2017-11-10 10:27 ` Alex Bennée 2017-11-10 10:27 ` Alex Bennée 2017-10-31 15:51 ` [PATCH v5 17/30] arm64: cpufeature: Move sys_caps_initialised declarations Dave Martin 2017-10-31 15:51 ` [PATCH v5 18/30] arm64/sve: Probe SVE capabilities and usable vector lengths Dave Martin 2017-10-31 15:51 ` Dave Martin 2017-10-31 15:51 ` [PATCH v5 19/30] arm64/sve: Preserve SVE registers around kernel-mode NEON use Dave Martin 2017-10-31 15:51 ` [PATCH v5 20/30] arm64/sve: Preserve SVE registers around EFI runtime service calls Dave Martin 2017-10-31 15:51 ` [PATCH v5 21/30] arm64/sve: ptrace and ELF coredump support Dave Martin 2017-10-31 15:51 ` [PATCH v5 22/30] arm64/sve: Add prctl controls for userspace vector length management Dave Martin 2017-10-31 15:51 ` Dave Martin 2017-10-31 15:51 ` [PATCH v5 23/30] arm64/sve: Add sysctl to set the default vector length for new processes Dave Martin 2017-10-31 15:51 ` Dave Martin 2017-10-31 15:51 ` [PATCH v5 24/30] arm64/sve: KVM: Prevent guests from using SVE Dave Martin 2017-10-31 15:51 ` Dave Martin 2017-10-31 15:51 ` [PATCH v5 25/30] arm64/sve: KVM: Treat guest SVE use as undefined instruction execution Dave Martin 2017-10-31 15:51 ` [PATCH v5 26/30] arm64/sve: KVM: Hide SVE from CPU features exposed to guests Dave Martin 2017-10-31 15:51 ` [PATCH v5 27/30] arm64/sve: Detect SVE and activate runtime support Dave Martin 2017-10-31 15:51 ` Dave Martin [not found] ` <1509465082-30427-1-git-send-email-Dave.Martin-5wv7dgnIgG8@public.gmane.org> 2017-10-31 15:51 ` [PATCH v5 28/30] arm64/sve: Add documentation Dave Martin 2017-10-31 15:51 ` Dave Martin 2017-11-02 16:32 ` [PATCH v5 00/30] ARM Scalable Vector Extension (SVE) Will Deacon 2017-11-02 16:32 ` Will Deacon [not found] ` <20171102163248.GB595-5wv7dgnIgG8@public.gmane.org> 2017-11-02 17:04 ` Dave P Martin 2017-11-02 17:04 ` Dave P Martin 2017-10-31 15:51 ` [RFC PATCH v5 29/30] arm64: signal: Report signal frame size to userspace via auxv Dave Martin 2017-10-31 15:51 ` Dave Martin 2017-10-31 15:51 ` [RFC PATCH v5 30/30] arm64/sve: signal: Include SVE when computing AT_MINSIGSTKSZ Dave Martin 2017-10-31 15:51 ` Dave Martin 2017-11-29 15:04 ` [PATCH v5 00/30] ARM Scalable Vector Extension (SVE) Alex Bennée 2017-11-29 15:04 ` Alex Bennée [not found] ` <877eu9dt3n.fsf-QSEj5FYQhm4dnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org> 2017-11-29 15:21 ` Will Deacon 2017-11-29 15:21 ` Will Deacon [not found] ` <20171129152140.GD10650-5wv7dgnIgG8@public.gmane.org> 2017-11-29 15:37 ` Dave Martin 2017-11-29 15:37 ` Dave Martin 2018-01-08 14:49 ` Yury Norov 2018-01-08 14:49 ` Yury Norov 2018-01-09 16:51 ` Yury Norov 2018-01-09 16:51 ` Yury Norov 2018-01-15 17:22 ` Dave Martin 2018-01-15 17:22 ` Dave Martin [not found] ` <20180115172201.GW22781-M5GwZQ6tE7x5pKCnmE3YQBJ8xKzm50AiAL8bYrjMMd8@public.gmane.org> 2018-01-16 10:11 ` Yury Norov 2018-01-16 10:11 ` Yury Norov 2018-01-16 16:05 ` Dave Martin 2018-01-16 16:05 ` Dave Martin 2018-01-15 16:55 ` Dave Martin 2018-01-15 16:55 ` Dave Martin
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