From: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
"Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@oracle.com>,
linux-scsi <linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, qla2xxx-upstream@qlogic.com,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 17/19] qla2xxx: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 22:05:55 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1515737155.3056.48.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAPcyv4gb8SpBEYnuc3hULLZdiuUM1Lhc33CBirmXtckD0CsLww@mail.gmail.com>
On Thu, 2018-01-11 at 21:38 -0800, Dan Williams wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 11, 2018 at 5:19 PM, James Bottomley
> <jejb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Thu, 2018-01-11 at 16:47 -0800, Dan Williams wrote:
> > >
> > > Static analysis reports that 'handle' may be a user controlled
> > > value that is used as a data dependency to read 'sp' from the
> > > 'req->outstanding_cmds' array.
> >
> > Greg already told you it comes from hardware, specifically the
> > hardware response queue. If you don't believe him, I can confirm
> > it's quite definitely all copied from the iomem where the mailbox
> > response is, so it can't be a user controlled value (well, unless
> > the user has some influence over the firmware of the
> > qla2xxx controller, which probably means you have other things to
> > worry about than speculative information leaks).
>
> I do believe him, and I still submitted this. I'm trying to probe at
> the meta question of where do we draw the line with these especially
> when it costs us relatively little to apply a few line patch? We fix
> theoretical lockdep races, why not theoretical data leak paths?
I think I've lost the thread of what you're after. I thought you were
asking for the domain experts to look and see if there is the potential
for attack; if there's no theoretical way for a user to influence the
value what's the point of killing speculation? Furthermore, if the
user could affect that 32 bit value, what they'd actually do is extract
information via the que variable which you didn't fix and which could
be used to compromise the kernel without resorting to side channel
attacks.
What's most puzzling to me is the inconsistency of the positions: if it
doesn't cost that much to turn off speculation, just do it on kernel
entry as Jiří suggested; we can make it a dynamic option and the cloud
providers can do it and the rest of us don't need to bother. If it
does cost a lot to turn it off as Alan said, then you need us to
identify the cases above where there's no need to disrupt the
speculation pipeline and not turn it off there. Which is it?
James
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-01-12 6:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 103+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-12 0:46 [PATCH v2 00/19] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:46 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:46 ` [PATCH v2 01/19] Documentation: document array_ptr Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:46 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 10:38 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2018-01-12 10:38 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2018-01-16 21:01 ` Kees Cook
2018-01-16 21:01 ` Kees Cook
2018-01-12 0:46 ` [PATCH v2 02/19] arm64: implement ifence_array_ptr() Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:46 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:46 ` [PATCH v2 03/19] arm: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:46 ` [PATCH v2 04/19] x86: implement ifence() Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:46 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 2:27 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-01-12 2:27 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-01-12 3:39 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:46 ` [PATCH v2 05/19] x86: implement ifence_array_ptr() and array_ptr_mask() Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:46 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:46 ` [PATCH v2 06/19] asm-generic/barrier: mask speculative execution flows Dan Williams
2018-01-12 2:42 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-01-12 9:12 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-13 0:41 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-15 8:46 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-12 0:47 ` [PATCH v2 07/19] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:47 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 17:51 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-12 18:21 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 18:58 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-12 18:58 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-12 19:26 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 19:26 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 20:01 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-12 20:01 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-12 20:41 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-12 20:41 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-12 0:47 ` [PATCH v2 08/19] x86: use __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE in get_user paths Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:47 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 1:11 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-12 1:14 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 1:14 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:47 ` [PATCH v2 09/19] ipv6: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:47 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:47 ` [PATCH v2 10/19] ipv4: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:47 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 7:59 ` Greg KH
2018-01-12 7:59 ` Greg KH
2018-01-12 18:47 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 18:47 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-13 8:56 ` Greg KH
2018-01-13 8:56 ` Greg KH
2018-01-12 0:47 ` [PATCH v2 11/19] vfs, fdtable: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:47 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:47 ` [PATCH v2 12/19] userns: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:47 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:47 ` [PATCH v2 13/19] udf: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:47 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-15 10:32 ` Jan Kara
2018-01-15 17:49 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:47 ` [PATCH v2 14/19] [media] uvcvideo: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:47 ` Dan Williams
2018-08-06 21:40 ` Laurent Pinchart
2018-08-06 21:40 ` Laurent Pinchart
2018-01-12 0:47 ` [PATCH v2 15/19] carl9170: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:47 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 14:42 ` Christian Lamparter
2018-01-12 14:42 ` Christian Lamparter
2018-01-12 18:39 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 20:01 ` Christian Lamparter
2018-01-12 20:01 ` Christian Lamparter
2018-01-12 23:05 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 23:05 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:47 ` [PATCH v2 16/19] p54: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:47 ` [PATCH v2 17/19] qla2xxx: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:47 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 1:19 ` James Bottomley
2018-01-12 1:19 ` James Bottomley
2018-01-12 5:38 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 5:38 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 6:05 ` James Bottomley [this message]
2018-01-12 0:48 ` [PATCH v2 18/19] cw1200: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:48 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:48 ` [PATCH v2 19/19] net: mpls: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:48 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 1:19 ` [PATCH v2 00/19] " Linus Torvalds
2018-01-12 1:19 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-12 1:41 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 1:41 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-18 13:18 ` Will Deacon
2018-01-18 13:18 ` Will Deacon
2018-01-18 16:58 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-18 16:58 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-18 17:05 ` Will Deacon
2018-01-18 17:05 ` Will Deacon
2018-01-18 21:41 ` Laurent Pinchart
2018-01-18 21:41 ` Laurent Pinchart
2018-01-13 0:15 ` Tony Luck
2018-01-13 0:15 ` Tony Luck
2018-01-13 18:51 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-13 18:51 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-16 19:21 ` Tony Luck
2018-01-16 19:21 ` Tony Luck
2018-01-12 10:02 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-01-12 10:02 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
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