From: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
To: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@gmail.com>,
linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
alan@linux.intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 10/10] nl80211: sanitize array index in parse_txq_params
Date: Sun, 21 Jan 2018 11:37:43 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1516531063.2508.2.camel@sipsolutions.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <151632015637.21271.10452415430644852207.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com>
On Thu, 2018-01-18 at 16:02 -0800, Dan Williams wrote:
> Wireless drivers rely on parse_txq_params to validate that
> txq_params->ac is less than NL80211_NUM_ACS by the time the low-level
> driver's ->conf_tx() handler is called. Use a new helper, 'array_idx',
> to sanitize txq_params->ac with respect to speculation. I.e. ensure that
> any speculation into ->conf_tx() handlers is done with a value of
> txq_params->ac that is within the bounds of [0, NL80211_NUM_ACS).
Sorry, I didn't realize you were waiting for me to review.
LGTM.
Reviewed-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
> Reported-by: Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@gmail.com>
> Reported-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
> Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
> Cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
> ---
> include/linux/nospec.h | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
> net/wireless/nl80211.c | 10 +++++++---
> 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/nospec.h b/include/linux/nospec.h
> index f841c11f3f1f..8af35be1869e 100644
> --- a/include/linux/nospec.h
> +++ b/include/linux/nospec.h
> @@ -41,4 +41,25 @@ static inline unsigned long array_ptr_mask(unsigned long idx, unsigned long sz)
> __u._bit &= _mask; \
> __u._ptr; \
> })
> +
> +/**
> + * array_idx - Generate a pointer to an array index, ensuring the
> + * pointer is bounded under speculation to NULL.
> + *
> + * @idx: the index of the element, must be less than LONG_MAX
> + * @sz: the number of elements in the array, must be less than LONG_MAX
> + *
> + * If @idx falls in the interval [0, @sz), returns &@idx otherwise
> + * returns NULL.
> + */
> +#define array_idx(idx, sz) \
> +({ \
> + union { typeof((idx)) *_ptr; unsigned long _bit; } __u; \
> + typeof(idx) *_i = &(idx); \
> + unsigned long _mask = array_ptr_mask(*_i, (sz)); \
> + \
> + __u._ptr = _i; \
> + __u._bit &= _mask; \
> + __u._ptr; \
> +})
> #endif /* __NOSPEC_H__ */
> diff --git a/net/wireless/nl80211.c b/net/wireless/nl80211.c
> index 2b3dbcd40e46..202cb1dc03ee 100644
> --- a/net/wireless/nl80211.c
> +++ b/net/wireless/nl80211.c
> @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
> #include <linux/nl80211.h>
> #include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
> #include <linux/netlink.h>
> +#include <linux/nospec.h>
> #include <linux/etherdevice.h>
> #include <net/net_namespace.h>
> #include <net/genetlink.h>
> @@ -2056,20 +2057,23 @@ static const struct nla_policy txq_params_policy[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_MAX + 1] = {
> static int parse_txq_params(struct nlattr *tb[],
> struct ieee80211_txq_params *txq_params)
> {
> + u8 ac, *idx;
> +
> if (!tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AC] || !tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_TXOP] ||
> !tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_CWMIN] || !tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_CWMAX] ||
> !tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AIFS])
> return -EINVAL;
>
> - txq_params->ac = nla_get_u8(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AC]);
> + ac = nla_get_u8(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AC]);
> txq_params->txop = nla_get_u16(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_TXOP]);
> txq_params->cwmin = nla_get_u16(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_CWMIN]);
> txq_params->cwmax = nla_get_u16(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_CWMAX]);
> txq_params->aifs = nla_get_u8(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AIFS]);
>
> - if (txq_params->ac >= NL80211_NUM_ACS)
> + idx = array_idx(ac, NL80211_NUM_ACS);
> + if (!idx)
> return -EINVAL;
> -
> + txq_params->ac = *idx;
> return 0;
> }
>
>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-01-21 10:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 62+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-19 0:01 [PATCH v4 00/10] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-19 0:01 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-19 0:01 ` [PATCH v4 01/10] Documentation: document array_ptr Dan Williams
2018-01-19 0:01 ` [PATCH v4 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references Dan Williams
2018-01-19 0:01 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-19 10:20 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jann Horn
2018-01-19 17:48 ` Adam Sampson
2018-01-19 17:48 ` Adam Sampson
2018-01-19 18:12 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-19 18:18 ` Will Deacon
2018-01-19 18:18 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Deacon
2018-01-19 18:26 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-19 18:18 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-19 18:18 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2018-01-19 20:55 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-25 7:09 ` Cyril Novikov
2018-01-25 7:09 ` Cyril Novikov
2018-01-25 22:37 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-25 22:37 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-19 0:01 ` [PATCH v4 03/10] x86: implement array_ptr_mask() Dan Williams
2018-01-19 0:01 ` [PATCH v4 04/10] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec and ifence Dan Williams
2018-01-19 0:02 ` [PATCH v4 05/10] x86, __get_user: use __uaccess_begin_nospec Dan Williams
2018-01-19 0:02 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-19 0:02 ` [PATCH v4 06/10] x86, get_user: use pointer masking to limit speculation Dan Williams
2018-01-19 0:02 ` [PATCH v4 07/10] x86: narrow out of bounds syscalls to sys_read under speculation Dan Williams
2018-01-24 14:40 ` Jiri Slaby
2018-02-06 19:29 ` Luis Henriques
2018-02-06 19:48 ` Dan Williams
2018-02-06 19:48 ` Dan Williams
2018-02-06 20:26 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 20:26 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 20:37 ` Dan Williams
2018-02-06 20:42 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 20:42 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 20:43 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 20:43 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 20:49 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-06 20:49 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-06 20:58 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 20:58 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 21:37 ` Dan Williams
2018-02-06 22:52 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 22:52 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-07 0:33 ` Dan Williams
2018-02-07 1:23 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 22:51 ` Luis Henriques
2018-02-06 22:51 ` Luis Henriques
2018-01-19 0:02 ` [PATCH v4 08/10] vfs, fdtable: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-19 0:02 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-19 0:02 ` [PATCH v4 09/10] kvm, x86: fix spectre-v1 mitigation Dan Williams
2018-01-19 0:02 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-19 8:42 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-19 8:42 ` Paolo Bonzini
[not found] ` <151632009605.21271.11304291057104672116.stgit-p8uTFz9XbKj2zm6wflaqv1nYeNYlB/vhral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
2018-01-19 0:02 ` [PATCH v4 10/10] nl80211: sanitize array index in parse_txq_params Dan Williams
2018-01-19 0:02 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-21 10:37 ` Johannes Berg [this message]
2018-01-20 6:58 ` [PATCH v4 00/10] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-20 6:58 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-20 16:56 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-20 16:56 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-20 17:07 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-20 17:07 ` Alexei Starovoitov
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