From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
To: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org,
Jinpu Wang <jinpu.wang@profitbricks.com>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>,
alan@linux.intel.com, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3.16 56/76] x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation
Date: Mon, 19 Mar 2018 00:59:20 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1521421160.2495.188.camel@decadent.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2a1d3a0f-6227-39c6-0ed9-a07c22424d67@suse.cz>
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On Mon, 2018-03-12 at 08:32 +0100, Jiri Slaby wrote:
> On 03/12/2018, 04:06 AM, Ben Hutchings wrote:
> > In 3.16 the x86_32 syscall table lookup is also written in assembly.
> > So I've taken Jiri's version and added similar masking in entry_32.S,
> > using edx as the temporary. edx is clobbered by SAVE_REGS and seems
> > to be free at this point.
>
> I don't know the state in 3.16, but in 3.12, I had to fix the 32bit
> entry on 64bit in arch/x86/ia32/ia32entry.S (ia32_sysenter_target &
> others) too.
Thank you, yes I need to fix them in 3.16 too. I also failed to use
retpolines there.
Ben.
--
Ben Hutchings
The first rule of tautology club is the first rule of tautology club.
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-03-19 0:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <lsq.1520823971.5976735@decadent.org.uk>
2018-03-12 3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 74/76] x86/usercopy: Replace open coded stac/clac with __uaccess_{begin, end} Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 75/76] x86/uaccess: Use __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 70/76] nospec: Include <asm/barrier.h> dependency Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 59/76] x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 54/76] x86: Introduce barrier_nospec Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 55/76] x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculation Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 52/76] array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 58/76] nl80211: Sanitize array index in parse_txq_params Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 53/76] x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 56/76] x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 7:32 ` Jiri Slaby
2018-03-12 7:32 ` Jiri Slaby
2018-03-19 0:59 ` Ben Hutchings [this message]
2018-03-19 0:59 ` Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 51/76] Documentation: Document array_index_nospec Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 73/76] x86: Introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 57/76] vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 69/76] nospec: Kill array_index_nospec_mask_check() Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` Ben Hutchings
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