From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Yu-cheng Yu Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/10] Control Flow Enforcement - Part (3) Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2018 07:56:34 -0700 Message-ID: <1530024994.27091.0.camel@intel.com> References: <20180607143807.3611-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Return-path: In-Reply-To: Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org To: Jann Horn Cc: kernel list , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, Linux-MM , linux-arch , the arch/x86 maintainers , "H . Peter Anvin" , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , hjl.tools@gmail.com, vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com, ravi.v.shankar@intel.com, Dave Hansen , Andy Lutomirski , Jonathan Corbet , Oleg Nesterov , Arnd Bergmann , Mike Kravetz List-Id: linux-arch.vger.kernel.org On Tue, 2018-06-26 at 04:46 +0200, Jann Horn wrote: > On Tue, Jun 26, 2018 at 4:45 AM Yu-cheng Yu > wrote: > > > > > > This series introduces CET - Shadow stack > > > > At the high level, shadow stack is: > > > >         Allocated from a task's address space with vm_flags > > VM_SHSTK; > >         Its PTEs must be read-only and dirty; > >         Fixed sized, but the default size can be changed by sys > > admin. > > > > For a forked child, the shadow stack is duplicated when the next > > shadow stack access takes place. > > > > For a pthread child, a new shadow stack is allocated. > > > > The signal handler uses the same shadow stack as the main program. > > > > Yu-cheng Yu (10): > >   x86/cet: User-mode shadow stack support > >   x86/cet: Introduce WRUSS instruction > >   x86/cet: Signal handling for shadow stack > >   x86/cet: Handle thread shadow stack > >   x86/cet: ELF header parsing of Control Flow Enforcement > >   x86/cet: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack > >   mm: Prevent mprotect from changing shadow stack > >   mm: Prevent mremap of shadow stack > >   mm: Prevent madvise from changing shadow stack > >   mm: Prevent munmap and remap_file_pages of shadow stack > Shouldn't patches like these be CC'ed to linux-api@vger.kernel.org? Yes, I will do that. Thanks, Yu-cheng From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mga01.intel.com ([192.55.52.88]:38049 "EHLO mga01.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751650AbeFZPAG (ORCPT ); Tue, 26 Jun 2018 11:00:06 -0400 Message-ID: <1530024994.27091.0.camel@intel.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/10] Control Flow Enforcement - Part (3) From: Yu-cheng Yu Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2018 07:56:34 -0700 In-Reply-To: References: <20180607143807.3611-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-arch-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: To: Jann Horn Cc: kernel list , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, Linux-MM , linux-arch , the arch/x86 maintainers , "H . Peter Anvin" , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , hjl.tools@gmail.com, vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com, ravi.v.shankar@intel.com, Dave Hansen , Andy Lutomirski , Jonathan Corbet , Oleg Nesterov , Arnd Bergmann , Mike Kravetz Message-ID: <20180626145634.MRc5usK7TDJQb6963pNCaeY4EBKaUsnTx7FvNYFHW_A@z> On Tue, 2018-06-26 at 04:46 +0200, Jann Horn wrote: > On Tue, Jun 26, 2018 at 4:45 AM Yu-cheng Yu > wrote: > > > > > > This series introduces CET - Shadow stack > > > > At the high level, shadow stack is: > > > >         Allocated from a task's address space with vm_flags > > VM_SHSTK; > >         Its PTEs must be read-only and dirty; > >         Fixed sized, but the default size can be changed by sys > > admin. > > > > For a forked child, the shadow stack is duplicated when the next > > shadow stack access takes place. > > > > For a pthread child, a new shadow stack is allocated. > > > > The signal handler uses the same shadow stack as the main program. > > > > Yu-cheng Yu (10): > >   x86/cet: User-mode shadow stack support > >   x86/cet: Introduce WRUSS instruction > >   x86/cet: Signal handling for shadow stack > >   x86/cet: Handle thread shadow stack > >   x86/cet: ELF header parsing of Control Flow Enforcement > >   x86/cet: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack > >   mm: Prevent mprotect from changing shadow stack > >   mm: Prevent mremap of shadow stack > >   mm: Prevent madvise from changing shadow stack > >   mm: Prevent munmap and remap_file_pages of shadow stack > Shouldn't patches like these be CC'ed to linux-api@vger.kernel.org? Yes, I will do that. Thanks, Yu-cheng