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From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromiun.org>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	Vedvyas
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 13/27] mm: Handle shadow stack page fault
Date: Tue, 14 Aug 2018 14:28:45 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1534282125.24160.9.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180711090656.GS2476@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>

On Wed, 2018-07-11 at 11:06 +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 10, 2018 at 04:06:25PM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> > 
> > On 07/10/2018 03:26 PM, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> > > 
> > > +	if (is_shstk_mapping(vma->vm_flags))
> > > +		entry = pte_mkdirty_shstk(entry);
> > > +	else
> > > +		entry = pte_mkdirty(entry);
> > > +
> > > +	entry = maybe_mkwrite(entry, vma);
> > >  	if (ptep_set_access_flags(vma, vmf->address, vmf->pte,
> > > entry, 1))
> > >  		update_mmu_cache(vma, vmf->address, vmf->pte);
> > >  	pte_unmap_unlock(vmf->pte, vmf->ptl);
> > > @@ -2526,7 +2532,11 @@ static int wp_page_copy(struct vm_fault
> > > *vmf)
> > >  		}
> > >  		flush_cache_page(vma, vmf->address,
> > > pte_pfn(vmf->orig_pte));
> > >  		entry = mk_pte(new_page, vma->vm_page_prot);
> > > -		entry = maybe_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(entry), vma);
> > > +		if (is_shstk_mapping(vma->vm_flags))
> > > +			entry = pte_mkdirty_shstk(entry);
> > > +		else
> > > +			entry = pte_mkdirty(entry);
> > > +		entry = maybe_mkwrite(entry, vma);
> > Do we want to lift this hunk of code and put it elsewhere?  Maybe:
> > 
> > 	entry = pte_set_vma_features(entry, vma);
> > 
> > and then:
> > 
> > pte_t pte_set_vma_features(pte_t entry, struct vm_area_struct)
> > {
> > 		/*
> > 		 * Shadow stack PTEs are always dirty and always
> > 		 * writable.  They have a different encoding for
> > 		 * this than normal PTEs, though.
> > 		 */
> > 		if (is_shstk_mapping(vma->vm_flags))
> > 			entry = pte_mkdirty_shstk(entry);
> > 		else
> > 			entry = pte_mkdirty(entry);
> > 
> > 		entry = maybe_mkwrite(entry, vma);
> > 
> > 	return entry;
> > }
> Yes, that wants a helper like that. Not sold on the name, but
> whatever.
> 
> Is there any way we can hide all the shadow stack magic in arch
> code?

We use is_shstk_mapping() only to determine PAGE_DIRTY_SW or
PAGE_DIRTY_HW should be set in a PTE.  One way to remove this shadow
stack code from generic code is changing pte_mkdirty(pte) to
pte_mkdirty(pte, vma), and in the arch code we handle shadow stack.
Is this acceptable?

Thanks,
Yu-cheng

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromiun.org>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 13/27] mm: Handle shadow stack page fault
Date: Tue, 14 Aug 2018 14:28:45 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1534282125.24160.9.camel@intel.com> (raw)
Message-ID: <20180814212845.IUkfuZLMtMExJF1aLJ2w7NsRM7VxAQepZDITfP-bChs@z> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180711090656.GS2476@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>

On Wed, 2018-07-11 at 11:06 +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 10, 2018 at 04:06:25PM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> > 
> > On 07/10/2018 03:26 PM, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> > > 
> > > +	if (is_shstk_mapping(vma->vm_flags))
> > > +		entry = pte_mkdirty_shstk(entry);
> > > +	else
> > > +		entry = pte_mkdirty(entry);
> > > +
> > > +	entry = maybe_mkwrite(entry, vma);
> > >  	if (ptep_set_access_flags(vma, vmf->address, vmf->pte,
> > > entry, 1))
> > >  		update_mmu_cache(vma, vmf->address, vmf->pte);
> > >  	pte_unmap_unlock(vmf->pte, vmf->ptl);
> > > @@ -2526,7 +2532,11 @@ static int wp_page_copy(struct vm_fault
> > > *vmf)
> > >  		}
> > >  		flush_cache_page(vma, vmf->address,
> > > pte_pfn(vmf->orig_pte));
> > >  		entry = mk_pte(new_page, vma->vm_page_prot);
> > > -		entry = maybe_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(entry), vma);
> > > +		if (is_shstk_mapping(vma->vm_flags))
> > > +			entry = pte_mkdirty_shstk(entry);
> > > +		else
> > > +			entry = pte_mkdirty(entry);
> > > +		entry = maybe_mkwrite(entry, vma);
> > Do we want to lift this hunk of code and put it elsewhere?  Maybe:
> > 
> > 	entry = pte_set_vma_features(entry, vma);
> > 
> > and then:
> > 
> > pte_t pte_set_vma_features(pte_t entry, struct vm_area_struct)
> > {
> > 		/*
> > 		 * Shadow stack PTEs are always dirty and always
> > 		 * writable.  They have a different encoding for
> > 		 * this than normal PTEs, though.
> > 		 */
> > 		if (is_shstk_mapping(vma->vm_flags))
> > 			entry = pte_mkdirty_shstk(entry);
> > 		else
> > 			entry = pte_mkdirty(entry);
> > 
> > 		entry = maybe_mkwrite(entry, vma);
> > 
> > 	return entry;
> > }
> Yes, that wants a helper like that. Not sold on the name, but
> whatever.
> 
> Is there any way we can hide all the shadow stack magic in arch
> code?

We use is_shstk_mapping() only to determine PAGE_DIRTY_SW or
PAGE_DIRTY_HW should be set in a PTE.  One way to remove this shadow
stack code from generic code is changing pte_mkdirty(pte) to
pte_mkdirty(pte, vma), and in the arch code we handle shadow stack.
Is this acceptable?

Thanks,
Yu-cheng

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-08-14 21:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 246+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-07-10 22:26 [RFC PATCH v2 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/27] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUIDs for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Change some names to separate XSAVES system and user states Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Enable XSAVES system states Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/27] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11  8:27   ` Pavel Machek
2018-07-11  8:27     ` Pavel Machek
2018-07-11 15:25     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 15:25       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11  9:57   ` Florian Weimer
2018-07-11  9:57     ` Florian Weimer
2018-07-11 13:47     ` H.J. Lu
2018-07-11 13:47       ` H.J. Lu
2018-07-11 14:53       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 14:53         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/27] x86/cet: Control protection exception handler Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/27] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11  8:34   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11  8:34     ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 16:15     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 16:15       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/27] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/27] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11  8:45   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11  8:45     ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11  9:21   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11  9:21     ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/27] x86/mm: Modify ptep_set_wrprotect and pmdp_set_wrprotect for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:44   ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-10 22:44     ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-10 23:23     ` Nadav Amit
2018-07-10 23:23       ` Nadav Amit
2018-07-10 23:52       ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-10 23:52         ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11  8:48     ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11  8:48       ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/27] x86/mm: Shadow stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:52   ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-10 22:52     ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 17:28     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 17:28       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 23:24   ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-10 23:24     ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 13/27] mm: Handle shadow stack page fault Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 23:06   ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-10 23:06     ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11  9:06     ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11  9:06       ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-08-14 21:28       ` Yu-cheng Yu [this message]
2018-08-14 21:28         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 14/27] mm: Handle THP/HugeTLB " Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 23:08   ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-10 23:08     ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11  9:10   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11  9:10     ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 16:11     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 16:11       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-20 14:20   ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-20 14:20     ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-20 14:58     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-20 14:58       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 15/27] mm/mprotect: Prevent mprotect from changing shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 23:10   ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-10 23:10     ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11  9:12     ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11  9:12       ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 16:07       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 16:07         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 16:22         ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 16:22           ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 16/27] mm: Modify can_follow_write_pte/pmd for " Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 23:37   ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-10 23:37     ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 17:05     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 17:05       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-13 18:26       ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13 18:26         ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-17 23:03         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-17 23:03           ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-17 23:11           ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-17 23:11             ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-17 23:15           ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-17 23:15             ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-18 20:14             ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-18 20:14               ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-18 21:45               ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-18 21:45                 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-18 23:10                 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-18 23:10                   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-19  0:06                   ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-19  0:06                     ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-19 17:06                     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-19 17:06                       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-19 19:31                       ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-19 19:31                         ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11  9:29   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11  9:29     ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-17 23:00     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-17 23:00       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 17/27] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 23:40   ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-10 23:40     ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11  9:34   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11  9:34     ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 15:45     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 15:45       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11  9:36   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11  9:36     ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 21:10   ` Jann Horn
2018-07-11 21:10     ` Jann Horn
2018-07-11 21:34     ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-07-11 21:34       ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-07-11 21:51       ` Jann Horn
2018-07-11 21:51         ` Jann Horn
2018-07-11 22:21         ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-07-11 22:21           ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-07-13 18:03           ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-13 18:03             ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 18/27] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 23:48   ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-10 23:48     ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-12 22:59     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-12 22:59       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-12 23:49       ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-12 23:49         ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13  1:50         ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13  1:50           ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13  2:21           ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-07-13  2:21             ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-07-13  4:16             ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13  4:16               ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13  4:18               ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13  4:18                 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13 17:39                 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-13 17:39                   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-13  5:55               ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-07-13  5:55                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-07-11  9:44   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11  9:44     ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 15:06     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 15:06       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 15:30       ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 15:30         ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11  9:45   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11  9:45     ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 14:58     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 14:58       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 15:27       ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 15:27         ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-07-11 15:41         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 15:41           ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-13 12:12   ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13 12:12     ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13 17:37     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-13 17:37       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 19/27] x86/cet/shstk: Signal handling for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 20/27] x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing of CET Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 11:12   ` Florian Weimer
2018-07-11 11:12     ` Florian Weimer
2018-07-11 19:37   ` Jann Horn
2018-07-11 19:37     ` Jann Horn
2018-07-11 20:53     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 20:53       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 21/27] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 22/27] x86/cet/ibt: User-mode indirect branch tracking support Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11  0:11   ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11  0:11     ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 22:10     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 22:10       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 22:40       ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 22:40         ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 23:00         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 23:00           ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 23:16           ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 23:16             ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13 17:56             ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-13 17:56               ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-13 18:05               ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-13 18:05                 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 21:07   ` Jann Horn
2018-07-11 21:07     ` Jann Horn
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 23/27] mm/mmap: Add IBT bitmap size to address space limit check Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 23:57   ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-10 23:57     ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-11 16:56     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 16:56       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 24/27] x86: Insert endbr32/endbr64 to vDSO Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 25/27] x86/cet: Add PTRACE interface for CET Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 10:20   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-07-11 10:20     ` Ingo Molnar
2018-07-11 15:40     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 15:40       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-12 14:03       ` Ingo Molnar
2018-07-12 14:03         ` Ingo Molnar
2018-07-12 22:37         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-12 22:37           ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-12 23:08           ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-07-12 23:08             ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-07-13 16:07             ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-13 16:07               ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-13  6:28         ` Pavel Machek
2018-07-13  6:28           ` Pavel Machek
2018-07-13 13:33           ` Ingo Molnar
2018-07-13 13:33             ` Ingo Molnar
2018-07-14  6:27             ` Pavel Machek
2018-07-14  6:27               ` Pavel Machek
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 26/27] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26 ` [RFC PATCH v2 27/27] x86/cet: Add arch_prctl functions for CET Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-10 22:26   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 12:19   ` Florian Weimer
2018-07-11 12:19     ` Florian Weimer
2018-07-11 21:02     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 21:02       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 19:45   ` Jann Horn
2018-07-11 19:45     ` Jann Horn
2018-07-11 20:55     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-07-11 20:55       ` Yu-cheng Yu

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