From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> To: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>, linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>, Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>, Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>, Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>, hjl.tools@gmail.com, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, keescook@chromium.org, Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>, Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pave> Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 06/24] x86/cet: Control protection exception handler Date: Fri, 31 Aug 2018 09:20:18 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <1535732418.3789.7.camel@intel.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <CAG48ez0jvsDw189=YoCCa8tmJUENeUd_ypcP5bYJ+eLMPCYCOQ@mail.gmail.com> On Fri, 2018-08-31 at 17:01 +0200, Jann Horn wrote: > Is there a reason why all the code in this patch isn't #ifdef'ed > away > on builds that don't support CET? It looks like the CET handler is > hooked up to the IDT conditionally, but the handler code is always > built? Yes, in idt.c, it should have been: #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 INTG(X86_TRAP_CP, control_protection), #endif I will fix it. > > +dotraplinkage void > > +do_control_protection(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code) > > +{ > > + struct task_struct *tsk; > > + > > + RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN(!rcu_is_watching(), "entry code didn't > > wake RCU"); > > + if (notify_die(DIE_TRAP, "control protection fault", regs, > > + error_code, X86_TRAP_CP, SIGSEGV) == > > NOTIFY_STOP) > > + return; > > + cond_local_irq_enable(regs); > > + > > + if (!user_mode(regs)) > > + die("kernel control protection fault", regs, > > error_code); > > + > > + if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) && > > + !static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) > > + WARN_ONCE(1, "CET is disabled but got control " > > + "protection fault\n"); > > + > > + tsk = current; > > + tsk->thread.error_code = error_code; > > + tsk->thread.trap_nr = X86_TRAP_CP; > > + > > + if (show_unhandled_signals && unhandled_signal(tsk, > > SIGSEGV) && > > + printk_ratelimit()) { > > + unsigned int max_err; > > + > > + max_err = ARRAY_SIZE(control_protection_err) - 1; > > + if ((error_code < 0) || (error_code > max_err)) > > + error_code = 0; > > + pr_info("%s[%d] control protection ip:%lx sp:%lx > > error:%lx(%s)", > > + tsk->comm, task_pid_nr(tsk), > > + regs->ip, regs->sp, error_code, > > + control_protection_err[error_code]); > > + print_vma_addr(" in ", regs->ip); > Shouldn't this be using KERN_CONT, like other callers of > print_vma_addr(), to get the desired output? I will change it.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> To: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>, linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>, Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>, Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>, Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>, hjl.tools@gmail.com, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, keescook@chromium.org, Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>, Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, ravi.v.shankar@intel.com, vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 06/24] x86/cet: Control protection exception handler Date: Fri, 31 Aug 2018 09:20:18 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <1535732418.3789.7.camel@intel.com> (raw) Message-ID: <20180831162018.J5IwsVW23CuQ5bjaXGDvUTSYFrMYnrH3wguBC5P2bYA@z> (raw) In-Reply-To: <CAG48ez0jvsDw189=YoCCa8tmJUENeUd_ypcP5bYJ+eLMPCYCOQ@mail.gmail.com> On Fri, 2018-08-31 at 17:01 +0200, Jann Horn wrote: > Is there a reason why all the code in this patch isn't #ifdef'ed > away > on builds that don't support CET? It looks like the CET handler is > hooked up to the IDT conditionally, but the handler code is always > built? Yes, in idt.c, it should have been: #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 INTG(X86_TRAP_CP, control_protection), #endif I will fix it. > > +dotraplinkage void > > +do_control_protection(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code) > > +{ > > + struct task_struct *tsk; > > + > > + RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN(!rcu_is_watching(), "entry code didn't > > wake RCU"); > > + if (notify_die(DIE_TRAP, "control protection fault", regs, > > + error_code, X86_TRAP_CP, SIGSEGV) == > > NOTIFY_STOP) > > + return; > > + cond_local_irq_enable(regs); > > + > > + if (!user_mode(regs)) > > + die("kernel control protection fault", regs, > > error_code); > > + > > + if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) && > > + !static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) > > + WARN_ONCE(1, "CET is disabled but got control " > > + "protection fault\n"); > > + > > + tsk = current; > > + tsk->thread.error_code = error_code; > > + tsk->thread.trap_nr = X86_TRAP_CP; > > + > > + if (show_unhandled_signals && unhandled_signal(tsk, > > SIGSEGV) && > > + printk_ratelimit()) { > > + unsigned int max_err; > > + > > + max_err = ARRAY_SIZE(control_protection_err) - 1; > > + if ((error_code < 0) || (error_code > max_err)) > > + error_code = 0; > > + pr_info("%s[%d] control protection ip:%lx sp:%lx > > error:%lx(%s)", > > + tsk->comm, task_pid_nr(tsk), > > + regs->ip, regs->sp, error_code, > > + control_protection_err[error_code]); > > + print_vma_addr(" in ", regs->ip); > Shouldn't this be using KERN_CONT, like other callers of > print_vma_addr(), to get the desired output? I will change it.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-08-31 16:20 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 146+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2018-08-30 14:38 [RFC PATCH v3 00/24] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 01/24] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUIDs for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 02/24] x86/fpu/xstate: Change some names to separate XSAVES system and user states Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 03/24] x86/fpu/xstate: Enable XSAVES system states Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 04/24] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 05/24] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 20:39 ` Pavel Machek 2018-08-30 20:39 ` Pavel Machek 2018-08-30 22:49 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 22:49 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-14 21:17 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-14 21:17 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-03 2:56 ` Randy Dunlap 2018-09-03 2:56 ` Randy Dunlap 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 06/24] x86/cet: Control protection exception handler Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-31 15:01 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-31 15:01 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-31 16:20 ` Yu-cheng Yu [this message] 2018-08-31 16:20 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 07/24] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 08/24] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 09/24] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 10/24] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 11/24] drm/i915/gvt: Update _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 12/24] x86/mm: Modify ptep_set_wrprotect and pmdp_set_wrprotect for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 15:49 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-30 15:49 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-30 16:02 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 16:02 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 16:08 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-30 16:08 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-30 16:23 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-30 16:23 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-30 17:19 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-30 17:19 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-30 17:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 17:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 17:33 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-30 17:33 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-30 17:54 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 17:54 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 17:59 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-30 17:59 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-30 20:21 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 20:21 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 20:44 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-30 20:44 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-30 20:52 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 20:52 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 21:01 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-30 21:01 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-30 21:47 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-30 21:47 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-31 9:53 ` Peter Zijlstra 2018-08-31 9:53 ` Peter Zijlstra 2018-08-31 14:33 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-31 14:33 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-31 14:47 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-31 14:47 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-31 15:48 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-31 15:48 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-31 15:58 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-31 15:58 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-31 16:29 ` Peter Zijlstra 2018-08-31 16:29 ` Peter Zijlstra 2018-09-14 20:39 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-14 20:39 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-14 20:46 ` Dave Hansen 2018-09-14 20:46 ` Dave Hansen 2018-09-14 21:08 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-14 21:08 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-14 21:33 ` Dave Hansen 2018-09-14 21:33 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-31 1:23 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-08-31 1:23 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-08-30 17:34 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-08-30 17:34 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-08-30 18:55 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-30 18:55 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-31 17:46 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-08-31 17:46 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-08-31 17:52 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-31 17:52 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-30 19:59 ` Randy Dunlap 2018-08-30 19:59 ` Randy Dunlap 2018-08-30 20:23 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 20:23 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-31 16:29 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-31 16:29 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 13/24] x86/mm: Shadow stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 14/24] mm: Handle shadow stack page fault Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 15/24] mm: Handle THP/HugeTLB " Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 16/24] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte/pmd for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 17/24] mm: Introduce do_mmap_locked() Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 18/24] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 16:10 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-30 16:10 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-30 16:20 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 16:20 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 19/24] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 15:39 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-30 15:39 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-30 15:55 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-08-30 15:55 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-08-30 16:22 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 16:22 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-31 21:49 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-31 21:49 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-31 22:16 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-08-31 22:16 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-09-14 20:46 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-14 20:46 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:39 ` [RFC PATCH v3 20/24] x86/cet/shstk: Signal handling for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:39 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:39 ` [RFC PATCH v3 21/24] x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing of Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:39 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:39 ` [RFC PATCH v3 22/24] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:39 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:39 ` [RFC PATCH v3 23/24] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:39 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:39 ` [RFC PATCH v3 24/24] x86/cet/shstk: Add Shadow Stack instructions to opcode map Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:39 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-02 8:13 ` [RFC PATCH v3 00/24] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Balbir Singh 2018-09-02 8:13 ` Balbir Singh 2018-09-04 14:47 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-04 14:47 ` Yu-cheng Yu
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