From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Vasiliy Kulikov Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC v2] implement SL*B and stack usercopy runtime checks Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2011 11:40:43 +0400 Message-ID: <20110719074043.GA3942@albatros> References: <20110703111028.GA2862@albatros> <20110718183951.GA3748@albatros> <20110718115237.14d96c03.akpm@linux-foundation.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Return-path: Received: from mail-ew0-f46.google.com ([209.85.215.46]:53499 "EHLO mail-ew0-f46.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752175Ab1GSHku (ORCPT ); Tue, 19 Jul 2011 03:40:50 -0400 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20110718115237.14d96c03.akpm@linux-foundation.org> Sender: linux-arch-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: Linus Torvalds , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , "H. Peter Anvin" , x86@kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann , Christoph Lameter , Pekka Enberg , Matt Mackall , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org On Mon, Jul 18, 2011 at 11:52 -0700, Andrew Morton wrote: > > +noinline bool __kernel_access_ok(const void *ptr, unsigned long len) > > noinline seems unneeded Ah, understood what you mean. It is .c, and users are in other .c, so it is indeed redundant. Thanks! -- Vasiliy Kulikov http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments