From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "security@kernel.org" <security@kernel.org>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Vasily Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>,
Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
Alex Kelly <alex.page.kelly@gmail.com>,
Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Subject: [PATCH 0/3] get/set_dumpable() cleanups and theoretical fix
Date: Sat, 16 Nov 2013 20:00:57 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20131116190057.GA22666@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5j+=LZYAczLVawGPAxd=9VX1FupWZq+2858GsrD1YprL3w@mail.gmail.com>
On 11/15, Kees Cook wrote:
>
> On Fri, Nov 15, 2013 at 12:36 PM, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> wrote:
> >
> > unless I missed something, this is the fix, not cleanup ?
> >
> > If commit_creds()->set_dumpable(SUID_DUMP_ROOT) races with
> > sys_prctl()->set_dumpable(SUID_DUMP_DISABLE), we can get
> > SUID_DUMP_USER afaics.
> >
> > Yes, yes, even if I am right this race is very unlikely.
>
> Hm, yes, that is a fix then. I struggle to imagine it being
> exploitable (i.e. control over both threads, one at least already with
> a different cred, etc), but it certainly does look like a bug.
Yes, yes, sure, this is only theoretical.
OK, I am sending the patches to lkml. I didn't dare to keep your ack,
please review v2 (v1 confused bit-mask with bit-number, and in theory
we need ACCESS_ONCE).
It would be really nice if someone can ack the "it is safe to mix
bitops and cmpxchg" assumption mentioned in the changelog.
Alex, Josh, this also partly reverts 179899fd5dc780fe "coredump:
update coredump-related headers", I think fs/coredump.h buys nothing.
Oleg.
fs/coredump.c | 1 -
fs/coredump.h | 6 -----
fs/exec.c | 61 +++++--------------------------------------------
include/linux/sched.h | 25 ++++++++++++++-----
4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)
next parent reply other threads:[~2013-11-16 19:04 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20131101232521.GA23119@www.outflux.net>
[not found] ` <20131114170337.GA11068@redhat.com>
[not found] ` <CAGXu5jLXpLqjCAMFwKp7t7GpMq4+WBqNzSFC=up+CBvgGDuFCw@mail.gmail.com>
[not found] ` <20131115203652.GA13476@redhat.com>
[not found] ` <CAGXu5j+=LZYAczLVawGPAxd=9VX1FupWZq+2858GsrD1YprL3w@mail.gmail.com>
2013-11-16 19:00 ` Oleg Nesterov [this message]
2013-11-16 19:01 ` [PATCH 1/3] set_dumpable: fix the theoretical race with itself Oleg Nesterov
2013-11-18 16:36 ` Kees Cook
2013-11-16 19:01 ` [PATCH 2/3] kill MMF_DUMPABLE and MMF_DUMP_SECURELY Oleg Nesterov
2013-11-16 19:01 ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-11-18 18:38 ` Kees Cook
2013-11-18 19:16 ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-11-18 19:27 ` Kees Cook
2013-11-18 19:37 ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-11-16 19:02 ` [PATCH 3/3] make __get_dumpable/get_dumpable inline, kill fs/coredump.h Oleg Nesterov
2013-11-18 18:39 ` Kees Cook
2013-11-18 18:39 ` Kees Cook
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