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From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-mips@linux-mips.org, Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
	linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>,
	Julien Tinnes <jln@chromium.org>,
	"Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>,
	"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org"
	<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 09/11] seccomp: introduce writer locking
Date: Thu, 10 Jul 2014 19:35:52 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20140710173552.GA27410@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jKNUn0OcXPyTmqbHwQ_GPMNTeajyrxpd2xAtzjTRFyhpg@mail.gmail.com>

On 07/10, Kees Cook wrote:
>
> On Thu, Jul 10, 2014 at 8:24 AM, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> wrote:
> >
> > Just to simplify. Suppose TIF_SECCOMP was set a long ago. This thread
> > has a single filter F1 and it enters seccomp_run_filters().
> >
> > Right before it does ACCESS_ONCE() to read the pointer, another thread
> > does seccomp_sync_threads() and sets .filter = F2.
> >
> > If ACCESS_ONCE() returns F1 - everything is fine. But it can see the new
> > pointer F2, and in this case we need a barrier to ensure that, say,
> > LOAD(F2->prog) will see all the preceding changes in this memory.
>
> And the rmb() isn't sufficient for that?

But it has no effect if the pointer was changed _after_ rmb() was already
called.

And, you need a barrier _after_ ACCESS_ONCE().

(Unless, again, we know that this is the first filter, but this is only
 by accident).

> Is another barrier needed
> before assigning the filter pointer to make sure the contents it
> points to are flushed?

I think smp_store_release() should be moved from seccomp_attach_filter()
to seccomp_sync_threads(). Although probably it _should_ work either way,
but at least this looks confusing because a) "current" doesn't need a
barrier to serialize wuth itself, and b) it is not clear why it is safe
to change the pointer dereferenced by another thread without a barrier.

> What's the least time-consuming operation I can use in run_filters?

As I said smp_read_barrier_depends() (nop unless alpha) or
smp_load_acquire() which you used in the previous version.

And to remind, afaics smp_load_acquire() in put_filter() should die ;)

Oleg.

  parent reply	other threads:[~2014-07-10 17:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-06-27 23:22 [PATCH v9 0/11] seccomp: add thread sync ability Kees Cook
2014-06-27 23:22 ` Kees Cook
2014-06-27 23:22 ` [PATCH v9 01/11] seccomp: create internal mode-setting function Kees Cook
2014-06-27 23:22   ` Kees Cook
2014-06-27 23:22 ` [PATCH v9 02/11] seccomp: extract check/assign mode helpers Kees Cook
2014-06-27 23:22   ` Kees Cook
2014-06-27 23:22 ` [PATCH v9 03/11] seccomp: split mode setting routines Kees Cook
2014-06-27 23:22   ` Kees Cook
2014-06-27 23:22 ` [PATCH v9 04/11] seccomp: add "seccomp" syscall Kees Cook
2014-06-27 23:22   ` Kees Cook
2014-06-27 23:22 ` [PATCH v9 05/11] ARM: add seccomp syscall Kees Cook
2014-06-27 23:22   ` Kees Cook
2014-06-27 23:22 ` [PATCH v9 06/11] MIPS: " Kees Cook
2014-06-27 23:22   ` Kees Cook
2014-06-27 23:22 ` [PATCH v9 07/11] sched: move no_new_privs into new atomic flags Kees Cook
2014-06-27 23:22   ` Kees Cook
2014-06-27 23:22 ` [PATCH v9 08/11] seccomp: split filter prep from check and apply Kees Cook
2014-06-27 23:22   ` Kees Cook
2014-06-27 23:22 ` [PATCH v9 09/11] seccomp: introduce writer locking Kees Cook
2014-06-27 23:22   ` Kees Cook
2014-07-09 18:42   ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-07-09 18:42     ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-07-09 18:55     ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-07-09 18:55       ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-07-10  9:25       ` Kees Cook
2014-07-10 15:24         ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-07-10 15:24           ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-07-10 16:54           ` Kees Cook
2014-07-10 16:54             ` Kees Cook
2014-07-10 17:35             ` Oleg Nesterov [this message]
2014-07-10 17:35               ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-07-09 18:59   ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-07-09 18:59     ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-27 23:22 ` [PATCH v9 10/11] seccomp: allow mode setting across threads Kees Cook
2014-06-27 23:22   ` Kees Cook
2014-06-27 23:23 ` [PATCH v9 11/11] seccomp: implement SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC Kees Cook
2014-06-27 23:23   ` Kees Cook
2014-07-09 18:05   ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-07-09 18:05     ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-07-10  9:17     ` Kees Cook
2014-07-10  9:17       ` Kees Cook
2014-07-10 15:08       ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-07-10 15:08         ` Oleg Nesterov
     [not found]         ` <20140710150832.GA20861-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2014-07-10 16:03           ` Kees Cook
2014-07-10 16:03             ` Kees Cook

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