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From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
To: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/2] introduce post-init read-only memory
Date: Thu, 26 Nov 2015 11:42:29 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20151126104229.GA8530@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <5656D779.17137.12A1EA53@pageexec.freemail.hu>


* PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu> wrote:

> On 26 Nov 2015 at 9:54, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> 
> > * PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu> wrote:
> > 
> > > actually the kernel could silently recover from this given how the page fault 
> > > handler could easily determine that the fault address fell into the 
> > > data..read_only section and just silently undo the read-only property, log the 
> > > event to dmesg and retry the faulting access.
> > 
> > So a safer method would be to decode the faulting instruction, to skip it by 
> > fixing up the return RIP and to log the event. It would be mostly equivalent 
> > to trying to write to ROM (which get ignored as well), so it's a recoverable 
> > (and debuggable) event.
> 
> if by skipping you mean ignoring the write attempt then it's not a good idea as 
> it has a good chance to cause unexpected behaviour down the line.
> 
> e.g., imagine that the write was to a function pointer (even an entire ops 
> structure) or a boolean that controls some important feature for after-init 
> code. ignoring/dropping such writes could cause all kinds of logic bugs (if not 
> worse).

Well, the typical case is that it's a logic bug to _do_ the write: the structure 
was marked readonly for a reason but some init code re-runs during suspend or so.

But yes, logic bugs might trigger - but that is true in the opposite case as well, 
if we do the write despite it being marked readonly:

> my somewhat related war story is that i once tried to constify machine_ops (both 
> the struct and the variable of the same name) directly and just forced the 
> writes in kvm/xen/etc via type casts. now i knew it was all undefined behaviour 
> but i didn't expect gcc to take advantage of it but it did (const propagated the 
> *initial* fptr values into the indirect calls by turning them into direct calls) 
> and which in turn prevented proper reboots for guests (an event which obviously 
> happens much later after init/boot to the great puzzlement of end users and 
> myself).
> 
> misusing __read_only and ignoring write attempts would effectively produce the 
> same misbehaviour as above so i strongly advise against it.

No, the difference to the GCC related aliasing bug is that with my technique the 
kernel would immediately produce a very visible kernel warning, which is a very 
clear sign that is wrong - and with a very clear backtrace in the warning that 
points right to the problematic code - which signature shows us (and users) what 
is wrong.

So your example is not comparable at all.

Plus the truly paranoid might panic/halt the system on such warnings, so for 
highly secure systems there's a way to not even allow the possibility of logic 
bugs. (at the cost of stopping the system when a bug triggers.)

Thanks,

	Ingo

  parent reply	other threads:[~2015-11-26 10:42 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 67+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-11-24 21:38 [PATCH 0/2] introduce post-init read-only memory Kees Cook
2015-11-24 21:38 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-24 21:38 ` [PATCH 1/2] x86: " Kees Cook
2015-11-24 21:38   ` Kees Cook
2015-11-25  0:34   ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-25  0:34     ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-25  0:44     ` Kees Cook
2015-11-25  0:54       ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman
2015-11-25 15:03         ` Kees Cook
2015-11-25 23:05           ` Michael Ellerman
2015-11-25 23:32             ` Kees Cook
2015-11-25 23:32               ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2015-11-24 21:38 ` [PATCH 2/2] x86, vdso: mark vDSO read-only after init Kees Cook
2015-11-24 21:38   ` Kees Cook
2015-11-25  9:13 ` [PATCH 0/2] introduce post-init read-only memory Mathias Krause
2015-11-25  9:13   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mathias Krause
2015-11-25 10:06   ` Clemens Ladisch
2015-11-25 10:06     ` Clemens Ladisch
2015-11-25 11:14     ` PaX Team
2015-11-25 11:14       ` [kernel-hardening] " PaX Team
2015-11-25 11:05   ` PaX Team
2015-11-25 11:05     ` [kernel-hardening] " PaX Team
2015-11-26  8:54     ` Ingo Molnar
2015-11-26  9:57       ` PaX Team
2015-11-26  9:57         ` [kernel-hardening] " PaX Team
2015-11-26 10:42         ` Ingo Molnar [this message]
2015-11-26 12:14           ` PaX Team
2015-11-26 12:14             ` [kernel-hardening] " PaX Team
2015-11-27  8:05             ` Ingo Molnar
2015-11-27  8:05               ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2015-11-27 15:29               ` PaX Team
2015-11-27 15:29                 ` [kernel-hardening] " PaX Team
2015-11-27 16:30                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-29  8:08                 ` Ingo Molnar
2015-11-29  8:08                   ` Ingo Molnar
2015-11-29 11:15                   ` PaX Team
2015-11-29 11:15                     ` [kernel-hardening] " PaX Team
2015-11-29 15:39                     ` Ingo Molnar
2015-11-29 18:05                       ` Mathias Krause
2015-11-29 18:05                         ` [kernel-hardening] " Mathias Krause
2015-11-30  8:01                         ` Ingo Molnar
2015-11-30  8:01                           ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2015-11-26 16:11       ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-26 16:11         ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-27  7:59         ` Ingo Molnar
2015-11-27  7:59           ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2015-11-27 18:00           ` Linus Torvalds
2015-11-27 18:03             ` Linus Torvalds
2015-11-27 18:03               ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2015-11-27 20:03             ` Kees Cook
2015-11-27 20:03               ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2015-11-27 20:09               ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-29  8:05                 ` Ingo Molnar
2015-11-29  8:05                   ` Ingo Molnar
2015-11-30 21:14                   ` H. Peter Anvin
2015-11-30 21:14                     ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2015-11-30 21:33                     ` Kees Cook
2015-11-30 21:38                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-30 21:38                         ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-30 21:43                       ` H. Peter Anvin
2015-11-30 21:43                         ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2015-11-25 17:26   ` Kees Cook
2015-11-25 17:26     ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2015-11-25 17:31   ` H. Peter Anvin
2015-11-25 17:31     ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2015-11-25 18:54     ` Kees Cook
2015-11-25 19:06       ` H. Peter Anvin

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