From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
To: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/2] introduce post-init read-only memory
Date: Thu, 26 Nov 2015 11:42:29 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20151126104229.GA8530@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <5656D779.17137.12A1EA53@pageexec.freemail.hu>
* PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu> wrote:
> On 26 Nov 2015 at 9:54, Ingo Molnar wrote:
>
> > * PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu> wrote:
> >
> > > actually the kernel could silently recover from this given how the page fault
> > > handler could easily determine that the fault address fell into the
> > > data..read_only section and just silently undo the read-only property, log the
> > > event to dmesg and retry the faulting access.
> >
> > So a safer method would be to decode the faulting instruction, to skip it by
> > fixing up the return RIP and to log the event. It would be mostly equivalent
> > to trying to write to ROM (which get ignored as well), so it's a recoverable
> > (and debuggable) event.
>
> if by skipping you mean ignoring the write attempt then it's not a good idea as
> it has a good chance to cause unexpected behaviour down the line.
>
> e.g., imagine that the write was to a function pointer (even an entire ops
> structure) or a boolean that controls some important feature for after-init
> code. ignoring/dropping such writes could cause all kinds of logic bugs (if not
> worse).
Well, the typical case is that it's a logic bug to _do_ the write: the structure
was marked readonly for a reason but some init code re-runs during suspend or so.
But yes, logic bugs might trigger - but that is true in the opposite case as well,
if we do the write despite it being marked readonly:
> my somewhat related war story is that i once tried to constify machine_ops (both
> the struct and the variable of the same name) directly and just forced the
> writes in kvm/xen/etc via type casts. now i knew it was all undefined behaviour
> but i didn't expect gcc to take advantage of it but it did (const propagated the
> *initial* fptr values into the indirect calls by turning them into direct calls)
> and which in turn prevented proper reboots for guests (an event which obviously
> happens much later after init/boot to the great puzzlement of end users and
> myself).
>
> misusing __read_only and ignoring write attempts would effectively produce the
> same misbehaviour as above so i strongly advise against it.
No, the difference to the GCC related aliasing bug is that with my technique the
kernel would immediately produce a very visible kernel warning, which is a very
clear sign that is wrong - and with a very clear backtrace in the warning that
points right to the problematic code - which signature shows us (and users) what
is wrong.
So your example is not comparable at all.
Plus the truly paranoid might panic/halt the system on such warnings, so for
highly secure systems there's a way to not even allow the possibility of logic
bugs. (at the cost of stopping the system when a bug triggers.)
Thanks,
Ingo
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-11-26 10:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 67+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-11-24 21:38 [PATCH 0/2] introduce post-init read-only memory Kees Cook
2015-11-24 21:38 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-24 21:38 ` [PATCH 1/2] x86: " Kees Cook
2015-11-24 21:38 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-25 0:34 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-25 0:34 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-25 0:44 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-25 0:54 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman
2015-11-25 15:03 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-25 23:05 ` Michael Ellerman
2015-11-25 23:32 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-25 23:32 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2015-11-24 21:38 ` [PATCH 2/2] x86, vdso: mark vDSO read-only after init Kees Cook
2015-11-24 21:38 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-25 9:13 ` [PATCH 0/2] introduce post-init read-only memory Mathias Krause
2015-11-25 9:13 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mathias Krause
2015-11-25 10:06 ` Clemens Ladisch
2015-11-25 10:06 ` Clemens Ladisch
2015-11-25 11:14 ` PaX Team
2015-11-25 11:14 ` [kernel-hardening] " PaX Team
2015-11-25 11:05 ` PaX Team
2015-11-25 11:05 ` [kernel-hardening] " PaX Team
2015-11-26 8:54 ` Ingo Molnar
2015-11-26 9:57 ` PaX Team
2015-11-26 9:57 ` [kernel-hardening] " PaX Team
2015-11-26 10:42 ` Ingo Molnar [this message]
2015-11-26 12:14 ` PaX Team
2015-11-26 12:14 ` [kernel-hardening] " PaX Team
2015-11-27 8:05 ` Ingo Molnar
2015-11-27 8:05 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2015-11-27 15:29 ` PaX Team
2015-11-27 15:29 ` [kernel-hardening] " PaX Team
2015-11-27 16:30 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-29 8:08 ` Ingo Molnar
2015-11-29 8:08 ` Ingo Molnar
2015-11-29 11:15 ` PaX Team
2015-11-29 11:15 ` [kernel-hardening] " PaX Team
2015-11-29 15:39 ` Ingo Molnar
2015-11-29 18:05 ` Mathias Krause
2015-11-29 18:05 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mathias Krause
2015-11-30 8:01 ` Ingo Molnar
2015-11-30 8:01 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2015-11-26 16:11 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-26 16:11 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-27 7:59 ` Ingo Molnar
2015-11-27 7:59 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2015-11-27 18:00 ` Linus Torvalds
2015-11-27 18:03 ` Linus Torvalds
2015-11-27 18:03 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2015-11-27 20:03 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-27 20:03 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2015-11-27 20:09 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-29 8:05 ` Ingo Molnar
2015-11-29 8:05 ` Ingo Molnar
2015-11-30 21:14 ` H. Peter Anvin
2015-11-30 21:14 ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2015-11-30 21:33 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-30 21:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-30 21:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-30 21:43 ` H. Peter Anvin
2015-11-30 21:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2015-11-25 17:26 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-25 17:26 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2015-11-25 17:31 ` H. Peter Anvin
2015-11-25 17:31 ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2015-11-25 18:54 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-25 19:06 ` H. Peter Anvin
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