From: Borislav Petkov <bp-Gina5bIWoIWzQB+pC5nmwQ@public.gmane.org>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
Cc: linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
kvm-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"Matt Fleming"
<matt-mF/unelCI9GS6iBeEJttW/XRex20P6io@public.gmane.org>,
x86-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org,
linux-mm-Bw31MaZKKs3YtjvyW6yDsg@public.gmane.org,
"Alexander Potapenko"
<glider-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
linux-arch-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet-T1hC0tSOHrs@public.gmane.org>,
linux-doc-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
kasan-dev-/JYPxA39Uh5TLH3MbocFFw@public.gmane.org,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"Andrey Ryabinin"
<aryabinin-5HdwGun5lf+gSpxsJD1C4w@public.gmane.org>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd-r2nGTMty4D4@public.gmane.org>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx-hfZtesqFncYOwBW4kG4KsQ@public.gmane.org>,
"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
iommu-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA@public.gmane.org,
"Paolo Bonzini"
<pbonzini-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 15/20] iommu/amd: AMD IOMMU support for memory encryption
Date: Mon, 12 Sep 2016 13:45:50 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160912114550.nwhtpmncwp22l7vy@pd.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160822223820.29880.17752.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
On Mon, Aug 22, 2016 at 05:38:20PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> Add support to the AMD IOMMU driver to set the memory encryption mask if
> memory encryption is enabled.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 2 ++
> arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 5 +++++
> drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c | 10 ++++++++++
> 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
> index 384fdfb..e395729 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
> @@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ void __init sme_early_init(void);
> /* Architecture __weak replacement functions */
> void __init mem_encrypt_init(void);
>
> +unsigned long amd_iommu_get_me_mask(void);
> +
> unsigned long swiotlb_get_me_mask(void);
> void swiotlb_set_mem_dec(void *vaddr, unsigned long size);
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> index 6b2e8bf..2f28d87 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> @@ -185,6 +185,11 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_init(void)
> swiotlb_clear_encryption();
> }
>
> +unsigned long amd_iommu_get_me_mask(void)
> +{
> + return sme_me_mask;
> +}
> +
> unsigned long swiotlb_get_me_mask(void)
> {
> return sme_me_mask;
> diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c
> index 96de97a..63995e3 100644
> --- a/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c
> +++ b/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c
> @@ -166,6 +166,15 @@ struct dma_ops_domain {
> static struct iova_domain reserved_iova_ranges;
> static struct lock_class_key reserved_rbtree_key;
>
> +/*
> + * Support for memory encryption. If memory encryption is supported, then an
> + * override to this function will be provided.
> + */
> +unsigned long __weak amd_iommu_get_me_mask(void)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
So instead of adding a function each time which returns sme_me_mask
for each user it has, why don't you add a single function which
returns sme_me_mask in mem_encrypt.c and add an inline in the header
mem_encrypt.h which returns 0 for the !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT case.
This all is still funny because we access sme_me_mask directly for the
different KERNEL_* masks but then you're adding an accessor function.
So what you should do instead, IMHO, is either hide sme_me_mask
altogether and use the accessor functions only (not sure if that would
work in all cases) or expose sme_me_mask unconditionally and have it be
0 if CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT is not enabled so that it just works.
Or is there a third, more graceful variant?
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
ECO tip #101: Trim your mails when you reply.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 15/20] iommu/amd: AMD IOMMU support for memory encryption
Date: Mon, 12 Sep 2016 13:45:50 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160912114550.nwhtpmncwp22l7vy@pd.tnic> (raw)
Message-ID: <20160912114550.ID1Ok7d_UESCaP7BoRjdXsgZQYwRsmbZ1rWX2AwLPEI@z> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160822223820.29880.17752.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>
On Mon, Aug 22, 2016 at 05:38:20PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> Add support to the AMD IOMMU driver to set the memory encryption mask if
> memory encryption is enabled.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 2 ++
> arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 5 +++++
> drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c | 10 ++++++++++
> 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
> index 384fdfb..e395729 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
> @@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ void __init sme_early_init(void);
> /* Architecture __weak replacement functions */
> void __init mem_encrypt_init(void);
>
> +unsigned long amd_iommu_get_me_mask(void);
> +
> unsigned long swiotlb_get_me_mask(void);
> void swiotlb_set_mem_dec(void *vaddr, unsigned long size);
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> index 6b2e8bf..2f28d87 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> @@ -185,6 +185,11 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_init(void)
> swiotlb_clear_encryption();
> }
>
> +unsigned long amd_iommu_get_me_mask(void)
> +{
> + return sme_me_mask;
> +}
> +
> unsigned long swiotlb_get_me_mask(void)
> {
> return sme_me_mask;
> diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c
> index 96de97a..63995e3 100644
> --- a/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c
> +++ b/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c
> @@ -166,6 +166,15 @@ struct dma_ops_domain {
> static struct iova_domain reserved_iova_ranges;
> static struct lock_class_key reserved_rbtree_key;
>
> +/*
> + * Support for memory encryption. If memory encryption is supported, then an
> + * override to this function will be provided.
> + */
> +unsigned long __weak amd_iommu_get_me_mask(void)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
So instead of adding a function each time which returns sme_me_mask
for each user it has, why don't you add a single function which
returns sme_me_mask in mem_encrypt.c and add an inline in the header
mem_encrypt.h which returns 0 for the !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT case.
This all is still funny because we access sme_me_mask directly for the
different KERNEL_* masks but then you're adding an accessor function.
So what you should do instead, IMHO, is either hide sme_me_mask
altogether and use the accessor functions only (not sure if that would
work in all cases) or expose sme_me_mask unconditionally and have it be
0 if CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT is not enabled so that it just works.
Or is there a third, more graceful variant?
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
ECO tip #101: Trim your mails when you reply.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-09-12 11:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 164+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-08-22 22:35 [RFC PATCH v2 00/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/20] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20160822223539.29880.96739.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-02 8:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-02 8:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:02 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 14:02 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <3fbb0763-5f9f-6ff7-2266-7478fb12642e-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-07 15:23 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 15:23 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/20] x86: Set the write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20160822223550.29880.39409.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-08-25 3:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-25 3:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) build enablement Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20160822223559.29880.1502.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-02 11:03 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-02 11:03 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:03 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 14:03 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-25 13:04 ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-08-25 13:04 ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-08-30 13:19 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-30 13:19 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <e296f12d-7c76-4690-17bd-0f721d739f07-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2016-08-30 14:57 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-30 14:57 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-31 13:26 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-31 13:26 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/20] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/20] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-02 18:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-02 18:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:11 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 14:11 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-05 8:48 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-05 8:48 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:16 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 14:16 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20160822223646.29880.28794.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-05 15:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-05 15:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:19 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 14:19 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-06 9:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-06 9:31 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20160906093113.GA18319-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-07 14:30 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 14:30 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <f4125cae-63af-f8c7-086f-e297ce480a07-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-07 15:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 15:55 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20160907155535.i7wh46uxxa2bj3ik-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-08 13:26 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-08 13:26 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <bc8f22db-b6f9-951f-145c-fed919098cbe-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-08 13:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-08 13:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 13:43 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 13:43 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/20] x86: Extend the early_memmap support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/20] x86: Add support for early encryption/decryption of memory Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20160822223710.29880.23936.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-06 16:12 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-06 16:12 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/20] x86: Insure that memory areas are encrypted when possible Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-09 15:53 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-09 15:53 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20160909155305.bmm2fvw7ndjjhqvo-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-12 15:05 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 15:05 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 16:33 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20160912163349.exnuvr7svsq7fmui-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-14 14:11 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:11 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/20] mm: Access BOOT related data in the clear Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-09 16:38 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-09 16:38 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20160909163814.sgsi2jlxlshskt5c-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-12 15:14 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 15:14 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <6431e761-a4c8-c9bb-1352-6d66672200fd-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-12 16:35 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 16:35 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 16:55 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-12 16:55 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <CALCETrUk2kRSzKfwhio6KV3iuYaSV2uxybd-e95kK3vY=yTSfg-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-14 14:20 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:20 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <e30ddb53-df6c-28ee-54fe-f3e52e515acb-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-15 9:57 ` Matt Fleming
2016-09-15 9:57 ` Matt Fleming
[not found] ` <20160915095709.GB16797-mF/unelCI9GS6iBeEJttW/XRex20P6io@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-15 16:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-15 16:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/20] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20160822223749.29880.10183.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-09 17:23 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-09 17:23 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20160909172314.ifcteua7nr52mzgs-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-12 15:41 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 15:41 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 16:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 13/20] x86: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20160822223757.29880.24107.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-09 17:34 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-09 17:34 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 15:43 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 15:43 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 15/20] iommu/amd: AMD IOMMU support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20160822223820.29880.17752.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-12 11:45 ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2016-09-12 11:45 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20160912114550.nwhtpmncwp22l7vy-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-14 13:45 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 13:45 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:41 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20160914144139.GA9295-K5JNixvcfoxupOikMc4+xw@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-15 16:57 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-15 16:57 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <421c767b-2410-2537-4f4e-b70670898fee-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-16 7:08 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-16 7:08 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 16/20] x86: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20160822223829.29880.10341.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-12 12:17 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 12:17 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 13:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 13:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:43 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 16:43 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20160912164303.kaqx2ayqjtbkcc2z-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-14 14:12 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:12 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 17/20] x86: Do not specify encrypted memory for VGA mapping Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20160822223529.29880.50884.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-08-22 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/20] x86: Add the Secure Memory Encryption cpu feature Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20160822223622.29880.17779.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-02 14:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-02 14:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:07 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 14:07 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 14/20] x86: DMA support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20160822223807.29880.69294.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-12 10:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 10:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 13:36 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 13:36 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 18/20] x86/kvm: Enable Secure Memory Encryption of nested page tables Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 14:35 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 14:35 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:02 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:02 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 19/20] x86: Access the setup data through debugfs un-encrypted Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20160822223859.29880.60652.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-12 16:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 16:59 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20160912165944.rpqbwxz2biathnt3-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-14 14:29 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:29 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:51 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20160914145101.GB9295-K5JNixvcfoxupOikMc4+xw@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-15 17:08 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-15 17:08 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <b734c2da-fee4-efae-fda2-bbcd74abbb33-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-16 7:11 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-16 7:11 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:39 ` [RFC PATCH v2 20/20] x86: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:39 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20160822223908.29880.50365.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-12 17:08 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 17:08 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:31 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:31 ` Tom Lendacky
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