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From: Borislav Petkov <bp-Gina5bIWoIWzQB+pC5nmwQ@public.gmane.org>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
Cc: linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	kvm-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	"Matt Fleming"
	<matt-mF/unelCI9GS6iBeEJttW/XRex20P6io@public.gmane.org>,
	x86-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org,
	linux-mm-Bw31MaZKKs3YtjvyW6yDsg@public.gmane.org,
	"Alexander Potapenko"
	<glider-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
	"Larry Woodman"
	<lwoodman-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	linux-arch-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet-T1hC0tSOHrs@public.gmane.org>,
	linux-doc-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	kasan-dev-/JYPxA39Uh5TLH3MbocFFw@public.gmane.org,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin"
	<aryabinin-5HdwGun5lf+gSpxsJD1C4w@public.gmane.org>,
	"Rik van Riel" <riel-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd-r2nGTMty4D4@public.gmane.org>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx-hfZtesqFncYOwBW4kG4KsQ@public.gmane.org>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	iommu-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA@public.gmane.org,
	"Paolo Bonzini"
	<pbonzini-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 09/20] x86: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly
Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2016 13:20:15 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161117122015.kxnwjtgyzitxio2p@pd.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20161110003620.3280.20613.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>

On Wed, Nov 09, 2016 at 06:36:20PM -0600, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> The boot data and command line data are present in memory in an
> un-encrypted state and are copied early in the boot process.  The early
> page fault support will map these areas as encrypted, so before attempting
> to copy them, add unencrypted mappings so the data is accessed properly
> when copied.
> 
> For the initrd, encrypt this data in place. Since the future mapping of the
> initrd area will be mapped as encrypted the data will be accessed properly.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h |   13 ++++++++
>  arch/x86/kernel/head64.c           |   21 ++++++++++++--
>  arch/x86/kernel/setup.c            |    9 ++++++
>  arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c          |   56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  4 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

...

> @@ -122,6 +131,12 @@ static void __init copy_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
>  	char * command_line;
>  	unsigned long cmd_line_ptr;
>  
> +	/*
> +	 * If SME is active, this will create un-encrypted mappings of the
> +	 * boot data in advance of the copy operations
						      ^
						      |
					    Fullstop--+

> +	 */
> +	sme_map_bootdata(real_mode_data);
> +
>  	memcpy(&boot_params, real_mode_data, sizeof boot_params);
>  	sanitize_boot_params(&boot_params);
>  	cmd_line_ptr = get_cmd_line_ptr();

...

> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> index 06235b4..411210d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> @@ -16,8 +16,11 @@
>  
>  #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
>  #include <asm/fixmap.h>
> +#include <asm/setup.h>
> +#include <asm/bootparam.h>
>  
>  extern pmdval_t early_pmd_flags;
> +int __init __early_make_pgtable(unsigned long, pmdval_t);
>  
>  /*
>   * Since sme_me_mask is set early in the boot process it must reside in
> @@ -126,6 +129,59 @@ void __init sme_early_mem_dec(resource_size_t paddr, unsigned long size)
>  	}
>  }
>  
> +static void __init *sme_bootdata_mapping(void *vaddr, unsigned long size)

So this could be called __sme_map_bootdata(). "sme_bootdata_mapping"
doesn't tell me what the function does as there's no verb in the name.

> +{
> +	unsigned long paddr = (unsigned long)vaddr - __PAGE_OFFSET;
> +	pmdval_t pmd_flags, pmd;
> +	void *ret = vaddr;

That *ret --->

> +
> +	/* Use early_pmd_flags but remove the encryption mask */
> +	pmd_flags = early_pmd_flags & ~sme_me_mask;
> +
> +	do {
> +		pmd = (paddr & PMD_MASK) + pmd_flags;
> +		__early_make_pgtable((unsigned long)vaddr, pmd);
> +
> +		vaddr += PMD_SIZE;
> +		paddr += PMD_SIZE;
> +		size = (size < PMD_SIZE) ? 0 : size - PMD_SIZE;

			size <= PMD_SIZE

				looks more obvious to me...

> +	} while (size);
> +
> +	return ret;

---> is simply passing vaddr out. So the function can be just as well be
void and you can do below:

	__sme_map_bootdata(real_mode_data, sizeof(boot_params));

	boot_data = (struct boot_params *)real_mode_data;

	...

> +void __init sme_map_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
> +{
> +	struct boot_params *boot_data;
> +	unsigned long cmdline_paddr;
> +
> +	if (!sme_me_mask)
> +		return;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * The bootdata will not be encrypted, so it needs to be mapped
> +	 * as unencrypted data so it can be copied properly.
> +	 */
> +	boot_data = sme_bootdata_mapping(real_mode_data, sizeof(boot_params));
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Determine the command line address only after having established
> +	 * the unencrypted mapping.
> +	 */
> +	cmdline_paddr = boot_data->hdr.cmd_line_ptr |
> +			((u64)boot_data->ext_cmd_line_ptr << 32);

<---- newline here.

> +	if (cmdline_paddr)
> +		sme_bootdata_mapping(__va(cmdline_paddr), COMMAND_LINE_SIZE);
> +}
> +
> +void __init sme_encrypt_ramdisk(resource_size_t paddr, unsigned long size)
> +{
> +	if (!sme_me_mask)
> +		return;
> +
> +	sme_early_mem_enc(paddr, size);
> +}

So this one could simply be called sme_encrypt_area() and be used for
other things. There's nothing special about encrypting a ramdisk, by the
looks of it.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 09/20] x86: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly
Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2016 13:20:15 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161117122015.kxnwjtgyzitxio2p@pd.tnic> (raw)
Message-ID: <20161117122015.weB1nVsuWSOcZNGZeGAaEaWM6K-37fM4mGiFb_7gFNQ@z> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20161110003620.3280.20613.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>

On Wed, Nov 09, 2016 at 06:36:20PM -0600, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> The boot data and command line data are present in memory in an
> un-encrypted state and are copied early in the boot process.  The early
> page fault support will map these areas as encrypted, so before attempting
> to copy them, add unencrypted mappings so the data is accessed properly
> when copied.
> 
> For the initrd, encrypt this data in place. Since the future mapping of the
> initrd area will be mapped as encrypted the data will be accessed properly.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h |   13 ++++++++
>  arch/x86/kernel/head64.c           |   21 ++++++++++++--
>  arch/x86/kernel/setup.c            |    9 ++++++
>  arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c          |   56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  4 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

...

> @@ -122,6 +131,12 @@ static void __init copy_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
>  	char * command_line;
>  	unsigned long cmd_line_ptr;
>  
> +	/*
> +	 * If SME is active, this will create un-encrypted mappings of the
> +	 * boot data in advance of the copy operations
						      ^
						      |
					    Fullstop--+

> +	 */
> +	sme_map_bootdata(real_mode_data);
> +
>  	memcpy(&boot_params, real_mode_data, sizeof boot_params);
>  	sanitize_boot_params(&boot_params);
>  	cmd_line_ptr = get_cmd_line_ptr();

...

> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> index 06235b4..411210d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> @@ -16,8 +16,11 @@
>  
>  #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
>  #include <asm/fixmap.h>
> +#include <asm/setup.h>
> +#include <asm/bootparam.h>
>  
>  extern pmdval_t early_pmd_flags;
> +int __init __early_make_pgtable(unsigned long, pmdval_t);
>  
>  /*
>   * Since sme_me_mask is set early in the boot process it must reside in
> @@ -126,6 +129,59 @@ void __init sme_early_mem_dec(resource_size_t paddr, unsigned long size)
>  	}
>  }
>  
> +static void __init *sme_bootdata_mapping(void *vaddr, unsigned long size)

So this could be called __sme_map_bootdata(). "sme_bootdata_mapping"
doesn't tell me what the function does as there's no verb in the name.

> +{
> +	unsigned long paddr = (unsigned long)vaddr - __PAGE_OFFSET;
> +	pmdval_t pmd_flags, pmd;
> +	void *ret = vaddr;

That *ret --->

> +
> +	/* Use early_pmd_flags but remove the encryption mask */
> +	pmd_flags = early_pmd_flags & ~sme_me_mask;
> +
> +	do {
> +		pmd = (paddr & PMD_MASK) + pmd_flags;
> +		__early_make_pgtable((unsigned long)vaddr, pmd);
> +
> +		vaddr += PMD_SIZE;
> +		paddr += PMD_SIZE;
> +		size = (size < PMD_SIZE) ? 0 : size - PMD_SIZE;

			size <= PMD_SIZE

				looks more obvious to me...

> +	} while (size);
> +
> +	return ret;

---> is simply passing vaddr out. So the function can be just as well be
void and you can do below:

	__sme_map_bootdata(real_mode_data, sizeof(boot_params));

	boot_data = (struct boot_params *)real_mode_data;

	...

> +void __init sme_map_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
> +{
> +	struct boot_params *boot_data;
> +	unsigned long cmdline_paddr;
> +
> +	if (!sme_me_mask)
> +		return;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * The bootdata will not be encrypted, so it needs to be mapped
> +	 * as unencrypted data so it can be copied properly.
> +	 */
> +	boot_data = sme_bootdata_mapping(real_mode_data, sizeof(boot_params));
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Determine the command line address only after having established
> +	 * the unencrypted mapping.
> +	 */
> +	cmdline_paddr = boot_data->hdr.cmd_line_ptr |
> +			((u64)boot_data->ext_cmd_line_ptr << 32);

<---- newline here.

> +	if (cmdline_paddr)
> +		sme_bootdata_mapping(__va(cmdline_paddr), COMMAND_LINE_SIZE);
> +}
> +
> +void __init sme_encrypt_ramdisk(resource_size_t paddr, unsigned long size)
> +{
> +	if (!sme_me_mask)
> +		return;
> +
> +	sme_early_mem_enc(paddr, size);
> +}

So this one could simply be called sme_encrypt_area() and be used for
other things. There's nothing special about encrypting a ramdisk, by the
looks of it.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.

  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-11-17 12:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 156+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-11-10  0:34 [RFC PATCH v3 00/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:34 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:34 ` [RFC PATCH v3 01/20] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:34   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 10:51   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-10 10:51     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-14 17:15     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-14 17:15       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:34 ` [RFC PATCH v3 02/20] x86: Set the write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:34   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 13:14   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-10 13:14     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-11  1:26     ` Kani, Toshimitsu
2016-11-11  1:26       ` Kani, Toshimitsu
     [not found]       ` <1478827480.20881.142.camel-ZPxbGqLxI0U@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-14 16:51         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-14 16:51           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:35 ` [RFC PATCH v3 07/20] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:35   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:36 ` [RFC PATCH v3 08/20] x86: Add support for early encryption/decryption of memory Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:36   ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20161110003610.3280.22043.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-16 10:46     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-16 10:46       ` Borislav Petkov
     [not found]       ` <20161116104656.qz5wp33zzyja373r-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-16 19:22         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-16 19:22           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:36 ` [RFC PATCH v3 09/20] x86: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:36   ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20161110003620.3280.20613.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-17 12:20     ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2016-11-17 12:20       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-19 18:12       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-19 18:12         ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found] ` <20161110003426.3280.2999.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-10  0:34   ` [RFC PATCH v3 03/20] x86: Add the Secure Memory Encryption cpu feature Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:34     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-11 11:53     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-11 11:53       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-10  0:35   ` [RFC PATCH v3 04/20] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:35     ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]     ` <20161110003513.3280.12104.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-15 12:10       ` Joerg Roedel
2016-11-15 12:10         ` Joerg Roedel
2016-11-15 12:14         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-15 12:14           ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-15 14:40           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 14:40             ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]             ` <a4cc5b07-89e1-aaa0-1977-1de95883ba62-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-15 15:33               ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-15 15:33                 ` Borislav Petkov
     [not found]                 ` <20161115153338.a2cxmatnpqcgiaiy-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-15 16:06                   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 16:06                     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 16:33                     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-15 16:33                       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-15 17:08                       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 17:08                         ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]           ` <20161115121456.f4slpk4i2jl3e2ke-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-15 21:22             ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 21:22               ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 21:33               ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-15 21:33                 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-15 22:01                 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 22:01                   ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]         ` <20161115121035.GD24857-zLv9SwRftAIdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-15 14:32           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 14:32             ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:35   ` [RFC PATCH v3 05/20] x86: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:35     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:35   ` [RFC PATCH v3 06/20] x86: Add support to enable SME during early boot processing Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:35     ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]     ` <20161110003543.3280.99623.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-14 17:29       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-14 17:29         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-14 18:18         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-14 18:18           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-14 20:01           ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-14 20:01             ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-10  0:36   ` [RFC PATCH v3 10/20] Add support to access boot related data in the clear Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:36     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-11 16:17     ` Kani, Toshimitsu
2016-11-11 16:17       ` Kani, Toshimitsu
     [not found]       ` <1478880929.20881.148.camel-ZPxbGqLxI0U@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-14 16:24         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-14 16:24           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-17 15:55     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-17 15:55       ` Borislav Petkov
     [not found]       ` <20161117155543.vg3domfqm3bhp4f7-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-19 18:33         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-19 18:33           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-20 23:04           ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-20 23:04             ` Borislav Petkov
     [not found]     ` <20161110003631.3280.73292.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-12-07 13:19       ` Matt Fleming
2016-12-07 13:19         ` Matt Fleming
2016-12-09 14:26         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-12-09 14:26           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:36   ` [RFC PATCH v3 11/20] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:36     ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]     ` <20161110003655.3280.57333.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-17 17:39       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-17 17:39         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-19 18:48         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-19 18:48           ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]           ` <6f1a16e4-5a84-20c0-4bd3-3be5ed933800-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-21  8:27             ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-21  8:27               ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-10  0:37   ` [RFC PATCH v3 12/20] x86: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:37     ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]     ` <20161110003708.3280.29934.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-17 18:09       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-17 18:09         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-19 18:50         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-19 18:50           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:37   ` [RFC PATCH v3 14/20] iommu/amd: Disable AMD IOMMU " Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:37     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-14 16:32     ` Joerg Roedel
2016-11-14 16:32       ` Joerg Roedel
2016-11-14 16:48       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-14 16:48         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:37   ` [RFC PATCH v3 16/20] x86: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:37     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:38   ` [RFC PATCH v3 17/20] x86/kvm: Enable Secure Memory Encryption of nested page tables Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:38     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:38   ` [RFC PATCH v3 18/20] x86: Access the setup data through debugfs un-encrypted Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:38     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:37 ` [RFC PATCH v3 13/20] x86: DMA support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 14:39   ` Radim Krčmář
2016-11-15 14:39     ` Radim Krčmář
2016-11-15 17:02     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 17:02       ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]       ` <d5ebd13d-1278-8714-3f03-8ee7f04a2b38-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-15 18:17         ` Radim Krčmář
2016-11-15 18:17           ` Radim Krčmář
2016-11-15 20:33           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 20:33             ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 15:16   ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-11-15 15:16     ` Michael S. Tsirkin
     [not found]     ` <20161115171443-mutt-send-email-mst-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-15 18:29       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 18:29         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 19:16         ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-11-15 19:16           ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-11-22 11:38         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-22 11:38           ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-22 15:22           ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-11-22 15:22             ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-11-22 15:41             ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-22 15:41               ` Borislav Petkov
     [not found]               ` <20161122154137.z5vp3xcl5cpesuiz-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-22 20:41                 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-11-22 20:41                   ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-11-10  0:37 ` [RFC PATCH v3 15/20] x86: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-22 19:25   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-22 19:25     ` Borislav Petkov
     [not found]     ` <20161122192526.vg63jjhwsbjwex7i-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-29 18:00       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-29 18:00         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 19/20] x86: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:38   ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20161110003826.3280.5546.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-24 12:50     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-24 12:50       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-29 18:40       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-29 18:40         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 20/20] " Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10  0:38   ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20161110003838.3280.23327.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-22 18:58     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-22 18:58       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-26 20:47   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-26 20:47     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-29 18:48     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-29 18:48       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-29 19:56       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-29 19:56         ` Borislav Petkov

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